The Five Things Turned Over Again

The Determination of the Bodhisattva Ground, part two. Further, the summary verse says: investigation, own nature, grasping; the view of self, existence, the world; reality, search, and the knowledge of things as they are; hidden intent, and order. Of these five things, how many are included in the truths? Characteristic is included in the four truths as conventionally set out. A name is included in one truth, the truth of suffering. Discrimination is included in three truths, cessation excepted. Suchness is included in the four truths as not conventionally set out. And correct knowledge is included in the truth of the path that takes as its object both the truths as conventionally set out and the truth not so set out.

Are all characteristics names, and are all names characteristics? All names are characteristics, but there are characteristics that are not names, namely the four characteristics other than the characteristic of name. The rest should be known to be the same, each according to its case. Are all characteristics the characteristic of characteristic, and is every characteristic of characteristic a characteristic? Every characteristic of characteristic is a characteristic, but there are characteristics that are not the characteristic of characteristic, namely the four beginning with name. If one discriminates the characteristic of characteristic, must the characteristic of name in every case be joined with it and depended upon for the discrimination? And if one discriminates the characteristic of name, must the characteristic of characteristic in every case be joined and depended upon? Four alternatives should be made. There is discriminating the characteristic of characteristic without the characteristic of name being joined and depended upon: when the discrimination does not know the name belonging to that characteristic, and when the latent tendency of names has already been pulled out from characteristics. There is discriminating the characteristic of name without the characteristic of characteristic being joined and depended upon: when the discrimination does not know the thing that name belongs to. The contrary of the above is the alternative in which both hold. And excluding all the characteristics just spoken of is the alternative in which neither holds.

If one contemplates suchness, is one beholding suchness? And if one beholds suchness, is one contemplating it? Four alternatives should be made. There is contemplating suchness without beholding suchness: contemplating suchness by an attention in accordance with reason that is included under discrimination, whereby one sees only the characteristic of suchness and not the real suchness — up until one has reached the stage of true penetration, and after penetration whenever one attends to the suchness that is conventionally set out. There is beholding suchness without contemplating suchness: at the moment of penetrating suchness, when by the ultimate one contemplates its characteristic. There is contemplating suchness that is also beholding it: after penetration, continuing to contemplate the suchness that is not conventionally set out. And there is neither contemplating suchness nor beholding it: contemplating characteristics by an attention other than the one reason draws forth.

If one contemplates a characteristic, is one beholding that characteristic? And if one beholds a characteristic, is one contemplating it? Four alternatives should be made. There is contemplating a characteristic without beholding it — the second alternative above. There is beholding a characteristic without contemplating it — the first alternative above. There is contemplating a characteristic that is also beholding it — the fourth alternative above. And there is neither contemplating a characteristic nor beholding it — the third alternative above. Do these five things include all phenomena, or not? They do. And with what should it be said that all those phenomena have as their own nature? The own nature of things cannot be spoken.

How should one look at the characteristics of those things? Like the appearance of a conjured display, which is not wholly non-existent. Just as a conjured display has the nature of a conjured display, while having no nature of elephant, horse, chariot, infantry, jewel, pearl, gold, or silver. In just this way, the substance of these things offers nothing to be found except name and characteristic, and nothing to be found of an own nature or of differences, set up and made to appear. A characteristic, by way of the characteristic and by way of its name, seems present, but the own nature of characteristic is really not to be found. As with characteristic, so should it be understood of name and its own nature, of discrimination and its own nature, and of suchness and its own nature. Correct knowledge, by way of the name correct knowledge, seems present, but the own nature of correct knowledge is really not to be found. Why so? Because in every case a nature that follows upon words is not established.

If one holds that the own natures of characteristics are established and that provisional names are assigned so as to match their measure, this provisional naming being founded upon the characteristic — then before a name has been assigned to a characteristic there ought to be the corresponding awareness of it, just as there is once the name has been assigned. Further, since the names assigned to one characteristic are many and carry various senses, there ought to be many different substances. Therefore that names are founded upon characteristics does not stand to reason. If one holds that characteristics are established after names, the own nature of a characteristic arising by the force of the name — then before the name has been assigned that characteristic ought to have no own nature; and since it does not exist, the provisional name ought not to exist either, so that both are ruined together. Further, since provisional names are many and carry various senses, there ought to be many different substances. Further, there is the fault of dependence on another, since those characteristics would be provisionally established merely in dependence on something else. Therefore that everything provisionally named is as its own nature is named does not stand to reason. It is like the various conjured kinds a conjurer raises: as a conjurer produces conjured persons of every sort — men, women, elephants, horses, bears, brown bears — and those kinds have no real substance answering to the appearance they wear.

In just this way, these characteristics do not have real substance answering to their names; it should be understood likewise. If one holds that apart from that characteristic and that name an own nature is born from the meeting of the two, then it ought to appear and be found in the characteristics, or in the name, or between the two — and it is not found. Therefore this reckoning does not stand to reason. And for this reason, a nature that follows upon words has in every case no existence whatever. If one holds that names are able to light up own natures, this too does not stand to reason. For whether the characteristic is taken up or not taken up before the provisional name is assigned, either way there is a fault: if the characteristic is taken up and the name assigned afterward, nothing is lit up; and if the name is assigned without the characteristic being taken up, a name with no thing behind it does not stand to reason. Further, as was said before, since the names assigned are many and carry various senses, there would be many different substances, which is a grave fault. And further, the simile of illumination is not parallel, so the position does not stand to reason. It is not parallel in this: the causal condition that illuminates makes no distinction among all the things it lights, and so with the many sorts of illumination. But the causal condition that takes something up — a name — is not like that.

Objection: within what cannot be spoken, the words "cannot be spoken" are right here to be had; therefore that the nature of things cannot be spoken does not stand to reason. And: as for the conjured shapes a conjurer produces, though those shapes are not as their nature appears, there are still the acts of conjuring that produce them, and these are as their own nature is; therefore the simile is not parallel either. Answer: at the moment the thesis was set up, the words "cannot be spoken" were themselves already ruled out. It is in order to make this sense known that similes and the like are provisionally set up, and so it is not a case of non-resemblance. Though what is provisionally named is not as that name has it, the meaning that cannot be spoken is not therefore non-existent. Objection: if characteristics and things come to be when a provisional name is assigned and do not come to be when none is assigned, then the simile would be parallel and the reckoning of the unsayable would stand to reason; if not, that reckoning is thrown away for nothing. Answer: in this way, because of the eight discriminations previously raised, three kinds of thing arise in the present world, as the Basic Section has already described their characteristics. And because of these three kinds of thing so produced, discrimination arises again. By this principle the defiled phenomena continue one after another without a break, and by this the simile does resemble. When what discrimination has provisionally set up is cut off, the defiled phenomena can all cease along with it, and the wisdom of the noble ones is realized. Since this is directly known, the reckoning of the unsayable is not thrown away for nothing.

Objection: if at that moment everything provisionally set up by discrimination is entirely cut off, then at that same moment characteristics and things are swept away with it. If so, then as soon as any single person attains the wisdom of a noble one, all the sentient and insentient beings and all the inner and outer things included under characteristic, name, and discrimination ought to perish forever, as with the show a conjurer makes. Answer: characteristics and the rest arise either with uncommon discrimination as their cause or with common discrimination as their cause. If a thing has arisen from uncommon discrimination, then for one who is without discrimination it too ceases along with him. If it has arisen from common discrimination, then although his discrimination is gone, it does not perish forever, being sustained by the discrimination of others; were it not so, the discrimination of others would have no fruit. And though they do not perish, one who has attained purity has, with regard to those things, a right view that is pure. It is as when many practitioners of contemplation, upon one and the same thing, arrive at various resolutions and different ways of seeing through the knowledge of a concentrated mind; so it is here as well.

Of these five things, how many are what is grasped and how many what grasps? Three are what is grasped. Discrimination and correct knowledge are both what grasps and what is grasped. Of these five things, how many fields should be known that grasping ranges over? In brief there are three: the field with words and with characteristics; the field without words but with characteristics; and the field with neither words nor characteristics. Of these, the first is the field grasping ranges over for one in whom speech is presently awake; the second, for one in whom speech is only latent; and the third, for one who has separated from the latency of speech. Further, the first two are grasping at the level of conventional truth, and the last is grasping at the level of ultimate truth. And further, there is the grasping subsequently attained by one who has separated from the latency of speech, which grasps across everything included under both truths as the field it ranges over. That is, since the knowledge at once worldly and transcendent ranges over the truths as conventionally set out, that knowledge is established as using both truths for its field. These two graspings should be known to be established as worldly and transcendent by two causes: by what was attained before and what was not attained before, and by depending on speech and not depending on speech.

Grasping with characteristics is held in common by the world; grasping without characteristics is not. What cause and condition make it grasping without characteristics? To have no cause and no condition does not stand to reason. Answer: the fruit of grasping produced by the perfuming of conventional naming is grasping with characteristics, held in common by the world, and makes for defilement; the fruit of grasping produced by the perfuming of ultimate knowledge and vision is grasping without characteristics, not held in common, and makes for purity. Therefore both have a cause and a condition. It is as when the eye has the fault of a cataract and the film-marks of hairs and wheels appear before it and can be found, whereas without that fault they cannot be found, and there is only the taking of the thing's own nature without inversion. If within the realm without characteristics one grasps a characteristic, that is not grasping without characteristics; and if one grasps nothing at all, that too fails to be it. Then why is it called grasping without characteristics? Because the latency of speech has been left behind, this grasping, though it takes the realm without characteristics, does not take a characteristic, and so becomes grasping without characteristics. If there is no acquiring, how does it become grasping? Though it does not acquire the differences among characteristics or add anything to them, it takes what is without characteristics, and so becomes grasping. If there is no acquiring and nothing added, how can the shape of this grasping be known? Because it takes the ultimate and takes what is without characteristics, its shape is that the characteristics of the five kinds of thing do not appear at all. If it cannot be clearly established as grasping, why not allow that graspings have ceased into nothing? Because in what has ceased into nothing there is no sense of practice to be done, and one who cultivates contemplation does not practice upon a mere nothing. Then how is its shape realized and known? By the knowledge that realizes it within oneself.

In that case, why does one not report what one realized just as one realized it? Because this inward realization is not a place where names can find their footing. If there was previously no knowledge of what is without characteristics, then there was also no repeated practice of it; and having never been practiced, that knowledge has no cause and ought not to arise. Answer: what has characteristics can also be a cause of what is without them, since it accords with it. As worldly knowledge is the condition from which transcendent knowledge arises, as knowledge with outflow is the condition from which uncontaminated knowledge arises, and as an absorption with mind is the condition from which the absorption without mind arises, so it is here. The knowledges of suffering and the rest the Blessed One declared to be the cause of attaining purity. But if the knowledge of suffering discriminates suffering within the truth of suffering, it must have characteristics; and if it does not discriminate, those knowledges do not exist, and how then is final purity attained? Answer: it is by the enhancing force of the knowledge without characteristics that a supremely purified discriminating knowledge, at once worldly and transcendent, arises with regard to the truths, and that is what is meant by saying the afflictions to be abandoned have been abandoned. That knowledge without characteristics is the cause of the knowledges of suffering and the rest, and it is what actually severs the afflictions to be abandoned; the name of the fruit is provisionally assigned to this cause, and so it is provisionally called the knowledge of suffering and the rest. Therefore there is no fault. It was said earlier that what is grasped is the fruit of what grasps; of what then is this grasping the fruit? These two are the fruit of one another in turn.

If the objects one knows are impermanent, accumulated, continuous, immeasurable, and for the most part not directly seen, how can one who cultivates contemplation take them as object and bring about their ceasing? Answer: by the enhancing force of hearing and reflecting upon them he attains concentration; and by that cause the images of the five kinds of object appear within the concentration, and he takes just those things as his objective sphere, and by sweeping them away they come to cease. When the five kinds of knowable object have been swept away, what characteristic should this be said to have? It has the unsurpassed turning of the basis, unconditioned nirvāṇa, for its characteristic. What is nirvāṇa? It is the purity of the sphere of phenomena, the sense in which the afflictions and the mass of suffering are stilled forever; it is not the sense of extinction into nothing. If it is only the eternal stilling of the afflictions and the mass of suffering that is called nirvāṇa, on what grounds is it not the sense of extinction into nothing? As with the water element outside: only by leaving turbidity behind does it attain clarity, and it is not that when turbidity is left behind there is no clarity. As with true gold: only by leaving hardness behind does it attain malleability, and it is not that when hardness is gone there is no malleability. As with empty space: only when the obscuration of clouds and mist is stilled does it attain purity, and it is not that when they are gone its purity is nowhere to be found. The principle here should be known to be the same. What is called the purity of the sphere of phenomena? By cultivating correct knowledge one removes all characteristics forever and realizes suchness. It is like a man who in a dream sees his own body swept away and drowned in a great torrent; wishing to cross it, he rouses great effort, and just because he roused great effort he suddenly wakes; and having woken, he sees nothing whatever of that torrent. The principle by which characteristics are removed should be known to be the same.

Are the characteristics swept away at the very moment the latency of speech is being severed, or only after the severing is complete? Answer: the time of severing and the time of sweeping away are exactly equal, on the principle of the two ends of a balance. And as with a painted image, when the pigments are ruined the figure vanishes with them. And as when the fault of a cataract is healed, the marks of hairs and wheels are swept away with it, the time of healing and the time of sweeping away being exactly equal. The principle here should be known to be the same. How does one who cultivates contemplation sweep away the characteristics of his object? By a rightly concentrated mind he first examines carefully the images of the objects he knows; and afterward, by the force of attention directed to the ultimate, he turns away from what has characteristics and turns to what is without them. This turn to characteristiclessness has, further, five stages: the stage of a small portion, the stage of full pervasion, the stage that still wavers, the stage that still requires effort, and the stage of completion.

What is the characteristic of this completion? Because one is no longer intruded upon by any affliction or any calamity, and is the final untroubled and purified support, it is called completion. And this same completion is what a thoroughly purified real meaning ranges over, what all direct perception ranges over, and what all mastery ranges over. How many vehicles are established upon this completion, and by what time is it realized? Three vehicles are established, according to the difference of three kinds of faculty in those who realize it. But those two vehicles take the vehicle of unsurpassed complete awakening as their root. And since for those two vehicles the differences of condition and the ripening are not fixed, the length of time for realization is not fixed either. The last vehicle can be realized only after three incalculable great eons, on account of the difference among three kinds of heaviness to be severed. What are the three? First, the heaviness lodged in the skin, of the class of the unpleasant in the lower destinies; by severing it one does not go to the lower destinies, and when cultivating preparatory effort one is not intruded upon by anything unpleasant. Second, the heaviness lodged in the flesh, of the class of the obstruction of the afflictions; by severing it even the subtlest afflictions of every kind no longer become active, though the latent tendencies are not yet all destroyed. Third, the heaviness lodged in the heart, of the class of the obstruction to what is knowable; by severing it one destroys forever every latent tendency there is, and unobstructed knowledge proceeds with mastery throughout the whole field of the knowable.

Further, how is the śrāvaka vehicle established? By three causes: by manifestation, by vow, and by nature. By manifestation: according to the strength of what each sort of being is to be trained by, the Tathāgata manifests a manifested śrāvaka. By vow: there is a person who has already made a vow directed to the śrāvaka vehicle, and just so he is established as a śrāvaka. By nature: there is a person whose compassion has been thin and weak from the beginning and who is deeply afraid of things that involve suffering; by these two causes he does not greatly delight in benefiting others and does not for that sake willingly stay in birth and death; because he abides in this nature he is established as a śrāvaka. And further by awakening to that nature: within the truths as conventionally set out he for the most part cultivates a practice governed by fear, and by this cause attains completion. As with the śrāvaka vehicle, so with the solitary realizer; the difference is that he appears in an age without a buddha and realizes awakening there. And by the three causes contrary to the above, the bodhisattva should be known. Further, how does a śrāvaka ruin the true teaching and the discipline? There are śrāvakas who reckon that what is called quiescence is merely the absence of the burning of the afflictions, and conceive a great fear of it, thinking: I shall be cut off, I shall be destroyed forever, I shall not exist. It is like a man afflicted with a fever who has no way of recognizing what health would be, and supposes that when the illness is cured his whole body will perish with it, and becomes afraid, thinking, I would rather not be rid of this fever — that is called ruin. By this simile, the śrāvaka who ruins the teaching should be known to be the same. Further, how does a bodhisattva ruin the Great Vehicle? There are bodhisattvas who, hearing that all phenomena are profoundly without nature, cling to the view that the burning of the afflictions is of itself originally non-existent, and suppose they have no grave sickness of birth and death. It is like a man who, with a fever arisen in his own body, declares he has no illness, and so cannot be freed from that fever — that is called ruin. By this simile, the bodhisattva who ruins the Great Vehicle should be known to be the same.

Of these five things, how many are the view of a real self and how many are not? Characteristic runs through both; two are the view of a real self; one is not; and of suchness neither can be said. As with the view of a real self, so should it be understood of existence and of the world. Of these five things and the four realities, which things include how many realities? The reality established by the world and the reality established by reasoning are included in three of the things. The reality that the knowledge purified of the obstruction of the afflictions ranges over and the reality that the knowledge purified of the obstruction to what is knowable ranges over are included in two. Of these five things and the four searches, which things include how many searches? Discrimination joined to attention in accordance with reason includes all four. Of these five things and the four kinds of thorough knowledge of things as they are, which things include how many? All of them are included in correct knowledge.

With what hidden intent did the Blessed One say that all phenomena are without two? Just with reference to these five things as set out: by their conventional nature they are said to be without own nature, and by their several particular characteristics they are said to have own nature. With what hidden intent did the Blessed One say that all phenomena are without own nature? Three kinds of absence of own nature are taught according to the capacity of those to be trained: absence of own nature in respect of characteristic, in respect of arising, and in respect of the ultimate. What is the absence of own nature in respect of characteristic? The conventionally spoken nature of all phenomena. What is the absence of own nature in respect of arising? All conditioned things are produced by a coming together of conditions and exist by the force of conditions, not of themselves; therefore it is so called. What is the absence of own nature in respect of the ultimate? It is that which the aspect of real meaning has left behind, and by reference to the ultimate this is said to be without own nature. It is like a monk cultivating contemplation who forms a provisional resolve upon a great heap of bones and cannot sweep it away, and in whom the notion that this heap of bones is without own nature in respect of the ultimate runs on without interruption. Thus should the absence of own nature in respect of the ultimate be known. Among these five things, it is not by the absence of own nature in respect of characteristic that they are said to be without own nature; it is by the absence of own nature in respect of arising and in respect of the ultimate that they are said, each according to its case, to be without own nature. That is, characteristic, name, discrimination, and correct knowledge are all so by those two. Suchness is not said to be without own nature by any absence of own nature. Therefore the Blessed One, with this hidden intent, spoke thus in verse: I teach one truth, and there is no second.

With what hidden intent did the Blessed One say that all phenomena are unborn and unceasing, quiescent from the beginning, and of their own nature nirvāṇa? He said this with reference to the absence of own nature in respect of characteristic. With what hidden intent did he say that all phenomena are equal to space? This too he said with reference to the absence of own nature in respect of characteristic. With what hidden intent did he say that all phenomena are like an illusion and the rest? He said this with reference to the absence of own nature in respect of arising and the absence of own nature in respect of the ultimate. With what hidden intent did he say that contemplating form and so on through consciousness, wholly or in part, one finds them impermanent? He said this with reference to the absence of own nature in respect of characteristic. Why so? Because wishing to say that in such contemplation nothing permanent is to be found, he said that in such contemplation they are impermanent. With what hidden intent did he say that contemplating form and so on through consciousness one finds them all painful? He said this with reference to the absence of own nature in respect of arising and the absence of own nature in respect of the ultimate. With what hidden intent did he say that contemplating those same aggregates one finds them all empty? Just with reference to the absence of own nature in respect of arising and the absence of own nature in respect of the ultimate, phenomena having left the absence of own nature in respect of characteristic behind. And as their being empty is spoken of by way of their having left something behind, so their being without self is spoken of by way of their being of a different aspect; this should be known to work the same way.

With what hidden intent did the Blessed One say that when form and so on through consciousness are contemplated in accordance with reason and thought over carefully, one comes to see that they do not appear as existing? He said this with reference to the absence of own nature in respect of characteristic. With what hidden intent did he say that they appear falsely and unreally? He said this with reference to the absence of own nature in respect of arising and the absence of own nature in respect of the ultimate. With what hidden intent did he say this: therefore one should now know this place, where the eye is forever stilled and separated from the notion of form, and so on until the mind is forever stilled and separated from the notion of phenomena? He said this without reference to any absence of own nature. With what hidden intent did he say that, by that, in every place one dismisses every notion, so that even Śakra and the other gods cannot know upon what basis such a one has entered absorption? He said this without reference to any absence of own nature. With what hidden intent did he say that in a form cognized by the eye, and so on to a phenomenon cognized by the mind, answering to a place of joy or sorrow or equanimity, there is no truth, no reality, no absence of inversion, and no non-inversion — and yet also say that there is a transcendent truth of the noble ones? He said this both with reference to all the absences of own nature and without reference to any absence of own nature. With what hidden intent did he say that the objective range of one who cultivates absorption, and the buddhas and the objective range of buddhas, are all inconceivable? He said this both with reference to all the absences of own nature and without reference to any absence of own nature.

Of these five things, on what grounds is characteristic established first and correct knowledge established last? Because if there were no thing, it would not stand to reason to set up a name, and so in this order a name is set up. And because there is a name, an own nature is set up and differences are set up, and so in this order discrimination is set up. And because of discrimination, one discriminates now a characteristic, now a name, now both together. By these three the defiled side is displayed in its complete order. Only from there does it become possible to cultivate the purified side: contemplating the suchness of all those defiled things, and by correct knowledge being able to contemplate rightly, one attains purity. By these two the purified side is displayed in its complete order. Therefore this order is shown. Within the section on the real, the determination of the things has been given. One who wishes to know the real should further cultivate contemplation upon the three natures. The summary verse says: a general statement, then distinguishing them one by one; what each takes as object, the differences, what they rest upon; also the subtle clinging; and the imputed nature that follows names and the rest. What are called the three natures? First, the nature that is pervasively imputed; second, the nature that arises in dependence on other things; third, the nature that is perfectly accomplished. What is the nature that is pervasively imputed? The nature established by following speech and relying on provisional naming. What is the nature that arises in dependence on other things? The nature produced from a coming together of conditions. What is the nature that is perfectly accomplished? The suchness of phenomena, which is what the knowledge of the noble ones ranges over, the objective sphere of that knowledge, and what it takes as object; and which is able to bring one to the attainment of purity, able to release one from every bond of characteristics and every bond of heaviness, and able also to draw forth every good quality.

Through what should the pervasively imputed nature be known as its condition? Through the binding together of characteristic and name. Through what should the nature that arises in dependence on other things be known as its condition? Through the clinging to the pervasively imputed nature. Through what should the perfectly accomplished nature be known as its condition? Through the pervasively imputed nature being, within the nature that arises in dependence on other things, finally unreal. In another scripture the Blessed One said that this nature should be known through not clinging to the pervasively imputed nature; but that was said with reference to the attainment of purity, not with reference to characteristics. Here, in the present sense, it should be understood as said with reference to characteristics. How many kinds does the pervasively imputed nature have? In brief, five: imputing the meaning as an own nature, imputing the name as an own nature, imputing the defiled as an own nature, imputing the purified as an own nature, and imputing what is neither defiled nor purified as an own nature.

What is imputing the meaning as an own nature? There are four kinds: imputing an own characteristic, imputing a characteristic of difference, imputing the characteristic of what is grasped, and imputing the characteristic of what grasps. Imputing an own characteristic means imputing that this thing is the own nature of form, and so on to consciousness; that this thing is the own nature of the eye, and so on to a phenomenon. Imputing a characteristic of difference means imputing that this form is agreeable, disagreeable, or neither; visible or invisible; resistant or unresistant; with outflow or without; conditioned or unconditioned — and by reasoning of this sort, imputing all the differences this form has. As with form, so should it be understood of the remaining aggregates, of all the sense fields, and of the rest. Imputing the characteristic of what is grasped means imputing that this form is what the eye grasps, and this what the ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind grasp; and further, imputing that this feeling, perception, formation, and consciousness are what a desire-realm mind grasps, what a form-realm mind grasps, what a formless-realm mind grasps, and what an unbound mind grasps. Imputing the characteristic of what grasps means imputing that this form is what grasps form, and that this form is what grasps sound, smell, taste, touch, and phenomena; and further, imputing that this feeling, perception, formation, and consciousness are what grasps form, and what grasps sound, smell, taste, touch, and phenomena. What is imputing the name as an own nature? There are two kinds: without difference and with difference. Without difference means imputing the names that belong to all phenomena alike. With difference means imputing that this is named form, this is named feeling, this is named perception, this is named formation, this is named consciousness — and terms of that sort, the separate names belonging severally to phenomena immeasurable and innumerable in their differences.

What is imputing the defiled as an own nature? Imputing that this form has greed, hatred, and delusion, cannot get free of their bondage, and is unaccompanied by faith and all the wholesome states. And further, imputing that this feeling, this perception, this formation, this consciousness have greed, hatred, and delusion, cannot get free of their bondage, and are unaccompanied by faith and all the wholesome states. What is imputing the purified as an own nature? Its characteristic should be known as the contrary of the above. What is imputing what is neither defiled nor purified as an own nature? Imputing that this form is what is grasped and this is what grasps; that this feeling, perception, formation, and consciousness are what is grasped and this is what grasps. And further, within all indeterminate phenomena, imputing whatever indeterminate phenomena there are. Further, it should be known that the pervasively imputed nature has five more kinds: imputing a meaning by way of a name, imputing a name by way of a meaning, imputing a name by way of a name, imputing a meaning by way of a meaning, and imputing both by way of both. What is imputing a meaning by way of a name? Imputing that this name for a thing that is form has a real nature of form, and that these names for things that are feeling, perception, formation, and consciousness have real natures of feeling, perception, formation, and consciousness. What is imputing a name by way of a meaning? Imputing that this thing is named form, or is not named form; that this thing is named feeling, perception, formation, and consciousness, or is not so named. What is imputing a name by way of a name? Not understanding the thing that is form, one discriminates the name of form and raises an imputation; not understanding the things that are feeling, perception, formation, and consciousness, one discriminates their names and raises imputations.

What is imputing a meaning by way of a meaning? Not understanding the name of form, one discriminates the thing that is form by way of what one does not name, and raises an imputation; and not understanding the names of feeling, perception, formation, and consciousness, one discriminates those things by way of what one does not name, and raises imputations. What is imputing both by way of both? Imputing that this thing is the own nature of form and naming it form; that this thing is the own nature of feeling, perception, formation, and consciousness and naming it feeling, perception, formation, and consciousness. Further, the clinging to the pervasively imputed nature should be known to be, in brief, of two kinds: clinging that comes with effort, and clinging that comes with the assigning of names. The clinging that comes with effort should be known to have five kinds: through the effort of craving; through the effort of hatred; through the effort of bringing together; through the effort of parting; and through the effort of indifferently going along. The clinging that comes with the assigning of names should be known to have two kinds: what is not made of words, and what is made of words. What is not made of words means clinging in the form: what is this thing? how does this thing come about? what is this thing in particular? and how does that come about? What is made of words means clinging in the form: this is this thing, and this thing is thus — form, or so on to consciousness, or conditioned, or unconditioned, or permanent, or impermanent, or wholesome, or unwholesome, or indeterminate, and the like.

Further, subtle clinging should be known to be of five kinds: clinging to the permanent in what is impermanent; clinging to the pleasant in what is painful; clinging to the pure in what is impure; clinging to a self in what has no self; and clinging, within all characteristics, to the pervasively imputed nature. Further, by five causes it should be known that the fool, following names and following speech, clings to what those words point to as having a real own nature. How so? Suppose someone asks: what does this thing have as its own nature? And he answers: this thing has the own nature of form, not the name of form. Or he answers: this thing has the own nature of feeling, perception, formation, and consciousness, not their names. Further, dwelling alone in a quiet place and diligently examining the own characteristics and shared characteristics of things, he searches out that this thing is the characteristic of form, not the name of form; or that this thing is the characteristic of feeling, perception, formation, and consciousness, not their names. Further, when he seeks the characteristic of form in this thing that is form and cannot get it, displeasure arises; not so when he seeks the name of form and cannot get it. Or when he seeks the characteristics of feeling, perception, formation, and consciousness in these things and cannot get them, displeasure arises; not so when he seeks their names and cannot get them.

Further, speech runs upon names and a name runs upon a meaning. Here, if a name makes manifest the meaning that is an own characteristic, it does not make manifest the meaning that is a characteristic of difference, nor that which is the characteristic of what is grasped, nor that which is the characteristic of what grasps; or if a name makes manifest the meaning that is the characteristic of what grasps, it does not make manifest the others down to the own characteristic. If that same name ran upon the meaning that is an own characteristic and also upon the meaning that is the characteristic of what grasps, then all these other names, each understood separately and running upon its own meaning, could not be had. This does not stand to reason. Then, among the names that run each upon its separate meaning, if a name runs upon the meaning that is an own characteristic, and so on to one that runs upon the characteristic of what grasps — does this name run upon something that exists, or upon something that does not? That it runs upon something that exists does not stand to reason; why it does not was already argued in the examination of the five things. And if it runs upon something that does not exist, then it follows that this name runs upon a meaning that has no characteristic, and there the reasoning arrives. And if it runs upon a meaning that has no characteristic, then this non-existent meaning can only make manifest what one has oneself added; and to take up what one has added is precisely to cling. Therefore that the fool, following names and following speech, clings to an own nature in what those words point to, is a conclusion that stands. Further, all fools are bound by naming within all characteristics, and so it should be known that, following names and following speech, they falsely cling to an own nature in what those words point to. How is it known that they are bound by naming within all characteristics? By reasoning and by scripture. How by reasoning? Because apart from naming no delight is to be had in things, whereas where naming accompanies them delight is to be had in things; that is one reason. Further, because the two arise in dependence on each other. Why? Because with a thing as its support a name comes to be, and with a name as its support a thing can come to be. That is: the world must have a thing to depend on before the discrimination of naming arises, and does not raise such discrimination where there is no thing; so with a thing as support, a name comes to be. And as when one who cultivates absorption, inwardly absorbed, directs attention and thinks according to a name held in mind, and just so an image of the same kind as the thing to be known arises, running forward by that means and standing present before him; so with a name as support, a thing can come to be.

Further, when one cultivates the counteragent to naming: if one settles the mind in the realm without characteristics, no characteristic whatever appears before it; and if one does not settle the mind in the realm without characteristics, then it does not go as one wishes, and the characteristics carry the mind off and turn it about. By this reasoning it should be known that within characteristics, naming is a bond. And how by scripture? As the Blessed One said: the fool who thinks in ignorance is bound by words within characteristics; the Sage is released from the bond of words and has mastery within characteristics. One who dwells in a purified seeing abides in true knowledge; he attains nothing of an own nature, and does not see what that own nature was resting on. Because the true knowledge is purified, he is called truly luminous; because he is joined to neither of the two clingings, he is called the one without two. Further, it is as with an ordinary person who understands well that there is no self within the aggregates: though he contemplates that the self set up within the aggregates is only provisionally there, it is not the case that clinging to a self does not go on arising in him, since the latent tendency to it has not been cut off for good. The principle here should be known to be the same.