Naturelessness and Direct Realization
Three chapters meet in this fascicle, and the treatise changes register twice. The chapter on emptiness ends with practice — eighteen kinds of cultivation, sorted at the last into two, poisoned and unpoisoned, according to whether "I" and "mine" are still mixed into them. Then comes the chapter on naturelessness, the densest piece of Yogācāra argument in the treatise: the imagined nature is shown to have no substance at all, on the ground that nothing falls outside the five categories and a name is only a guest in the object it names; the dependent nature is shown nevertheless to be, on the ground that a fiction needs something real to be a fiction of; and the perfectly accomplished nature is identified with the ultimate. Last, the chapter on direct realization opens, and the questions become procedural — what is realized, by what knowledge, where, by whom, in what order, and what exactly is cut when the three fetters are cut.
Where This Fascicle Picks Up
Fascicle 15 established the second and third of the four theses — that what is impermanent is suffering, and that what is suffering is empty — and broke off inside the chapter on emptiness, having just given the six confusions and the eight knowledges. What remains of that chapter is short: how emptiness is cultivated, and what cultivating it yields. The fourth thesis, selflessness, is not given a chapter of its own; instead the chapter on naturelessness takes it up in the Mahāyāna key, as the selflessness of things rather than of persons.
Collating against T1603 gives four verse lines in the remainder of the chapter on emptiness, forty-eight in the chapter on naturelessness, and thirty-eight in the first part of the chapter on direct realization — matching line for line in every case. Four single-character variants fall in this fascicle, and one of them is unusually informative: it is the first place in the treatise where the verse-only text preserves the better reading and T1602's own prose says so. All four are noted below where they fall.
Classical text is set in the left-hand column, our English in the right. See also this site's note on translation method.
1. Eighteen Kinds of Cultivation
論曰：如是空理，依修故證。云何為修？頌曰：
修差別十八， 或有毒無毒，
對治五種執， 略二種應知。
論曰：修相差別有十八種。
一聲聞相應作意修，謂如有一是聲聞住聲聞法性，或未入正性離生、或已入正性離生，唯觀自利不觀利他，依安立諦作意門入真如理，自內緣有分量法，起厭離無欲解脫行，為盡自愛作意修習，是名聲聞相應作意修。
二菩薩作意修，謂如有一是菩薩住菩薩法性，或未入正性離生、或已入正性離生，觀自他俱利，依安立非安立諦作意門入真如理，自內緣無分量法，大悲增上故起利益他攝受方便行，履無上迹因，為盡自他愛作意修習，是名菩薩作意修。
The exposition: this principle of emptiness is realized in dependence on cultivation. What is cultivation?
Cultivation is distinguished as eighteen;
it may be poisoned or unpoisoned;
it counteracts five kinds of grasping;
in brief it should be known as two.
The exposition: the marks of cultivation are distinguished as eighteen kinds.
First, the cultivation of attention associated with the śrāvakas. Suppose someone is a śrāvaka abiding in the śrāvaka nature, whether he has not yet entered the certainty of rightness or has already entered it. He observes only his own benefit and not the benefit of others; through the gate of attention that rests on the conceptually established truths he enters the principle of suchness; inwardly he takes as object things that have measure; he gives rise to the practice of weariness, absence of craving, and liberation; and he cultivates attention in order to exhaust his love of self. This is called the cultivation of attention associated with the śrāvakas.
Second, the cultivation of a bodhisattva's attention. Suppose someone is a bodhisattva abiding in the bodhisattva nature, whether he has not yet entered the certainty of rightness or has already entered it. He observes the benefit of himself and of others alike; through the gate of attention that rests on both the conceptually established and the non-conceptually established truths he enters the principle of suchness; inwardly he takes as object things that are without measure; because great compassion is dominant in him he gives rise to skillful practices that benefit and gather in others; he treads the causes that lead to the unsurpassed; and he cultivates attention in order to exhaust the love of self and of others. This is called the cultivation of a bodhisattva's attention.
三影像作意修，謂或思惟有分別毘鉢舍那品三摩地所行本境界法同分影像，或復思惟無分別奢摩他品三摩地所行本境界法同分影像，如是修習名為影像作意修。
四事究竟作意修，謂思惟諸法，若過去若未來若現在、若內若外、若麁若細、若遠若近，或復思惟諸法真如盡諸所有、如諸所有，如是修習，是名事究竟作意修。
五事成就修，謂已證得根本靜慮及世出世三摩鉢底，如是修習是名事成就修。
六得修，謂如有一依初靜慮，或修習無常想，或乃至修習死想時，此人所有不現在前所餘善想，若自地攝若下地攝，及彼所引世及出世所有功德，皆悉修習令其轉增，猛利清淨當得生起，證得彼法自在成就，是名得修。
七習修，謂如有一，現前思惟彼彼諸法起無常等所有善想，及現修習諸餘善法，如是修習是名習修。
八除遣修，謂如有一，思惟三摩地所行影像相故除遣諸法根本性相令不復現，依以榍出榍道理。猶如有人以其細榍除遣麁榍，或以身安遣身麁重。如前已說，是名除遣修。
九對治修，謂思惟修習厭壞對治、斷對治、持對治、遠分對治，是名對治修。此中聞思所生道是厭壞對治，出世間道是斷對治，彼果轉依是持對治，世間修慧道是遠分對治。
Third, the cultivation of attention to an image: one contemplates the image corresponding to the underlying object, ranged over by concentration of the insight class and accompanied by discrimination; or else one contemplates the image corresponding to the underlying object, ranged over by concentration of the calm-abiding class and free of discrimination. Cultivating thus is called the cultivation of attention to an image.
Fourth, the cultivation of attention that exhausts the matter: one contemplates things past, future, and present, inner and outer, coarse and fine, far and near; or else one contemplates the suchness of things, both in all that they are and as they are. Cultivating thus is called the cultivation of attention that exhausts the matter.
Fifth, the cultivation in which the matter is accomplished: one has already realized the fundamental absorptions and the attainments both worldly and transcendent. Cultivating thus is called the cultivation in which the matter is accomplished.
Sixth, the cultivation of acquisition. Suppose someone, in dependence on the first absorption, cultivates the notion of impermanence, or on up to the notion of death. Whatever other wholesome notions that person has which are not presently before him, whether comprised in his own level or in a lower level, together with all the qualities they draw forth, worldly and transcendent — all of these are cultivated and made to increase, so that they will arise keen and pure and he will realize mastery in those things. This is called the cultivation of acquisition.
Seventh, the cultivation of practice. Suppose someone, right before him, contemplates this and that thing and gives rise to the wholesome notion of impermanence and the rest, and presently cultivates the other wholesome things as well. Cultivating thus is called the cultivation of practice.
Eighth, the cultivation of removal. Suppose someone, by contemplating the mark of the image ranged over in concentration, removes the underlying marks of the nature of things so that they no longer appear — relying on the principle of driving out a peg with a peg. It is as when a man removes a coarse peg by means of a fine one, or dispels the coarse heaviness of the body by means of bodily ease. This has been stated above; it is called the cultivation of removal.
Ninth, the cultivation of antidotes: one contemplates and cultivates the antidote that wears down, the antidote that severs, the antidote that sustains, and the antidote that distances. This is called the cultivation of antidotes. Here the path born of hearing and reflection is the antidote that wears down; the transcendent path is the antidote that severs; the transformation of the basis that is its fruit is the antidote that sustains; and the worldly path of the wisdom born of cultivation is the antidote that distances.
十身修、十一戒修、十二心修、十三慧修，如其次第依根防護修習三學，當知是名身等修性。
十四少分修，謂思惟諸法起無常等一一善想及修所餘少分善法，是名少分修。
十五遍行修，謂思惟一切法一味真如，如是修習名遍行修。
十六有動修，謂勤方便修無相時，於中間起諸有相修，是名有動修。
十七功行修，謂勤方便修無相時，由功用行無有間缺起無相修，是名功行修。
十八成滿修，謂或依聲聞乘、或依獨覺乘、或依大乘，一切依已轉得一切法自在，如是修習是名成滿修。
Tenth, cultivation of the body; eleventh, of moral discipline; twelfth, of mind; thirteenth, of wisdom. In that order, one guards in dependence on the faculties and cultivates the three trainings. Know this as the nature of the cultivation of the body and the rest.
Fourteenth, partial cultivation: one contemplates things and gives rise to the wholesome notions of impermanence and the rest one by one, and cultivates some portion of the other wholesome things. This is called partial cultivation.
Fifteenth, all-pervading cultivation: one contemplates suchness as the single taste of all things. Cultivating thus is called all-pervading cultivation.
Sixteenth, cultivation with movement: while diligently applying oneself to the cultivation of signlessness, one gives rise in the intervals to cultivations that have signs. This is called cultivation with movement.
Seventeenth, cultivation with exertion: while diligently applying oneself to the cultivation of signlessness, by applied effort and without interruption or gap one gives rise to the cultivation of signlessness. This is called cultivation with exertion.
Eighteenth, the cultivation that fulfills: whether in dependence on the śrāvaka vehicle, the pratyekabuddha vehicle, or the Great Vehicle, the basis in every case has been transformed and mastery over all things obtained. Cultivating thus is called the cultivation that fulfills.
This list is a condensation of one in the Treatise on the Stages of Yogic Practice, fascicle 67, and the correspondence runs close enough that individual clauses can be laid side by side — the śrāvaka who 唯觀自利不觀利他 here observes 不觀他利益事，唯觀自利益事 there. The interest of the compression is in what Asaṅga chose to keep. He kept the whole apparatus of antidotes and the whole apparatus of images, and he kept, at the head of the list, the one distinction that decides everything else: whether the practitioner is looking at his own benefit or at everyone's.
The eighth kind carries the treatise's most concrete image. 以榍出榍 — driving out a peg with a peg. The image is exact and slightly uncomfortable: the meditative image that replaces ordinary appearance is itself a peg, not the absence of one. It is finer than what it displaces, as bodily ease is finer than coarse heaviness, but it is the same kind of thing. Nothing here suggests that the cultivated image is the goal; it is a tool for getting the other peg out.
2. Poisoned and Unpoisoned; the Fruit of Cultivating Emptiness
如是諸修略有二種，謂有毒修、無毒修，我我所執雜不雜故。
又此諸修，當知對治五種邪執：一眾生邪執、二法邪執、三損減邪執、四差別邪執、五變異邪執。眾生邪執者，謂於諸蘊執有有情作者受者。法邪執者，謂如所言說執有色等自體差別。損減邪執者，謂執諸法一切相無。差別邪執者，謂執諸法我無我等有別體性。變異邪執者，謂執諸法先實有我、後成無我。又此諸修略有二種，謂世間修、出世間修。復次頌曰：
修果應當知， 三菩提功德，
依止轉依性， 所作事成就。
論曰：因修空故證得妙果，謂依止轉依證三菩提，及得無諍、願智、無礙解等無量功德。及所作事圓滿成就，謂即轉依究竟成滿。
In brief these cultivations are of two kinds, poisoned and unpoisoned, according to whether the grasping at "I" and "mine" is mixed into them or not.
Further, these cultivations should be known to counteract five wrong graspings: at beings, at things, by denial, by differentiation, and by alteration. Wrong grasping at beings means grasping that within the aggregates there is a sentient being, an agent, an experiencer. Wrong grasping at things means grasping, just as one speaks, that form and the rest have differences of substance. Wrong grasping by denial means grasping that all the marks of things are absent. Wrong grasping by differentiation means grasping that things have separate natures such as self and non-self. Wrong grasping by alteration means grasping that things first really have a self and afterward come to have none. And in brief these cultivations are of two kinds, worldly and transcendent.
The fruit of cultivation should be known:
the qualities of the three enlightenments,
the nature of the basis transformed,
and the accomplishment of what is to be done.
The exposition: because one cultivates emptiness, one realizes the excellent fruit — in dependence on the transformation of the basis one realizes the three enlightenments, and one obtains measureless qualities such as non-contention, the knowledge of vows, and the analytic knowledges. And what is to be done is perfectly accomplished, which is to say that the transformation of the basis is brought to its final fulfillment.
Of the five wrong graspings the third is the one the chapter on emptiness has been most careful to fence off. 損減邪執 — grasping by denial, holding that all the marks of things are absent — is the error that lies immediately on the other side of everything this chapter has argued. Having spent a chapter dismantling the self, Asaṅga names the overcorrection and calls it a wrong grasping too, alongside its opposite. The fifth is subtler still: to hold that things first really had a self and later came to have none is to concede the self a period of genuine tenure, which is exactly what emptiness denies.
The two-way sort is the sharpest sentence in this passage. Every one of the eighteen cultivations can be run in either mode, and the difference is not in the technique but in whether 我我所執 is still mixed in. A practitioner cultivating suchness as the single taste of all things can be doing so poisoned. The treatise gives no procedure for telling which one is happening; it only insists that the distinction is real and that it applies to the whole list.
3. The Three Natures and the Three Naturelessnesses
論曰：成空品中已成立眾生無我、非法無我，今為成立法無我故，說成無性。頌曰：
三自性應知， 初遍計所執，
次依他起性， 最後圓成實。
論曰：當知無性不離自性，是故先說三自性義，如是即顯三種無性密意故說。三自性者，謂遍計所執自性、依他起自性、圓成實自性。遍計所執者，所謂諸法依因言說所計自體。依他起者，所謂諸法依諸因緣所生自體。圓成實者，所謂諸法真如自體。頌曰：
三無性應知， 不離三自性，
由相無、生無， 及勝義無性。
論曰：如是三種自性，當知由三無自性故說三無性。一相無性，謂遍計所執自性，由此自性體相無故。二生無性，謂依他起自性，由此自性緣力所生，非自然生故。三勝義無性，謂圓成實自性，由此自性體是勝義，又是諸法無性故。已說三種自性及三無性相，今當顯示成立道理。
The exposition: in the chapter on establishing emptiness, the selflessness of beings was established, but not the selflessness of things. Now, in order to establish the selflessness of things, the establishing of naturelessness is taught.
Three own-natures are to be known:
first, the imagined;
next, the dependent nature;
and last, the perfectly accomplished.
The exposition: know that naturelessness is not apart from own-nature. Therefore the sense of the three own-natures is stated first, and thereby the hidden intent of the three naturelessnesses is displayed and taught. The three own-natures are the imagined own-nature, the dependent own-nature, and the perfectly accomplished own-nature. The imagined is the substance that things are supposed to have in dependence on the causes that are words. The dependent is the substance that things arise with in dependence on causes and conditions. The perfectly accomplished is the substance of things that is suchness.
Three naturelessnesses are to be known,
not apart from the three own-natures:
naturelessness of mark, of arising,
and naturelessness as the ultimate.
The exposition: of these three own-natures, three naturelessnesses are taught because each is without own-nature in one of three ways. First, naturelessness of mark, namely the imagined own-nature, since the very mark of this nature's substance is absent. Second, naturelessness of arising, namely the dependent own-nature, since this nature is produced by the force of conditions and does not arise of itself. Third, naturelessness as the ultimate, namely the perfectly accomplished own-nature, since the substance of this nature is the ultimate, and is moreover the naturelessness of things. The three own-natures and the marks of the three naturelessnesses having been stated, the reasoning that establishes them shall now be displayed.
The opening sentence states the division of labor between two chapters plainly enough that it is worth not passing over: the chapter on emptiness established 眾生無我 but 非法無我 — it got the selflessness of persons and not the selflessness of things. That is a fair description of what fascicle 15 actually did. Every argument there was aimed at a dweller, an agent, an experiencer. Nothing there touched the question of whether form and feeling have substances of their own. This chapter is the Mahāyāna half of the fourth thesis, and the treatise says so in its first line rather than letting the reader discover it.
無性不離自性 is the hinge on which the whole scheme turns, and it is easy to read past. The three naturelessnesses are not three additional items; they are the three natures stated from the other side. Each is a different kind of lacking, which is why the list cannot be collapsed: the imagined lacks a mark, the dependent lacks self-arising, the perfectly accomplished lacks anything at all to be superimposed on it. Read as three ways of being empty rather than three empty things, the scheme stops looking like an inventory and starts looking like a grammar.
4. The Imagined Nature Has No Substance: Five Categories, and Two Guests
云何應知遍計所執皆無自體相？頌曰：
非五事所攝， 此外更無有，
由名於義轉， 二更互為客。
論曰：遍計所執自相是無。何以故？五事所不攝故，除五事外更無所有。何等為五？一相、二名、三分別、四真如、五正智。問：若遍計所執相無有自體，云何能起遍計執耶？答：由名於義轉故。謂隨彼假名於義流轉，世間愚夫執有名義決定相稱真實自性。問：云何應知此是邪執？答：以二更互為客故。所以者何？以名於義非稱體故，說之為客；義亦如名，無所有故說之為客。云何知然？頌曰：
於名前無覺， 多名及不定，
於有義無義， 轉非理義成。
論曰：若義自體如名有者，未得名前此覺於義應先已有。又名多故，一義應有多種自體。又名不定故，義之自體亦應不定。何以故？即此一名於所餘義亦施設故。又復此名為於有義轉、為於無義轉耶？若於有義轉者，不應道理，即前所說三因緣故。若於無義轉者，即前所說二互為客，道理成就。
How is it to be known that the imagined is entirely without a mark of its own substance?
It is not comprised in the five categories,
and outside these there is nothing more;
a name turns upon an object,
and the two are guests to each other.
The exposition: the particular mark of the imagined own-nature is absent. Why? Because it is not comprised in the five categories, and outside the five categories nothing whatever exists. What five? Mark, name, discrimination, suchness, and correct knowledge. Question: if the imagined mark has no substance of its own, how is imagined grasping able to arise at all? Answer: because a name turns upon an object. That is, following that provisional name, it circulates through the object, and foolish worldlings grasp that name and object have a real own-nature that answers to each other with certainty. Question: how is it to be known that this is a wrong grasping? Answer: because the two are guests to each other. Why? Because a name does not answer to the substance of an object, it is called a guest; and the object likewise, being as the name is, has nothing whatever, and so is called a guest.
How is this known?
Before the name there is no awareness;
names are many, and unfixed;
whether it turns upon an object present or absent —
the sense that this does not stand to reason is established.
The exposition: if the substance of the object existed as the name does, then before the name was obtained this awareness of the object should already have been there. Again, since names are many, one object would have to have many kinds of substance. Again, since names are unfixed, the substance of the object would have to be unfixed too — for why? because this very name is applied to other objects as well. And further: does this name turn upon an object that is present, or upon one that is absent? If it turns upon an object that is present, this does not stand to reason, for the three reasons just stated. If it turns upon an object that is absent, then the reasoning already stated — that the two are guests to each other — is established.
The five categories — 相、名、分別、真如、正智 — are the same list this site has already met in fascicle 6, where they were glossed one by one. Here they do a different job. The argument is not that the imagined nature is a bad member of the list but that it is not a member at all, and that the list is exhaustive. Everything there is falls under mark, name, discrimination, suchness, or correct knowledge; the imagined nature is not any of them; therefore it is nothing. That is a clean elimination proof, and it rests entirely on the completeness claim 此外更無有.
更互為客 — guests to each other — is the image worth keeping. A guest is not an intruder; a guest belongs somewhere else. The name is a guest in the object because it does not answer to the object's substance; and then, in a turn that is easy to miss, the object is declared a guest as well, 義亦如名，無所有故. Both parties turn out to be visiting. The three arguments that follow are the standard ones and they are stated with unusual economy — one object cannot have as many substances as it has names, and a name that can be moved to another object cannot have been fixed to this one.
5. The Lamp Analogy Refuted, and How the Error Reproduces Itself
復次若執義是實有，由名顯了如燈照色，不應道理。何以故？頌曰：
取已立名故， 餘即不能取，
如眾生邪執， 增益為顛倒。
論曰：先取義已，然後立名，非未取義能立名字。已取得義，復須顯了，不應道理。又即由此名，餘未解者不取得義。燈照了物即不如是，非由此燈餘不能取所照了物。又不應執義異名異，由唯依名起義執故。譬如唯有諸行無始流轉自性異生，數習力故，於自他相續起眾生邪執。如是於長夜中串習言說熏修心故，由此方便起妄遍計執有諸法。此法邪執，猶如眾生妄增益故，當知顛倒。如是顛倒云何與雜染法展轉生起？頌曰：
由熏起依他， 依此生顛倒，
如是互為緣， 展轉生相續。
論曰：由此顛倒熏習力故，後依他果自性得生；又依此果，後時復生法執顛倒。如是二法更互為緣，生死展轉相續不斷。
Further: if one grasps that the object really exists and is made manifest by the name as a lamp illuminates form, this does not stand to reason. Why?
Because the name is set up after grasping,
others are then unable to grasp;
as with wrong grasping at beings,
the superimposition is a distortion.
The exposition: one first grasps the object and afterward sets up the name; it is not that a name can be set up without having grasped the object. And to say that an object already grasped and obtained still requires making manifest does not stand to reason. Again, by this very name others who have not understood do not grasp and obtain the object. A lamp illuminating a thing is not like this: it is not the case that, because of this lamp, others are unable to grasp the thing it illuminates. Nor should one grasp that the object is one thing and the name another, since the grasping at an object arises in dependence on the name alone. It is like this: there are only formations, flowing on from beginningless time, ordinary beings by nature, and by the force of repeated habituation a wrong grasping at beings arises with respect to one's own continuum and another's. Just so, because through the long night the mind has been perfumed and shaped by habituated speech, by this means a false imagining arises that grasps things as existing. This wrong grasping at things, being a false superimposition just as with beings, should be known as a distortion.
How does such a distortion arise in mutual succession with the things of defilement?
By perfuming, the dependent arises;
in dependence on this, distortion is born;
thus each is a condition for the other,
and in succession the continuum is produced.
The exposition: by the force of the perfuming of this distortion, the own-nature of the dependent, as a result, is afterward able to arise; and in dependence on that result, the distortion of grasping at things is again produced later. Thus these two things are conditions for each other, and birth and death continue on in succession without a break.
The lamp is the opponent's best analogy and the refutation is careful with it. A lamp does not create what it lights, so if names worked like lamps, objects could be real and names could still be doing honest work. Asaṅga breaks the analogy at two joints. First, order: you must have hold of a thing before you can name it, so naming cannot be what reveals it — the lamp comes after the seeing. Second, publicity: a lamp lights a room for everybody, but a name conveys nothing to someone who does not already know the object. 非由此燈餘不能取所照了物 — with a lamp, it is not the case that other people can't see the illuminated thing. With a name, that is exactly the case. Anyone who has been handed a technical term with no referent attached knows the experience the argument is pointing at.
The comparison in the middle is the chapter's structural claim in miniature: grasping at things works exactly as grasping at a self works, and by the same mechanism — 數習力故, repeated habituation. This is why the two chapters can share a method. The self is not a special error requiring a special cure; it is one instance of a general habit of taking words for substances, and the chapter on emptiness was a worked example of what this chapter states in general.
6. Six Kinds of Imagining
已說成立道理，今當顯示遍計所執自性差別。頌曰：
自性與差別， 有覺悟、隨眠、
加行、名遍計， 又當知五種。
論曰：由有六種遍計差別故，遍計所執自性亦有六種。何等名為六種遍計？一自性遍計，謂遍計色等實有自相。二差別遍計，謂遍計色等決定實有有色無色、有見無見等諸差別相。三覺悟遍計，謂善名言者所有遍計。四隨眠遍計，謂不善名言者所有遍計。五加行遍計，此復五種：一貪愛加行、二瞋恚加行、三合會加行、四別離加行、五隨捨加行。六名遍計，此復二種：一文字所起、二非文字所起。非文字所起者，如有計執，此為何物？云何此物？此物是何？此物云何？文字所起者，如有計執，此為此物，此物如是，或色或乃至識，或有為或無為，或常或無常，或善或不善或無記，如是等。
The reasoning that establishes it having been stated, the distinctions within the imagined own-nature shall now be displayed.
Own-nature and difference,
with awakened awareness and with latent tendency,
by application, and by name — these are the imaginings;
and five kinds further are to be known.
The exposition: because there are six distinctions of imagining, the imagined own-nature is also of six kinds. What are the six imaginings? First, imagining of own-nature: imagining that form and the rest really have particular marks. Second, imagining of difference: imagining that form and the rest definitely and really have the various marks of difference — material and immaterial, visible and invisible, and so on. Third, imagining with awakened awareness: the imagining of those who are skilled in names and speech. Fourth, imagining with latent tendency: the imagining of those who are unskilled in names and speech. Fifth, imagining by application, which is again of five kinds: the application of craving, of hatred, of joining together, of separating apart, and of letting go along with it. Sixth, imagining by name, which is again of two kinds: that which arises from written words and that which does not. What does not arise from written words is as when someone supposes: what is this thing? how is this thing? this thing is what? this thing is how? What arises from written words is as when someone supposes: this is this thing, this thing is thus — whether form or on up to consciousness, whether conditioned or unconditioned, whether permanent or impermanent, whether wholesome or unwholesome or indeterminate, and so on.
The third and fourth kinds make a pair that repays attention, because the order runs against expectation. One might assume that the person skilled in language is the one who has been freed from the tyranny of words, and the inarticulate one the naïve victim. Asaṅga has it the other way: the skilled speaker's imagining is 覺悟, out in the open where he can see it, while the unskilled speaker's is 隨眠, a latent tendency he cannot inspect. Fluency does not remove the error; it brings it into view. That is a comparatively hopeful thing to say about study, and it fits a treatise whose whole method is the sharpening of distinctions.
The sixth kind divides the same way at the level of grammar. The imagining that does not use written words is all question — 此為何物, what is this thing — and the imagining that does use them is all predication: this is that, and it is thus, form or consciousness, conditioned or unconditioned, wholesome or not. The list of predicates Asaṅga reaches for is a list of Abhidharma categories. His own vocabulary is offered as an example of imagining by name, which is the sort of self-implication this treatise makes without remarking on it.
7. Five Kinds of Imagining, by Name and by Object
復次遍計所執自性，當知復由五種遍計。何等為五？一依名遍計義自性、二依義遍計名自性、三依名遍計名自性、四依義遍計義自性、五依二遍計二自性。依名遍計義自性者，如有計執，此物既名為色，必應定有色體真實。此物既名為受想行識，必應定有受想行識體性真實。依義遍計名自性者，如有計執，此物名色、為不名色？此物名受想行識、為不名受想行識？依名遍計名自性者，如有計執，不了物體但知種種分別色名，不了物體但知種種分別受想行識名。依義遍計義自性者，如有計執不了色名但於色體種種分別，不了受想行識名但於受想行識體性種種分別。依二遍計二自性者，如有計執，此物是色體性名之為色，此物是受想行識體性名受想行識。
Further, the imagined own-nature should be known by five imaginings as well. What five? Imagining the own-nature of the object in dependence on the name; imagining the own-nature of the name in dependence on the object; imagining the own-nature of the name in dependence on the name; imagining the own-nature of the object in dependence on the object; and imagining the own-nature of both in dependence on both. Imagining the own-nature of the object in dependence on the name is as when someone supposes: since this thing is called form, there must definitely be a real substance of form. Since this thing is called feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness, there must definitely be a real substance and nature of feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness. Imagining the own-nature of the name in dependence on the object is as when someone supposes: is this thing called form, or is it not called form? Is this thing called feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness, or is it not? Imagining the own-nature of the name in dependence on the name is as when someone supposes, without understanding the substance of the thing, and knows only the various discriminations among the names for form; or, without understanding the substance of the thing, knows only the various discriminations among the names for feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness. Imagining the own-nature of the object in dependence on the object is as when someone supposes, without understanding the name of form, and discriminates variously upon the substance of form alone; or, without understanding the names of feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness, discriminates variously upon the substance and nature of feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness alone. Imagining the own-nature of both in dependence on both is as when someone supposes: this thing has the substance and nature of form and is therefore called form; this thing has the substance and nature of feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness and is therefore called feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness.
The five are generated mechanically — name from object, object from name, name from name, object from object, both from both — and the mechanical derivation is the point. Once you accept that name and object are guests to each other, every combination of the two is an available error, and the list simply enumerates them. What makes the passage worth reading slowly is that two of the five look like scholarship and two look like meditation. The third, knowing the various discriminations among names without understanding the thing, is the failure mode of the scholar who has mastered a vocabulary; the fourth, discriminating upon the substance without knowing the name, is the failure mode of someone working entirely from experience with no analysis to check it against.
The fifth is the most complete version and reads almost innocently: this thing has the nature of form, and that is why it is called form. Stated that way it sounds simply like correct usage. The treatise's claim is that the confident traffic in both directions at once — from nature to name and back — is the fully developed form of the error rather than its cure.
8. Eight Discriminations and the Three Things They Produce
已說遍計所執自性差別。此遍計執由妄分別故生，此分別差別今當更說。頌曰：
分別有八種， 能生於三事，
分別體應知， 二界心心法。
論曰：八種分別能生三事。何等為三？一分別戲論所依緣事、二見我慢事、三貪愛等事。
八種分別者，一自性分別，謂於色等想事分別色等所有自性。二差別分別，謂即於色等想事起諸分別，此有色此無色、此有見此無見、此有對此無對，如是等無量差別，以自性分別為依處故，分別種種差別之義。三總執分別，謂即於色等想事所立我及有情命者生者等假想施設所引分別，由於積聚多法總執為因分別轉故。又於舍軍林等及於飲食衣乘等想事所立舍等假想施設所引尋思。四我分別，謂若事有漏有取，長時數習我執所聚，由數習邪執自見處事為緣所起虛妄分別。五我所分別，謂若事有漏有取，長時數習我所執所聚，由數習邪執自見處事為緣所起虛妄分別。六愛分別，謂緣淨妙可意事境分別。七不愛分別，謂緣不淨妙不可意事境分別。八愛不愛俱相違分別，謂緣淨不淨可意不可意俱離事境分別。
The distinctions within the imagined own-nature having been stated, and this imagined grasping being born of false discrimination, the distinctions within that discrimination shall now be stated further.
Discrimination is of eight kinds,
able to produce three things;
the substance of discrimination is to be known as
the mind and mental factors of the realms.
The exposition: the eight discriminations are able to produce three things. What three? The thing that is the basis and object of discriminative elaboration; the thing that is view and self-conceit; and the thing that is craving and the rest.
The eight discriminations. First, discrimination of own-nature: with respect to the perceived matters of form and the rest, discriminating whatever own-nature form and the rest have. Second, discrimination of difference: with respect to those same perceived matters of form and the rest, giving rise to discriminations — this is material and this immaterial, this visible and this invisible, this resistant and this unresistant, and measureless differences of that kind — taking the discrimination of own-nature as its base and discriminating the various senses of difference. Third, discrimination by grasping a whole: the discrimination drawn forth by the provisional designations established upon the perceived matters of form and the rest — a self, a sentient being, a living one, one who is born, and the like — since discrimination turns with the grasping of an accumulation of many things as a whole for its cause. Also the inquiry drawn forth by provisional designations such as "house," established upon perceived matters such as house, army, and forest, and food, clothing, and vehicle. Fourth, discrimination of a self: where a matter is contaminated and appropriated, gathered by the grasping at a self long and repeatedly habituated, the false discrimination that arises conditioned by a matter that is the site of one's own habituated wrong view. Fifth, discrimination of what is mine: where a matter is contaminated and appropriated, gathered by the grasping at what is mine long and repeatedly habituated, the false discrimination that arises conditioned by a matter that is the site of one's own habituated wrong view. Sixth, discrimination as liked: discrimination taking as object a matter that is pure, excellent, and agreeable. Seventh, discrimination as disliked: discrimination taking as object a matter that is impure, unexcellent, and disagreeable. Eighth, discrimination as neither: discrimination taking as object a matter apart from both the pure and impure, the agreeable and disagreeable.
如是略說有二種，謂分別自體及分別所依所緣事。此中自性分別、差別分別、總執分別，此三分別能生分別戲論所依事。分別戲論所緣事，謂色等想事為依緣故。名想言說所攝名想言說所顯分別戲論，即於此事分別計度無量種種眾多差別。此中我分別、我所分別，此二分別能生餘見根本及慢根本身見，及能生餘慢根本我慢。
此中愛分別不愛分別俱相違分別，如其所應生貪瞋癡。是故如是八種分別，為起此三種事。若欲略說分別體性，所謂三界諸心心法。
In brief these are of two kinds: the substance of discrimination, and the matter that is its basis and object. Among them, the discrimination of own-nature, the discrimination of difference, and the discrimination by grasping a whole — these three are able to produce the thing that is the basis of discriminative elaboration. As for the thing that is the object of discriminative elaboration: because the perceived matters of form and the rest serve as its basis and object, discriminative elaboration, which is comprised in naming, perceiving, and speaking and is displayed by naming, perceiving, and speaking, discriminates and calculates upon this very matter measureless kinds of manifold difference. Among them, the discrimination of a self and the discrimination of what is mine — these two are able to produce the view of the body that is the root of the remaining views and the root of conceit, and are able to produce self-conceit, the root of the remaining conceits.
Among them, the discrimination as liked, as disliked, and as neither give rise, each as is fitting, to craving, hatred, and delusion. Therefore these eight discriminations arise so as to bring about these three things. If one wishes to state the nature of discrimination in brief, it is all the mind and mental factors of the three realms.
The verse here carries the fascicle's most useful variant, and for once it runs the opposite way from every earlier case in this treatise. T1602's verse reads 二界心心法, the mind and mental factors of two realms; T1603, the extracted verse text, reads 三界, three realms. This time the verse-only text is right, and T1602 itself proves it — the closing sentence of its own prose is 若欲略說分別體性，所謂三界諸心心法, the mind and mental factors of the three realms. The prose and the verse are three lines apart and they do not agree. Beyond that, this site's own fascicle 6 already had occasion to translate the gloss 分別者，謂三界所攝諸心心法 — discrimination is all the mind and mental factors comprised in the three realms. Three separate witnesses against one; we have translated 三界 and record 二界 here as what the received verse actually says.
In earlier fascicles collation went the other way, with T1602's prose confirming T1602's verse against T1603. The lesson of the reversal is not that one text is more reliable than the other but that the method works in both directions, and that the arbiter in every case has been Asaṅga's own prose rather than either text's authority.
The eight are not a flat list; they are a production line, and the three-way sort at the end reveals the design. The first three discriminations — own-nature, difference, grasping a whole — manufacture the furniture, the objects that elaboration will then talk about. The next two manufacture the owner. The last three manufacture the attitude. In that order one gets a world, a self to stand in it, and a set of reactions to what it contains, which is a fair description of ordinary experience assembled from parts.
The third discrimination is the one that names its own examples, and they are worth listing as Asaṅga gives them: 舍、軍、林 — house, army, forest — alongside food, clothing, and vehicle. These are the standard Indian examples of things that are nothing over and above their parts, and the treatise puts the self on that list without comment. An army is a way of grasping many soldiers as one; a self is a way of grasping many aggregates as one. The claim is not that either is unreal in the sense of never appearing, but that the unity in both cases is contributed by the grasping.
9. The Two Bonds
復次頌曰：
由二縛所縛， 堅執二自性，
故二縛解脫， 正無得無見。
論曰：起前所說諸分別時，即為二縛所縛，所謂相縛及麁重縛。由此二縛，執二自性，謂執依他起自性及遍計所執自性。是故解脫二種縛已，於二自性正無所得及無所見。所以者何？由遍計所執自性畢竟無故不可得。依他起自性雖復是有，不取相故無所見。如是成立遍計所執自性已。為欲成立依他起自性故，當說成立道理。
Furthermore:
Bound by the two bonds,
one firmly grasps two own-natures;
therefore, freed from the two bonds,
one rightly finds nothing and sees nothing.
The exposition: when the discriminations stated above arise, one is bound by two bonds, namely the bond of marks and the bond of coarse heaviness. By these two bonds one grasps two own-natures, namely the dependent own-nature and the imagined own-nature. Therefore, having been freed from the two bonds, one rightly finds nothing and sees nothing with respect to the two own-natures. Why? Because the imagined own-nature is finally absent and so cannot be found. The dependent own-nature, although it does exist, is not seen, because one does not take up its mark. The imagined own-nature having thus been established, the reasoning that establishes the dependent own-nature shall now be stated.
The two verbs at the end of the verse are doing precise and different work, and a translation that blurs them loses the argument. 無得 and 無見 are not a pair of synonyms for absence. One finds nothing of the imagined nature because there is nothing there to find; one sees nothing of the dependent nature although there is something there, because seeing here means taking up a mark and one has stopped doing that. 雖復是有 — although it does exist — is stated flatly, and it is the sentence that keeps this system from collapsing into the denial the last chapter warned against.
The pairing of the bonds with the natures is likewise exact. The bond of marks holds one to the dependent, which does appear; the bond of coarse heaviness — the term this treatise has used since fascicle 1 for the unwieldiness that is the opposite of pliancy — holds one to the imagined. Liberation is described as release from a grip rather than the disappearance of an object, which is why the freed practitioner is said to find and see nothing rather than to have nothing left in front of him.
10. Establishing the Dependent Nature
頌曰：
假有所依因， 若異壞二種，
雜染可得故， 當知依他有。
論曰：不應宣說諸法唯是假有。何以故？假法必有所依因故，非無實物假法成立。若異此者，無實物故假亦是無，即應破壞二法。二法壞故，雜染之法應不可得。由雜染法現可得故，當知必有依他起自性。復次此依他起自性有何相貌？頌曰：
相麁重為體， 此更互緣生，
非自然是有， 故說生無性。
論曰：此依他起自性，以相及麁重為體。云何說為依他起？由此二種更互為緣而得生故。謂相為緣起於麁重，麁重為緣又能生相。若爾，何故名生無性？謂緣力所生，非自然有故。復次此依他起自性，為決定有、為決定無？頌曰：
非決定有無， 一切種皆許，
通假實二性， 世俗說為有。
論曰：依他起自性非如施設決定是有，亦非一切決定是無，故一切種非有非無。然許一切種皆可言說，謂若有、若無、亦有亦無、非有非無。問：此依他起自性，為是實有、為是假有？答：應知此性通假實有。問：為由世俗故有、為由勝義故有？答：當知由世俗故說之為有。
Verse:
The provisional has a cause it rests on;
were it otherwise, both would be destroyed;
and since defilement can be found,
know that the dependent exists.
The exposition: one should not declare that all things are merely provisionally existent. Why? Because a provisional thing must have a cause it rests on; it is not the case that provisional things are established where there is no real substance. Were it otherwise, then since there were no real substance the provisional too would be nothing, and both would thereby be destroyed. And since both were destroyed, the things of defilement could not be found. Since the things of defilement manifestly can be found, know that there must be a dependent own-nature. Further, what mark does this dependent own-nature have?
Mark and coarse heaviness are its substance;
these arise as conditions for each other;
it is not by itself that it exists,
and so naturelessness of arising is taught.
The exposition: this dependent own-nature has mark and coarse heaviness for its substance. Why is it called dependent? Because these two are able to arise as conditions for each other — that is, mark as condition gives rise to coarse heaviness, and coarse heaviness as condition is again able to produce mark. If so, why is it called naturelessness of arising? Because it is produced by the force of conditions and does not exist of itself. Further, is this dependent own-nature definitely existent or definitely non-existent?
Not definitely existent or non-existent;
every mode of statement is allowed;
it runs through both the provisional and the real,
and conventionally is said to exist.
The exposition: the dependent own-nature is not definitely existent as it is designated, nor is it in every respect definitely non-existent; therefore in every mode it is neither existent nor non-existent. Yet every mode of statement is allowed of it — that it exists, that it does not, that it both does and does not, that it neither does nor does not. Question: is this dependent own-nature really existent or provisionally existent? Answer: know that this nature runs through both the provisional and the real. Question: does it exist conventionally or ultimately? Answer: know that it is said to exist conventionally.
The verse-only text reads 當知依他起, know the dependent arises, where T1602 reads 當知依他有, know the dependent exists. The variant is small and the prose favors T1602: the whole argument is a proof of existence, closing on 當知必有依他起自性 — know there must be a dependent own-nature. "Arises" would restate the name of the nature; "exists" states the conclusion. We have followed T1602.
The argument itself is the shortest complete answer this treatise gives to a total anti-realism, and it is a transcendental one. It does not say that we perceive the dependent nature. It says that we manifestly find defilement — 雜染法現可得 — and that defilement could not be found if nothing whatever were real, since a fiction with nothing underneath it is not even a fiction. The premise is deliberately modest. Not "we experience real objects," only "something is going wrong, and something must be going wrong in."
Note the reciprocal definition of the dependent nature: mark conditions coarse heaviness, coarse heaviness conditions mark. Neither is prior. What we have is not a substrate with properties but a loop — appearance producing unwieldiness producing appearance — and this is what the treatise means by dependency. That the loop can be entered from either side is also, read forward, why it can be broken from either side, which is what the chapter on emptiness was describing when it dealt with the cultivations that remove marks and the ones that remove heaviness.
The tetralemma is handled here in a way worth marking, since it is often assumed that Yogācāra refuses the four alternatives as the Madhyamaka does. Asaṅga does not refuse them; he allows all four — 一切種皆可言說 — of the dependent nature. What he denies is that any one of them is 決定, settled. The dependent nature is not a thing about which the four positions compete; it is a thing to which each applies in some respect, which is precisely why it can be described as both provisional and real, and why it exists conventionally rather than ultimately.
11. The Two Truths, and the Perfectly Accomplished Nature
復次頌曰：
宣說我法用， 皆名為世俗；
當知勝義諦， 謂七種真如。
論曰：世俗諦者，當知宣說我法作用，已如攝淨義品中說。勝義諦者，謂七種真如，已如攝事品中說。復次頌曰：
圓成實自性， 二最勝智義，
無有諸戲論， 遠離一異性。
論曰：此勝義諦，當知即是圓成實自性。問：何因緣故，七種真如名勝義諦？答：由是二最勝智所行故，謂出世間智及此後得世間智。由此勝義無戲論故，非餘智境。又此勝義無戲論故，於有相法離一異性。何以故？由此真如於有相法不可說異亦非不異故。復次頌曰：
清淨之所緣， 常無有變異，
善性及樂性， 一切皆成就。
論曰：由勝義諦離一異性故，當知即是清淨所緣性。何以故？由緣此境得心清淨故。當知亦是常，於一切時性無變異故。又由清淨所緣故，當知是善。以是常故，當知是樂。
Furthermore:
Whatever declares the working of self and things
is called the conventional;
know that the ultimate truth
is the seven kinds of suchness.
The exposition: the conventional truth should be known as what declares the working of self and things, as already stated in the chapter on Gathering the Pure Meaning. The ultimate truth is the seven kinds of suchness, as already stated in the chapter on Gathering the Topics.
The perfectly accomplished own-nature
is the object of the two most excellent knowledges;
it is without any discursive elaboration
and keeps far from being one or other.
The exposition: this ultimate truth should be known to be the perfectly accomplished own-nature. Question: for what reason are the seven kinds of suchness called the ultimate truth? Answer: because they are ranged over by the two most excellent knowledges, namely transcendent knowledge and the worldly knowledge subsequently attained to it. Because this ultimate is without discursive elaboration, it is not the range of any other knowledge. And because this ultimate is without discursive elaboration, it keeps far from being one with or other than things that have marks. Why? Because this suchness cannot be said to be other than things that have marks, nor yet not other.
The object of purity,
permanent and without alteration,
of the nature of the wholesome and of ease —
in all respects it is accomplished.
The exposition: because the ultimate truth keeps far from being one or other, know that it is the very nature of the object of purity. Why? Because by taking this as object one obtains purity of mind. Know that it is permanent as well, since its nature is without alteration at all times. And since it is the object of purity, know that it is wholesome. And since it is permanent, know that it is ease.
The two truths are given here in a single line apiece, and the definition of the conventional is worth pausing on because it is not the usual one. The conventional is not defined as what is false, nor as what appears to ordinary people; it is 宣說我法用, whatever declares the working of self and things. The conventional is a mode of speech about function. That definition makes the conventional truth genuinely a truth — talk about what things do is accurate talk — while leaving it entirely silent on what they are.
The last verse arrives at a quartet that will be familiar from elsewhere: permanent, blissful, pure, and — by way of 善性 — wholesome. This is the language of the qualities of nirvāṇa, and Asaṅga derives it here by a chain of inferences rather than asserting it: suchness is what purifies the mind that takes it as object, therefore wholesome; it never alters, therefore permanent; and because permanent, therefore ease. The reasoning that permanence entails ease is compressed to four characters, but it follows the treatise's own definition of suffering from fascicle 15, where what makes the conditioned painful is precisely that it does not hold.
12. Ultimate Naturelessness, and Five Marks in Three
復次頌曰：
實勝義無性， 戲論我無故，
依他無彼相， 亦勝義無性。
論曰：圓成實自性，由勝義無性故說為無性。何以故？由此自性即是勝義亦是無性，由無戲論我法性故。是故圓成實自性，是勝義故及無戲論性故，說為勝義無性應知。於依他起自性，由異相故，亦得建立為勝義無性。何以故？由無勝義性故。復次如前所說有五種相，謂能詮相、所詮相、此二相屬相、執著相、不執著相，又有三相，謂遍計所執相、依他起相、圓成實相。為五攝三、為三攝五耶？頌曰：
依三相應知， 建立五種相，
彼如其所應， 別別有五業。
論曰：當知依三自相建立五相。所以者何？初及第二依三自相，第三依遍計所執相，第四依依他起相，第五依圓成實相。又三自性一一各有五業，已如攝淨義品中說。
Furthermore:
Truly, naturelessness as the ultimate,
since the elaborated self is absent;
the dependent, lacking that mark,
is likewise naturelessness as the ultimate.
The exposition: the perfectly accomplished own-nature is called natureless by way of naturelessness as the ultimate. Why? Because this nature is itself the ultimate and is also naturelessness, since it is without the elaborated nature of self and things. Therefore the perfectly accomplished own-nature, being the ultimate and being without elaboration, is to be known as naturelessness as the ultimate. As for the dependent own-nature, it too can be established as naturelessness as the ultimate, by way of a different aspect. Why? Because it is without the nature of the ultimate. Further, as stated above there are five marks — the mark that expresses, the mark expressed, the mark of the relation between these two, the mark of grasping, and the mark of not grasping — and there are also three marks, namely the mark of the imagined, of the dependent, and of the perfectly accomplished. Do the five subsume the three, or the three the five?
Know that in dependence on the three marks
the five marks are established;
and each of them, as is fitting,
has its own five functions.
The exposition: know that the five marks are established in dependence on the three own-marks. Why? The first and the second rest on all three own-marks; the third on the mark of the imagined; the fourth on the mark of the dependent; the fifth on the mark of the perfectly accomplished. And each of the three own-natures has five functions apiece, as already stated in the chapter on Gathering the Pure Meaning.
The two halves of the verse use the same phrase for two different things, and the prose is at pains to say so: the perfectly accomplished nature is 勝義無性 because it is the ultimate and is naturelessness; the dependent nature is 勝義無性 because it lacks the ultimate. One is natureless by being the thing; the other by not being it. 由異相故 — by way of a different aspect — is the whole caution, and without it the third naturelessness would appear to be shared by two natures in the same sense, which would flatten the scheme.
The subsumption question at the end answers itself in the answer's shape. The three subsume the five, not the other way round, and the distribution is uneven in an informative way: the marks of expressing and being expressed rest on all three natures, since language reaches everywhere, while grasping is assigned to the imagined alone and not-grasping to the perfectly accomplished. The dependent nature gets the fourth position, the relation between what expresses and what is expressed — which is exactly where the treatise has been locating it all chapter, in the traffic between name and object rather than at either end.
13. Which Grasping Comes First, and What Purity Perfumes
復次前成空品所遮眾生執，今此品中所遮法執。此二種執，誰從誰生？頌曰：
法執故愚夫， 起彼眾生執；
彼除覺法性， 覺法我執斷。
論曰：由法執故，世間愚夫起眾生執。除眾生執現起纏故，覺法實性。覺法性故，法執永斷。法執斷時，當知亦斷眾生執隨眠。復次於何未斷而成雜染？於何斷滅得成清淨？頌曰：
於依他執初， 熏習成雜染；
無執圓成實， 熏習成清淨。
雜染有漏性， 清淨則無漏，
此當知轉依， 不思議二種。
論曰：於依他起自性執著初自性故，起於熏習則成雜染。當知圓成實自性無執著故，起於熏習則成清淨。雜染即是有漏性，清淨即是無漏性，此無漏性當知即是轉依相。又此轉依不可思議及有二種。
Further: the chapter on establishing emptiness above blocked the grasping at beings; this chapter blocks the grasping at things. Of these two graspings, which is born from which?
Because of grasping at things, the foolish
give rise to that grasping at beings;
when that is removed, one awakens to the nature of things;
awakening to it, the grasping at a self in things is cut.
The exposition: because of grasping at things, foolish worldlings give rise to grasping at beings. Because the presently arisen entanglement of grasping at beings is removed, one awakens to the real nature of things. Because one awakens to the nature of things, grasping at things is permanently cut. And when grasping at things is cut, know that the latent tendency of grasping at beings is cut as well. Further, where, being uncut, does defilement come about? And where, being cut off, is purity accomplished?
Grasping the first nature in the dependent,
perfuming brings about defilement;
without grasping, the perfectly accomplished —
perfuming brings about purity.
Defilement is of the contaminated kind,
and purity of the uncontaminated;
this is to be known as the transformation of the basis,
inconceivable, and of two kinds.
The exposition: because one grasps the first own-nature within the dependent own-nature, the perfuming that arises brings about defilement. Know that because there is no grasping in the perfectly accomplished own-nature, the perfuming that arises brings about purity. Defilement is the contaminated kind and purity the uncontaminated kind; and this uncontaminated kind is to be known as the mark of the transformation of the basis. And this transformation of the basis is inconceivable, and is of two kinds.
The order given here is the reverse of the pedagogical order, and the treatise is candid about it. Fascicles 15 and 16 teach the selflessness of persons first and the selflessness of things second; but in the causal order, grasping at things comes first and produces the grasping at beings. This is not a contradiction but a division between what can be dislodged first and what lies deeper. And the sequence of removal is stated with a precision that is easy to skim past: removing the grasping at beings clears the presently arisen entanglement (現起纏) and lets one awaken to the nature of things; that awakening cuts the grasping at things; and only then is the latent tendency (隨眠) of the grasping at beings cut. The person-self is dealt with twice, once at the surface and once at the root, with the whole of the second selflessness in between.
The account of what perfuming does is as compressed as anything in the treatise and states the mechanism of the entire path. Perfuming is neutral. The same process produces defilement or purity depending on one thing only — whether the imagined nature is being grasped within the dependent, or whether there is no grasping. The path is therefore not a matter of perfuming with different material but of perfuming without the grip. And the result of that, stated in one line, is the transformation of the basis.
14. Why the Transformation Is Inconceivable, and by What It Is Reached
云何不可思議？頌曰：
真實及自體， 寂靜與功德，
一切不思議， 當知由四道。
論曰：如是轉依不可思議，由四道理：一由真實，謂是常故；二由自體，謂非有色非無色如是等故；三由寂靜，謂寂靜住故；四由功德，謂此轉依有威德故。又此轉依不可思議，由四種道方乃證得，謂四種正行、四種尋思、四如實智、四種境事。何等為四？一遍滿境、二淨行境、三善巧境、四淨惑境。此中遍滿境復有四種：一有分別影像、二無分別影像、三事究竟、四所作成就。有分別影像者，謂所知事同分三摩地所行毘鉢舍那境。無分別影像者，謂所知事同分三摩地所行奢摩他境。事究竟者，謂盡所有性及如所有性。所作成就者，謂轉依及依此無分別智。淨行境有五種：一不淨、二慈悲、三緣起、四界差別、五入出息念。善巧境有五種，謂蘊善巧、界善巧、處善巧、緣起善巧、處非處善巧。淨惑境，謂世間道有二下地麁性，上地靜性等，出世間道有四聖諦等。
How is it inconceivable?
In truth and in its own substance,
in stillness and in quality —
inconceivable in every way;
know it by four principles.
The exposition: this transformation of the basis is inconceivable by four principles. First, in truth, since it is permanent. Second, in its own substance, since it is neither material nor immaterial, and so on. Third, in stillness, since it abides in stillness. Fourth, in quality, since this transformation of the basis has majestic power. And this inconceivable transformation of the basis is realized by four ways, namely the four right practices, the four inquiries, the four knowledges of things as they really are, and the four objective matters. What four objective matters? The all-pervading object, the object that purifies conduct, the object of skill, and the object that purifies afflictions. Among these, the all-pervading object is again of four kinds: the image accompanied by discrimination, the image free of discrimination, the exhausting of the matter, and the accomplishment of what is to be done. The image accompanied by discrimination is the object of insight ranged over by the concentration that corresponds to a known matter. The image free of discrimination is the object of calm abiding ranged over by the concentration that corresponds to a known matter. The exhausting of the matter is the nature of all that there is and the nature of things as they are. The accomplishment of what is to be done is the transformation of the basis and the non-discriminating knowledge that rests on it. The object that purifies conduct is of five kinds: the impure, loving-kindness and compassion, dependent arising, the differentiation of the elements, and mindfulness of the in-breath and out-breath. The object of skill is of five kinds: skill in the aggregates, in the elements, in the sense fields, in dependent arising, and in the possible and the impossible. The object that purifies afflictions is: on the worldly path, the coarseness of the two lower levels and the stillness of the higher levels and the like; on the transcendent path, the four noble truths and the like.
"Inconceivable" is given four grounds and none of them is a refusal to explain. The transformation is inconceivable because it is permanent, because it is neither material nor immaterial, because it abides in stillness, and because it has power. Each of these is a specifiable feature that ordinary thought has no category for, since ordinary thought handles either things that alter or things that do not exist, either the material or the mental. The word marks a limit of the categories, not a prohibition on inquiry — which is consistent with the treatise going straight on to explain exactly how the thing is reached.
And what it goes on to is a syllabus. The four objective matters are the standard curriculum of the Treatise on the Stages of Yogic Practice, and the five objects that purify conduct are the five classical antidotal meditations — the impure for craving, loving-kindness for hatred, dependent arising for delusion, the differentiation of the elements for conceit, mindfulness of breathing for scattered thinking. The five objects of skill are precisely the seven skills of fascicle 14, minus the faculties and the truths. The inconceivable is approached, in other words, through a wholly conceivable course of study.
15. Two Transformations: Śrāvaka and Bodhisattva
復次如前所說有二種轉依。何等為二？謂聲聞、菩薩轉依差別。頌曰：
聲聞有二種， 趣寂、趣菩提，
依止變化身， 趣無上正覺。
諸聲聞轉依， 厭背修所得；
菩薩方便修， 無二智依止，
不住生滅故； 諸佛智無上，
利樂諸有情， 不思議無二。
論曰：聲聞轉依當知復有二種，一趣寂滅、二趣菩提。問：聲聞無學永盡後有，云何能證阿耨多羅三藐三菩提？答：依變化身住能證菩提，非業報身。又聲聞轉依以於流轉背修故得。菩薩轉依以方便修及無二智為依止故得。云何以方便修？謂由無間達法性故、所緣大故、發起最勝勤精進故、顧有情故、了諸行故。云何無二智為依止？謂不住流轉及以寂滅，不顧流轉故、顧諸有情故。由此因緣，當知佛智最勝無上。所以者何？餘有情智，或住流轉、或住寂滅，故非無上。又諸佛智利益安樂一切有情，善能成滿自他利故，最勝無上。餘有情智，或唯自利或不俱利，故非無上。以是因故，諸佛智慧不可思議，不住二邊能作一切眾生利益事故。又無有二，謂般涅槃、不涅槃等，性無二故。
Further, as stated above there are two transformations of the basis. What two? The difference between the śrāvaka's transformation and the bodhisattva's.
Śrāvakas are of two kinds,
bound for quiescence and bound for enlightenment;
resting on a transformation body,
one proceeds to unsurpassed right awakening.
The śrāvakas' transformation of the basis
is obtained by cultivating in aversion;
the bodhisattva cultivates by skillful means,
resting on the non-dual knowledge,
because he abides in neither arising nor ceasing.
The knowledge of the buddhas is unsurpassed,
benefiting and gladdening all beings,
inconceivable and non-dual.
The exposition: the śrāvaka's transformation of the basis should be known to be of two kinds — bound for quiescence, and bound for enlightenment. Question: a śrāvaka adept has permanently exhausted future existence; how can he realize unsurpassed, perfect, complete enlightenment? Answer: he abides in dependence on a transformation body and can realize enlightenment there, not in a body of karmic recompense. Again, the śrāvaka's transformation of the basis is obtained by cultivating in aversion toward flowing on. The bodhisattva's transformation of the basis is obtained because it rests on cultivation by skillful means and on the non-dual knowledge. How by skillful means? Because he penetrates the nature of things without interval; because his object is vast; because he arouses the most excellent diligence; because he regards beings; and because he understands the formations. How does it rest on the non-dual knowledge? Because he abides neither in flowing on nor in quiescence — not regarding the flowing on, and regarding beings. For these reasons, know that the buddhas' knowledge is the most excellent and unsurpassed. Why? Because the knowledge of other beings abides either in flowing on or in quiescence, and so is not unsurpassed. Again, the buddhas' knowledge benefits and gladdens all beings and is well able to fulfill the benefit of self and others, and so is the most excellent and unsurpassed; whereas the knowledge of other beings is either for one's own benefit only or is not for both, and so is not unsurpassed. For this reason the wisdom of the buddhas is inconceivable, since abiding in neither extreme it can accomplish the work of benefiting all beings. And it has no duality — as between entering parinirvāṇa and not entering it, and the like — since its nature is non-dual.
The question put here is a real difficulty and the answer is one of the more remarkable sentences in the treatise. If a śrāvaka arhat has exhausted future existence, there is no further birth in which he could take up the bodhisattva path — so how can such a person ever reach buddhahood? Asaṅga's answer is that he does it 依變化身, in dependence on a transformation body, and not in a body of karmic recompense. The point is precise: what the arhat has ended is karmically produced existence, and that is not the only kind of existence there is. The vehicle that seemed to be a dead end is reopened without retracting anything that was said about it.
The contrast between the two cultivations turns on a single character. The śrāvaka's transformation is obtained 背修, by cultivating with his back to flowing on — aversion is the engine. The bodhisattva's rests on a knowledge that is called non-dual for a reason spelled out in six words: 不顧流轉故、顧諸有情故, not regarding the flowing on, and regarding beings. He is not indifferent, and he is not attached; the two attitudes are aimed at different objects. Non-duality here is not a metaphysical blur but the specific ability to hold those two at once — which is also why the same passage can say that a buddha's knowledge has no duality of entering nirvāṇa and not entering it.
16. Direct Realization: What Is Observed, by What, and Where
論曰：如是正勤了知無常、苦、空、無我已，欲何所觀？頌曰：
當知現所觀， 下中上品事，
有漏及無漏， 未見未受遍。
論曰：為現觀察欲色無色三界所繫下中上品所知事故。有漏者，謂即此苦集諦攝。無漏者，謂此增上滅道諦攝。未見者，謂四諦所攝。未受者，謂滅道所攝。遍者，謂現見不現見法智種類智所行境界。復次以何現觀？頌曰：
出世間勝智， 能除見所斷，
無分別證得， 唯依止靜慮。
論曰：出世間智能為現觀，非世間智。為斷見所斷惑，唯是見道，非修道故。問：彼復何行？答：無分別證得。謂現前證得無分別行，非未現證。問：彼何所依？答：唯依止靜慮，不依無色。復次何處現觀？頌曰：
極慼非惡趣， 極欣非上二，
處欲界人天， 佛出世現觀。
論曰：於惡趣中不起現觀，苦受恒隨極憂慼故、不能證得三摩地故。色無色界亦無現觀，欣掉重故、厭羸劣故。是故二界三趣不起現觀，唯一欲界人天二趣，有佛出世能起現觀。
The exposition: having with right diligence understood impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and selflessness, what does one wish to observe?
Know what is presently observed:
matters of lower, middling, and higher grade,
contaminated and uncontaminated,
not yet seen, not yet undergone, and pervading.
The exposition: because one observes directly the knowable matters of lower, middling, and higher grade bound to the three realms of desire, form, and formlessness. Contaminated means what is comprised in the truths of suffering and origin. Uncontaminated means what is comprised, over and above these, in the truths of cessation and the path. Not yet seen means what is comprised in the four truths. Not yet undergone means what is comprised in cessation and the path. Pervading means the range of the knowledge of things and the knowledge by kind, with respect to what is presently seen and what is not presently seen. Further, by what does one directly realize?
The excellent transcendent knowledge
is able to remove what is abandoned by seeing;
it is realized without discrimination,
resting on the absorptions alone.
The exposition: transcendent knowledge is able to serve as direct realization; worldly knowledge is not. Since it is for cutting the afflictions abandoned by seeing, it is the path of seeing alone and not the path of cultivation. Question: what practice is it? Answer: it is realized without discrimination — that is, one realizes the undiscriminating practice directly present before one, not something not yet directly realized. Question: what does it rest on? Answer: on the absorptions alone, not on the formless attainments. Further, where does direct realization occur?
Extreme distress rules out the bad destinies;
extreme elation rules out the upper two;
in the desire realm, among humans and gods,
and where a buddha has appeared, is direct realization.
The exposition: direct realization does not arise in the bad destinies, because painful feeling constantly attends there with extreme grief and distress, and because concentration cannot be realized. Nor is there direct realization in the realms of form and formlessness, because elation and excitement are heavy there and weariness is feeble. Therefore direct realization does not arise in two realms and three destinies; only in the single realm of desire, in the two destinies of humans and gods, where a buddha has appeared in the world, can direct realization arise.
The verse on where realization happens is built out of two disqualifications, and the symmetry is deliberate: the bad destinies are ruled out by 極慼, extreme distress, and the higher two realms by 極欣, extreme elation. Suffering too great and pleasure too great fail in the same way, by making the mind unavailable — the one because concentration cannot be reached under constant pain, the other because 欣掉重, elation and excitement weigh heavy, and 厭羸劣, the weariness that motivates practice is too feeble to move anything. The human realm is favored not for its comfort but for its mixture. This is a familiar claim in Buddhist literature; what is unusual here is that the treatise gives it a mechanism on both sides rather than only lamenting the pleasures of the gods.
The restriction to the absorptions and not the formless attainments follows from the same reasoning and is worth noticing because it cuts against an intuition that deeper is better. Direct realization needs a mind steady enough to hold and discerning enough to see. The formless attainments buy their depth at the cost of the second, and so the entire path of seeing takes place in the four absorptions, which are the shallower end of the meditative range.
17. Who Can Enter, and Why Mind and Not a Self
復次誰能現觀？頌曰：
未離欲、倍離， 及已離欲者，
獨、一證正覺， 最勝我所生。
論曰：有五種補特伽羅能入現觀，或無入者，以無我故。何等為五？一未離欲者、二倍離欲者、三已離欲者、四獨覺、五菩薩。云何應知唯心能入現觀，非我能入？頌曰：
非我為智因， 亦非自取境，
我非自現觀， 執愛自我故。
無常有境界， 待緣智生起，
斷麁重等三， 故依心現觀。
論曰：若計有我能入現觀，不應道理。何以故？我為智因，不應理故。若離於智，自然不能取故。所以者何？若我能為智因，即是無常，或應智是常有。若我自能取境界者，智未生前亦應能取。又若計我能入現觀，此我亦應自觀我性。若如是者，應無解脫，以緣執我及起愛故。所以者何？無有取我不起我執及我愛者。若說依心能入現觀，斯有道理。何以故？心是無常，有境待緣能生智故。又依止心，若麁重若我執及與我愛皆可斷滅。所以者何？心無常故，為智生因；有所緣故，與智俱時同取境界；待眾緣故，智不常有。又心是麁重之所依故、性離我故。若證遍智，即能遠離麁重而生，永除我執及與我愛。
Further, who is able to realize directly?
One not yet free of craving, one doubly free,
and one already free of craving;
the solitary one, and the one who realizes right awakening —
the most excellent, born of what I have taught.
The exposition: there are five persons able to enter direct realization — or there is no one who enters, since there is no self. What five? One not yet free of craving; one doubly free of craving; one already free of craving; a pratyekabuddha; and a bodhisattva. How is it to be known that mind alone can enter direct realization and a self cannot?
A self is not the cause of knowledge,
nor does it take an object of itself;
a self does not realize itself directly,
since it grasps and loves its own self.
Impermanent, having an object,
awaiting conditions, knowledge arises;
it cuts coarse heaviness and the other two —
therefore direct realization rests on mind.
The exposition: to suppose that a self can enter direct realization does not stand to reason. Why? Because a self being the cause of knowledge does not stand to reason; and because, apart from knowledge, it could not of itself take anything up. Why? Because if a self could be the cause of knowledge, it would be impermanent — or else knowledge would have to exist permanently. And if a self could take an object of itself, it should have been able to take one before knowledge arose. Again, if one supposes that a self can enter direct realization, this self would also have to observe its own nature; and were that so, there could be no liberation, since it would grasp itself as object and give rise to love — for there is no one who takes up a self without giving rise to grasping at self and love of self. To say that direct realization can be entered in dependence on mind does stand to reason. Why? Because mind is impermanent, has an object, and awaits conditions, and so can produce knowledge. Moreover, in dependence on mind, coarse heaviness, the grasping at self, and the love of self can all be cut off. Why? Because mind is impermanent, it is a cause for the arising of knowledge; because it has an object, it takes an object together with knowledge at the same time; because it awaits many conditions, knowledge does not exist permanently. Again, because mind is the support of coarse heaviness and its nature is apart from a self: if one realizes the all-pervading knowledge, one can then arise having kept far from coarse heaviness, and permanently remove the grasping at self and the love of self.
The aside in the middle of the prose is the sort of thing that makes this treatise worth reading closely. Having asked who can enter direct realization and prepared a list of five, Asaṅga interrupts himself: 或無入者，以無我故 — or there is no one who enters, since there is no self. The list is then given anyway. He is not undoing the answer; he is marking that the question was asked in the conventional register, where persons are the working units, and that the same page has just spent a chapter denying them ultimately. Neither register is withdrawn.
The argument proper turns on three features of mind, and each is exactly the feature a self is supposed not to have. Mind is impermanent, so it can cause; a permanent self either causes nothing or causes a knowledge that never stops. Mind has an object, so it can accompany knowledge to that object. Mind awaits conditions, so knowledge comes and goes as it manifestly does. The last argument is the strongest and is moral rather than metaphysical: a self observing itself would be grasping and loving itself in the act of observing, since 無有取我不起我執及我愛者 — nobody takes up a self without grasping and loving it. Self-observation by a self would therefore be the one procedure guaranteed to produce no liberation at all.
18. The Order of Entry, and the Three Fetters
云何次第能入現觀？頌曰：
已成熟相續， 或聽聞正法，
自然極如理， 作意故現觀，
繫念於所緣， 精勤修靜定，
增上善根力， 證聖覺道分。
論曰：修現觀者，先當成熟自相續已，或復聽聞正法，謂聲聞乘；或復自然，謂菩薩及獨覺，於自內心極善作意故，能入現觀。次繫念於所緣者，謂四念住。精勤者，謂四正斷。修靜定者，謂四神足。增上善根者，謂先證得增上資糧信等善根。力者，謂彼所治不信等障所不能雜。證聖覺分者，謂依彼故證遍覺支。證聖道分者，謂證八聖道支。如是次第得入現觀。復次齊何當言正入現觀？頌曰：
從是入見道， 無漏正見起，
永斷於三結， 證現觀應知。
論曰：從前所修如理作意故，於見道位出世間正見得生。由正見故三結永斷，謂薩迦耶見、戒禁取及疑，齊如是位當知已入現觀。然此位中一切惡趣雜染之法皆悉遣除，云何但言三結永斷？頌曰：
雖惡趣雜染， 計所起惑斷，
境見導師等， 隨生三所攝。
論曰：由薩迦耶見於境迷失，由戒禁取於見迷失，由彼疑故於佛導師所說正法及正行僧而生迷惑，是故隨強唯說永斷三結。
In what order can direct realization be entered?
The continuum already ripened,
or having heard the true Dharma,
or of oneself, most thoroughly and rightly —
by attention, direct realization;
binding mindfulness upon its object,
diligently cultivating the stillness of concentration,
by the power of dominant wholesome roots,
one realizes the noble factors of enlightenment and of the path.
The exposition: one who cultivates direct realization should first ripen his own continuum; and then, either having heard the true Dharma, which is the śrāvaka vehicle, or of himself, which is the bodhisattva and the pratyekabuddha, he can enter direct realization because within his own mind he attends most thoroughly. Next, binding mindfulness upon its object means the four establishments of mindfulness. Diligently means the four right abandonings. Cultivating the stillness of concentration means the four bases of supernormal power. Dominant wholesome roots means the wholesome roots of faith and the rest, realized earlier as the dominant provisions. Power means that the obstructions they counteract — lack of faith and the rest — cannot be mixed in with them. Realizing the noble factors of enlightenment means that in dependence on these one realizes the factors of complete enlightenment. Realizing the factors of the noble path means realizing the eight branches of the noble path. In this order one comes to enter direct realization. Further, at what point should one be said to have properly entered direct realization?
From this one enters the path of seeing;
uncontaminated right view arises;
the three fetters are permanently cut —
know this as realizing direct realization.
The exposition: because of the right attention cultivated before, transcendent right view is produced at the stage of the path of seeing. By right view the three fetters are permanently cut, namely the view of a substantial body, clinging to rules and rituals, and doubt. At just this stage one should know that direct realization has been entered. Yet at this stage all the defiled things of the bad destinies are dispelled entirely; why is it said only that the three fetters are permanently cut?
Though the defilements of the bad destinies,
the afflictions arisen by supposing, are cut,
as to object, view, and the guide and the rest,
they follow and are comprised in the three.
The exposition: by the view of a substantial body one goes astray with respect to the object; by clinging to rules and rituals one goes astray with respect to view; and by that doubt one is confused about the Buddha as guide, the true Dharma he taught, and the Saṅgha of right practice. Therefore, following what is strongest, it is said only that the three fetters are permanently cut.
The list of preliminaries is a compressed statement of the thirty-seven factors of enlightenment in their canonical order — the four establishments of mindfulness, the four right abandonings, the four bases of supernormal power, then the five faculties and five powers, then the seven factors of enlightenment and the eight branches of the path — but it is arranged so that each verse phrase names one group. Two details are added rather than merely recited. 增上善根 is glossed as the faculties and 力 as the powers, and the difference between them is given a clean criterion: a wholesome root becomes a power when the obstruction it counteracts can no longer be mixed in with it. Faith is a faculty while doubt can still contaminate it, and a power when it cannot.
The question about the three fetters is a genuine objection and the answer is elegant. If the path of seeing dispels the whole mass of defilement leading to bad destinies, naming only three fetters looks like an undercount. The answer is that the three are not a partial list but a complete taxonomy of what goes wrong, sorted by target: the view of a substantial body misses the object, clinging to rules and rituals misses the view, and doubt misses the teacher, teaching, and community. 隨強 — following what is strongest — everything else is comprised under one of the three. It is a naming convention, not a smaller claim.
19. The Marks of Direct Realization, and Ten Certainties
復次現觀有何相貌？頌曰：
由先世間智， 簡擇諦究竟，
於諦無加行， 決定生起相，
智境和合相， 於所知究竟，
當知諦現觀， 於十種決定。
論曰：由先世間智者，謂從聞所生智乃至世間第一法智。簡擇諦究竟者，謂已於諸諦究竟簡擇，於諦無加行。決定生起相者，謂於所觀察諸諦境中不由加行功用決定生起相，是現觀相。又此決定智與境和合相究竟到所知故。所以者何？除是以外更無異境可須求故，是故此觀名為現觀。當知此決定相復有十種。何等為十？頌曰：
我性無三有， 不滅無有二，
無分別無怖， 自斷中決定。
論曰：十種決定者，一於眾生無中決定、二於遍計所執自性無中決定、三於無我有、四於相有、五於麁重有，是中並決定。六於不滅中決定，謂或無故不滅，謂眾生我及法我或有故不滅，謂二無我。
七於無二中決定，謂法及法空無有差別。八於空無分別決定、九於法性無怖決定，謂諸愚夫於此性處生諸怖畏，智者於此無有怖畏是故決定。十於自在能斷決定，謂我不復從於他人求斷方便，是故決定。
Further, what marks does direct realization have?
By the worldly knowledge that comes first,
discernment of the truths is brought to its end;
with no further application to the truths,
the mark of certainty arises;
the mark of knowledge joined with its object,
brought to its end in the knowable —
know this as the direct realization of the truths,
with ten certainties.
The exposition: by the worldly knowledge that comes first means from the knowledge born of hearing on up to the knowledge of the supreme worldly dharma. Discernment of the truths brought to its end means that one has already discerned the truths to the end and applies oneself to them no further. The mark of certainty arising means that within the objects of the truths under observation the mark arises with certainty and without any applied effort; this is the mark of direct realization. And this certain knowledge has the mark of being joined with its object, since it is brought to its end in reaching the knowable. Why? Because apart from this there is no other object that need be sought; and therefore this observation is called direct realization. Know that this mark of certainty is again of ten kinds. What ten?
Selfhood; the absence of the three existences;
not ceasing; being without duality;
without discrimination, without fear,
and certainty as to cutting by oneself.
The exposition: the ten certainties. First, certainty as to the absence of beings. Second, certainty as to the absence of the imagined own-nature. Third, as to the presence of selflessness; fourth, as to the presence of marks; fifth, as to the presence of coarse heaviness — in these there is likewise certainty. Sixth, certainty as to not ceasing: either not ceasing because absent, namely a self in beings and a self in things; or not ceasing because present, namely the two selflessnesses.
Seventh, certainty as to non-duality, namely that things and the emptiness of things are without difference. Eighth, certainty as to being without discrimination in emptiness. Ninth, certainty as to being without fear in the nature of things: foolish worldlings give rise to fears in the place of this nature, while the wise have no fear here, and therefore it is certain. Tenth, certainty as to being able to cut by one's own mastery: I no longer seek from another the means of cutting, and therefore it is certain.
The six certainties in the middle are arranged as a careful pair of triples, and the arrangement is the doctrine. Two things are certainly absent: beings, and the imagined nature. Three things are certainly present: selflessness, marks, and coarse heaviness. This is the Yogācāra position stated as an inventory. What goes is the imagined; what stays is the dependent — and marks and coarse heaviness are exactly the two components the dependent nature was defined by in section 10 above. The sixth certainty then makes the same point in a form that reads like a riddle until one sees the two halves: what is absent does not cease, because it was never there to cease; and what is present does not cease, because it is what remains.
The ninth certainty is the only one with an emotion in it, and it is placed where it is for a reason. 諸愚夫於此性處生諸怖畏 — foolish worldlings give rise to fears in this place. The treatise does not argue anyone out of that fear or say it is unreasonable; it records that at a certain point the fear is simply no longer there, and counts its absence as one of the ten marks that realization has occurred. The tenth follows on naturally and is the most practical of the set: from here the practitioner no longer asks anyone else how to proceed.
20. The Sequence — Four, Eight, Seven — and the Three Purities
復次如是現觀，云何次第修習應知？頌曰：
發起、證、等流、 成滿次第四；
又法住智等， 次第八應知。
論曰：現觀次第，或四、或八、或復七種。何等為四？一發起，謂從聞所生智乃至世第一法。二證得，謂見道。三等流，謂修道。四成滿，謂究竟道。云何為八？謂法住智乃至善清淨智，如前所說。
云何七種？頌曰：
無悔住所緣， 如實見境界，
道所依無惑， 純差別行斷。
論曰：七種次第者，謂尸羅淨乃至行斷智見淨；由尸羅清淨故無有變悔；由無悔故心定住境；由心定故於所知境得如實見；次於如實智見道所依止佛法僧寶遠離疑惑，得四證淨俱生智；次於善逝所證所說得決定智，謂唯佛法中有純淨出離苦道，非於餘法；次於此道得行差別智，謂苦遲通行是下品樂、速通行是上品、餘二行是中品；次依上品正行於餘斷滅生勝智見。復次此尸羅等七清淨，若略說三學所攝，當知亦是三淨所攝。云何三淨？頌曰：
三淨攝應知， 戒淨及心淨，
境界依止道， 說為慧清淨。
論曰：三種淨者，所謂戒淨、心淨、慧淨。慧清淨中復有三種：一於境界、二於道所依止、三於道體。於道體中當知復有三種，謂純故、差別故、斷故。
Further, in what order should this direct realization be cultivated?
Arousing, realizing, outflow,
and fulfilling: four in order;
and the knowledge of the abiding of things and the rest —
eight in order are to be known.
The exposition: the order of direct realization is fourfold, or eightfold, or again sevenfold. What four? First, arousing, from the knowledge born of hearing on up to the supreme worldly dharma. Second, realizing, namely the path of seeing. Third, outflow, namely the path of cultivation. Fourth, fulfilling, namely the final path. What eight? From the knowledge of the abiding of things on up to the well-purified knowledge, as stated above.
What seven?
Free of regret, abiding on its object,
seeing the object as it really is,
free of confusion as to what the path rests on,
pure, differentiated, and cut off.
The exposition: the sevenfold order runs from the purity of moral discipline to the purity of knowledge and vision as to the cutting off of practice. Because moral discipline is pure, there is no regret; because there is no regret, the mind settles fixed upon its object; because the mind is settled, one comes to see the knowable object as it really is; next, with respect to the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha upon which the knowledge and vision of things as they really are depend, one keeps far from doubt and confusion and obtains the knowledge born together with the four confirmed faiths; next, with respect to what the Well-Gone One realized and taught, one obtains certain knowledge — that only within the Buddha's teaching is there a purely pure path of deliverance from suffering, and not in other teachings; next, with respect to this path one obtains the knowledge of the differences among practices — that painful and slow progress is of the lower grade, pleasant and swift progress of the higher, and the remaining two of the middling; and next, in dependence on right practice of the higher grade, one gives rise to excellent knowledge and vision regarding what remains to be cut off. Further, these seven purities beginning with moral discipline, if stated in brief as comprised within the three trainings, should be known to be comprised within three purities as well. What three purities?
Comprised as three purities, to be known:
purity of discipline and purity of mind;
as to object, as to what the path rests on, and as to the path —
this is called purity of wisdom.
The exposition: the three purities are purity of discipline, purity of mind, and purity of wisdom. Within purity of wisdom there are again three: as to the object, as to what the path rests on, and as to the substance of the path. And within the substance of the path there are again three, namely by purity, by differentiation, and by cutting off.
Three schemes for one process, and the treatise offers no ranking among them — which is itself informative about how these lists are meant to be used. The fourfold is structural and covers the whole path in a sentence. The eightfold is epistemic, running through kinds of knowledge. The sevenfold is the old sequence of purities familiar from the Rathavinīta discourse and its later elaborations, and it is the only one of the three with a stated causal chain: discipline produces the absence of regret, absence of regret produces a settled mind, a settled mind produces seeing things as they are. That is a psychological claim, and it is the reason the sevenfold scheme has to begin where it does.
The grading of the four progressions is a small aside with a sting in it. Painful and slow progress is 下品, the lower grade; pleasant and swift is 上品, the higher. It would be easy to assume the opposite — that a harder road indicates a more serious practitioner — and the treatise does not allow the assumption. Ease and speed are marks of a well-prepared continuum, not of laxity. And the sequence ends not in an achievement but in an assessment: excellent knowledge and vision regarding what remains to be cut off.
21. From the Four Foundations to the Supreme Worldly Dharma
復次於如是次第中，以何次第入於現觀？頌曰：
知身等因緣， 善達於三世，
次了知四苦， 復八苦應知。
論曰：先於四念住位應善了知身受心法四種因緣，謂由食集故身集、觸集故受集、名色集故識集、作意集故法集。次此身等於三世中應善了知，謂於未來世集法隨觀、於過去世滅法隨觀、於現在世集滅法隨觀。次應了知即此身等四苦所苦，謂受重擔苦、位變異苦、麁重苦及死生苦。以善不善法為因能感流轉死及生苦，是故了知死生二苦即是了知法苦。從此無間將觀諸諦，故先了知八種苦法，所謂生苦乃至略說五取蘊苦。復次頌曰：
從是正觀諦， 起十六行智，
為治四顛倒， 後後之所依。
論曰：知八苦後，次正觀察四種諦理，起十六行智，前為後後之所依止。謂為對治四顛倒故起苦諦四行，一為對治常顛倒故起無常行、二為對治樂淨倒故起於苦行、三為對治我顛倒故起於空行、四即為治此起無我行。所以者何？離諸行外餘我空故、即諸行體非我性故。次於常樂淨我四愛集諦起因、集、生、緣四行。次於此斷滅諦起滅、靜、妙、離四行。次於此能證道諦起道、如、行、出四行。復次頌曰：
從是轉修習， 於心總厭離、
諦簡擇、決定、 究竟覺生起。
論曰：從十六行智後復轉修習，先緣自心總厭心智生，此說名煖。從此已上諦簡擇智生，此說名頂。從此已上決定覺智生，此說名忍。復從此已上究竟覺智生，此說名為世第一法。
Further, within such an order, in what order does one enter direct realization?
Knowing the causes and conditions of the body and the rest,
penetrating well the three times,
next understanding the four sufferings,
and then the eight sufferings, to be known.
The exposition: first, at the stage of the four establishments of mindfulness, one should understand well the four causes and conditions of body, feeling, mind, and things — that by the gathering of food the body gathers, by the gathering of contact feeling gathers, by the gathering of name-and-form consciousness gathers, and by the gathering of attention things gather. Next, one should understand well the body and the rest across the three times — contemplating what gathers with respect to the future, contemplating what ceases with respect to the past, and contemplating what gathers and ceases with respect to the present. Next, one should understand that this body and the rest are afflicted by four sufferings: the suffering of bearing a heavy load, the suffering of alteration of state, the suffering of coarse heaviness, and the suffering of death and birth. Since wholesome and unwholesome things as causes bring about the suffering of death and birth in the flowing on, to understand these two sufferings of death and birth just is to understand the suffering of things. From this, without interval, one is about to observe the truths, and so one first understands the eight sufferings — the suffering of birth, on down to the suffering, stated in brief, of the five appropriated aggregates.
From this one rightly observes the truths
and gives rise to the knowledge of the sixteen aspects,
to counteract the four distortions,
each serving as the support of the next.
The exposition: having known the eight sufferings, one next rightly observes the principles of the four truths and gives rise to the knowledge of the sixteen aspects, each earlier one serving as the support of those that follow. That is, in order to counteract the four distortions one gives rise to the four aspects of the truth of suffering: first, to counteract the distortion of permanence, the aspect of impermanence; second, to counteract the distortion of pleasure and purity, the aspect of suffering; third, to counteract the distortion of self, the aspect of emptiness; and fourth, to counteract this same distortion, the aspect of selflessness. Why two? Because apart from the formations there is no other self, and because the substance of the formations is itself not of the nature of a self. Next, with respect to the truth of origin, which is the fourfold craving for the permanent, pleasant, pure, and self, one gives rise to the four aspects of cause, origin, production, and condition. Next, with respect to the truth of cessation, in which this is cut off, one gives rise to the four aspects of cessation, stillness, excellence, and separation. Next, with respect to the truth of the path, by which this is realized, one gives rise to the four aspects of path, principle, practice, and deliverance.
From this one cultivates on in turn:
a general weariness toward mind,
discernment of the truths, certainty,
and the arising of final awareness.
The exposition: after the knowledge of the sixteen aspects one cultivates on further. First, taking one's own mind as object, the knowledge of a mind generally weary arises; this is called warmth. Above this, the knowledge that discerns the truths arises; this is called summit. Above this, the knowledge of certain awareness arises; this is called forbearance. And above this again, the knowledge of final awareness arises; this is called the supreme worldly dharma.
The four gatherings assigned to the four establishments of mindfulness are worth reading as a set, because each is the standard Abhidharma cause of its object and the alignment is exact: food gathers the body, contact gathers feeling, name-and-form gathers consciousness, attention gathers things. The practice of mindfulness is therefore not described here as bare observation. One is watching each of the four as an effect, with its cause specified in advance. That is what makes the transition to the truths of suffering and origin continuous rather than abrupt: the practitioner has been looking at causation the whole time.
The doubling of the third and fourth aspects of the truth of suffering is a genuine puzzle in the tradition — why both emptiness and selflessness, when one distortion is being counteracted? Asaṅga's answer is the shortest good one available. Emptiness handles the self that might be outside the formations: 離諸行外餘我空. Selflessness handles the self that might be identical with them: 即諸行體非我性. One denial for each place a self could hide, which is a compressed form of the fourfold search of fascicle 15.
The four factors conducive to penetration are named here by what the practitioner knows at each point, and the first is the surprise. Warmth is 緣自心總厭心智 — the knowledge, taking one's own mind as object, of a mind generally weary. Not warmth toward the truths, and not an incipient glow of insight; the first sign that the path of seeing is near is that one turns and looks at one's own mind and finds it tired of the whole business. Summit then discerns the truths, forbearance is certain of them, and the supreme worldly dharma is final awareness — the last moment before the path of seeing, and the highest thing an ordinary being can reach.
The fascicle ends mid-chapter and mid-sentence of the argument, on the threshold. Everything up to the supreme worldly dharma has now been described; the path of seeing itself, and the sixteen mind-moments in which it happens, belong to fascicle 17.
Fascicle 16 Complete
Three chapters, and the treatise's whole Yogācāra core in the middle one. Emptiness closes with eighteen cultivations sorted at last into poisoned and unpoisoned. Naturelessness proves that the imagined nature has no substance — nothing lies outside the five categories, and name and object are guests to each other — while insisting that the dependent nature does exist, since defilement could not be found if nothing real were being mistaken; and it identifies the perfectly accomplished nature with the ultimate, the permanent, and the object that purifies. Direct realization then opens with its procedural questions answered: the desire realm and no other, the absorptions and not the formless, mind and not a self, and four stages of preparation ending at the supreme worldly dharma. Fascicle 17 completes the chapter with the path of seeing itself, and then runs quickly through the chapters on yoga and the inconceivable before opening the treatise's long concluding chapter.
Continue to Fascicle 17 — Realization, Yoga, and the Inconceivable →