Establishing Skill and Impermanence
The treatise changes shape again. After thirteen fascicles of survey, a run of short chapters begins, each proving one thesis — and each built the way the treatise was built at the start, as Asaṅga's own root verses with his own prose beneath them. The third chapter asks why there are exactly seven skills and answers that there are exactly seven ways of believing in a self, one per skill. The fourth then argues the first of the four theses: that conditioned things perish moment by moment, not because anything destroys them but because nothing holds them. Everything else follows from that — the permanent self, the creator god, primordial nature, the atom, and permanent awareness are each dispatched in turn, and the chapter closes by asking why, if impermanence is so plain, nobody sees it.
Where This Fascicle Picks Up
Fascicle 13 completed the chapter on Gathering the Pure Meaning, and with it the treatise's long descriptive survey, which has run for thirteen fascicles. What follows is a different kind of writing: eight short chapters, each establishing one thesis, occupying fascicles 14 through 17.
These chapters are the most verse-dense in the treatise, and collating them against T1603 confirms the correspondence exactly — fifty verse lines in the third chapter and forty-seven in the fourth, matching line for line. Two single-character variants and some punctuation are all that differ; both are noted below where they fall.
Classical text is set in the left-hand column, our English in the right. See also this site's note on translation method.
1. Seven Skills, and Why Exactly Seven
復次於此論體九事等中，應善了知七種善巧。何等為七？頌曰：
於諸蘊、界、處， 及眾緣起法、
處非處、根、諦， 善巧事應知。
論曰：住正法者應善了達如是七種善巧之事。問：何故唯立七種善巧？答：世間愚夫多如是計。頌曰：
身者自在等， 無因身者住，
流轉作諸業， 及增上二種。
Furthermore, within the nine topics and the rest that are the substance of this treatise, seven skills should be well understood. What seven?
In the aggregates, the elements, the sense fields,
the teachings of dependent arising,
the possible and impossible, the faculties, the truths —
these are the matters of skill, to be known.
The exposition: one who abides in the true Dharma should well penetrate these seven matters of skill. Question: why are exactly seven skills established? Answer: because foolish worldlings mostly suppose as follows.
An embodied one; a Lord and the rest;
the embodied one abiding without cause;
flowing on; performing deeds;
and two kinds of dominance.
論曰：於諸蘊中不善巧故，執諸蘊體為我身者。於諸界中不善巧故，執自在等為身生因，或執無因身自然起，以不了達從自種因身得生故。所以者何？界者，功能、種子、族姓因等名差別故。於諸處中不善巧故，執有身者依身而住取外境界。於緣起中不善巧故，執有身者流轉生死。由不善知處非處故，執有身者能造諸業。由不善知諸根諸諦，執有二種增上身者，謂愛非愛業果增上者，及染污清淨增上者。由不善知苦集兩諦，計有染污增上者。由不善知滅道兩諦，計有清淨增上者。
The exposition: because one is unskilled in the aggregates, one grasps the substance of the aggregates as an embodied self. Because one is unskilled in the elements, one grasps a Lord and the rest as the cause of the body's arising, or grasps that the body arises of itself without cause — because one does not penetrate that the body arises from its own seed as cause. Why? Because "element" is a difference of name for capacity, seed, lineage-cause, and the like. Because one is unskilled in the sense fields, one grasps that an embodied one dwells in dependence on the body and takes up outer objects. Because one is unskilled in dependent arising, one grasps that an embodied one flows on through birth and death. Because one does not know well the possible and the impossible, one grasps that an embodied one performs deeds. Because one does not know well the faculties and the truths, one grasps two kinds of dominant embodied one — one dominant over the fruits of welcome and unwelcome karma, and one dominant over defilement and purity. Because one does not know well the truths of suffering and origin, one supposes a defiling dominant one; because one does not know well the truths of cessation and the path, one supposes a purifying dominant one.
This is the treatise's characteristic move — the same one that justified nine topics in fascicle 4 and five aggregates in fascicle 5 — but applied here to a therapeutic rather than an ontological list. There are seven skills because there are seven distinct errors, and each skill is the specific antidote to one of them. The categories of Abhidharma are not a filing system; they are a pharmacy.
Note the gloss on "element," which explains why unskillfulness there produces theism specifically: 界者，功能、種子、族姓因等名差別故 — element is another name for capacity, seed, and lineage-cause. Someone who does not grasp that a body arises from its own seed must find some other cause for it, and the two available answers are a god or nothing at all. Theism and materialism are here diagnosed as the same gap filled two different ways.
2. Seven Confusions
頌曰：
於身者等起， 實我所住持，
流轉者作者， 及諸增上義。
染污若清淨， 起七種愚癡，
對治此應知， 攝七種善巧。
論曰：如前總說二種增上，分別顯示二種愚癡，謂增上義愚癡及染污清淨愚癡。誰依七種身等愚轉？頌曰：
妄計我身者， 依止諸根住，
於境界迴轉， 受用愛非愛。
言說所依住， 作者有覺者，
由於差別蘊， 總見一身者。
Verse:
About an embodied one, about its arising,
about a real self that sustains,
about one who flows on, one who acts,
and about the senses of dominance —
defiling or purifying:
seven confusions arise.
Know that what counteracts these
is gathered as the seven skills.
The exposition: the two kinds of dominance stated above display two confusions in particular — confusion about the sense of dominance, and confusion about defilement and purity. Upon what does the sevenfold confusion about an embodied one and the rest turn?
Falsely supposing an embodied self,
abiding in dependence on the faculties,
turning among objects,
enjoying the welcome and unwelcome;
that on which speech rests,
an agent, one who is aware —
upon aggregates that are distinct
one sees a single embodied one throughout.
論曰：身者愚者由不了知色蘊體故，計有一我，依止五根於境界轉。由不了知受蘊體故，計有受者，受用一切愛非愛事。由不了知想蘊體故，別計有我言說依住，不知想是言說依故。如薄伽梵說：如其所想起於言說。由不了知行蘊體故，計有作者。由不了知識蘊體故，計有覺者非唯有識，以諸世間於識蘊體起覺想故。如是愚夫，於諸差別蘊自相中，總起一種身者愚癡，即計身者以之為我。
The exposition: one confused about an embodied one, because he does not understand the substance of the aggregate of form, supposes a single self abiding in dependence on the five faculties and turning among objects. Because he does not understand the substance of the aggregate of feeling, he supposes an experiencer who enjoys all welcome and unwelcome things. Because he does not understand the substance of the aggregate of perception, he separately supposes a self on which speech rests — not knowing that it is perception that speech rests on. As the Blessed One said: one speaks in accordance with what one has perceived. Because he does not understand the substance of the aggregate of formations, he supposes an agent. Because he does not understand the substance of the aggregate of consciousness, he supposes one who is aware and not merely consciousness — since the world forms the notion of an aware one upon the substance of the consciousness aggregate. Thus the foolish worldling, upon the particular marks of the distinct aggregates, gives rise to a single confusion about an embodied one throughout, and supposes that embodied one to be a self.
This is the same argument the self-theorist made in fascicle 9, turned inside out. There, the opponent observed that on seeing the five aggregates one perceives not five things but a person, and offered that as evidence for a self. Here the identical observation is offered as a diagnosis: because one does not understand each aggregate, one manufactures a corresponding role for a self — a body-dweller, an experiencer, a speaker, an agent, a knower — and then, 總見一身者, sees one embodied being across all five.
The remark about perception is the sharpest: 不知想是言說依故, not knowing that it is perception that speech rests on. Something does underlie our speaking; the error is in supposing it must be a someone rather than an aggregate. Each of the five confusions has this shape — a real function misattributed to a fictitious owner.
3. The Remaining Confusions
復次等起愚者。頌曰：
迷惑初因故， 計常因無因。
論曰：世間愚夫，或於身所有初因而生迷惑故，執不平等因，謂有常住自在天、毘瑟弩天自性等因。或說無因，謂撥無一切能生因體。復次實我所住持愚者。頌曰：
我住持諸根， 能觸及能受。
論曰：計我住持諸根，能觸順苦受觸、順樂受觸，及能領受若樂若苦。
復次流轉作者增上義及染污清淨愚者，謂計有各別住持身者我已，頌曰：
從此死生處， 計有流轉者，
法非法作者， 及彼果增上。
於修習邪行， 計為染污者；
於修習正行， 妄計解脫者。
Next, confusion about arising. Verse:
Because one is confused about the first cause,
one supposes a permanent cause, or no cause.
The exposition: foolish worldlings, being confused about the first cause of the body, grasp an unequal cause — a permanently abiding Maheśvara, Viṣṇu, primordial nature, and the like; or they assert no cause, denying every substance capable of producing.
Next, confusion about a real self that sustains. Verse:
A self sustains the faculties,
and can contact, and can feel.
The exposition: one supposes a self that sustains the faculties, can make the contact conducive to painful feeling and that conducive to pleasant feeling, and can undergo pleasure and pain.
Next, confusion about flowing on, about an agent, about the sense of dominance, and about defilement and purity — that is, having supposed a self that separately sustains a body:
Dying here and being born there,
one supposes a flower-on,
a doer of what is right and wrong,
and one dominant over its fruit.
In the cultivation of wrong conduct
one supposes a defiled one;
in the cultivation of right conduct
one falsely supposes a liberated one.
論曰：彼愚癡者，於彼彼死生處計有實我生死流轉，即此實我造作後世法非法因，即此實我於彼果自在受用故彼果法生，即此實我依於果法習行邪行計為染者、修行正行計為解脫者。頌曰：
佛未出於世， 如是愚癡轉；
由佛現世間， 說七種善巧。
論曰：此中顯示依如是時，如其所應外道愚癡。眾生還滅，由此七種善巧言說不共一切諸外道故。
The exposition: those confused ones suppose that at each place of dying and being born there is a real self flowing on through birth and death; that this same real self performs the causes, right and wrong, of a future life; that this same real self, having mastery over that fruit and enjoying it, is why the resultant states arise; and that this same real self, in dependence on those resultant states, is supposed to be defiled when it practices wrong conduct and liberated when it practices right conduct. Verse:
Before a buddha appeared in the world
such confusion turned;
because a buddha appeared in the world,
the seven skills were taught.
The exposition: this displays the confusion of the outsiders as it stood at such a time, each according to its kind. Beings return to cessation because these seven skills, as taught, are held in common with none of the outsiders.
The single verse on the first cause is the most economical statement of the alternatives anywhere in the treatise: confusion about origin yields either a permanent cause or no cause. Both were refuted at length in fascicle 10 — theism and the view of no cause — and here they are shown to be one error with two faces, each arising from the same failure to see that a thing comes from its own seed.
The historical verse is worth noting for its modesty. It does not claim that the outsiders were stupid; it says that before a buddha appeared, this confusion 轉, turned — it was simply the state of things. And the reason the seven skills work is stated as a bare fact of intellectual history: 不共一切諸外道, held in common with none of the outsiders. Nobody else had this analysis.
4. Skill in the Aggregates and the Elements
此中蘊善巧者，頌曰：
知世等別故， 能除一合想，
即離與解脫， 眾生不可得。
多種及總略， 共有差別轉，
增益損減智， 蘊善巧應知。
Of these, skill in the aggregates:
Because one knows the distinctions of time and the rest,
one can remove the notion of a single mass;
as identical, as apart, and as liberated —
a being is not to be found.
Many kinds and the whole gathered;
held in common, turning in distinction;
the knowledge of superimposing and denying —
such is skill in the aggregates, to be known.
論曰：世等別者，謂諸蘊去來等體性差別。如薄伽梵說：諸所有色，若過去若未來若現在、若內若外、若麁若細、若劣若勝、若遠若近等，乃至廣說。由勝智慧如實知故，於諸蘊中捨一合想，即是還滅。又於諸蘊中補特伽羅性不可得。何以故？即於諸蘊眾生不可得，離於諸蘊眾生亦不可得，解脫諸蘊眾生亦不可得。如薄伽梵告西你迦：汝於色蘊見如來耶？乃至汝於識蘊見如來耶？西你迦答：不也。喬答摩！如是乃至廣說。於彼經中說色等蘊，若總若別補特伽羅皆不可得。今於此中但略說，總於五蘊是不可得。
如是已說，了知色等相差別故，及能遠離彼所對治增益執故，於諸蘊中自相共相皆得善巧。又復蘊者是積聚義，能善了知是積聚義，名蘊善巧。此積聚義復有四種，謂多種義、總略義、共有轉義、增益損減義。此中顯示諸蘊自體及彼障斷勝利，是名蘊善巧。
云何界善巧？頌曰：
見三因生故， 說名界善巧，
從無始自種， 多種種生起，
由此及於此， 取者不可得，
依自智成故， 能除下劣性。
論曰：由觀根境識三法從自因而生，名界善巧。所以者何？由彼諸法無始流轉從自種生多生起及種種生起。當知多生起者，如經言：非一界故。種種生起者，如經言：種種界故。復次由依諸根於諸境界能取之我不可得故，能知所作依自成立，不由大自在天等。是故凡所欲為不生下劣，自在修習此中顯示界善巧自體及彼障斷勝利，是名界善巧。
The exposition: the distinctions of time and the rest means the differences in the substance of the aggregates as past, future, and so on. As the Blessed One said: whatever form there is, past, future, or present, inner or outer, coarse or fine, inferior or superior, far or near, and so on at length. Because one knows this as it really is by surpassing wisdom, one abandons the notion of a single mass with respect to the aggregates — and that is the return to cessation. Moreover, within the aggregates the nature of a person is not to be found. Why? Because a being is not found as identical with the aggregates, nor apart from the aggregates, nor as liberated from them. As the Blessed One said to Seniya: do you see the Tathāgata in the aggregate of form? — down to: do you see the Tathāgata in the aggregate of consciousness? Seniya answered: no, Gautama. And so on at length. In that scripture it is said that in form and the other aggregates, whether taken together or separately, no person is to be found. Here it is stated only in brief: taken as a whole, in the five aggregates none is to be found.
Thus, because one understands the differences among the marks of form and the rest, and because one can keep far from the grasping at superimposition that they counteract, one attains skill in the particular and general marks of the aggregates. Moreover, "aggregate" has the sense of heaping together, and to understand well this sense of heaping is called skill in the aggregates. This sense of heaping is of four kinds: many kinds, the whole gathered, turning in what is held in common, and superimposing and denying. This displays the substance of skill in the aggregates and the benefit of removing its obstruction.
What is skill in the elements?
Because one sees the three arise from causes,
it is called skill in the elements:
from beginningless time, from their own seeds,
arising in many ways and in various ways;
and by this, and within this,
no grasper is to be found —
because it is established by one's own knowledge,
one can remove the state of inferiority.
The exposition: because one observes that the three — faculty, object, and consciousness — arise from their own causes, it is called skill in the elements. Why? Because those things, flowing on from beginningless time, arise from their own seeds, arising in many ways and in various ways. Arising in many ways is as the scripture says, "because the elements are not one"; arising in various ways, as it says, "because the elements are various." Furthermore, since a self that grasps objects in dependence on the faculties is not to be found, one can know that what is done is established by oneself and not by Maheśvara and the rest. Therefore whatever one wishes to do does not give rise to inferiority, and one cultivates with mastery. This displays the substance of skill in the elements and the benefit of removing its obstruction.
The threefold search — a being is not found as identical with the aggregates, apart from them, or liberated from them — is the classical formula, and the third term is the one that catches people out. Even if one grants that no self is in or beside the aggregates, one may still imagine a self that is released from them, standing free. The exchange with Seniya blocks that too.
The benefit of skill in the elements is stated in a phrase that stands out for its psychological cast: 能除下劣性, one can remove the state of inferiority. The reasoning is direct — if what one does is established by one's own seeds rather than by Maheśvara, then one's efforts are one's own, and there is no ground for feeling small. A metaphysical thesis about causation is cashed out as a claim about self-worth, which is the same move the treatise made in fascicle 10 when it said that all good qualities are obtained by one's own exertion.
5. Skill in the Sense Fields and in Dependent Arising
云何處善巧？頌曰：
知諸觸諸受， 由二種生門，
依止於觸故， 當知處善巧。
如法處天處， 後後所依止，
由世俗諦故， 了知二種性。
論曰：由善了知觸生門體建立二處，謂根及境。如是由能生義故名為處，猶如世間修善法所名為法處。又善了知諸受依觸，是故建立觸為彼處。如是所居住義故名為處，猶如世間天像住所名為天處。又復觸受二法生時，依世俗故了知二性，謂觸者、受者，由觸能觸對受能領納。此中顯示，就勝義諦，觸者受者皆不可得；就世俗諦，二皆可得。是名處善巧。
What is skill in the sense fields?
Knowing contacts and feelings
by the two gates of their arising,
and because feelings rest on contact —
know this as skill in the sense fields.
As with a place of dharma and a place of gods,
each later resting on the earlier;
and by way of conventional truth
one understands the two natures.
The exposition: because one understands well the substance of the gate from which contact arises, two sense fields are established, namely faculty and object. Thus, in the sense of being able to produce, they are called a field — as in the world a place where good practices are cultivated is called a place of dharma. Again, one understands well that feelings rest on contact, and so contact is established as their field. Thus, in the sense of being dwelt in, it is called a field — as in the world a place where images of the gods reside is called a place of gods. Moreover, when contact and feeling arise, one understands by way of convention two natures — a contacter and a feeler, since contact contacts and feeling registers. This displays that in the ultimate sense neither contacter nor feeler is to be found, while in the conventional sense both are found.
云何緣起善巧？頌曰：
知未斷無常， 因能生諸果，
自相續相似， 名緣起善巧。
眾生不可得， 而有捨續者，
由了達甚深， 四種緣起故。
論曰：能善了知從未永斷無常之因能生諸果，名緣起善巧。謂如經說：此有故彼有，此生故彼生。如其次第。又能善知由從此因於自相續生諸果法，謂如經說：非緣餘生而有老死等。又善了知從相似因生諸果法，謂如經說：身惡行者，能感不憙不樂不愛不可意異熟身。妙行者，能感與上相違可意等異熟。如是等。復次即諸蘊相續名捨命者及續生者，補特伽羅性不可得，由善了知四種甚深緣起故，謂不從自生、不從他生、非自他生、非無因生。此中顯示緣起自體及彼障斷勝利，是名緣起善巧。
What is skill in dependent arising?
Knowing that causes not yet cut off, impermanent,
can produce their fruits,
within their own continuum and by likeness —
this is called skill in dependent arising.
A being is not to be found,
and yet there is one who lays down and one who continues:
because one penetrates the profound
fourfold dependent arising.
The exposition: to understand well that fruits are produced from impermanent causes not yet permanently cut off is called skill in dependent arising — as the scripture says, "this being, that is; this arising, that arises," in that order. And to know well that resultant states arise within one's own continuum from that cause — as the scripture says, "aging and death do not come about depending on some other birth." And to understand well that resultant states arise from like causes — as the scripture says, one of evil bodily conduct brings about a ripened body unwelcome, unpleasant, unloved, and disagreeable; one of excellent conduct brings about a ripening the reverse of that. Furthermore, it is the continuity of the aggregates itself that is called the one who lays down life and the one who takes up birth again; the nature of a person is not to be found — because one understands well the fourfold profound dependent arising, namely that things do not arise from themselves, nor from another, nor from both, nor without cause.
The verse "as with a place of dharma and a place of gods" is where T1603 and T1602 diverge by a single character: the verse-only text reads 知, "knowing," where the prose text reads 如, "as with." The prose commentary settles it — it goes on to use precisely the comparison 猶如世間, "as in the world," twice, first for a place where good is practiced and then for a place where images of the gods reside. T1602's reading is confirmed by its own gloss, and this is exactly the sort of question collating the two texts is good for.
The section on dependent arising states the four negations that would later become the opening verse of Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā — not from self, not from another, not from both, not without cause. Here they arrive not as a critique of causation but as its correct description, and they sit immediately after three positive claims: fruits come from causes not yet cut off, within one's own continuum, and resembling their causes. The four negations rule out four accounts of how that happens, not the happening.
The phrase 捨續者, "one who lays down and one who continues," names the deepest form of the problem: something does die and something is reborn, and the vocabulary is unavoidable. The answer given is that the continuity of the aggregates is what that vocabulary names.
6. Skill in the Possible and the Impossible
云何處非處善巧？頌曰：
不作，不趣、得， 二、餘體不轉，
淨見無餘業， 非我自在二。
如是智能知， 處非處善巧，
於自果定處， 異此說非處。
論曰：若不見我，於因果二處而得自在，名處非處善巧，謂不作故、不趣故、不得故、二體不轉故、餘體不轉故、淨見無餘業故。
云何不作？謂不純作妙善行故，是故無有自在之我。云何不趣？謂離妙行不往善趣故。如經言：無處無容行身惡行乃至得生天上，必無是處，乃至廣說。云何不得？謂離善方便無漏聖道，定不能得道果所攝畢竟清淨。如經言：無處無容不永斷五蓋乃至不修七遍覺支能正證得苦盡邊際，必無是處。云何二體不轉？謂無處無容非前非後有二如來出現於世，乃至廣說。云何餘體不轉？謂離丈夫身外，餘身必無有作轉輪王等。如經言：無處無容女人得作轉輪聖王，乃至廣說。云何淨見無餘業？謂如經言：無處無容聖見具足補特伽羅故斷物命，乃至受第八有，必無是處。有是處者，謂諸異生。
今於此中言不作者，謂所計我於因不得自在。不得者通於因果，淨見無餘業亦爾，餘唯於果。又處非處者，於自果決定名之為處，當知於餘名為非處。由無倒慧於此善巧，是名處非處善巧。此中顯示處非處善巧自體及彼障斷勝利。
What is skill in the possible and the impossible?
Not acting; not going; not obtaining;
two bodies not turning; another body not turning;
the one of pure vision having no residual karma —
no self, and no mastery of two kinds.
Knowledge that knows thus
is skill in the possible and impossible:
where a fruit is settled it is called possible,
and otherwise it is called impossible.
The exposition: if one does not see a self having mastery over both cause and effect, that is skill in the possible and impossible — by not acting, not going, not obtaining, two bodies not turning, another body not turning, and the one of pure vision having no residual karma.
What is not acting? That one does not perform purely excellent and wholesome conduct — therefore there is no self with mastery. What is not going? That apart from excellent conduct one does not go to a good destiny. As the scripture says: there is no place and no room for one who practices evil bodily conduct to be reborn in heaven; that is impossible. What is not obtaining? That apart from the uncontaminated noble path of good means, one certainly cannot obtain the final purity comprised in the fruits of the path. As the scripture says: there is no place and no room for one who has not permanently cut off the five hindrances and has not cultivated the seven factors of awakening to rightly realize the end of suffering. What is two bodies not turning? That there is no place and no room for two Tathāgatas to appear in the world neither before nor after one another. What is another body not turning? That apart from a man's body, no other body performs the role of a wheel-turning king and the like. As the scripture says: there is no place and no room for a woman to become a wheel-turning sage king. What is the one of pure vision having no residual karma? As the scripture says: there is no place and no room for a person complete in noble vision deliberately to take the life of a creature, down to undergoing an eighth existence; that is impossible. Where it is possible is among ordinary beings.
Here, "not acting" means that the supposed self has no mastery over the cause. "Not obtaining" applies to both cause and effect, and so does "the one of pure vision having no residual karma"; the rest apply only to the effect. And as to possible and impossible: where a fruit is settled it is called possible, and otherwise impossible. To be skilled in this by undistorted wisdom is skill in the possible and impossible.
The list is a set of canonical impossibilities, and the argument running through it is that if a self had mastery, none of them would be impossible. A self with real agency could reach heaven without good conduct, or attain the path without cultivating it. That these things cannot happen shows that outcomes follow causes and not wills.
Two items require comment. The claim that a woman cannot be a wheel-turning king belongs to a fixed list of impossibilities inherited from the early canon and repeated across Buddhist literature; it is a claim about a specific mythological office, not a general statement about capacity, and it sits here as one of the received examples rather than as anything the argument needs. The last item is more interesting: someone of pure vision — a stream-enterer — cannot deliberately kill, and cannot undergo an eighth existence. And the closing clause makes the whole list's point: 有是處者，謂諸異生, where these things are possible is among ordinary beings. What is impossible for the noble one is entirely possible for the rest of us.
7. Skill in the Faculties and in the Truths
云何根善巧？頌曰：
於能取生住， 及染污清淨，
無理我觀餘， 於彼果增上。
於如是方便， 名為根善巧，
謂於取生住， 染淨增上故。
論曰：若不見我於能取等是增上故，名根善巧。何以故？非所計我觀餘因緣，於能取等增上自在，即餘因緣於能取等是增上故，是故計我不應道理。所言諸根於能取等是增上者，謂眼等六根於取六境是增上，男女二根於能生相續是增上，命根一種於相續住是增上，五受根於染污是增上，信等八根於清淨是增上。此中顯示根善巧自體及彼障斷勝利，是名根善巧。
What is skill in the faculties?
Over grasping, over arising and abiding,
and over defilement and purity,
it is unreasonable that a self, regarding others,
should be dominant over their fruit.
Skill in that means
is called skill in the faculties —
that is, over grasping, arising, and abiding,
and over defilement and purity, they are dominant.
The exposition: if one does not see a self as dominant over grasping and the rest, that is skill in the faculties. Why? It is not the supposed self, regarding other causes and conditions, that has dominance and mastery over grasping and the rest; rather it is those other causes and conditions that are dominant over grasping and the rest — and therefore supposing a self does not stand to reason. And as to the faculties being dominant over grasping and the rest: the six faculties, the eye and the rest, are dominant over grasping the six objects; the two faculties of male and female are dominant over the producing of the continuum; the single faculty of life is dominant over the continuum's abiding; the five feeling-faculties are dominant over defilement; and the eight faculties of faith and the rest are dominant over purity.
云何諦善巧？頌曰：
二自性苦故， 合故不應理，
由無因有因， 及五種譬喻。
如是隨覺故， 應知諦善巧，
隨覺未曾見， 未受義因緣。
論曰：由能善觀我於染淨二法非順道理，名諦善巧。何等為二？謂自性苦故、與苦合故。云何自性苦故？謂若我自性是苦者，為無因、為有因？若無因者，常應染污；若有因者，應先清淨後方染污，故不順理。云何與苦合故？謂引五喻皆不順理。何以故？若言苦與我合者，不應如兩木共合，有不攝出離性過故。亦非如有情與木共合，有出離過故。亦非如火與薪共合，有性壞過故。亦非如衣與染色共合，於我體上如白淨色少分亦不可得故。亦非如心心法合。何以故？心是能取，與此同緣一境等可名相應；於我無此義，故不順道理。又由觀見未曾見義及彼因緣，又復觀見未曾受義及彼因緣，名諦善巧。謂從昔來未曾了見苦集二諦及彼因緣，從昔已來未曾了見未曾經受滅道兩諦及彼因緣。此中顯示出世智自體及彼障斷勝利，是名諦善巧。
What is skill in the truths?
Two: because suffering is its own nature,
and because of conjunction — neither stands to reason,
by way of having no cause or having one,
and by way of five similes.
Because one awakens to this,
know it as skill in the truths —
awakening to what was never seen,
and the causes of what was never undergone.
The exposition: because one can well observe that a self does not stand to reason with respect to the two states of defilement and purity, it is called skill in the truths. What two? That suffering is its own nature, and that it is conjoined with suffering. How by its own nature being suffering? If the self's own nature is suffering, is that without cause or with one? If without cause, it should be defiled permanently; if with a cause, it should first have been pure and only afterward defiled — so it does not stand to reason. How by conjunction with suffering? Five similes are adduced and none stands to reason. Why? If suffering is conjoined with the self, it cannot be as two logs joined together, since then there would be the fault of not admitting deliverance. Nor as a being joined with a log, since then there would be the fault of already being delivered. Nor as fire joined with fuel, since then there would be the fault of the nature being destroyed. Nor as a cloth joined with dye, since not the least part of anything like a pure white color is to be found in the substance of the self. Nor as mind is joined with mental factors — why? Because mind is a grasper, and what shares one object with it may be called associated with it; but the self has no such sense, and so it does not stand to reason. Moreover, because one observes the meaning never before seen and its causes, and observes the meaning never before undergone and its causes, it is called skill in the truths — namely, that from of old one has never clearly seen the two truths of suffering and origin and their causes, and from of old one has never clearly seen nor ever undergone the two truths of cessation and the path and their causes.
The five similes are a compact demolition of every available model for how a self could be related to suffering. Two logs lying together can be separated — but then the self was never really suffering, and the model concedes too much. A person leaning on a log is already separate. Fire and fuel destroy each other. Dye and cloth requires that the self have some original color to be stained, and none is found. And mind and mental factor requires sharing an object, which a self does not do. Each simile fails for a different reason, and between them they exhaust the ways two things can be together.
The closing definition is the one to keep. Skill in the truths is awakening to 未曾見, what was never seen, and 未曾受, what was never undergone. Suffering and its origin have always been present and never clearly seen; cessation and the path have never been seen or experienced. The four noble truths are not four things one knew and forgot. Two are facts one has lived inside without noticing, and two are wholly new.
8. Twenty-Three Kinds of Skill, and Eleven Subsumptions
頌曰：
當知諸善巧， 差別二十三，
異攝論為先， 後最極清淨。
論曰：應知蘊等善巧差別復有二十三種，謂異攝論善巧、聞所生智善巧、思所生智善巧、修所生智善巧、順決擇分智善巧、見道智善巧、修道智善巧、究竟道智善巧、練根智善巧、發神通智善巧、不善清淨世俗智善巧、善清淨世俗智善巧、勝義智善巧、不善清淨相有分別智善巧、善清淨相有分別智善巧、善清淨相無分別智善巧、成所作前行智善巧、成所作智善巧、成所作後智善巧、聲聞智善巧、獨覺智善巧、菩薩智善巧、最極清淨智善巧。此中異攝論善巧復有二種，一種種攝善巧、二種種論善巧。
種種攝善巧者有十一種，所謂界攝乃至更互攝。界攝者，謂諸蘊等自種子所攝。相攝者，謂諸蘊等自相共相所攝。種類攝者，謂諸蘊等遍自種類所攝。分位攝者，謂諸蘊等順樂受等分位所攝。不相離攝者，謂諸蘊等由一法攝一切蘊等，以彼眷屬不相離故。時攝者，謂諸蘊等過去未來現在各別相攝。方攝者，謂諸蘊等依方而轉，若依此方所生即此方所攝。全攝者，謂諸蘊等具足五十八十二等所攝。一分攝者，謂諸蘊等各別少分所攝。勝義攝者，謂諸蘊等真如相所攝。更互攝者，謂諸蘊等更互相攝。
Verse:
Know that the skills are
of twenty-three distinctions,
beginning with skill in the varieties of subsumption and discourse,
and ending with utterly pure knowledge.
The exposition: the skills in the aggregates and the rest are further of twenty-three kinds — skill in the varieties of subsumption and discourse; skill in the knowledge born of hearing; of reflection; of cultivation; skill in the knowledge of the factors conducive to penetration; of the path of seeing; of the path of cultivation; of the final path; of refining the faculties; of arousing the supernormal powers; skill in conventional knowledge not well purified; in conventional knowledge well purified; in ultimate knowledge; skill in discriminating knowledge whose mark is not well purified; whose mark is well purified; in non-discriminating knowledge whose mark is well purified; skill in the knowledge preceding the accomplishing of what is to be done; in the knowledge that accomplishes it; in the knowledge subsequent to it; skill in the knowledge of śrāvakas; of pratyekabuddhas; of bodhisattvas; and skill in utterly pure knowledge. Of these, skill in the varieties of subsumption and discourse is of two kinds: skill in the varieties of subsumption, and skill in the varieties of discourse.
Skill in the varieties of subsumption is of eleven kinds, from subsumption by element to mutual subsumption. By element: the aggregates and the rest as subsumed under their own seeds. By mark: as subsumed under their particular and general marks. By class: as subsumed pervasively under their own class. By stage: as subsumed under the stages of conducing to pleasant feeling and the rest. By inseparability: one thing subsuming all the aggregates and the rest, since their retinue is inseparable from them. By time: as subsumed separately under past, future, and present. By place: since the aggregates and the rest turn in dependence on place, what arises in this place is subsumed under this place. In whole: as subsumed under the complete five, eighteen, twelve, and so on. In part: as subsumed under each separate portion. In the ultimate sense: as subsumed under the mark of suchness. Mutually: as subsuming one another.
The twenty-three are a ladder of who has the skill and how well, and the interesting stretch is the middle. Three triads run in parallel and are then identified with each other in the prose that follows: conventional knowledge not well purified, conventional knowledge well purified, and ultimate knowledge; discriminating knowledge with an unpurified mark, with a purified mark, and non-discriminating knowledge with a purified mark; and the knowledge preceding, accomplishing, and following the work. Nine names, three actual things, described from three angles — before the path of seeing, at it, and after it.
The eleven subsumptions are a working toolkit for the question "under what heading does this belong?", and the answer turns out to be eleven different questions. Under its seed, its marks, its class, its stage, what it is inseparable from, its time, its place, the whole set, a part of the set, its suchness, or something else that subsumes it in turn. The last, 更互攝, mutual subsumption, is the reminder that categories in this system contain each other rather than forming a tree.
9. Skill in Discourse: The Four-Cornered Answer
種種論善巧者，謂於蘊等種種問答方便善巧，如以一行為。問：應以順前句、順後句、四句、無事句？答：如有問言，若有界攝即有相攝耶？設有相攝復有界攝耶？且應依眼以四句答，或有界攝無相攝，謂生有色界不得眼、設得已失，若諸異生生無色界。或有相攝無界攝，謂阿羅漢最後眼。或有界攝亦有相攝，謂除上所說餘有眼位。或有無界攝亦無相攝，謂阿羅漢眼壞失者、生無色界、已見諦者，及已入無餘般涅槃界。
如於眼如是分別，於餘一切隨其所應當廣分別。如以界攝對相攝，如是以界攝對餘攝，展轉一行應廣分別。如是以餘攝對餘攝，除前前對後後，皆應以一行道理如其所應當廣分別。復次若法蘊所攝，此法界所攝耶？設法界所攝，此法蘊所攝耶？此應以順前句答，若法蘊所攝，此法亦界所攝。或法界所攝非蘊所攝，謂無為法。如以蘊對界，如是以蘊乃至對諦，應依一行道理廣辯相攝。如蘊對餘，如是以界對處等，乃至以根對諦，應廣分別。
此中不善清淨世俗智善巧者，即是順決擇分智善巧。善清淨世俗智善巧者，即是出世後得世間智善巧。勝義智善巧者，即是見道智善巧。如是三種即是不善清淨相有分別智善巧、善清淨相有分別智善巧、善清淨相無分別智善巧。如是三種即是成所作前行智善巧、成所作智善巧、成所作後智善巧。又前三種差別者，未斷煩惱生非煩惱對治、已斷煩惱生非煩惱對治、已斷煩惱生是煩惱對治差別故。中三種差別者，即此三種由有分別無分別、世俗勝義智性差別故。後三種差別者，謂即此三種顯示斷前行智性、正斷道智性、彼後時智性差別故。如是九智，依相續補特伽羅差別，復建立四種應知。
Skill in the varieties of discourse: skill in the means of the various questions and answers concerning the aggregates and the rest, as by a single line of inquiry. Question: should one answer by the clause following what precedes, by the clause following what comes after, by four alternatives, or by the clause with no instance? Answer: as when someone asks, if a thing is subsumed by element is it also subsumed by mark? And if subsumed by mark, is it also subsumed by element? With reference to the eye one should answer by four alternatives. There is what is subsumed by element but not by mark: one born in the realms with form who has not obtained the eye, or has obtained and lost it; and ordinary beings born in the formless realm. There is what is subsumed by mark but not by element: an arhat's final eye. There is what is subsumed by both: all the remaining states of the eye apart from those stated. And there is what is subsumed by neither: an arhat whose eye is destroyed and lost, one born in the formless realm, one who has seen the truths, and one who has entered the realm of nirvāṇa without remainder.
As the eye is thus distinguished, so all the rest should be distinguished at length as is fitting. As subsumption by element is set against subsumption by mark, so it should be set against the other subsumptions, each in turn by a single line of inquiry; and so with each other subsumption against the others, excluding the earlier ones already set against the later, all to be distinguished by the same method. Further: if a thing is subsumed by the aggregates, is it subsumed by the elements? And if subsumed by the elements, is it subsumed by the aggregates? This should be answered by the clause following what precedes: if a thing is subsumed by the aggregates it is also subsumed by the elements; but there is what is subsumed by the elements and not by the aggregates, namely the unconditioned. As the aggregates are set against the elements, so the aggregates down to the truths, and the elements against the sense fields, down to the faculties against the truths, should all be distinguished at length.
Here, skill in conventional knowledge not well purified just is skill in the knowledge of the factors conducive to penetration. Skill in conventional knowledge well purified just is skill in the worldly knowledge subsequently attained after the transcendent. Skill in ultimate knowledge just is skill in the knowledge of the path of seeing. These same three are skill in discriminating knowledge whose mark is not well purified, in discriminating knowledge whose mark is well purified, and in non-discriminating knowledge whose mark is well purified. And these same three are skill in the knowledge preceding the accomplishing of what is to be done, in the knowledge that accomplishes it, and in the knowledge subsequent to it. The distinctions among the first three are that the afflictions are not yet cut off and it does not arise as their counteragent; that the afflictions are cut off and it does not arise as their counteragent; and that the afflictions are cut off and it does arise as their counteragent. The distinctions among the middle three are that these same three differ as discriminating and non-discriminating, and as conventional and ultimate in the nature of their knowledge. The distinctions among the last three are that these same three display the nature of the knowledge preceding cutting off, the nature of the knowledge that is the path of actual cutting off, and the nature of the knowledge that follows it. And these nine knowledges, by the differences of persons in their continuums, are further established as four.
This is the Abhidharma catechism in miniature, and it is worth working through the four alternatives once to see what they are for. Subsumed by element means the seed for an eye is present; subsumed by mark means an actual eye is present. Someone in the formless realm has neither — no eye and, if an ordinary being, still the seed. An arhat's last eye is the arresting case: the eye is there, but no seed for another remains. The four alternatives are how one keeps potential and actual apart in a system where both are real.
The second example gives the other answer-form. Everything in the aggregates is in the elements, but not conversely — the unconditioned is an element and not an aggregate. That is why the question takes 順前句, the clause following what precedes, rather than four alternatives: the entailment runs one way only. Knowing which of the four answer-forms a question takes is most of the skill.
10. Establishing Impermanence: Three Marks, Six and Eight Kinds
The fourth chapter begins, and with it the treatise's first sustained proof of a single thesis.
復次如先所說，若欲正修行遍知等功德者，謂遍知苦等。云何於苦遍知？謂於苦諦遍知無常、苦、空、無我。今隨次第應廣成立。此中成無常者，謂應顯示無常體性及無常差別。云何無常？何等差別？頌曰：
無常謂有為， 三相相應故，
無常義如應， 六八種應知。
論曰：無常性者，謂有為法，與三有為相共相應故，一生相、二滅相、三住異相。又無常義差別者，如其所應，或六或八應知。何等六、八？頌曰：
無性壞轉異， 別離得當有；
剎那、續、病等， 心、器、受用故。
論曰：六種無常者，一無性無常、二失壞無常、三轉異無常、四別離無常、五得無常、六當有無常。八種無常者，一剎那門、二相續門、三病門、四老門、五死門、六心門、七器門、八受用門。此中剎那、相續二種無常遍一切處，病等三無常在於內色，心無常唯在於名，器、受用二無常在於外色。此中無性無常者，謂性常無故，名曰無常。餘變異無常有十五種。
Furthermore, as stated above, one who would rightly practice full knowledge and the other qualities must fully know suffering and the rest. How is suffering fully known? By fully knowing, with respect to the truth of suffering, that it is impermanent, suffering, empty, and selfless. These are now to be established at length in order. Here, establishing impermanence means displaying the substance of impermanence and its distinctions. What is impermanence, and what are its distinctions?
Impermanence means the conditioned,
because it is associated with the three marks;
and the senses of impermanence, as is fitting,
are to be known as six or eight.
The exposition: impermanence is conditioned things, because they are associated in common with the three marks of the conditioned — the mark of arising, the mark of ceasing, and the mark of abiding-and-altering. And the distinctions in the sense of impermanence are six or eight, as is fitting. What six and eight?
Absence of nature; destruction; alteration;
separation; obtaining; what is to come.
The moment; continuity; sickness and the rest;
mind; the receptacle; and enjoyment.
The exposition: the six kinds of impermanence are — impermanence as absence of nature; as destruction; as alteration; as separation; as obtaining; and as what is to come. The eight kinds are: by way of the moment; of continuity; of sickness; of aging; of death; of mind; of the receptacle world; and of what is enjoyed. Of these, the impermanences of the moment and of continuity pervade everywhere; the three of sickness and the rest are in inner form; the impermanence of mind is only in the immaterial; and the two of the receptacle and of enjoyment are in outer form. Here, impermanence as absence of nature means that the nature is permanently absent, and so is called impermanent. The remaining impermanences of alteration are fifteen.
The first of the six is the odd one and will turn out to matter: 無性無常, impermanence as absence of nature — not something that changes but something that was never there. Two verses later this will be identified with the imagined nature, and the whole doctrine of the three natures will be brought to bear on what looks like a straightforward Abhidharma list.
The eightfold division sorts impermanence by where it is found, and the sorting is informative. Momentariness and continuity are everywhere. Sickness, aging, and death belong to inner form — that is, to one's own body. Mind's impermanence is in the immaterial. And the receptacle world and the things one enjoys are outer form. Nothing about impermanence is uniform across these domains, which is why the doctrine needs eight names rather than one.
11. Fifteen Alterations, and Eight Conditions
頌曰：
變異應當知， 十五種差別，
所謂分位等， 八緣所逼故。
下界具一切， 中界離三門，
具三種變異， 上界復除器。
論曰：十五種變異者，謂分位變異，乃至一切種不現盡變異。分位變異者，謂從嬰兒位乃至老時，前後不相似各別變異。顯變異者，謂從妙色鮮肌潤澤膚體，乃至變為惡色麁肌枯顇膚體。形變異者，謂肥瘦等變異。興盛變異者，謂眷屬資財及戒見等興盛。與此相違，名衰退變異。支節變異者，謂先具諸支節，後變為不具。寒熱變異者，謂於寒時踡跼戰慄，熱則舒適流汗，希求冷煖等變異。他所損害變異者，謂手足蹴搏、蚊虻觸等身體變異。疲倦變異者，謂因走跳騰躑等身勞變異。威儀變異者，謂四威儀前後易脫損益變異。觸對變異者，謂由順苦樂等觸變異故，苦樂等受變異。染污變異者，謂心所有貪瞋等大小兩惑嬈亂變異。病等變異者，謂先無病苦，後為重疾所逼身體變異。死變異者，謂先有壽命，後空無識，前後變異。青瘀等變異者，謂命終後身色青瘀脹爛乃至骨鎖等變異。一切種不現盡變異者，謂骨鎖位燒壞離散，彼一切種都無所見變異。
Verse:
Alteration should be known
as of fifteen distinctions,
namely of stage and the rest,
because pressed by eight conditions.
The lower realm has them all;
the middle realm lacks three gates
and has three kinds of alteration;
the upper realm further lacks the receptacle.
The exposition: the fifteen alterations run from alteration of stage down to the alteration in which every kind is exhausted and appears no more. Alteration of stage: from infancy down to old age, each period differing and not resembling the one before. Alteration of color: from lovely color, fresh flesh, and glossy skin, down to becoming ill-colored, coarse-fleshed, and withered of skin. Alteration of shape: growing fat or thin. Alteration of flourishing: flourishing in kin, wealth, moral discipline, and views; and the reverse is called alteration of decline. Alteration of limbs: having formerly had all one's limbs, becoming maimed. Alteration of cold and heat: in cold, huddling and shivering; in heat, stretching out and sweating, and longing for cool or warmth. Alteration by another's injury: the body's alteration from being struck by hand or foot, or touched by mosquito and gadfly. Alteration of weariness: the body's alteration from running, jumping, and leaping. Alteration of posture: the shifting of the four postures, gaining and losing, before and after. Alteration of contact: because contacts conducive to pain and pleasure alter, the feelings of pain and pleasure alter. Alteration of defilement: the disturbance of craving, hatred, and the delusions great and small among the mental factors. Alteration of sickness: having formerly been without illness, the body's alteration when pressed by grave disease. Alteration of death: having formerly had a lifespan, being afterward empty and without consciousness. Alteration of discoloration and the rest: after death the body's color turning livid, bloated, and putrid, down to a chain of bones. Alteration in which every kind is exhausted: the chain of bones burned, broken, and scattered, so that of it nothing at all is seen.
又此十五種變異，由與八緣相應。八緣者，一積時貯畜、二他所損害、三受用虧減、四時節推謝、五火所燒、六水所壞、七風所燥、八異緣合。積時貯畜者，謂經時久故，有色之法不離本處自然朽敗。他所損害者，謂由他種種逼惱因緣前後變異。受用虧減者，謂於種種所受用物，為各別主宰之所食用損減變異。時節推謝者，謂冬時寒雪、夏日暑雨，叢林藥草或盛或衰。火所燒者，謂大火縱逸，國城聚落悉為灰燼。水所壞者，謂大水漂漫，閈里邑居並隨淪沒。風所燥者，謂大風飄鼓，潤衣濕地速令乾㬤。異緣合者，謂多貪者與瞋緣合時，貪纏止息，發起瞋纏。如是多瞋多癡者與餘煩惱緣合，應知亦爾。如是諸識，異境現前亦爾。
復次是無常義，於欲界中一切具有。於色界中除病、老、受用三門無常，又有觸、染、死三種變異。如色界所說諸無常義，當知無色界亦爾，唯除器門。
And these fifteen alterations are associated with eight conditions: long keeping in storage; injury by another; diminution through use; the passing of the seasons; being burned by fire; being ruined by water; being dried by wind; and meeting a different condition. Long keeping in storage: because time passes, material things decay of themselves without leaving their place. Injury by another: alteration from the various oppressions caused by others. Diminution through use: the alteration of the various things one uses, consumed and diminished by their several owners. The passing of the seasons: in winter cold and snow, in summer heat and rain, so that groves and herbs flourish or wither. Burned by fire: a great fire running loose, and kingdoms, cities, and villages all reduced to ashes. Ruined by water: a great flood spreading, so that lanes and dwellings are all submerged. Dried by wind: a great wind blowing, so that wet clothes and damp ground are quickly dried. Meeting a different condition: when one in whom craving is abundant meets the conditions of hatred, the entanglement of craving stops and the entanglement of hatred arises; and so with one in whom hatred or delusion is abundant meeting the conditions of the other afflictions. And so too with the consciousnesses, when a different object appears before them.
Furthermore, these senses of impermanence are all present in the realm of desire. In the realm of form, the three gates of sickness, aging, and enjoyment are excluded, and there are three alterations — of contact, of defilement, and of death. As with the realm of form, so with the formless realm, except that the receptacle gate is also excluded.
The fifteen run in order from infancy to the scattering of the bones, and reading them straight through is the point — it is a single life laid end to end. What is striking is how much of the middle is ordinary and reversible: growing fat or thin, shivering in cold and sweating in heat, being bitten by a mosquito, getting tired from running, shifting posture. Impermanence is not being illustrated by catastrophes. Nine of the fifteen are things that will happen to a reader today.
The last of the eight conditions is the one that lifts the list out of physics. 異緣合, meeting a different condition, is illustrated by a person full of craving who meets the occasion for anger: the craving stops and anger arises. Nothing was destroyed and nothing decayed — one state simply displaced another. The same is then said of the consciousnesses when a new object appears. Alteration by displacement is put on the same footing as fire and flood, and it is the kind we live in.
12. Impermanence and the Three Natures; Why the Impermanent Is Suffering
頌曰：
無性義無常， 遍計之所執；
所餘無常義， 依他起應知。
論曰：無性義所攝無常義，當知遍計所執相攝；餘無常義，依他起相攝；圓成實相中無無常義。如是已顯無常義差別及三相所攝。又如世尊說：諸無常者皆悉是苦。有何意耶？頌曰：
諸無常皆苦， 眾苦所雜故；
迷法性愚夫， 得為害不覺。
論曰：由麁重苦所雜無常，此無常性是行苦故苦，及由變壞苦所依止故苦。是故道諦非苦，以非苦相所雜無常義故。於此法性迷惑愚夫，不能了達常無常義，又為已得現前無常之所惱害。
Verse:
Impermanence in the sense of absence of nature
belongs to the imagined;
the remaining senses of impermanence
belong to the dependent, be it known.
The exposition: the sense of impermanence comprised under absence of nature is to be known as comprised in the imagined nature; the remaining senses of impermanence are comprised in the dependent nature; and within the perfectly accomplished nature there is no sense of impermanence at all. Thus the distinctions in the sense of impermanence and their subsumption under the three natures have been displayed. And as the Blessed One said: whatever is impermanent is all suffering. What is intended by that?
All that is impermanent is suffering,
because it is mixed with the many sufferings;
foolish worldlings confused about the nature of things
are harmed by it and do not notice.
The exposition: because impermanence is mixed with the suffering of coarse heaviness, this impermanence is suffering by way of the suffering of formations; and it is suffering because it is the support of the suffering of decay. Therefore the truth of the path is not suffering, since its sense of impermanence is not mixed with the mark of suffering. Foolish worldlings confused about this nature of things cannot penetrate the senses of permanence and impermanence, and are moreover harmed by the impermanence already present before them.
The single verse on the three natures reorganizes the whole list retroactively. Fourteen of the fifteen alterations, and five of the six impermanences, belong to the dependent nature — real change in really conditioned things. Only the first, absence of nature, belongs to the imagined; and the perfectly accomplished has no impermanence at all. This is why the treatise bothered to include "absence of nature" in a list of kinds of change: it is the impermanence of what never existed, and naming it is how the doctrine of emptiness gets folded into the doctrine of impermanence.
The qualification about the path is the fine point. If everything impermanent were suffering without exception, the path — which is conditioned, and therefore impermanent — would be suffering too, and cultivating it would be pointless. The escape is precise: the path's impermanence is not 苦相所雜, mixed with the mark of suffering. The Buddha's sweeping statement holds of the impermanent as we encounter it, not as a formal entailment.
13. Why Momentariness Must Be Proved
前說剎那無常遍行一切，此無常義非世間現證，故應成立。頌曰：
由彼心果故， 生已自然滅，
後變異可得， 念念滅應知。
論曰：彼一切行是心果故，其性纔生離滅因緣自然滅壞。又復後時變異可得，當知諸行皆剎那滅。云何應知諸行是心果耶？頌曰：
心熏習增上， 定轉變自在，
影像生道理， 及三種聖教。
論曰：由道理及聖教，證知諸行是心果性。道理者，謂善不善法熏習於心，由心習氣增上力故諸行得生。又脫定障心清淨者，一切諸行隨心轉變，由彼意解自在力故種種轉變。又由定心自在力故，隨其所欲定心境界影像而生。是名道理。聖教者，謂三種聖言。如經中說：心將引世間，心力所防護，隨心生起已，自在皆隨轉。又說：是故苾芻應善專精，如正道理觀察於心，乃至廣說。又說：苾芻當知，言城主者，即是一切有取識蘊。是名聖教。
It was said above that momentary impermanence pervades everything. This sense of impermanence is not directly witnessed by the world, and so must be established.
Because they are the fruit of mind,
having arisen they perish of themselves;
and since later alteration is found,
know that they perish moment by moment.
The exposition: because all those formations are the fruit of mind, their nature, as soon as it arises, perishes of itself apart from any cause of perishing. And moreover, since alteration is found at a later time, know that all formations perish momentarily. How is it known that formations are the fruit of mind?
By the dominance of mind's perfuming;
by mastery in transformation through concentration;
by the principle of images arising;
and by three passages of the sacred teaching.
The exposition: by reasoning and by the sacred teaching it is proved that formations are the fruit of mind. By reasoning: wholesome and unwholesome states perfume the mind, and by the dominant force of the mind's habitual traces formations come to arise. Again, for one released from the obstructions to concentration, whose mind is pure, all formations transform in accordance with mind, and by the force of the mastery of his resolve they transform in various ways. Again, by the force of the concentrated mind's mastery, the image that is the object of the concentrated mind arises as he wishes. By the sacred teaching: three noble statements. As a scripture says: "Mind leads the world along; it is guarded by the power of mind; once things have arisen according to mind, all turns at its mastery." And again: "Therefore, monks, you should be well and diligently attentive, observing the mind in accordance with right principle." And again: "Monks, know that what is called the lord of the city is the whole appropriating aggregate of consciousness."
The candour of the opening is worth registering: momentariness 非世間現證, is not directly witnessed by the world. Nobody sees things perishing moment by moment. The treatise does not pretend otherwise, and therefore treats the thesis as something to be argued rather than pointed at — which is what makes this chapter the first genuine proof in the work.
The argument's premise is startling and specifically Yogācāra: formations are 心果, the fruit of mind. The three reasons given are all drawn from what mind demonstrably does — it is perfumed by good and bad states and produces formations from those traces; a purified mind in concentration can transform things at will; and a concentrated mind produces its object-image as it wishes. From the fact that mind evidently makes some things, the conclusion is drawn that mind makes all conditioned things, and therefore that they share mind's own moment-to-moment character. Whether the inference holds is a fair question; that it is being made openly, with its grounds named, is the mark of the chapter.
14. Nothing Destroys Them
The heart of the proof: things perish not because something kills them but because nothing keeps them.
問：彼諸行自然滅壞道理，云何應知？答：由四種因緣。頌曰：
生因相違故， 無住滅兩因，
自然住常過， 當知任運滅。
論曰：非彼生因能滅諸行，生滅兩種互相違故。又無住因令諸行住，若必有者，應成常住。行既不住，何用滅因？又餘滅因性不可得。若行生已自然住者，彼應常住則成大過。如是有住滅因及自然住並有過故，當知諸行任運壞滅。
頌曰：
非水火風滅， 以俱起滅故；
彼相應滅已， 餘變異生因。
論曰：若水火風是滅因者，不應道理，由俱生滅故。若彼水等是滅因者，爛燒燥物不應前相續滅已復變異相續生。何以故？即無體因為有體因，不應理故。然水火風與爛等物相應滅時，能為彼物後變生因。除此功能，水等於彼更無餘力。
Question: how is the principle known by which formations perish of themselves? Answer: by four reasons.
Because it contradicts the cause of arising;
because there is no cause of abiding and none of perishing;
because abiding of itself entails the fault of permanence —
know that they perish spontaneously.
The exposition: it is not the cause of their arising that destroys formations, since arising and perishing are mutually contradictory. Again, there is no cause of abiding that makes formations abide; and if there necessarily were one, they would become permanent. And since formations do not abide, what use is a cause of perishing? Again, no other substance that is a cause of perishing is to be found. And if formations, once arisen, were to abide of themselves, they would be permanent, which is a great fault. Since both a cause of abiding and perishing, and abiding of itself, involve faults, know that formations perish spontaneously.
Verse:
Not water, fire, or wind that destroys,
since they arise and perish together;
when they have perished along with the thing,
they are the cause of its further alteration.
The exposition: if water, fire, and wind were causes of perishing, it would not stand to reason, since they arise and perish together with the thing. If water and the rest were causes of perishing, then rotted, burned, and dried things should not, after the earlier continuum has perished, arise again as an altered continuum. Why? Because for what has no substance to be the cause of what has substance does not stand to reason. Rather, when water, fire, and wind perish along with the rotting thing and the rest, they serve as the cause of that thing's subsequent altered arising. Apart from this capacity, water and the rest have no further power over it.
The argument is elegant and its conclusion counterintuitive. We naturally think destruction needs a destroyer — the fire burns the log, the water rots the wood. The treatise's response is that the fire and the log are both perishing at every moment; the fire is not a stable agent acting on a stable patient. What fire actually does is not destroy the log but 為彼物後變生因, serve as the cause of the log's next, altered arising. Burning is not annihilation; it is a change in what arises next.
The four reasons for spontaneous perishing form a closed argument. The cause of arising cannot also destroy. There is no cause of abiding, and if there were, things would be permanent. Since nothing abides, a cause of perishing has nothing to work on. And no such cause is found in any case. Nothing needs to destroy a thing because nothing was holding it up. This is the ontological version of the point fascicle 1 made when it defined "time" as the ever-renewed arising and ceasing of formations.
15. Perishing Is Not a Cause of Perishing
復次若執滅相為滅因者，此能滅相與所滅法，為俱時有、為不俱耶？若爾何過？頌曰：
相違相續斷， 二相成無相，
違世間現見， 無法及餘因。
論曰：彼能滅相與所滅法，若言俱有者，不應道理，有相違過故。若言不俱，亦不應理，有彼相續斷過失故。又此滅因能滅法者，為體是滅、為體非滅？若體是滅，即應一法有二滅相；若體非滅，應無滅相。有如是過，故不應理。又違世間現見相故，不應執滅是滅壞因。何以故？世間共見餘有體法是滅壞因，不見滅法是滅因故。又若滅法是滅因者，為唯有滅即能滅法、為更待餘事耶？此兩種因，俱有過失。若唯有滅即能滅法者，若時有滅，爾時法體畢竟應無。若更待餘事者，應即餘事為滅壞因，不應計滅為滅壞因。
復次云何應知後變異可得故諸法剎那滅？頌曰：
非身乳林等， 先無有變異，
亦非初不壞， 最後時方滅。
論曰：一切世間身乳林等內外諸法，於最後時變異可得。是故先時體無變易，不應道理。又非先時無有滅壞、最後方滅，無異因故。如是先不變異後不變故，先無滅壞後不滅故，當知諸行念念變滅，是故彼法剎那義成。
Further, if one holds that the mark of perishing is the cause of perishing: is this destroying mark simultaneous with the thing destroyed or not? And what fault follows either way?
Contradiction; the continuum cut off;
two marks, or no mark at all;
contrary to what the world plainly sees;
a non-thing, and some other cause.
The exposition: if the destroying mark and the thing destroyed are said to be simultaneous, it does not stand to reason, since there is the fault of contradiction. If they are said not to be simultaneous, that too does not stand to reason, since there is the fault of the continuum being cut off. Again, as to this cause of perishing that destroys a thing — is its own substance perishing, or is it not? If its substance is perishing, then one thing would have two marks of perishing; if its substance is not perishing, it should have no mark of perishing at all. Since such faults follow, it does not stand to reason. Again, it is contrary to what the world plainly sees, and so one should not hold perishing to be the cause of destruction. Why? Because the world commonly sees that some other substantial thing is the cause of destruction, and does not see perishing itself as the cause. Again, if perishing were the cause of perishing, then does perishing alone destroy the thing, or does it await something further? Both alternatives are faulty. If perishing alone destroys it, then whenever there is perishing the substance of the thing should be utterly absent. If it awaits something further, then that further thing is the cause of destruction, and one should not suppose perishing to be it.
Further, how is it known from later alteration being found that things perish momentarily?
It is not that a body, milk, a grove and the rest
had no alteration before;
nor that they were unbroken at first
and only perished at the last.
The exposition: in all the inner and outer things of the world — a body, milk, a grove, and the rest — alteration is found at the last. Therefore to say that at the earlier time their substance had no alteration does not stand to reason. Nor is it that at the earlier time there was no perishing and only at the last did they perish, since there would be no differing cause. Thus, because there was no alteration before if there is none after, and no perishing before if there is none after, know that formations alter and perish moment by moment; and so the sense of momentariness is established.
The three examples in the last verse are chosen to span the range: a body, milk, a grove. Milk turns sour, a body ages, a grove grows and thins — and in each case the change is undeniable at the end. The argument is that the change at the end cannot be the first change, because nothing new intervened to cause it. 無異因故, there is no differing cause. If milk was unchanging until the moment it soured, what happened at that moment? Something must have been happening all along, and the only alternative to imperceptible continuous change is a change from nothing, which is worse.
The refutation of perishing-as-cause is directed at an Abhidharma position rather than an outsider one — the view that the mark of impermanence, one of the three conditioned marks named at the head of this chapter, does the destroying. Asaṅga's reply is that a mark is not an agent, and the observation he leans on is disarmingly ordinary: the world sees fire destroy a house; nobody has ever seen perishing destroy anything.
16. The Permanent Self and the Creator Refuted
如是成立無常性已，一切外道邪分別所計我、自在、自性、極微、覺等常住之法，皆不成立。云何我常不得成立？頌曰：
位思煩惱分， 非常變異故，
此若無變異， 受作脫非理。
論曰：由所計我有苦樂等位、善惡等思、貪瞋等煩惱、時分差別，是故無常。所以者何？此所計我由樂等故，有少變異者不應是常。若都不變，不應計為受者、作者及解脫者，彼法有無我無別故。
復次亦無自在，體性常住能生世間。何以故？頌曰：
功能無有故， 攝不攝相違，
有用及無用， 為因成過失。
論曰：所計自在，無有功能出生世間。所以者何？若此自在生世功能無有因緣自然有者，汝何不許一切世間無因自有？若此功能業為因者，何不信受一切世間以業為因？若此功能以求方便為因生者，何不信受一切世間以自功力為因得生？
又若自在世間所攝墮在世間，而言能生一切世間，是則道理相違。若此自在非世間攝，是則解脫，解脫之法能生世間，不應道理。又若自在須有用故生諸世間，離生世間用不成者，是則自在於此須用無有自在，自成過失。若此自在雖生世間無所須者，不應化生一切世間，或此自在有如顛狂愚夫之過。又此自在生世間者，為唯自在為因生諸世間、為亦更待其餘因耶？若唯自在體為因者，如自在體本來常有，世間亦爾，不應更生。若亦少待其餘因者，此所待因若無有因，一切世間亦應如是。若有餘因，世間亦爾，從餘因生，何須自在？故立自在有多過失。
Impermanence having thus been established, all the permanently abiding things falsely discriminated by the outsiders — a self, a Lord, primordial nature, atoms, awareness, and the rest — are not established. How is a permanent self not established?
Because of stages, thoughts, and afflictions —
it alters, and so is not permanent;
and if it does not alter,
experiencing, acting, and being liberated do not stand to reason.
The exposition: because the supposed self has stages of pain and pleasure, thoughts good and evil, afflictions of craving and hatred, and differences of time, it is therefore impermanent. Why? Because this supposed self, on account of pleasure and the rest, has some alteration, and what alters should not be permanent. And if it does not alter at all, it should not be supposed to be an experiencer, an agent, or one liberated, since a thing that neither has nor lacks a self is no different either way.
Further, there is likewise no Lord, permanent in nature and able to produce the world.
Because the capacity does not exist;
because inclusion and non-inclusion both contradict;
whether it has a use or has none;
and taken as cause, faults follow.
The exposition: the supposed Lord has no capacity to produce the world. Why? If this Lord's capacity to produce the world exists of itself with no cause or condition, why do you not allow that the whole world exists of itself without cause? If this capacity has karma as its cause, why do you not accept that the whole world has karma as its cause? If this capacity arises with the seeking of means as its cause, why do you not accept that the whole world arises with its own effort as its cause?
Again, if the Lord is included within the world and falls within it, yet is said to produce the whole world, the reasoning contradicts itself. If this Lord is not included in the world, then he is liberated, and that a liberated thing should produce the world does not stand to reason. Again, if the Lord produces the worlds because he has need of doing so, and apart from producing the world that need is not met, then the Lord has no mastery over that need of his, which is a fault. If he produces the world while having no need at all, then he should not conjure the whole world into being, or else this Lord has the fault of a madman or a fool. Again, in producing the world, does the Lord alone cause it, or does he further await some other cause? If his own substance alone is the cause, then just as his substance has always been permanent, so would the world be, and it should not need producing. If he awaits some other cause, then if that awaited cause has no cause, the whole world should likewise have none; and if it has some further cause, so has the world, arising from that further cause — so what need is there of a Lord?
The refutation of the Lord repeats the argument of fascicle 10 almost verbatim, down to the same summary verse — and that repetition is itself informative. Fascicle 10 refuted theism as one of sixteen doctrines; here the same refutation reappears as a consequence of momentariness. Having proved that nothing conditioned lasts a moment, the permanent entities of every rival system fall together, and the treatise simply recites the demolitions.
The new argument is the first one, and it is sharp: three "why do you not allow" questions in a row. If the Lord's creative capacity is uncaused, why not let the world be uncaused? If it comes from karma, why not let the world come from karma? If it comes from effort, why not from ours? In each case the explanation offered for the Lord's power is an explanation that would serve equally well for the world directly, making the Lord an idle wheel.
The refutation of the permanent self ends on a formulation worth keeping: if the self never alters, then 彼法有無我無別, a thing with such a self and a thing without one are indistinguishable. An unchanging self makes no difference to anything, and a posit that makes no difference is not a posit.
17. Primordial Nature and the Atom
復次執有自性常住為因，不應道理。何以故？頌曰：
自性變異相， 有無不應理，
無差別無常， 有差別五失。
無相亦無因， 非自性恒變，
先無有變異， 我應常解脫。
論曰：若計自性是常，則應非變異因。所以者何？所計自性非有變異相，亦非無變異相，故不應理。若此自性與餘變異相無差別者，應是無常。若有差別，成五種過。一無相過，離變異相，餘自性相少分亦不可得故。二非因過，世間不見常住之法是生因體故。三非自性過，世間不見非彼種類為彼自性故。四常住自性於一切時起變異過，以不待餘因故。五此自性未生變異之前我解脫過。若如是者，後時不應起諸變異。
復次計極微常，不應道理。何以故？頌曰：
常、造不應理， 由二三因故；
財有情增上， 極微非常住。
論曰：所計極微常性造作，俱不應理。云何常性不應道理？由二因故。汝極微性為由細故性是常住、為由異類性是常耶？若由細者，細羸劣故，不應常住。若由異類者，此相不可得。從非地等造地等物，不應道理。
Further, to hold that a permanently abiding primordial nature is the cause does not stand to reason. Why?
That primordial nature has the mark of alteration,
or has it not — neither stands to reason;
without difference, it is impermanent;
with difference, five faults follow.
It would have no mark and be no cause;
it would not be a primordial nature; it would alter constantly;
and before alteration had arisen,
a self should always have been liberated.
The exposition: if primordial nature is supposed permanent, it should not be the cause of alteration. Why? Because the supposed primordial nature neither has the mark of alteration nor lacks it, and so does not stand to reason. If this primordial nature is no different from the other marks of alteration, it must be impermanent. If it differs, five faults follow. First, the fault of having no mark: apart from the marks of alteration, not the least other mark of a primordial nature is to be found. Second, the fault of not being a cause: the world does not see any permanently abiding thing as the substance of a producing cause. Third, the fault of not being a primordial nature: the world does not see what is not of a thing's own kind serving as its primordial nature. Fourth, the fault that a permanent primordial nature would give rise to alteration at all times, since it awaits no other cause. Fifth, the fault that before this primordial nature had given rise to alteration, a self would have been liberated — and if so, no alterations should arise afterward.
Further, to suppose that atoms are permanent does not stand to reason. Why?
Permanence and production both fail to stand to reason,
by two reasons and by three;
through the dominance of beings' karma there are goods —
the atom is not permanently abiding.
The exposition: both the permanence of the supposed atoms and their producing fail to stand to reason. How does permanence fail? By two reasons. Is your atom permanent because it is fine, or permanent because it is of a different kind? If because it is fine, then since what is fine is feeble it should not be permanent. If because it is of a different kind, that mark is not to be found — and for earth and the rest to be produced from what is not earth and the rest does not stand to reason.
The fifth fault against primordial nature is the one that would land hardest on a Sāṃkhya opponent, since it uses their own soteriology. On their account, bondage begins when prakṛti starts to evolve, and liberation is the puruṣa's disentanglement from that evolution. But if prakṛti is permanent and needs no further cause, then before evolution began the self was already free — and there is then no reason for evolution ever to have started. The system cannot explain its own beginning without abandoning the permanence of its first principle.
This is the second refutation of atoms in the treatise; fascicle 10 gave the first. The verse here adds one item the earlier version lacked: 財有情增上, the goods of the world exist through the dominance of beings' karma. The atomist's explanandum — that there is a furnished world — is met by an alternative explanation that does not require permanent atoms at all, which is the same move fascicle 5 made under "arising by impetus."
18. How Atoms Would Have to Produce, and Permanent Awareness
云何造作不應道理？由三因故，一由方所、二由因緣、三由自體。云何由方所故造作不應道理？謂從極微造作麁物，為過彼量、為不過耶？若不過者，麁質礙物應如極微不可執取。又復世間不見質礙不明淨物同在一處，故不應理。若過彼量者，過量之處麁質礙物，非極微成，應是常住。若復計有餘極微生，是則極微應非常住。
云何由因緣故？謂若汝計由和合性為因緣故建立餘物令和合者，此和合性為生已能作因緣、為未生耶？若生已者，所和合物和合已後，無有少異和合性可得，故不應理。若未生者，則無體性。無體為因，不應道理。
云何由自體故？此極微性造麁物時，不應如種生芽。如種，極微應滅壞故。不應如乳，極微應變異故。不應如陶師，極微勤劬不可得故。是故造作不應道理。雖無常住極微，而有劫初器世間等受用物生，諸有情業增上力故，不由極微。是故極微常住，不應道理。
復次執有常覺，不應道理。何以故？頌曰：
無常為彼依， 次第差別轉，
諸受等異故， 當知覺無常。
論曰：眼識等覺，依止無常眼等起故，於色等義次第轉故、眾多相貌差別轉故、樂等諸受貪等諸惑施等善思位分異故。於一常覺如是轉異，不應道理。
How does producing fail to stand to reason? By three reasons: by place, by cause and condition, and by own substance.
By place: when a coarse thing is produced from atoms, does it exceed their extent or not? If it does not, then a coarse resistant thing should, like an atom, be unable to be grasped. And the world does not see resistant, non-transparent things occupying one and the same place, so it does not stand to reason. If it does exceed their extent, then in the region exceeding it the coarse resistant thing is not made of atoms and should be permanent. And if you suppose that further atoms arise there, then atoms are not permanent.
By cause and condition: if you suppose that combination is the cause and condition by which other things are established and made to combine, then is this combination able to act as cause once it has arisen, or before it has arisen? If once it has arisen, then after the things have combined not the least separate combination is to be found, and it does not stand to reason. If before it has arisen, then it has no substance; and for what has no substance to be a cause does not stand to reason.
By own substance: when atoms produce a coarse thing, it cannot be as a seed produces a sprout, since like a seed the atom would have to perish. It cannot be as with milk, since the atom would have to alter. It cannot be as with a potter, since no exertion is to be found in an atom. Therefore producing does not stand to reason. And although there are no permanent atoms, at the beginning of an aeon the receptacle world and the goods that are enjoyed do arise — through the dominant force of beings' karma, and not through atoms.
Further, to hold that there is a permanent awareness does not stand to reason. Why?
What is impermanent is its support;
it turns in sequence and in difference;
and because feelings and the rest differ,
know that awareness is impermanent.
The exposition: because eye-consciousness and the other awarenesses arise in dependence on an impermanent eye and the rest; because they turn in sequence upon form and the other objects; because they turn amid many differing appearances; and because they differ by the stages of pleasant and other feelings, of craving and the other delusions, and of giving and the other wholesome volitions. For a single permanent awareness to turn and alter in this way does not stand to reason.
The argument by place is the sharpest of the three and has a nice observational hook. If a coarse object occupies no more space than the atoms composing it, then it should be as imperceptible as they are — and besides, we never see two solid opaque things in the same place. Either the whole is bigger than its parts, in which case something non-atomic has appeared, or it is not, in which case it should be invisible.
The argument by own substance runs through the same seed / milk / potter triad the treatise used in fascicle 10, and the third item is the memorable one: a potter exerts himself, and 極微勤劬不可得, no exertion is to be found in an atom. Every available model of production requires the producer either to change or to try, and an atom does neither.
The refutation of permanent awareness is the shortest in the chapter, and it works entirely by pointing. Awareness rests on an impermanent eye; it moves from object to object in sequence; it takes many appearances; and it comes tinged now with pleasure, now with craving, now with generosity. Anything that does all that is not one permanent thing.
19. Why Nobody Sees It
The proof is complete; the chapter's last movement asks the harder question. If impermanence is so, why does everyone believe the opposite?
何因緣故，世間有情無常性有而不取執，常住性無而種種執耶？頌曰：
於無常無智， 四顛倒根本，
當知世上進， 愚癡力轉增。
論曰：以於無常無智起故，實有無常而不取執，實無常性種種執生。非唯常倒無智為因，然四顛倒皆以無智為其根本。何以故？以於無常不如實知故，於無常法起常顛倒、於苦起樂顛倒、於不淨起淨顛倒、於無我起我顛倒。由有如是次第義故，薄伽梵說：若法無常彼必是苦，若法是苦彼必無我。當知由世間道得上進時，不斷無智漸進上地，於無常性愚癡之力轉更增上。何以故？如欲界中破壞變易及別離等諸無常相現可了知，上地無有。
復次何因緣故，於無常性無智起耶？頌曰：
由放逸、懈怠、 見、昧、乏資糧、
惡友、非正法， 當知無智因。
論曰：無常無智有七種因，一放逸、二懈怠、三倒見、四愚昧、五未多積集菩提資糧、六由惡友、七聞非正法。以於境界樂及靜慮樂起放逸故，於無常性不如實知。設不放逸而復懈怠，設不懈怠而復倒見，設無倒見而復愚昧，設不愚昧而未積集菩提資糧，設已修習菩提資糧而隨惡友，又復從彼聞非正法故，於無常不如實知。
復有何因，不了無常妄執常轉？頌曰：
不如理作意， 憶念前際等，
相似相續轉， 於無常計常。
論曰：由二種因起於常執，一由不如理作意、二由憶念前際等事。由前際等事相似相續轉故，於餘世間亦計常住。
For what reason do beings in the world not grasp impermanence, which really is, and variously grasp permanence, which is not?
Not knowing impermanence
is the root of the four distortions;
and know that as one advances in the world,
the force of that confusion grows greater still.
The exposition: because non-knowledge of impermanence arises, one does not grasp impermanence though it really is, and various graspings arise at permanence though there really is none. And it is not only the distortion of permanence that has non-knowledge as its cause; all four distortions have it as their root. Why? Because not knowing impermanence as it really is, one gives rise to the distortion of permanence with respect to the impermanent, of pleasure with respect to suffering, of purity with respect to the impure, and of a self with respect to the selfless. Because the sense runs in this order, the Blessed One said: whatever is impermanent is necessarily suffering, and whatever is suffering is necessarily without self. And know that when one advances by the worldly path without cutting off non-knowledge, ascending gradually to the higher levels, the force of confusion about impermanence grows greater still. Why? Because in the realm of desire the marks of impermanence — destruction, alteration, separation, and the rest — are plainly evident, and in the higher levels they are not.
Further, for what reason does non-knowledge of impermanence arise?
By heedlessness, laziness,
wrong views, dullness, want of provisions,
bad friends, and a teaching that is not true —
know these as the causes of non-knowledge.
The exposition: non-knowledge of impermanence has seven causes: heedlessness; laziness; distorted views; dullness; not having accumulated much of the provisions for enlightenment; bad friends; and hearing what is not the true teaching. Because one is heedless through the pleasure of objects and the pleasure of absorption, one does not know impermanence as it really is. Suppose one is not heedless but is lazy; suppose not lazy but of distorted views; suppose without distorted views but dull; suppose not dull but has not accumulated the provisions for enlightenment; suppose one has cultivated the provisions but follows bad friends; and further, because from them one hears what is not the true teaching — one does not know impermanence as it really is.
And for what reason, not understanding impermanence, does the false grasping at permanence turn?
By attention not in accordance with principle,
and by recalling the prior limit and the rest,
which turn on in a resembling continuum —
upon the impermanent one supposes permanence.
The exposition: grasping at permanence arises from two causes — attention not in accordance with principle, and recollecting the prior limit and the like. Because the events of the prior limit and the rest turn on in a resembling continuum, one supposes permanence in the rest of the world too.
The claim that confusion about impermanence increases as one ascends the meditative levels is the most unsettling sentence in the chapter, and the reason given is exact: in the realm of desire, things visibly break, change, and are taken away; in the higher levels they do not. Someone who has climbed out of the realm of desire by the worldly path has climbed out of the evidence. This is the same warning fascicle 9 gave when it traced eternalism to meditators recollecting past lives, and it is a striking thing for a meditation manual to say about meditative attainment.
The seven causes are presented as a chain of escapes, each closed in turn — suppose not heedless, then lazy; suppose not lazy, then wrong-viewed; and so on down to hearing false teaching from bad friends. The rhetorical form makes the point that there is no single obstacle to remove. And the two causes of grasping permanence are worth separating: improper attention is a fault of method, but the second is not a fault at all. Memory does present a resembling continuum. The mistake is only in generalizing from that resemblance to the rest of the world.
20. The Three Marks, and Entering Impermanence
復次如前所說，三有為相非唯剎那。何以故？頌曰：
生初後中間， 取三有為相。
論曰：三有為相由眾同分一生所攝。謂初生時取為生相，最後死時取為滅相，於二中間相續住時取為住異。如是建立三有為相應知。
頌曰：
無常調伏智， 當知由二因。
論曰：於無常性如實智入，由二種因：一由念住、二由緣起。由念住故，於諸境界繫心令住。由緣起故，達彼法性。如經中說：見集起法於身念住，乃至廣說。
頌曰：
彼見有六種， 及緣起四種。
論曰：無常性見當知六種。一世俗智，謂乃至順決擇分位。二勝義智，謂乃至出世道位。三聲聞智，謂除無性無常義。四菩薩智，謂於一切無常義。五不善清淨，謂彼二學智。六善清淨，謂彼二無學智。又緣起法當知有四種道理。何等為四？頌曰：
自種故非他， 待緣故非自，
無作故非共， 用故非無因。
論曰：由四道理入無常性。謂諸行法不從他生，自種起故。亦非自生，待外緣故。亦非俱生，俱無作故。亦非無因，彼二於生有功用故。
Further, as stated above, the three marks of the conditioned are not only momentary. Why?
At the beginning, the end, and the middle of a birth,
the three marks of the conditioned are taken.
The exposition: the three marks of the conditioned are comprised within one birth in a single class-commonality. That is, at the first arising one takes the mark of arising; at the last, at death, one takes the mark of ceasing; and in the middle of the two, while the continuum abides, one takes the mark of abiding-and-altering.
Verse:
The knowledge that tames by impermanence
is to be known by two causes.
The exposition: entering the knowledge of impermanence as it really is happens by two causes: by the establishments of mindfulness, and by dependent arising. By the establishments of mindfulness one binds the mind and makes it abide upon its objects. By dependent arising one penetrates the nature of those things. As a scripture says: seeing the arising of what gathers, one is mindful with respect to the body, and so on at length.
Verse:
That seeing is of six kinds,
and dependent arising of four.
The exposition: the seeing of impermanence is of six kinds. First, conventional knowledge, up to the stage of the factors conducive to penetration. Second, ultimate knowledge, up to the stage of the transcendent path. Third, the knowledge of śrāvakas, which excludes the sense of impermanence as absence of nature. Fourth, the knowledge of bodhisattvas, which covers every sense of impermanence. Fifth, not well purified, being the knowledge of those two while learners. Sixth, well purified, being the knowledge of those two as adepts. And the teaching of dependent arising is to be known by four principles. What four?
Because from their own seeds, not from another;
because they await conditions, not from themselves;
because neither acts, not from both;
because both function, not without cause.
The exposition: by four principles one enters impermanence. Formations do not arise from another, since they arise from their own seeds. Nor from themselves, since they await outer conditions. Nor from both, since neither acts on its own. Nor without cause, since both have a function in their arising.
The first verse resolves a tension the chapter created for itself. Having argued that everything perishes moment by moment, what becomes of the three conditioned marks — arising, ceasing, abiding-and-altering — which look like they describe a lifespan? The answer is that they apply at both scales: within one birth, one takes birth as the arising, death as the ceasing, and everything between as abiding-and-altering. Momentariness does not abolish the ordinary description; it underlies it.
The third and fourth kinds of seeing mark the one place in this chapter where the two vehicles part. The śrāvaka's knowledge of impermanence 除無性無常義, excludes the sense of impermanence as absence of nature — the first of the six, the one that belongs to the imagined nature. A śrāvaka sees everything change; a bodhisattva additionally sees that something was never there. The whole difference between the vehicles, on this chapter's showing, is one item on a list of six.
The closing verse gives the four negations again, now with their reasons attached, and this is the fullest form the treatise gives them. Not from another, because things come from their own seeds. Not from self, because they need outer conditions. Not from both, because neither acts alone. Not without cause, because both do function. The negations are not scepticism about causation — each is grounded in an affirmation about how causation actually works.
Fascicle 14 Complete
Two chapters: the seven skills, shown to be seven antidotes to seven ways of believing in a self; and the establishing of impermanence, the first of the four theses, proved by the argument that formations perish spontaneously because nothing holds them — with the permanent self, the creator, primordial nature, the atom, and permanent awareness falling as consequences. Fascicle 15 takes up the second thesis, that what is impermanent is suffering, and begins the third, that what is suffering is empty.
Continue to Fascicle 15 — Establishing Suffering and Emptiness →