Even "Arising and Ceasing" Are Only Names

How, further, is it known that the characteristics of conditioned dharmas have a real nature distinct from form, mind, and the rest? Because scripture says so — as when scripture says, "there are three characteristics of the conditioned," and so on. But scripture never says these have a real nature apart from form, mind, and the rest — cited as proof, it proves nothing.

The mere grammatical possessive — "the characteristics of the conditioned" — does not by itself indicate some separate entity; the substance of form and mind simply is form and mind. Nor is a characteristic-marker necessarily different in substance from what it marks, any more than "solidity" is different from earth itself. And if the characteristics of the conditioned really were different in substance from what they characterize, the characteristic of the unconditioned should equally be different from it — which no one holds.

Furthermore: if arising and the other three characteristics all exist simultaneously as substances, their functions should all operate at once. But if their functions cannot operate all at once because they contradict one another, then their substances must be equally contradictory — so how could they all exist together in the first place? By the same token, abiding, change, and ceasing should not be able to function together either.

If marker and marked both exist inherently, their functions should exist inherently too, since substance and function are not held to differ. If you say their function still depends on further causes and conditions, then those further conditions cannot themselves be inherently existent — and positing "arising" and the rest becomes pointless work, since the further conditions are doing the real causing. And if what is characterized exists eternally, with arising and the rest merely attaching to it, then unconditioned dharmas — equally eternal — should have arising and the rest too, and no reason can be found for why they alone are exempt.

Furthermore: the past and future, being neither present nor permanent, should be like a sky-flower — not really existent. If "arising" means "to exist," how could it belong to the future, where nothing yet exists on their own account? If "ceasing" means "to not exist," it should not belong to the present. And if ceasing is not simply nonexistence, then arising, by the same logic, should not simply be existence either. If ceasing is incompatible with abiding, how can the two be held to occur in the same moment — yet abiding is not incompatible with arising, so why force the two into different times? Whichever way their position turns, it does not hold up.

In fact, conditioned dharmas, through the power of causes and conditions, are originally nonexistent and now exist, and, having existed for a while, return to nonexistence; and, to mark their difference from the unconditioned, the four characteristics are provisionally established. "Originally nonexistent, now existing" — this moment of coming to exist is called arising. The stage where what has arisen briefly persists is called abiding. Distinguishing earlier from later within that abiding gives the further name "change." "Having existed for a while, then returning to nonexistence" — the moment of no longer existing is called ceasing.

Since the first three involve existence, they belong alike to the present; the last is a nonexistence, and so belongs to the past. But how can a nonexistence serve as a "characteristic" at all? — It marks the subsequent nonexistence of that dharma; there is no fault in that.

"Arising" marks that an existent dharma did not exist before; "ceasing" marks that it will not exist afterward; "change" marks that it is not static and frozen; "abiding" marks that it has, for a while, an active function. So although all four characteristics alike mark conditioned dharmas, what each one marks is different.

This account applies the four characteristics to a single instant; but they can equally be applied, provisionally, to an entire lifespan: the first moment of existing is "arising," the final nonexistence is "ceasing," the similar, continuous succession after arising is "abiding," and the gradual transformation within that very continuity is "change." The four characteristics, in every case, are nothing more than provisional constructions.

How, further, is it known that there is a real, expressive "name-body," "phrase-body," and "syllable-body" distinct from form, mind, and the rest? Because scripture says so — as when scripture says the Buddha attained a rare name-body, phrase-body, and syllable-body. But scripture never says these really exist apart from form, mind, and the rest — cited as proof, it proves nothing.

If name, phrase, and syllable really exist as something different from sound, they should, like form, be incapable of actually expressing meaning. If you say sound gives rise to name, phrase, and syllable, then the sound must already carry modulation and inflection — and that alone should be enough to express meaning. What further need is there for "names" on top of it?

If you say the modulation and inflection within sound just is name, phrase, and syllable, really existing as something different from sound — then the shape seen within color should equally be a real, separate entity apart from color, which no one holds. If you say that modulation and inflection, like the sound of a stringed or wind instrument, cannot by itself express meaning — then ordinary speech-sound, by the same logic, should not separately generate names either. And who says instrumental sound definitely cannot express meaning? If any sound can express meaning, even a wind-chime should have expressive power, and speech-sound, just like it, would need no separate real "name-body" to do the expressing.

If only speech-sound can generate names, why not simply grant that speech alone expresses meaning? By what reasoning could you be certain that what expresses meaning is something other than speech itself? That speech is what expresses meaning — not something apart from it — is something ordinary people and gods alike already understand; insisting otherwise is nobody's view but the insister's own.

Rather, based on distinct conditions within speech-sound, "name-body," "phrase-body," and "syllable-body" are provisionally established. A name expresses a thing's own nature; a phrase expresses relations between things; a syllable is simply the spoken or written letter, the basis for both of the others. Though these three have no substance apart from sound, they are provisional while sound is real, so they cannot simply be identified with sound either — which is why the two kinds of unobstructed understanding, of reality and of language, take different objects, and why sound and name are classified differently among the aggregates, sense-fields, and elements, even though one is built entirely on the other.

This account — that name, phrase, and syllable rest on sound — holds for our world; it is not meant universally. In other buddha-lands, the same three may just as well be provisionally built on light, or fragrance, or taste instead.

Some hold that latent tendencies (anuśaya) are different from mind and mental factors, and belong among the forces disjoined from mind. This too is unreasonable: they are called "craving" and the like — the very same names used for manifest craving — and manifest craving is certainly not disjoined from mind. Whatever other forces disjoined from mind anyone might still wish to insist on, beyond what has already been discussed, should be turned back by this same line of reasoning.

That unconditioned dharmas really exist, apart from form, mind, and the rest, cannot be established on examination. Things that are definitely existent are, broadly, of three kinds: things directly known, like form and mind; things directly experienced and used, like a pot or a piece of cloth — these two kinds are commonly known to exist by everyone, without needing proof by inference; and things that have a function, like the eye and ear faculties, whose existence is proven by that very function. The unconditioned is not commonly known by everyone to definitely exist, nor does it have any function like the eye or ear — and if it did have a function, it would have to be impermanent. The unconditioned, then, cannot be held to definitely, really exist as a separate substance. Rather, it is simply a knowable nature, or a nature revealed by form, mind, and the rest — like form and mind themselves — and should not be treated as some real, separate "unconditioned" thing.

Furthermore: is space one thing, or many? If its substance is a single unity pervading everywhere, then, since space is held to accommodate form and the other dharmas within it, it should become multiple in step with the many dharmas it accommodates — the place it joins with one thing is not the place it joins with another. Deny this, and every dharma should end up pervading every other dharma's place, which is absurd. And if space does not actually join with dharmas at all, then it does not really accommodate them either — no different, in that respect, from any other unconditioned dharma.

Furthermore: is there space within form itself, or not? If there is, space and form should intermingle; if not, space should not be all-pervading after all. The same problem recurs for cessation through discernment: severing the afflictions of one class should then yield the cessation belonging to every other class at once; and a single missing condition should yield universal cessation-without-discernment for everything at once. This is simply what follows from insisting that each is a single, undivided substance.

If, instead, its substance is multiple, it has different kinds and classes, and so, like form, should not be a real unconditioned dharma — and space should then no longer be able to accommodate everything universally either. Whatever other unconditioned dharmas any other school posits as really existing apart from mind and mental factors should be refuted by this same reasoning. And since the unconditioned is granted to have neither cause nor effect, it should, like the horns of a rabbit, not be held to exist as anything different from mind at all.

Scripture does speak of space and the other unconditioned dharmas as existing — but this happens in two distinct ways. First, they are provisionally posited based on what consciousness transforms: having once heard the term "space" and formed a conceptual image accordingly, one then, through the power of repeated habituation, has a mind that manifests an appearance resembling the unconditioned characteristic of "space" whenever it arises. Because this manifested appearance stays similar from one moment to the next, without any real change, it is provisionally called "permanent."

Second, they are provisionally posited based on the true nature of dharmas. That is: the suchness revealed by the emptiness of self and of dharmas is neither existent, nor nonexistent, nor both; it lies beyond the reach of thought and language; it is neither identical with nor different from any dharma. Being the true principle underlying all dharmas, it is called "the nature of dharmas."

This very suchness, free of every obstruction, is called "space." Realized ultimately through the power of discerning wisdom that extinguishes all defilement, it is called "cessation through discernment." Originally pure not through the power of discernment but simply revealed through the absence of a condition, it is called "cessation without discernment." Where the sensation of suffering and of pleasure has ceased, it is called "the unmoving." Where perception and sensation no longer operate, it is called "the cessation of perception and sensation." All five of these names are provisionally established based on suchness — and "suchness" itself is likewise only a provisionally established name.

To block the denial that it exists at all, it is called "existent." To block the attachment that it exists as some separate real thing, it is called "empty." So that it not be mistaken for something merely illusory, it is called "real." Because its principle is free of delusion and distortion, it is called "suchness." This is nothing like other schools' "suchness" — some really existent, eternal thing they hold to stand apart from form, mind, and the rest. Unconditioned dharmas, therefore, are not definitely, really existent as separate substances.

All the dharmas that non-Buddhist schools and other Buddhist vehicles hold to exist as something different from mind and mental factors are not really existent, since they are things grasped as an object — just as mind and mental factors themselves are, when reflected upon, yet no one takes them to be external substances for that reason. Nor does the very cognition that grasps such an object thereby take that object as something ultimately real, since it is itself simply what grasps — just as the cognition that in turn reflects on that grasping is simply what grasps, without requiring some further ultimate object either. Mind and mental factors, since they arise in dependence on other things, are themselves like a magical illusion — not independently, truly real either.

It is in order to dispel the mistaken clinging to some real object existing outside mind and mental factors that "Consciousness-Only" is taught. But if one then clings to Consciousness-Only itself as truly, independently real — the very same way one clung to an external object before — that too is dharma-attachment.

Attachment to dharmas, in brief, is of two kinds: innate, and discriminated. Innate dharma-attachment, through deluded habituation from beginningless time, arises constantly together with the body by its own inner causal power; it does not depend on mistaken teaching or mistaken discrimination, but operates spontaneously — hence it is called innate.

This too is of two kinds. One is continuous and unbroken: located in the seventh consciousness, which takes the eighth consciousness as its object, it generates its own mental image and clings to it as a real dharma. The other occurs with interruption: located in the sixth consciousness, which takes the appearance of the aggregates, sense-fields, and elements as transformed by consciousness — as a whole or individually — it generates its own mental image and clings to it as a real dharma. Because these two are subtle, they are hard to sever; only later, across the ten grounds, through repeated practice of contemplating the higher emptiness of dharmas, can they finally be eliminated.

Discriminated dharma-attachment, by contrast, is brought about by the power of present external conditions; it does not arise together with the body, but requires a mistaken teaching and mistaken discrimination before it can arise — hence it is called discriminated. It exists only in the sixth, cognizing consciousness.

This too is of two kinds: one takes the characteristics of the aggregates, sense-fields, and elements as described by a mistaken teaching, generates its own mental image, and constructs it as a real dharma; the other takes the characteristics of "own-nature" and the like as described by a mistaken teaching, generates its own mental image, and constructs it as a real dharma. Because these two are coarse, they are easy to sever; upon entering the first ground, by contemplating the suchness of the emptiness of dharmas in all things, they are eliminated at once.

In every kind of dharma-attachment just described, an object among the dharmas outside one's own mind may or may not be present — but an object among the dharmas within one's own mind is always present. Every kind of dharma-attachment, then, takes hold of some dharma-like appearance manifested by one's own mind, and mistakenly clings to it as really existent. But this dharma-like appearance, arising as it does from conditions, exists the way an illusion exists; the real dharma mistakenly clung to, being arbitrarily constructed, definitely does not exist at all. Hence the World-Honored One says: "Maitreya, you should know: whatever the various consciousnesses take as their object is simply what consciousness itself manifests. It has the nature of dependent origination, and is like a magical illusion." In this way, the self and the dharmas that non-Buddhist schools and other Buddhist vehicles cling to, apart from consciousness, are, in every case, not really existent.

Therefore, mind and mental factors certainly do not take external form and the other supposedly external dharmas as their object-condition, since the function of an object-condition must depend on a really existent substance. The mind and mental factors belonging to some other, separate stream of consciousness cannot serve as the direct object-condition for this stream, since, not being its own object, they belong to a different group entirely. Even a mental factor within the very same stream is not the direct object of its accompanying consciousness, since its own substance remains distinct — no different from anything else not directly grasped as an object. From this it should be understood that there really is no external object at all: there is only inner consciousness, manifesting an appearance that resembles one. Hence the scripture says, in verse: "As the foolish discriminate it, the external object is, in every case, entirely nonexistent; it is habitual tendencies that disturb and cloud the mind, causing it to turn and manifest resembling that object."

Someone raises this objection: if there is no real self or dharmas apart from consciousness, then even provisional designation should be impossible. Provisional designation must rest on a real thing, a resembling thing, and a quality shared between them — as when there is a real fire, a person who resembles fire, and a fierce, ruddy quality shared by both — only then can one provisionally call this person "fire." The same should hold for provisionally calling something "a cow," and so on. If self and dharmas do not exist at all, on what basis could they be provisionally spoken of? And if provisional designation is impossible, then even saying that mind merely "resembles" an external object cannot be established either — so how can you still claim that mind turns as if it were an external object?

This objection is unreasonable, since a real self and real dharmas apart from consciousness have already been refuted above. In fact, provisional designation grounded in class-membership, and provisional designation grounded in a real shared quality, both fail.

Grounding it in class-membership fails first: qualities like "fierce" and "ruddy" do not themselves belong to any class the way substances do. And if there were no shared quality at all, one might as well call water "fire" too — nothing would make fire the apt comparison and not water. If you say fierceness and ruddiness, though not class-qualities themselves, are still inseparable from fire — that fails too: a fierce person, in plain experience, is often found nowhere near actual fire. Since the class has no defining quality, and the supposed shared quality is in any case separable from fire, and yet "fire" is still applied to such a person — provisional designation plainly does not rest on class-membership.

Grounding it in a real shared quality fails too: "fierce" and "ruddy" are not, in fact, shared — the fierceness in fire and the fierceness in a person are distinct in substance, since they depend on entirely different bases, so there is no truly shared quality to ground the comparison, and the same faults just given recur. If you say it rests merely on resemblance between the two qualities — that fails too: we say the fire is "in" the person, not that one quality is "in" another quality. Provisional designation, then, does not rest on a real shared quality either.

Furthermore, the claim that provisional designation must, in any case, rest on some real thing does not hold up either. "Real" means a thing's own particular character — but neither provisional concept nor provisional language, functioning as they do, ever actually takes hold of that particular character as its object. Provisional cognition and provisional language operate only on the shared, general characteristics dharmas hold in common; there is no further special mechanism by which they could instead fasten onto a thing's own unique character as their basis. And provisional cognition and language necessarily depend on words arising — wherever words do not reach, they simply do not operate at all — so neither the word doing the designating nor the concept designated is ever a thing's own particular character. From this it can be known that provisional designation does not, after all, rest on something real. It operates only on a resembling appearance — "resembling" here meaning something superimposed, not a thing's own real character. Since language works by way of exactly this kind of superimposition, turning on a merely resembling appearance, one cannot say that provisional designation must rest on something real.

The objection, therefore, does not accord with reason. Rather, it is based on what consciousness transforms — and precisely in order to dispel the deluded clinging to a truly real self and real dharmas — that this language of provisional resemblance is spoken. Hence the scripture says, in verse: "In order to dispel what the unenlightened cling to as a real self and real dharmas, based on what consciousness transforms, the names 'self' and 'dharmas' are provisionally spoken."

Although what consciousness transforms into takes countless forms, the kinds of consciousness capable of transforming are only three. First, the ripening consciousness — the eighth consciousness — so called because it is characterized, for the most part, by ripening. Second, the deliberating consciousness — the seventh consciousness — so called because it constantly and closely deliberates. Third, the consciousness that discerns objects — the first six consciousnesses — so called because their manner of discerning objects is comparatively coarse. The word "and," in the verse's list, shows that these six are grouped together as a single kind.

All three are called "transforming consciousnesses" because transformation is itself of two kinds. The first is causal transformation: the two kinds of causal habitual tendencies within the eighth consciousness — the "homogeneous-outflow" tendency and the "ripening" tendency. The homogeneous-outflow tendency grows through the perfuming left by wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral activity in the seven active consciousnesses. The ripening tendency grows through the perfuming left by contaminated wholesome and unwholesome activity in the six sense-consciousnesses.

The second is resultant transformation: through the power of these two habitual tendencies, the eight consciousnesses arise and manifest their various distinct appearances. Because the homogeneous-outflow tendency serves as a direct cause, the eight consciousnesses arise with their own distinct substances and characteristics — this is called the "homogeneous-outflow result," since the result resembles its cause. Because the ripening tendency serves as a contributing condition, it draws forth the eighth consciousness, repaying the power of life-projecting karma, continuing constantly without break — hence the name "ripening." It also draws forth the first six consciousnesses, repaying completing karma; since these arise from the ripening consciousness but are themselves interrupted, they are called "ripened arisings" rather than simply "ripening." The ripening consciousness together with these ripened arisings are together called the "result of ripening," since the result differs in kind from its cause.

What is specifically meant here by "the ripening consciousness" is the consciousness that is clung to and cherished as a self, that stores seeds, and that, holding the seeds of defilement, is capable of transforming into a resultant consciousness — this is the sense of "ripening" meant in the present context, not every possible sense of the term.

The three names of the transforming consciousnesses have been given, but their three natures have not yet been explained. What, then, is the nature of the first transformation?

The verse says: The first is the ālayavijñāna — ripening, holding all seeds. What it grasps and sustains, and its own domain, are unknowable. It is constantly joined with contact, attention, feeling, perception, and volition, and only ever with neutral feeling. It is unobstructed and morally indeterminate; contact and the other mental factors that accompany it are likewise so. It flows on constantly, like a rushing torrent, and is relinquished at the stage of the arhat.

The treatise says: the first transforming consciousness is called, in both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna teaching, the ālaya — the "storehouse" — because this consciousness carries a threefold meaning: that which stores, that which is stored, and that which is clung to as a store. That is: it mutually serves as condition together with defilement, and sentient beings cling to it as their inner self. This reveals the self-characteristic of the first transforming consciousness, since holding and sustaining cause and effect together is exactly what constitutes that self-characteristic. Although this consciousness's self-characteristic has many aspects, its role as "storehouse" carries the greatest weight, and so this aspect is specifically emphasized in its name.

This consciousness draws forth the ripened results of wholesome and unwholesome karma across every realm, destiny, and mode of birth — hence it is called "ripening." Apart from it, the life-faculty, the sameness-of-kind, and the rest — the constant, unbroken, superior ripened result that sustains an entire life — could not be found. This reveals the result-characteristic of the first transforming consciousness. Though its result-characteristic takes many stages and many forms, "ripening" is the broadest and most distinctive, and so this aspect is specifically emphasized.

This consciousness holds the seeds of every dharma without letting them be lost — hence it is called "holding all seeds." Apart from it, no other dharma capable of universally holding the seeds of all dharmas could be found. This reveals the cause-characteristic of the first transforming consciousness. Though its cause-characteristic has many aspects, its holding of seeds is unique and shared by nothing else, and so this aspect is specifically emphasized.

Although the substance and characteristics of the first transforming consciousness are many, in brief, they amount to just these three. The meaning of "holding all seeds" should now be examined further.

What, in this context, is meant by "seed"? It is a distinct functional capacity within the root consciousness that directly gives rise to its own result. This capacity is neither identical with nor different from the root consciousness and the result it produces — this follows from the very logic of substance and function, and of cause and effect. Although neither identical nor different, it is really existent — for a merely provisional thing, having no efficacy of its own, cannot serve as a cause and condition.

One might object: since this seed is neither identical with nor different from other dharmas generally, it should, like a pot, be merely provisional, not real. But if that reasoning held, suchness too — also described as neither identical with nor different from dharmas — would have to be merely provisional, and accepting that would leave no true ultimate reality at all. Seeds, however, are said to be really existent only in the sense of conventional truth, unlike suchness, which is really existent in the sense of ultimate truth.

Although seeds depend on the substance of the eighth consciousness, they are that very consciousness's own perceived-aspect — not anyone else's — since its perceiving-aspect constantly takes them as its object. Contaminated seeds, since their substance is not different from the ripening consciousness itself, are classed as morally indeterminate; yet since both their cause and their effect can carry a wholesome or other moral quality, they can secondarily be called "wholesome" and so on. Uncontaminated seeds, however, are not included within the ripening consciousness's own nature, since both their cause and their effect are of a wholesome nature — they are called only "wholesome."

If so, why does the "Chapter of Investigation" say that all twenty-two faculties have ripening seeds, and are all "ripened arisings"? — Though called "ripening," they need not be morally indeterminate; they are called "ripening seeds" simply because they depend on the ripening consciousness, even while differing from it in nature — just as the eye-consciousness and the rest depend on it while having their own distinct qualities. Or, alternatively: uncontaminated seeds, through the power of perfuming, transform and mature, and so are given the name "ripening" in this looser sense — not the "ripening" that belongs to a morally indeterminate nature.

On this question, one view holds: all seeds inherently exist from the start; they do not arise from perfuming. Perfuming can only cause them to increase and grow. As scripture says: all sentient beings, from beginningless time, possess various elements, clustered together like akṣa seeds, existing just as they naturally are — "element" being simply another name for the distinct varieties of seeds. Scripture also says: "the beginningless element is the equal basis of all dharmas," where "element" carries the sense of "cause." The Yogācārabhūmi likewise says that although the substance of seeds has, from beginningless time, inherently existed, it is nonetheless activated anew by defiled or pure perfuming.

Among sentient beings, from beginningless time, those capable of ultimately attaining nirvāṇa possess every kind of seed in full; those incapable of it lack the seeds of the three kinds of awakening. Passages like these offer more than one proof. Furthermore, since sentient beings are said to have five inherently distinct spiritual dispositions, there must certainly be naturally-existing seeds, not produced by perfuming. The Yogācārabhūmi also says that even hell-beings possess the three uncontaminated faculties in seed form, though not manifest — and that these have been transmitted, one after another, from beginningless time, naturally obtained as an abiding nature. From such proofs, uncontaminated seeds naturally, inherently exist, and do not arise from perfuming; contaminated seeds should likewise naturally exist, merely increased through perfuming rather than separately produced by it. Established this way, cause and effect remain unconfused.

Another view holds: all seeds arise because of perfuming. What is perfumed and what does the perfuming have both existed since beginningless time, so all seeds have likewise been established since beginningless time — through an endless process, not as an unchanging starting inventory. Since "seed" is simply another name for "habitual tendency," and a habitual tendency must come into being through perfuming — just as sesame oil takes on fragrance only because it has been perfumed by flowers.

As scripture says: the minds of sentient beings, perfumed by defiled and pure dharmas, accumulate countless seeds. Another treatise says: inner seeds certainly involve perfuming; outer seeds may or may not. The three kinds of perfuming — of verbal expression and the rest — together encompass the seeds of every contaminated dharma; since these three arise through perfuming, contaminated seeds must, without exception, be produced by relying on perfuming. Uncontaminated seeds, too, arise through perfuming — this is why "the perfuming of hearing" is spoken of: hearing the true teaching that flows from the pure dharma-realm perfumes and activates them, since they are exactly the seed-nature of the mind that transcends the world.

The distinct spiritual dispositions sentient beings are said to have from the start are not established by whether uncontaminated seeds already exist, but by whether the two obstructions can ultimately be removed. As the Yogācārabhūmi says: with respect to suchness, those whose seeds of both obstructions can never be ultimately eliminated are established as never attaining nirvāṇa; those whose seeds of the cognitive obstruction alone can never be ultimately eliminated are established, in part, with the disposition of a śrāvaka, and in part with that of a pratyekabuddha; those with no seeds of either obstruction that can never be eliminated are established with the disposition of a tathāgata. From this it can be known that inherent dispositional differences are established on the basis of the obstructions, not on the basis of uncontaminated seeds. The statement that everyone "possesses uncontaminated seeds," then, refers to what can, in the future, come to arise — not to something that already substantially exists now.

A further view holds: seeds are, in every case, of two kinds. The first is the inherently pre-existent kind: the distinct functional capacities for producing the aggregates, sense-fields, and elements, existing naturally within the ripening consciousness from beginningless time. It is on this basis that the World-Honored One speaks of sentient beings possessing, from beginningless time, various elements, clustered like akṣa seeds, existing just as they naturally are — the other citations given earlier apply here too. This is called the "naturally-abiding seed."

The second is the newly-arisen kind: seeds that come into being through repeated perfuming by manifest activity, across beginningless time. It is on this basis that the World-Honored One speaks of the minds of sentient beings accumulating countless seeds because they are perfumed by defiled and pure dharmas; other treatises likewise say that defiled and pure seeds arise because of perfuming by defiled and pure dharmas. This is called the "seed formed through habituation."

If seeds were only inherently pre-existent, the evolving consciousnesses could not serve as a causal condition for the ālaya at all. As scripture says: "All dharmas are stored in consciousness, and consciousness likewise is stored in dharmas — each in turn serves as the other's result, and each is likewise always a cause for the other." This verse means that the ālayavijñāna and the evolving consciousnesses, at every moment, generate one another in turn, each serving as both cause and effect for the other. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: the ālayavijñāna and defiled dharmas serve as each other's cause and condition, just as a wick and its flame continually give rise to one another's burning, or as bundled reeds mutually lean on and sustain each other — it is only by relying on these two that a genuine cause-and-condition relationship can be established at all, since no other such relationship can be found.

If seeds were not produced by perfuming at all, how could the evolving consciousnesses have any genuine cause-and-condition relationship with the ālaya? Merely causing growth through perfuming, without real production, cannot be called a cause-and-condition relationship — otherwise, by that same weak standard, wholesome and unwholesome karma would have to count as a cause-and-condition for the ripened result, which no one holds. And every scripture that speaks of seeds arising through perfuming would be directly contradicted. The "only inherently pre-existent" view, then, conflicts with both reason and scripture.

If seeds arose only through perfuming, conditioned uncontaminated dharmas, having no prior cause-condition, could never arise at all. Contaminated seeds cannot serve as the seed for uncontaminated results either — uncontaminated seeds are not supposed to produce contaminated ones, and if you allowed that they could, even Buddhas should be able to lapse back into contaminated states, and wholesome seeds should end up producing unwholesome results.

The Vibhajyavādins say: the nature of mind is originally pure; it is defiled only by adventitious afflictions, hence called "defiled"; freed of afflictions, it turns uncontaminated — so the uncontaminated is not produced without a cause. But what, exactly, do they mean by "the nature of mind"?

If they mean the principle of emptiness — emptiness cannot be a cause of mind, and, being an eternal, unchanging principle, it certainly cannot serve as any dharma's seed, since its substance never changes. If they mean mind's own substance — this becomes just like the Sāṃkhya position already refuted: appearance changes while substance remains eternally one. Unwholesome and neutral states of mind should then be wholesome too; grant this, and they should be associated with faith and the other wholesome factors; deny it, and that substance cannot really be called wholesome at all, let alone uncontaminated.

Since even wholesome-but-contaminated mind is called "defiled," just like unwholesome mind, its nature is not uncontaminated — so it should not serve as a cause for the uncontaminated, any more than wholesome and unwholesome states cause each other. And if a contaminated mind's nature really were uncontaminated, then, by the same token, an uncontaminated mind's nature should be contaminated — no distinguishing cause could ever explain why only one direction holds.

Furthermore, if an ordinary being's mind were uncontaminated in nature, then its uncontaminated manifest activity should already qualify that ordinary being as a noble one. If you say the ordinary being's mind-nature is uncontaminated but its outward characteristics remain defiled, and so it isn't actually called uncontaminated — avoiding that fault — then its seed, too, should not be called uncontaminated by the same logic. Why, then, does your own treatise say an ordinary being can already possess genuinely uncontaminated seeds, when seed and manifest activity are supposed to share the same nature?

What scripture actually means by "mind's nature is pure" is the suchness revealed by mind's emptiness, since suchness is mind's true nature — or it means mind's substance is not itself affliction, hence "originally pure" in that sense, not that a contaminated mind's nature is somehow already uncontaminated. One should therefore believe that sentient beings possess, from beginningless time, uncontaminated seeds not produced by perfuming but naturally established as they are; later, at more advanced stages, perfuming causes them to grow, and uncontaminated dharmas arise, taking these seeds as their cause. When the uncontaminated arises, it perfumes and forms further seeds in turn — contaminated seeds should be understood the same way.

Although the sacred teachings say inner seeds certainly involve perfuming, they never say that every seed without exception arises purely from perfuming — so how could one deny inherently pre-existent seeds altogether? Rather, inherently pre-existent seeds are also affected by perfuming, which strengthens them enough to actually yield their result — this is the sense in which inner seeds "certainly involve perfuming."

"The perfuming of hearing" is not only of a contaminated kind: hearing the true teaching also perfumes the inherently pre-existent uncontaminated seeds, gradually strengthening them until, in due course, the mind that transcends the world arises — this too falls under "the perfuming of hearing." Within it, the contaminated portion is eliminated through cultivation and brings a superior ripened result, serving as a powerful contributing condition for the supramundane teaching; the uncontaminated portion is not eliminated, and serves as its direct cause. Because this direct cause is extremely subtle and hard to discern, scripture speaks instead in terms of the more evident contributing condition, provisionally calling it "the seed of the mind that transcends the world."

As for establishing dispositional differences on the basis of the obstructions — this is meant precisely to indicate whether uncontaminated seeds are present. Someone with no uncontaminated seeds at all has seeds of both obstructions that can never be eliminated, and so is established as one who will never attain nirvāṇa; someone with only the uncontaminated seeds of the two lesser vehicles has cognitive-obstruction seeds that can never be eliminated, and is established with the disposition of a śrāvaka or a pratyekabuddha; someone who also has the uncontaminated seeds of buddhahood can eliminate the seeds of both obstructions entirely, and is established with the disposition of a tathāgata. The presence or absence of uncontaminated seeds, in other words, is precisely what makes the obstructions eliminable or not — but since uncontaminated seeds are too subtle to discern directly, the teaching speaks in terms of the obstructions instead.

Otherwise, what distinguishing cause would explain why the obstructions are eliminable for some and not others? If you say this difference simply exists naturally as a given — why not equally allow that uncontaminated seeds simply exist naturally too? And if there were originally no uncontaminated seeds at all, the noble path could never arise for anyone — so who would ever eliminate the two obstructions' seeds, such that dispositions could still be established on their basis? Since, on this view, the noble path genuinely could never arise, saying it merely "can arise in the future" is equally unreasonable. Yet the sacred teachings, again and again, speak of inherently pre-existent seeds — all of which the "only newly-arisen" position contradicts. It, too, conflicts with both reason and scripture.

From this, it should be understood that the seeds of all dharmas are, in every case, of two kinds: inherently pre-existent, and newly arisen.

The meaning of "seed," in brief, involves six marks. First, momentary cessation: as soon as its substance arises, it must cease without interruption — only then, possessing a superior functional capacity, does it count as a seed. This rules out permanent things, since a changeless thing cannot be said to have any capacity to generate something new.

Second, co-existing with its result: only when it exists together, in the present moment, combined with the manifest result it produces, does it count as a seed. This rules out anything that produces its result before or after itself, or that is necessarily separate from it. A manifest activity and its seed, though different in kind, do not contradict one another, and can both have generative capacity within the same stream at the same time — unlike a seed generating a further seed of its own kind, which unfolds strictly one after another and so cannot coexist with itself. Only in the present moment can a cause have real functional force, since what has not yet arisen, or has already ceased, has no substance of its own — so "seed" is named specifically for its power to generate a manifest result, not for generating a later seed of its own kind.

Third, constantly continuing: only when it continues, over a long span, as a single unbroken kind, all the way to its final stage, does it count as a seed. This rules out the evolving consciousnesses, which shift and are subject to interruption, and so do not fit the pattern proper to a seed-dharma — this mark describes seed generating further seed of its own kind.

Fourth, fixed nature: only when its capacity to produce a wholesome, unwholesome, or other result is fixed and determinate, in accordance with the power of its own cause, does it count as a seed. This rules out other schools' claim that a cause of one moral quality can genuinely produce a result of a different moral quality.

Fifth, depending on the coming-together of conditions: only when it depends on its own full set of conditions coming together — at which point its capacity becomes especially potent — does it count as a seed. This rules out non-Buddhist schools' claim of a spontaneous cause that produces its result constantly and all at once, without depending on conditions, and also rules out other schools' claim that the needed conditions are simply always present. Rather, the conditions depended upon are not constantly present, so a seed does not instantly produce its result regardless of circumstances.

Sixth, drawing forth its own result: only when it draws forth, respectively, its own particular result — material or mental — does it count as a seed. This rules out non-Buddhist schools' claim that a single cause produces every result indiscriminately, and also rules out other schools' claim that material and mental dharmas can cause one another across categories.

Only the distinct functional capacities within the root consciousness possess all six of these marks and so count as genuine seeds — nothing else does. Ordinary things like grain and wheat are themselves transformations of consciousness, and are called "seeds" only by loose, provisional analogy — they are not real seeds in this sense. A genuine seed's power to produce a near, direct result is called its "generative cause"; its power to draw forth a more distant, residual result, keeping the causal thread from breaking off entirely, is called its "drawing cause."

On what basis is the term "perfuming" established? What is perfumed and what does the perfuming must each possess four marks; only then, causing seeds to grow, does the process properly count as perfuming.

The four marks of what can be perfumed are, first, stability: only something that continues, start to finish, as a single unbroken kind, capable of holding habitual tendencies, can be perfumed — ruling out the evolving consciousnesses, sound, wind, and the like, whose nature is not stable. Second, moral neutrality: only something even-tempered and unresisting, able to accommodate habitual tendencies, can be perfumed — ruling out anything with an intensely wholesome or defiled force, which has no room left to accommodate anything further. This is why the Tathāgata's pure eighth consciousness, at buddhahood, carries only its old seeds and no longer receives new perfuming.

Third, receptivity: only something self-sufficient, not dense and impenetrable by nature, capable of receiving habitual tendencies, can be perfumed — ruling out the mental factors, which depend on their consciousness rather than standing on their own, and the unconditioned dharmas, which are utterly impenetrable to change. Fourth, capacity for union with what perfumes it: only something existing at the same time and place as what perfumes it, neither identical with it nor separate from it, can be perfumed — ruling out another person's mind-stream, and any moment before or after the present one, neither of which can genuinely unite with a given act of perfuming. Only the ripening consciousness possesses all four marks, and so only it can be perfumed — not the mental factors, and not anything else.

The four marks of what can perfume are, first, having arising and ceasing: only something impermanent, capable of active function, can grow habitual tendencies, and so can perfume — ruling out the unconditioned, which never changes and has no growing function at all. Second, having superior force: only something that, besides arising and ceasing, also has a strong, vigorous force capable of drawing forth habitual tendencies can perfume — ruling out the ripening consciousness itself and its own mental factors, whose force is too weak.

Third, being capable of increase and decrease: only something that, besides having superior force, can also increase or decrease, gathering and planting habitual tendencies, can perfume — ruling out the perfected wholesome dharmas of buddhahood, which neither increase nor decrease. If they could perfume, buddhahood would not truly be perfect, and one Buddha's attainment would have to outrank another's, which is absurd. Fourth, operating in union with what is perfumed: only something existing at the same time and place as what it perfumes, neither identical with it nor separate from it, can perfume — ruling out another person's mind-stream and any moment before or after the present one. Only the seven evolving consciousnesses and their associated mental factors — which have superior force and are capable of increase and decrease — possess all four marks, and so only they can perfume.

In this way, what perfumes and what is perfumed arise and cease together, and the meaning of "perfuming" is established: it causes the seeds within what is perfumed to grow, just as sesame seeds take on fragrance from being perfumed by flowers — hence the name. When the perfuming consciousness and its factors arise from a seed, they immediately act as a cause, and perfume again to form further seeds. These three — seed, manifest activity, and new seed — thus turn upon one another as cause and effect all at the same time: just as a wick gives rise to a flame, and the flame in turn scorches the wick, or just as bundled reeds mutually lean on and depend upon one another. Cause and effect occurring together in this way is a principle nothing can shake.

This concludes the brief account of the characteristics of all seeds. What, then, are this consciousness's perceiving-activity and its object? The verse says its grasping-and-holding, its domain, and its discerning are unknowable. "Discerning" means cognizing and discriminating — this is its perceiving-activity, since consciousness takes discerning as its very activity. "Domain" means location, the receptacle-world, since it is what all sentient beings depend on and dwell within. "Grasping-and-holding" is of two kinds: seeds, and the body together with its faculties. "Seeds" here means the habitual tendencies of characteristics, names, and discrimination; "the body with its faculties" means the physical sense-faculties and their physical bases. Both are grasped and held by this consciousness, taken in as its very own substance, sharing the same safety and danger with it.

Both what is grasped-and-held and the receptacle-world are this consciousness's object. Through the power of its own causes and conditions, when the ālayavijñāna's own substance arises, it transforms, internally, into seeds and the body-with-faculties, and, externally, into the receptacle-world — and it is precisely this transformed appearance that becomes its own object; its perceiving-activity arises only in dependence on it.

Here, "discerning" means that the ripening consciousness has, with respect to its own object, a function of discriminating cognition — and this function belongs to its perceiving-aspect. Whenever a contaminated consciousness's own substance arises, it always manifests as though split into an object side and a subject side, and its associated mental factors do likewise. The side that resembles the object is called the perceived-aspect; the side that resembles the subject is called the perceiving-aspect.

If mind and mental factors had no perceived-aspect, they could not take their own respective objects as objects at all — or else each would have to be able to take absolutely anything as its object, since its own object would be no different from any other. And if mind and mental factors had no perceiving-aspect, they could not cognize anything at all, and would be no different from empty space — or else empty space itself would have to count as something that cognizes. Mind and mental factors, therefore, must necessarily have these two aspects. As scripture says, in verse: "Everything is only cognition; what is cognized has no independent reality at all — the divisions of cognizer and cognized each simply arise, each according to its own nature."

Those who hold that an object exists apart from consciousness say: the external object is what is grasped; the perceived-aspect is merely called the "perceiving-activity"; and the perceiving-aspect is called the "substance," since, on their view, it simply is mind and mental factors' own essential character, with nothing further needed. On this view, mind and its mental factors share the same basis and object, and resemble each other in perceiving-activity, though their number of "substances" differs in character — since consciousness, feeling, perception, and the rest each have their own distinct nature.

Those who have realized that no object exists apart from consciousness say instead: the perceived-aspect is what is grasped; the perceiving-aspect is the perceiving-activity; and the underlying substance both aspects depend on is called the "self-witnessing aspect." If this did not exist, one could never remember one's own past mental states — just as one can never remember an object one has never actually experienced. Mind and its mental factors share the same underlying faculty and resemble each other in object, but differ in perceiving-activity, since their functions — discerning, receiving, and so on — are each distinct.

In fact, whenever mind or a mental factor arises, careful examination shows it has three parts: what is measured, what does the measuring, and the result of measuring are distinct, and the perceived- and perceiving-aspects must have some substance they depend on. As the Pramāṇasamuccaya says, in verse: "The aspect resembling the object is what is measured; the aspect that grasps it, and the self-witnessing, are the measuring and its result. These three have no separate substance" — three functions of one and the same consciousness.

Analyzed more finely, mind and mental factors should be seen to have a fourth part as well: the three already given, plus the self-witnessing of the self-witnessing. Without this fourth part, what would verify the third part itself? Since all parts of mind belong to the same kind, the third should require verification just as the first two clearly do. Furthermore, without a fourth part, the self-witnessing aspect would have no result of its own — yet whatever does the measuring must produce a result. Nor can the perceiving-aspect serve as that result, since the perceiving-aspect is sometimes mistaken, while what verifies self-witnessing must always be accurate, direct perception.

Of these four parts, the first two are, relatively, "outer"; the latter two are "inner." The first part is purely an object, never a subject; the latter three can each serve as either. The second part takes only the first as its object, and may be accurate or mistaken, direct or inferential. The third part takes the second as its object. The fourth takes only the third as its object, not the second, since that would serve no purpose — the third and fourth are both, without exception, accurate, direct perception. Mind and mental factors are thus composed of these four parts together, each equipped with an object-side and a subject-side relative to its neighbors, with no infinite regress — the fourth verifies the third, and needs nothing further to verify itself. These four parts are neither identical with nor separate from one another; this is exactly how the truth of Consciousness-Only is established, even within a single moment of cognition.

Hence scripture says, in verse: "The nature of sentient beings' minds is twofold — in every part, inner and outer, there is the entanglement of what is grasped and what grasps, and seeing shows many kinds of difference." This means: the nature of the mind is composed of two aspects; in every part, inner or outer, there is this entanglement of grasped and grasping, and "seeing" shows many distinctions — sometimes accurate, sometimes mistaken, sometimes direct, sometimes inferential. Here "seeing" refers to the perceiving-aspect.

These four parts can equally be grouped as three, since the fourth is simply another instance of self-witnessing; or as two, since the latter three are all, by nature, functions of the subject, and so all fall under "perceiving-aspect" in a broad sense; or even as one, since ultimately no separate substance underlies any of them.

As the Laṅkāvatāra says, in verse: "Because of attachment to one's own mind, mind turns as though it were an external object; what is seen this way does not exist — hence it is said to be mind-only." Scripture speaks this way, of "one mind," again and again — and this term also includes the mental factors. Consciousness's perceiving-activity, therefore, is precisely its discerning function, and this discerning function is precisely consciousness's own perceiving-aspect.

As for "domain": the ripening consciousness, through the maturing power of its shared-characteristic seeds, transforms and manifests an appearance resembling the receptacle-world of form and the rest — the outer elements and the matter composed from them. Although what each individual sentient being transforms is, strictly speaking, separate, the appearances resemble one another and occupy no distinct locations — just as the light of many lamps, each entirely filling the room, appears to be a single, unified light.

Whose ripening consciousness transforms into this shared world? One view: everyone's, without exception — as scripture says, it arises jointly through the combined power of the karma of all sentient beings.

Another view: if that were so, Buddhas and bodhisattvas would still have to transform this defiled land into existence, and ordinary beings would have to transform pure lands in other worlds they have never even visited. And noble ones who, weary of form, are reborn into the formless realm certainly do not descend again — so what use would their consciousness transforming this land be? Rather, only the ripening consciousness of those presently living here, or about to be reborn here, transforms this world. Scripture's word "all" refers only to the relevant group: everyone whose karma is of the same kind, who jointly transform it together.

Yet another view: if that were so, then at the moment the physical universe is about to be destroyed, with no one presently living there and no one yet to be reborn there, whose consciousness transforms it? And beings reborn formless, having no physical body at all, would have no use for transforming a physical land in advance for some future rebirth — and even granting they somehow did, a body suited to one realm and a world suited to an entirely different one are worlds apart, with no way to support each other, so what benefit could there possibly be?

Rather, the land that consciousness transforms exists, from the start, to support and be used by a physical body — so wherever a body could potentially make use of it, that consciousness can transform it into being there. This is why, even if one were reborn elsewhere, one's consciousness could still transform this present land too — and why, even as the physical universe is about to be destroyed, or has only just newly formed, with no sentient beings currently present, it can nevertheless still manifest as existing. This explains what is used in common by everyone; individual, differing perceptions — as ghosts, humans, and gods each see the very same thing differently — should be understood by the same reasoning, adjusted accordingly.

"Seeds" here means all the contaminated dharma-seeds held by the ripening consciousness; since these are included within this consciousness's own nature, they are its object. Uncontaminated seeds, though they depend on this consciousness, are not included within its nature, and so are not its object — yet, though not its object, they are not separate from it either, just as suchness is not the object of ordinary cognition and yet is never separate from mind. This is in no way inconsistent with Consciousness-Only.

"The body with its faculties" means: through the maturing power of its own individual seeds, the ripening consciousness transforms and manifests an appearance resembling the physical sense-faculties and their bases — the internal elements and the matter composed from them. And, through the maturing power of its shared seeds, it also transforms an appearance resembling other beings' bodies — otherwise there would be no way to account for one's ability to make use of, or relate to, others' presence at all.

On this point, one view holds it also transforms an appearance resembling others' actual faculties, since the Madhyāntavibhāga says "the five faculties of self and other both appear." Another view holds it can only transform their physical basis, since another's faculties are of no use to oneself — "the five faculties of self and other both appear" simply means each consciousness transforms its own respectively, which is why, when someone is reborn elsewhere or enters final nirvāṇa, their remaining corpse can still be seen continuing on.

What has been said so far concerns the outer world, inner body, and various realms and stages as transformed by the power of karma; but what is transformed by the power of meditative concentration and the like — world, body, realm, stage, self, other — is not so fixed. What karma transforms as body and world mostly continues constantly; what meditative power transforms as sound, light, and the like is mostly temporary, arising in response to present conditions.

In brief, this consciousness's objects are: contaminated seeds, the ten form-based sense-fields, and the real form included within the mental-object sense-field. Why, then, can this consciousness not transform an appearance resembling mind or mental factors, and take that as its object?

A contaminated consciousness's transformations are, in brief, of two kinds: driven by cause-and-condition, and driven by discrimination. The first necessarily has a real function; the second serves merely as an object. The ripening consciousness's transformation follows only cause-and-condition, and what it transforms must have real function — but transforming an appearance resembling mind would have no real function, since a mere perceived-image resembling mind cannot itself cognize anything; genuine cognition would have to arise separately from that image. Transforming an appearance resembling the unconditioned would likewise have no real function. Hence the ripening consciousness does not take mind or the unconditioned as its object.

At the uncontaminated stage, associated with superior wisdom, though free of ordinary discrimination, consciousness is so utterly clear and pure that it can still manifest an image even without that narrower "real function" — otherwise, Buddhas would not be omniscient. So, at the contaminated stage, this ripening consciousness takes only the receptacle-world, the body, and contaminated seeds as its object. In the realms of desire and form, it has all three; in the formless realm, it takes only contaminated seeds, since beings there have grown weary of form, and so have no karmically-resultant form — though form produced by meditative power can still exist, and this consciousness takes that as an object too.

As for "unknowable": this consciousness's perceiving-activity is extremely subtle, and so hard to discern; its inner object of grasping-and-holding is likewise subtle; and the external receptacle-world's extent is difficult to measure — for these reasons it is called "unknowable."

How is it that this consciousness's very act of taking hold of its object is so hard to know? Consider: even within the attainment of cessation, a consciousness that never leaves the body should be believed to exist — indeed, one must grant that consciousness is present even in the attainment of cessation, since one who has entered it is still counted as a sentient being, just as when ordinary mind is present. The same should be understood to hold for the attainment of no-thought and similar states.