Refuting the Hīnayāna Objection

Next, regarding whether buddha-nature exists or not, the establishing and refuting of positions should be understood. There are three refutations: first, refuting Hīnayāna attachments; second, refuting non-Buddhist attachments; third, refuting certain Mahāyāna attachments. As for the first: the Buddha, teaching Hīnayāna followers, said that there are sentient beings who do not abide within buddha-nature and will never attain final nirvāṇa. On hearing this, doubt arises, and a lack of faith is born.

Explanation. The reason doubt arises is that the Buddha's own statement is read differently by the various Hīnayāna schools. According to the Vibhajyavādins, all beings — ordinary and holy alike — take emptiness as their basis, since all of them emerge from emptiness; emptiness is buddha-nature, and buddha-nature is precisely mahāparinirvāṇa. According to the Abhidharma Sarvāstivādins and similar schools, however, no sentient being possesses buddha-nature inherently — it can only be obtained through cultivation. On this view, sentient beings fall into exactly three kinds: first, those who definitely lack buddha-nature and will never attain nirvāṇa — the icchantikas who have committed grave transgressions; second, those in whom it is undetermined — if they cultivate, they attain it, and if they do not, they do not, these being persons at or above the rank shared by the worthy and the good; third, those who definitely possess it, namely followers of the three vehicles: śrāvakas attain it from the level of the forbearance regarding suffering upward, pratyekabuddhas from the level of worldly dharmas upward, and bodhisattvas from the ten dedications upward, at the stage of non-retrogression. And why is this so? Because, as the sūtras say, "there are sentient beings who do not abide within nature and will never attain final nirvāṇa." And an Āgama says: "Among the Buddha's ten powers, the power that illuminates beings' natures reveals that sentient beings' conditions comprise many differing natures, down to differences of coarse and fine realm" — hence it is called the power of natures. Why? Because sentient beings differ in whether they possess this nature or not: those who possess buddha-nature cultivate all manner of excellent conduct, while those who lack it give rise to all manner of coarse evil. For this reason, students of the Hīnayāna, seeing that both readings have some rational basis, do not know which is settled, and so doubt arises.

Furthermore, as to how a lack of faith arises: each of these two readings is one-sided, holding to a single extreme, and so each fails to believe the other. How so? Followers of the Vibhajyavādin reading do not believe there are sentient beings who altogether lack buddha-nature; followers of the Sarvāstivādin and similar readings do not believe that all beings possess it.

One who holds that buddha-nature is universal asks one who holds that some beings lack it: "On what grounds do you say there are sentient beings who altogether lack buddha-nature and will never attain final nirvāṇa?" He answers: "Since sentient beings plainly differ, some coarse and some refined, it stands to reason that some possess this nature and some do not." "If you do not believe that there are sentient beings who altogether lack buddha-nature and will never attain nirvāṇa, and yet you do believe that sentient beings differ in coarse and refined realms — is this not inconsistent? Because your standard is applied unequally."

Question: "You believe sentient beings exhibit differing coarse and fine realms, and on this basis you would have me believe there are natureless beings — should I then also believe there are rootless beings, beings lacking sense-faculties altogether? For it is precisely on account of having or lacking sense-faculties that beings exhibit their differing coarse and fine realms. If you do not believe there are rootless beings, then on what grounds do you believe in differing coarse and fine realms at all? If you say that differing realms have nothing to do with having or lacking sense-faculties, then I too may say that differing realms have nothing to do with having or lacking buddha-nature — what fault would there be in that? And if you say there are no rootless beings, then I too will say there are no natureless beings."

Answer: "Your comparison of having-or-lacking sense-faculties to my having-or-lacking buddha-nature does not hold. Why? As for what you call a 'rootless being' — is it a sentient being, or is it not? If it is a sentient being, two faults follow: first, the fault of excess — if something lacking the six sense-faculties could still be a sentient being, then all insentient things, grass, trees, and stones, would equally be sentient beings, since they equally lack the faculties. Second, the fault of insufficiency — sentient beings are, by definition, constituted precisely by the six sense-faculties; lacking them, what then would remain to be called a sentient being at all? So your talk of rootless beings does not hold. This shows that differences of coarse and fine are not spoken of in terms of having or lacking sense-faculties, but precisely in terms of having or lacking buddha-nature."

Objection: "If you say that my positing rootless beings incurs two faults, then your own position commits an even graver version of the same. Your claim that the icchantika altogether lacks buddha-nature and will never attain nirvāṇa likewise incurs two faults. First, the fault of excess: sentient beings are, at root, constituted as ordinary beings by self-view and ignorance. This ignorance arises precisely because it violates the emptiness of person; once ignorance arises, karmic action and its retribution follow. If a being did not violate the emptiness of person, there would be no ignorance, action, or retribution. But if, as you say, such a being has no buddha-nature, there is no self-view to violate in the first place — so there would be no ignorance, action, or retribution, these three wheels, and such a being would have to be a sage merely playing the part of an ordinary being. On your claim, only a sage plays the ordinary; no ordinary being could ever become a sage — this is the fault of excess. Second, the fault of insufficiency: if you say a being lacks buddha-nature, then, having no empty nature to violate, it would have no ignorance; and having no ignorance, it would have no karmic retribution. But having no karmic retribution, how could such a 'being' exist at all? This is the fault of insufficiency. So your claim that there are sentient beings lacking buddha-nature does not hold. Why? Because you yourself do not believe there are rootless beings — how then can you suddenly believe there are natureless beings? The two faults are exactly the same."

Question: "You say that some sentient beings lack buddha-nature. Take a person of the kṣatriya caste — does he possess, in full, the natures of all four castes, together with the natures of hell-being, human, and god, or does he not? If you say he does not possess them in full, then a human would always remain a human, and there could be no sense in which one being takes on different destinies. If you say he possesses them in full, this contradicts the sūtras, which say that the Tathāgata's power of natures illuminates beings' many differing coarse and fine realms — which makes no sense if these natures were, from the start, all equally present in full; so the sūtra offers no support either way. Moreover, if you hold that some beings will never attain final nirvāṇa, this too does not hold — just as a person who was first a kṣatriya may later become a brāhmaṇa, or be reborn as a human or a god, there being no fixed, permanent mark that binds a being to one caste or destiny forever. If you say the natures are not possessed in full, this contradicts your own analogy, since on that reading neither presence nor absence would be full, and your parallel would fail on its own terms. You say a being lacking buddha-nature will never attain buddhahood — as if a being without a god's nature must forever lack a god's reward. But if a being without a god's nature can still attain a god's reward, then a being lacking buddha-nature should likewise be able to attain nirvāṇa. Furthermore, if natures are, as your analogy requires, possessed in full, then even a being said to lack buddha-nature should, in full, possess it. If presence and absence are two mutually exclusive natures, must a being have strictly one or the other? That cannot be maintained, given the caste analogy above. If a being lacks the nature for nirvāṇa, it ought never to come to possess it. Your claim that one being possesses both natures at once likewise fails — just as a kṣatriya lacks the nature of a brāhmaṇa, these two being mutually exclusive and definitely absent one from the other, so that he could never subsequently become a brāhmaṇa, which would contradict how caste actually works in the world. And if a being possesses both natures, it will in time definitely attain nirvāṇa; if it does not, it will in time definitely not attain it. If a single person possesses both aspects at once, to which does he finally belong?"

Question, again: "When you posit sentient beings lacking buddha-nature, do you mean fixed absence from beginning to end, or unfixed absence? Consider how the great earth, at first without any nature of gold, may later come to have it, and having had it, may lose it again — is your 'lacking buddha-nature' like this as well? If so, then a being who has already attained the nature of the two lesser vehicles could later fail to attain it after all; one who has attained the nature of the Mahāyāna could later lose it again; one who has attained a fixed nature could later become unfixed once more. Though one may cultivate and attain the merits of penetration and liberation, one could afterward lose them again — in which case cultivating the path would be pointless. To posit a fixed nature in this manner renders it, in every case, useless."

Question, again: "If instead you posit that beings of undetermined nature are like the earth, sometimes turning into gold or jewels — that is, if a being lacking buddha-nature abides in a lower nature but, being undetermined, can be transformed and attain nirvāṇa — does this transformation occur in this very life, or only in some future life? If in this very life, how does it come about — through encountering the Three Jewels and attaining the three wholesome roots that lead to liberation, or without such an encounter? If you say it transforms in the present life through cultivating a portion of merit, then what do you mean by saying such beings abide forever in a lower nature? Your own position collapses by its own terms. If instead you say that although such a being cultivates wholesome roots in this life it will still not transform, and the transformation occurs only in some future life — hence 'abiding in a lower nature' now — then in that future life, will the nature transform because it cultivates goodness, or because it does not? If because it cultivates goodness, why does it not transform when it cultivates goodness now? And if it transforms of itself without cultivating goodness, why does it not transform now, when it likewise has not cultivated goodness?"

And again, if you hold that lacking buddha-nature is a fixed and permanent absence — as fire is fixed in its nature of heat and cannot become water's nature of coldness — buddha-nature would likewise have to be fixed in its presence or absence, in every case unable to change. But if it truly cannot change, then in positing this fixity, do you mean it is fixed because of a cause, or fixed without any cause at all? If fixed because of a cause, then this "fixity" is not truly fixed — for at the outset it was not yet fixed, and became fixed only through a cause. But if you say it is fixed without any cause whatsoever, this leads to endless faults. This is why I say this nature is likewise undetermined, and is established precisely by not depending on any single external cause — this is how the matter must stand. For if, as you claim, fixity can arise together with no cause at all, then anything, however irrational, could equally come to be. Second, there is the fault of inconsistency: it would be like saying a barren woman bears two children, one white and one black, or that a rabbit has two horns, one sharp and one dull — if things could be asserted without any cause, such inconsistent claims too would have to be granted. If, on your own account, these cannot be granted, then your position cannot stand either. Third, this falls into the very same fault as the non-Buddhist schools, who hold that what fundamentally exists is fixed in existing and what fundamentally does not exist is fixed in not existing, that what exists cannot be destroyed and what does not exist cannot come to be. All these faults arise precisely from your mistaken attachment to the notion that some beings altogether lack this nature.

Question: "If that is so, then why did the Buddha say that there are sentient beings who do not abide within nature and will never attain final nirvāṇa?" Answer: "This refers to one who hates and turns his back on the Mahāyāna. Such an attitude is itself the cause of becoming an icchantika, and the Buddha spoke this way in order to make sentient beings abandon that very attitude. Should one follow this cause of icchantika-hood, one will revolve in saṃsāra for a long time without cessation — it is for this reason the sūtra speaks as it does. But according to the true principle, all sentient beings, without exception, inherently possess pure buddha-nature from the start; there is no such thing as a being who could never attain final nirvāṇa. Therefore buddha-nature is decisively, inherently existent — apart from both the extreme of fixed existence and the extreme of fixed non-existence."