Refuting the Vaiśeṣika

Next, since non-Buddhists fail to recognize buddha-nature, their position should be understood. Certain non-Buddhists hold: all dharmas possess a self-nature; they equally exist and are not empty, because each nature is distinct. If all dharmas were entirely empty and without self-nature, then water, fire, form, mind, saṃsāra, and nirvāṇa would all be without self-nature. And if self-nature were altogether absent, it should then be possible to turn fire into water, or to turn nirvāṇa back into saṃsāra. Why? Because, on the emptiness view, they would equally lack self-nature. But we plainly observe that the nature of fire is fixed as heat and cannot become water, and the nature of water is fixed as wetness and cannot become fire. Saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are likewise so — they cannot be transformed into one another, precisely because these two also possess fixed self-nature. If they could be mutually transformed, then cultivating the path would be pointless. Hence, they conclude, each dharma possesses its own self-nature, and is therefore not empty.

Next, the refutation of this notion of self-nature should be understood. Objection: "Your claim that each dharma possesses its own self-nature and is not empty, each nature being fixedly distinct, does not hold. Why? Because a fixed self-nature can nowhere be found. As to 'fixed': apart from the eight causes of non-perception — too near, too far, and the rest — if a thing definitely exists it ought to be perceivable, and if a thing definitely does not exist it will not be perceived. As with a rabbit's horns or a snake's ears, sought by decisive cognition and by reasoning and never found, such things are decisively, permanently non-existent. The self-nature of dharmas is exactly the same: sought and never found. Hence we know dharmas are without self-nature, and are therefore empty."

"If you say that things such as pots differ from one another — a pot differing from a robe, for instance — this too does not hold. Why? Is a pot identical with its own self-nature, or separate from it? Neither identity nor separateness can be maintained. If they are identical, then there should not be eight categories of quality, for a pot, being one, would conflict with being counted as many, and so the claim of identity cannot stand. If they are definitely separate, then apprehending its color should not yield the cognition 'pot' — as one who apprehends a cow never thereby sees a horse. Hence a pot, whether identical with or separate from its self-nature, can in neither case be established. If you say dharmas exist because 'existence-ness' itself exists, and so self-nature is not empty — this too does not hold. Why? Because 'existence-ness' itself has no further self-nature. If existence-ness possessed a self-nature by which it exists, it could not escape being situated in one of two cases: within existence, or within non-existence. If it exists within something that already exists, then the two 'existences' stand together with no distinct function of agent and object — since the thing already exists, what need is there for a further, self-natured existence? If it exists within non-existence, why could this not equally make rabbit-horns and tortoise-hair exist? So neither case can be established."

Again, question: "Is self-nature one with a pot, or different from it? If one, then there should not be eight categories of nature; and if there are eight, then oneness is contradicted. If different, then there is no direct connection between them, and so no speech or cognition of the pot could arise — for you hold that it is precisely because self-nature exists that speech and cognition become possible, yet since they are now, on your own account, different, no such connection is possible, and without it, cognition cannot arise. Whether identical or separate, existent or non-existent, self-nature can in no case be established — therefore self-nature is decisively non-existent."

And further, if you say that your own words are also empty, and that all dharmas are therefore not empty — this does not hold either. Why? Because such words themselves are included among all dharmas. Words, too, are empty; hence we know all dharmas are empty. If you say words are not empty because they can be heard, this does not hold either. Why? Because the self-nature of words cannot be found; the causes and conditions of words are themselves many and various. These factors number eight: first, awareness; second, attention; third, functional effort; fourth, the movement of breath; fifth, the eight places of articulation — the navel, chest, throat, root of the tongue, nape, teeth, nose, and lips; sixth, sound itself; seventh, names; and eighth, the opening and closing of the mouth. It is by the completion of these eight factors that spoken sound arises. Words, thus analyzed, are themselves included among all dharmas, and so we know they too, alike, are empty.

And you say further: "If you claim emptiness is universal, why is it that these eight causes and conditions give rise only to words, and not to other dharmas?" This objection does not hold. Why? Because you have not understood the true basis of my position. If someone claimed that words arise without any causes or conditions at all, you might rightly press this objection against him. But what I say is that cause and effect are determinate — that they are not without causes and conditions. That cause and effect are determinate means the effect arises from its cause: if the effect did not arise from its cause, it would have to already exist from the outset; and if the cause did not produce the effect, from what would the effect ever come? If you say cause and effect are both entirely without any nature at all, then self-production and production-by-another would be equally absent — but how, then, could this effect arise from its own cause, and not arise from something else? Because a given effect arises from its own proper cause and does not arise from another, causation cannot be said to be utterly without nature. Yet because it arises from its cause, it cannot be said to truly exist with fixed self-nature; and because it arises dependent on other conditions, it cannot be said to be non-existent either. For this reason cause and effect are determinate, and the objection does not succeed. As the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says in verse: "In every place, no dharma is ever born from itself, nor from another; not from both, nor without a cause."

As to the opening phrase, "in every place, no dharma" — "place" here has three senses. First, with respect to the four places of birth: the places of birth within the three realms, together with the place of birth in the unconditioned realm. These four comprehend the whole of the internal and external sense-fields, and every dharma comprehended by them is likewise included without remainder. Second, with respect to the teachings held within the Buddhist path and outside it, comprehending every dharma, mundane and supramundane, without remainder. Third, with respect to sentient and insentient things, comprehending every dharma without remainder, spanning the three times and including everything that exists without remainder. Hence it says, "in every place, no dharma." The next three lines seek, through four possible causes and conditions, the real arising of dharmas, and in every case find it cannot be established: first, arising from self; second, arising from another; third, arising from both self and other together; fourth, arising from neither. Examining all four positions, none yields any coherent sense of arising — hence we know that no dharma truly exists by way of inherent self-nature.

First, as to not arising from self: if a thing arose from itself, its arising would serve no purpose — since it already exists as itself, what need would there be for it to arise again? Hence the text says, "not born from itself." Second, as to arising from another: if it arose from another, why would it not equally give rise to any and every different effect, since prior to arising both the actual effect and any other possible effect are equally non-existent in the cause? Hence the text says, "not born from another." Third, as to arising from both self and other together: this too does not hold. The notions of "self" and "other" were established above with respect to distinct, continuous substances, as two things regarded relative to one another become, mutually, "self" and "other." Regarding Zhang from Wang's perspective, Zhang is "self" and Wang is "other"; regarding Wang from Zhang's perspective, Wang is "self" and Zhang is "other" — the sense is the same either way. Now, are these two "other-natures" one, or different? If they are one, then there is no real sense of self and other at all, since they are not truly regarded relative to one another as distinct. If the "other" in one case differs from the "other" in the other case, then each fails to qualify as a genuine "other," since genuine otherness would require a shared, determinate other-nature. Since neither qualifies as a genuine other, each correspondingly loses its own basis as a "self" as well — for it is only by being regarded relative to an other that one comes to have the sense of being a "self" at all, but since the other is not truly other, the sense of self is lost along with it, having depended, from the start, on the other. Once the notions of self and other are thus empty, the very rationale of self-nature is lost — so how, in the end, could anything arise jointly from self and other? Hence the text says, "from both, it is likewise so."

Next, regarding self and other considered with respect to cause and effect within the same class: take the seed as cause, able to produce the sprout as its effect. The sprout necessarily depends on its cause, and is thus called "effect"; the seed necessarily gives rise to its effect, and is thus called "cause." Is the cause one with its effect, or different from it? If they are definitely one, then there is no sense of arising at all, since the effect already exists from the start as identical with the cause — what need would there be for it to arise? If they are definitely different, then the cause should be able to give rise to any different effect equally — yet since every other thing would then equally count as a "different cause" with no special connection to this effect, why would the seed give rise only to its own proper effect, and not to any other? Since self and other, identity and difference, can in no case be established between cause and effect, arising jointly from self and other cannot be maintained either — which is why the text says, "from both, it is likewise so." Fourth, as to not arising without cause: this is the position of causeless arising. If you hold that dharmas exist of themselves, without depending on causes and conditions, then all dharmas ought to be able to give rise to one another indiscriminately — fire should give rise to water, and water should be able to give rise to fire, since on this view all alike lack causes and conditions. If this is not accepted, then the notion of causeless arising cannot be established either — hence the text says, "without a cause, it is likewise so." Having sought the mark of arising through all four positions and found it nowhere, we should therefore know that arising is decisively non-existent.

Next: "If you press this objection, it contradicts direct perception itself. If dharmas have no real nature, then neither the perceiving subject nor the perceived object could be established at all — yet in fact, sound does not travel all the way to the ear, nor does the ear itself possess sound, and we directly observe that sound and ear, meeting one another, is precisely how hearing occurs. Hence we know dharmas are not empty." This objection does not hold. Why? Because the perceiving subject, the perceived object, and direct perception itself can none of them be established as possessing self-nature. Your claim that hearing is accomplished through self-nature, and is therefore not empty, does not hold — because, examined within the sense-faculty, the sense-object, and the act of perception, this self-nature can in no case be established, whether as identical, as different, as existent, or as non-existent; hence self-nature is not established.

"You ask why it cannot be established? Because it is accomplished through many causes together." If a dharma possessed self-nature, it would not need to be accomplished through causes at all — for a thing already accomplished by its own nature to arise again through causes would serve no purpose. If you say the many causes each contribute their own share to producing sound's self-nature — as, for instance, the sound of a drum necessarily arises from the hand, the drumstick, and other causes and conditions, each contributing its own portion toward the arising of sound — this does not hold either. Why? Because, as shown above, arising cannot be found through any of the four positions of self, other, both, or neither, precisely because all such nature is empty. If a single nature cannot be established, how could many natures together be established? And if you posit self-nature at all, then causes need not be invoked in the first place — for if self-nature already exists of itself, what further use would there be for a cause?

If you say one effect is accomplished by one cause, the effect taking the cause as its substance, then only one person ought to be able to hear it. Why? Because if one person strikes the drum, only that one person should hear it — how could other people hear it as well? But since many people do hear it together, we know that cause and effect cannot be a single substance. If you say there are many effects because they arise from many causes, each person taking hold of the sound as it reaches them — as when a person scatters seed across a field, the person and the field each being one, yet the seeds many, so that the sprouts that arise are likewise not few; or as when one person strikes a drum, the drum-sounds are many, so that the people who hear it are likewise many — this does not hold either. Why? Because it could never be freshly apprehended at all. If it already possessed self-nature from the start, how could it be said that we now observe hearing the sound only after the drum has been struck? If you say sound's self-nature exists inherently from the start, but is not apprehended beforehand only because of the eight factors of non-perception, this does not hold either. Why? Because even accounting for nearness, distance, and the rest, it still cannot be heard beforehand; hence we know it has no self-nature from the start at all.

If you say one sound transforms into many sounds, this does not hold either. Why? Because "one" and "many" are mutually contradictory in number; the inverted conclusion would then follow, and your own position would collapse by its own terms. As to "one" and "many" being mutually contradictory: on your own account, sound would have to be of three kinds — one that stands in contradiction only to its effect, one that stands in contradiction to both cause and effect together, and one that stands in contradiction only to its cause. The first-instant sound would stand in contradiction only to the second-instant sound; the very last-instant sound would stand in contradiction only to its cause, having no further separate effect; and the innumerable intermediate sounds, regarded before and after one another, would involve limitless mutually contradicting causes and effects. For this reason, the claim that one sound gives rise to countless sounds cannot be maintained. Why? Because they are all heard at once. If the many sounds arose one after another, they should likewise be heard one after another — but since they are not heard successively, and are instead heard all at once, we know that one sound does not give rise to countless sounds. Furthermore, as to how the inverted conclusion follows: if you hold that one can give rise to many, then I may equally say that many can give rise to one; if you do not believe that many can give rise to one, then I likewise do not believe that one can give rise to many. Furthermore, as to how your own position collapses by its own terms: your system holds that there are three categories — substance, quality, and action — and that only within substance can one speak of it possessing qualities and actions; one does not, in turn, posit a further quality within a quality. Yet you now distinguish, within the quality of sound itself, a further quality of numerical quantity — does this not directly contradict your own foundational position?

"If you say that this numerical quantity belongs, rather, to the phonemes, words, and phrasal sense that convey meaning, and not to sound itself — just as when a house burns down over an eon, it is in truth fire that burns it, and because fire occurs together with the eon it is loosely called 'the eon's burning,' the fire being merely conjoined with the eon; so too the numerical quantity truly belongs to the quality of phonemes, words, and phrasal sense, and it is only because these are conjoined with sound that the quality of quantity is spoken of in connection with sound — and since this quantity is thus attributed to sound only derivatively, my position is not, after all, undermined." This does not hold either. Why? Because phonemes, words, and phrasal sense are themselves apprehended by the faculty of hearing. Are these phonemes, words, and phrasal sense themselves sound, or not sound? If they are sound, then, by your own principle, they should not possess a further quality, since qualities have no substance of their own apart from a substance to bear them. If they are not sound, then they should not be apprehended at the moment sound is heard. But since phonemes, words, and phrasal sense are apprehended at one and the same time as sound is heard, how can you still maintain that phonemes, words, and the rest possess numerical quantity while sound itself does not? Hence we know your position contradicts its own foundation. This concludes the refutation of the Vaiśeṣika.