The Outsiders' Many Nirvāṇas
Mahāmati asks once more what nirvāṇa is, this time pressing the Buddha to name what the outsiders themselves take it to be. The answer is a long, almost dizzying catalogue: nirvāṇa as the mere cessation of sensation, as a fixed direction in space, as a divine self persisting unbroken beneath its own transformations, as the exhaustion of merit and demerit alike, as the twenty-five principles fully known, even as the iridescent pattern on a peacock's tail or the sharpness of a natural thorn — each one mistaken, on the Buddha's own account, precisely because each one still fastens onto something imagined to have a fixed nature. Against this whole catalogue the Buddha sets his own single definition, and Fascicle Three closes with a teaching that reaches back to its own very first page: every sūtra's words are a raft, never the shore they were built to reach.
The Outsiders' Many Nirvāṇas
爾時，大慧菩薩復白佛言：「世尊！所言涅槃者，為何等法，名為涅槃？而諸外道各起妄想。」
佛告大慧：「諦聽，諦聽！善思念之，當為汝說。如諸外道妄想涅槃，非彼妄想隨順涅槃。」
大慧白佛言：「唯然受教。」
佛告大慧：「或有外道，陰界入滅，境界離欲，見法無常，心心法品不生，不念去來現在境界，諸受陰盡，如燈火滅，如種子壞，妄想不生。斯等於此，作涅槃想。大慧！非以見壞，名為涅槃。大慧！或以從方至方，名為解脫，境界想滅，猶如風止。或復以覺所覺見壞，名為解脫。或見常無常，作解脫想。或見種種相想，招致苦生因；思惟是已，不善覺知自心現量，怖畏於相，而見無相，深生愛樂，作涅槃想。或有覺知內外諸法，自相共相，去來現在，有性不壞，作涅槃想。或謂我、人、眾生、壽命，一切法壞，作涅槃想。或以外道惡燒智慧，見自性及士夫，彼二有間，士夫所出，名為自性。如冥初比，求那轉變，求那是作者，作涅槃想。或謂福非福盡，或謂諸煩惱盡，或謂智慧。或見自在是真實作生死者，作涅槃想。或謂展轉相生，生死更無餘因。如是即是計著因，而彼愚癡不能覺知。不知故，作涅槃想。或有外道言，得真諦道，作涅槃想。或見功德，功德所起和合，一異、俱不俱，作涅槃想。或見自性所起孔雀文彩，種種雜寶，及利刺等性，見已作涅槃想。大慧！或有覺二十五真實，或王守護國，受六德論，作涅槃想。或見時是作者，時節世間，如是覺者，作涅槃想。或謂性，或謂非性，或謂知性非性，或見有覺與涅槃差別，作涅槃想。有如是比種種妄想，外道所說，不成所成，智者所棄。大慧！如是一切，悉墮二邊，作涅槃想。如是等外道涅槃妄想，彼中都無若生若滅。大慧！彼一一外道涅槃，彼等自論。智慧觀察，都無所立。如彼妄想心意來去，漂馳流動，一切無有得涅槃者。」
Then Mahāmati Bodhisattva again said to the Buddha: "World-Honored One, this thing spoken of as nirvāṇa — what dharma, exactly, is called nirvāṇa? Every outsider gives rise to his own false thought about it."
The Buddha told Mahāmati: "Listen well! Listen well! Consider this carefully — I shall now explain it to you. Just as the outsiders' own false thought conceives of nirvāṇa, that false thought itself is not in accord with nirvāṇa at all."
Mahāmati said to the Buddha: "I gladly receive your teaching."
The Buddha told Mahāmati: "There are outsiders who, [seeing] the aggregates, elements, and sense-fields cease, the object-realm freed of desire, every dharma seen as impermanent, mind and its mental factors no longer arising, no thought given to any object-realm past, future, or present, every sensation-aggregate exhausted like a lamp's flame going out or a seed destroyed, with no false thought arising at all — form, on the basis of just this much, the notion of nirvāṇa. Mahāmati, it is not through the mere destruction of a view that nirvāṇa is named. Mahāmati, there are some who call it liberation because one moves from one fixed direction to another, the notion of an object-realm ceasing just as wind dies down; some who call it liberation through the mere destruction of the awareness and what is aware; some who form the notion of liberation upon seeing permanence, or impermanence; some who, seeing that every kind of mark and notion brings about the very cause of suffering, and, having reflected on this, fail to properly perceive that this is the very measure of their own mind's manifestation, become afraid of marks altogether, and, seeing only the markless instead, grow deeply attached to it with delight, forming thereby the notion of nirvāṇa; some who, aware of the own mark and shared mark of every dharma, within and without, past, future, and present, [conclude that] some [underlying] nature persists unbroken, and form the notion of nirvāṇa on this basis; some who hold that a self, a person, a sentient being, and a life-span, together with every dharma, are utterly destroyed, and form the notion of nirvāṇa on this basis; some who, through the outsiders' own wisdom, scorched by evil views, see own-nature and a primordial person as two things standing apart from each other, [holding that] the primordial person gives rise to what is called own-nature — as with the primordial darkness giving rise to intellect, and quality itself transforming, quality being [in this scheme] the very maker [of all things] — and form the notion of nirvāṇa on this basis; some who hold that merit and demerit alike are exhausted, or that every affliction is exhausted, or [identify nirvāṇa with] wisdom itself; some who see a sovereign lord as the true maker of birth-and-death, and form the notion of nirvāṇa on this basis; some who hold that all things arise from one another in succession, with no other cause behind birth-and-death at all — which is, in fact, itself just another instance of attachment to a fixed cause, though that same ignorant person, in his confusion, fails to perceive this, and, from that very failure, forms the notion of nirvāṇa; some outsiders who claim to have attained the very path of ultimate truth, and form the notion of nirvāṇa on this basis; some who, seeing [ascetic] merit, and the coming-together from which that merit arises, framed through identity and difference, both together and neither, form the notion of nirvāṇa on this basis; some who, seeing the iridescent pattern spontaneously arising on a peacock's tail, the manifold varieties of jewels, and the very sharpness of a natural thorn, having seen these, form the notion of nirvāṇa on this basis. Mahāmati, some who claim awareness of the twenty-five ultimate principles; some who hold that a king's protection of his realm, upheld by the theory of the six virtues, [is nirvāṇa]; some who see time itself as the maker, [governing] the very seasons of the world, and, aware of this, form the notion of nirvāṇa on this basis; some who posit a [fixed] nature, or posit its absence, or posit knowing both nature and its absence, or who see 'awareness' and 'nirvāṇa' as two distinct things — and form the notion of nirvāṇa on this basis. There are false-thought notions of just this kind and more, taught by the outsiders — doctrines that never accomplish what they claim to accomplish, and which the wise therefore abandon. Mahāmati, every one of these, without exception, falls into one of the two extremes, [and yet] forms the notion of nirvāṇa on that very basis. In every one of these outsider notions of nirvāṇa, there is, in truth, nothing there that either arises or ceases at all. Mahāmati, examined one by one, every single outsider's own account of nirvāṇa, when observed through wisdom, turns out to establish nothing whatsoever. Just like their own false thought, mind itself coming and going, tossed about and flowing on without rest — not one of them has ever actually attained nirvāṇa at all."
The commentators identify the source cataloguing these mistaken views as a specific treatise, and count them precisely: "按提婆論釋，凡外道妄計涅槃有二十種" — "according to Āryadeva's own treatise, the outsiders' false conceptions of nirvāṇa number, in total, twenty distinct kinds" — and they gloss several of the more obscure entries directly from named sources. On the "primordial darkness giving rise to intellect" scheme, familiar from Fascicle One's own refutation of heterodox causation: "求那轉變等者，謂依自性轉變能作諸法，以為涅槃" — "'quality itself transforming' means that, in dependence on own-nature's own transformation, all dharmas are held to be produced, and this is taken to be nirvāṇa" — the same Sāṃkhya cosmology named explicitly back in Fascicle One reappears here as one more mistaken candidate for what nirvāṇa actually is. On the peacock and the thorn, the commentators cite the parallel translation directly: "或計諸物從自然生，孔雀文彩棘刺銛利，生寶之處出種種寶，如此等事是誰能作？即執自然以為涅槃也" — "some hold that things arise spontaneously, of their own accord — a peacock's iridescent pattern, a thorn's own sharpness, a mine's manifold varieties of gem — asking, 'who could possibly have made such things?' and thereby concluding that spontaneous, uncaused nature itself must be nirvāṇa."
On why the commentators sum up this entire catalogue with a single fivefold verdict rather than refuting each of the twenty views individually, they draw out the shared structure running beneath every one of them: "以其皆妄想故，雖計涅槃而不成涅槃...又彼雖妄計生滅，而實彼法何曾生滅...然彼所計皆是邪論，以正智觀之無所成立" — "because every one of them is nothing but false thought, though each posits a nirvāṇa, none of them actually accomplishes it... and though each falsely conceives of arising and ceasing, the dharma [they are conceiving about] was never, in fact, subject to arising or ceasing at all... every one of their doctrines is a mistaken theory that, examined through correct wisdom, establishes absolutely nothing." Twenty different named systems, spanning cosmology, ethics, aesthetics, and political theory, all reduce to the identical error: taking something — sensation's cessation, a divine self, a peacock's plumage, a king's just rule — and mistaking it for a fixed thing that nirvāṇa could be identified with, when nirvāṇa was never, in the sūtra's own account, a fixed thing to be identified with anything at all.
What Nirvāṇa Actually Is, and Fascicle Three's Close
「大慧！如我所說涅槃者，謂善覺知自心現量(量有四種：一、現見，二、比知，三、譬喻，四、先勝相傳。彼外道於四度量，悉皆不成也)，不著外性，離於四句，見如實處，不隨自心現妄想二邊，攝所攝不可得。一切度量不見所成，愚於真實，不應攝受。棄捨彼已，得自覺聖法。知二無我，離二煩惱，淨除二障，永離二死。上上地如來地，如影幻等諸深三昧，離心、意、意識，說名涅槃。大慧！汝等及餘菩薩摩訶薩，應當修學，當疾遠離一切外道諸涅槃見。」
爾時，世尊欲重宣此義而說偈言：
「外道涅槃見， 各各起妄想，
斯從心想生， 無解脫方便。
愚於縛縛者， 遠離善方便，
外道解脫想， 解脫終不生。
眾智各異趣， 外道所見通，
彼悉無解脫， 愚癡妄想故。
一切癡外道， 妄見作所作，
有無有品論， 彼悉無解脫。
凡愚樂妄想， 不聞真實慧，
言語三苦本， 真實滅苦因。
譬如鏡中像， 雖現而非有，
於妄想心鏡， 愚夫見有二。
不識心及緣， 則起二妄想，
了心及境界， 妄想則不生。
心者即種種， 遠離相所相，
事現而無現， 如彼愚妄想。
三有惟妄想， 外義悉無有，
妄想種種現， 凡愚不能了。
經經說妄想， 終不出於名，
若離於言語， 亦無有所說。」
"Mahāmati, nirvāṇa as I myself teach it is this: rightly perceiving the very measure of one's own mind's manifestation (this measure is of four kinds: direct perception, inference, analogy, and the testimony handed down from those of prior excellence — the outsiders fail, without exception, to accomplish [genuine knowledge through] any of these four measures at all), not attached to what is external as though it had a fixed nature, apart from the four extremes, seeing the very place where reality actually is, not following the false thought bound up with either extreme manifested by one's own mind, [so that] the grasped and the grasper alike cannot ultimately be apprehended at all. No measure of any kind sees anything genuinely established through it; one who is ignorant of the truth ought not to hold onto any of them. Having cast all of this aside, one attains the dharma of self-realized noble wisdom: knowing the two kinds of no-self, being apart from the two kinds of affliction, purified of the two hindrances, forever free of the two kinds of death, [reaching] the very ground of the Tathāgata, the highest ground of all, abiding in every profound samādhi, [everything within it] like a shadow or an illusion, apart from mind, will, and consciousness — this alone is what is called nirvāṇa. Mahāmati, you, and every other bodhisattva-mahāsattva, should diligently train in this, and swiftly leave far behind every one of the outsiders' own views of nirvāṇa."
Then the World-Honored One, wishing to restate this meaning, spoke in verse: "The outsiders' views of nirvāṇa each give rise to their own false thought;
arising as they do from mere notions of mind, none of them offers any true skillful means to liberation.
Ignorant of what binds and of the one who is bound, far removed from any genuine skillful means,
the outsiders' own notion of liberation never, in the end, gives rise to liberation at all.
Every kind of worldly wisdom pursues its own different course, [yet] whatever the outsiders themselves see or claim to have penetrated,
none of it holds any liberation at all, since it is nothing but ignorant false thought.
Every one of these ignorant outsiders falsely sees a doer and a deed;
whether framed as existence, or non-existence, every such doctrine holds no liberation at all.
The ignorant and the foolish delight in false thought, never once hearing genuine wisdom;
mere words are the very root of the three kinds of suffering; genuine truth alone is the cause that extinguishes suffering.
It is like a reflection in a mirror: though it appears, it has no real existence at all;
yet, before the mirror of their own false-thought mind, the ignorant see two separate things there.
Failing to recognize mind and its condition, they thereby give rise to a twofold false thought;
understanding mind and its object-realm correctly, false thought simply does not arise at all.
Mind itself takes on every manifold form, and yet is far removed from any mark or what bears that mark;
a matter appears, and yet does not truly appear at all — this is exactly the ignorant person's own false thought.
The three realms of existence are nothing but false thought; what is taken as an external object has, in truth, no existence at all;
false thought appears in every manifold way, and the ignorant and the foolish are simply unable to see through it.
Every sūtra that speaks of false thought never once goes beyond the use of mere names to do so;
and were one to set language itself aside entirely, there would be nothing left to say at all."
The commentators lay the Buddha's own definition out as a precise five-part structure answering to five distinct faults just catalogued in the outsiders' twenty views: "謂善覺知自心現量，不著外性，一也。離於四句，見如實處，二也。不墮自心現妄想二邊...三也。一切度量不見所成者，顯如來涅槃出眾邪外，四也...五也" — "'rightly perceiving the very measure of one's own mind's manifestation, not attached to what is external' is the first point; 'apart from the four extremes, seeing the very place where reality actually is' is the second; 'not following the false thought bound up with either extreme' is the third; 'no measure of any kind sees anything genuinely established' shows that the Tathāgata's own nirvāṇa stands entirely outside every mistaken outsider view — this is the fourth; [and being ignorant of the truth, one ought not to hold onto any of the four measures at all] is the fifth." Each clause of the definition is a targeted correction, not a loosely accumulated string of praise — the Buddha's spare account is built specifically to close off every one of the twenty errors just enumerated, one structural point at a time.
On the closing verse's final couplet — that setting language entirely aside would leave nothing left to say — the commentators draw the moral that closes the whole fascicle: "然如來所說種種諸法，皆說眾生妄想，溺於生死，意令眾生反妄歸真，安住涅槃。而眾生著於名字言說，不能忘言得意；若能了言說而無言說，則所說之法亦不可得，如得魚兔而忘筌罤，此如來示人之深意也" — "everything the Tathāgata teaches, in all its manifold forms, speaks of nothing but sentient beings' own false thought, sunk as they are in birth-and-death, with the intention that they turn away from falsehood and return to the truth, abiding securely in nirvāṇa. Yet sentient beings remain attached to names and to speech itself, unable to set the words aside and grasp the meaning; but should one understand speech as itself without any fixed thing spoken, then even what is taught could not, in the end, be apprehended as a fixed thing either — like catching the fish or the rabbit and thereby forgetting the trap or the snare that caught it. This is the Tathāgata's own deep intention in showing this to people." The image of the raft that carries a traveler across and is then set down, promised at this collection's very opening pages, closes Fascicle Three exactly where it began.
Fascicle Three Complete
This closes Fascicle Three of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra: the three kinds of mind-made body and the five acts of immediate retribution reinterpreted; the tathāgatagarbha's own dharma-realm and the four equalities explaining "I was every buddha of the past"; two kinds of world-dependence and the destroyer of the true Dharma; mastery of realization and of teaching, twice explained; unreal false thought and the sweeping verse on the measure of mind; word and meaning, and the three kinds of wisdom; nine theories of transformation and eleven kinds of continuity; the warning against ever asserting even "all dharmas are unborn" as a fixed thesis; the Brahmin of worldly disputation, met at every turn with silence; and, closing the fascicle, the outsiders' twenty mistaken nirvāṇas set against the Buddha's own single definition. Fascicle Four turns to a new question Mahāmati raises without preamble: what, exactly, is the Tathāgata's own true and complete enlightenment — is it something made, or unmade; a cause, or an effect; and does the very asking of such a question already presuppose more than it should?
Continue to Part 34 — Is the Tathāgata Made or Unmade? →