Part 7 of 14 · 三論玄義 · Complete

Is the Three Treatises' Teaching Truly Final?

Having established Nāgārjuna's own authority in Part 6, Jizang turns to the second half of revealing the true: is the teaching itself — dedicated, as it plainly is, to emptiness — really the ultimate teaching, or only a preliminary one-sidedness? What follows is one of the most tightly argued passages in the whole treatise, a chain of objection and answer that presses toward nihilism at every step and is turned aside at every step, closing with the treatise's own precise definition of what "correct" can possibly mean once every fixed position has been let go.

Translator: Ru-Yi Meditation Center Source: Taishō T45, no. 1852, 三論玄義 Jizang (吉藏, 549–623) Reading notes: Ru-Yi, original

1. Sengrui's Testimony: Not a One-Sided Emptiness

The objection is stated plainly: Nāgārjuna wrote many works, so why should the three treatises, fixated as they seem to be on emptiness, be taken as his final and most complete teaching rather than a partial one? Jizang answers first with the same kind of direct testimony used throughout this collection — Sengrui's own preface, and the treatise's actual reception across the length and breadth of India.

Chinese Source

顯法正第二。問龍樹著述部類甚多。三論偏空似非究竟。答僧叡昔在什公門下為翻譯之宗。其論序云。夫百梁之搆興則鄙茅茨之仄陋。覩斯論之紘博則知偏悟之鄙倍。故偏主小乘。正歸此論。

Ru-Yi Translation

Revealing the right teaching, second. Question: Nāgārjuna's own compositions are extremely numerous in kind — the three treatises, fixed as they seem to be on emptiness alone, appear not to be his ultimate teaching. Answer: Sengrui, who stood as the foremost figure in Kumārajīva's translation bureau, wrote in his preface to this very treatise: "Once a structure of a hundred great beams has been raised, one comes to despise the crookedness of a thatched hut; once one has beheld the vast breadth of this treatise, one comes to recognize how doubly contemptible a one-sided awakening actually is." Hence those who fixed exclusively on the Hīnayāna properly return, in the end, to this treatise.

又如前云。天竺十六大國方八千里。有向化之緣。並為委誠龍樹為無相佛。敢預學者之徒無不翫味斯論以為喉衿。若是偏空。豈為諸國所重。又羅什本執小乘。因此論而迴轍正觀。厥後眾師藉斯文而曉迷。以此詳之。蓋是究竟無餘之說。

And as already noted earlier: throughout India's sixteen great kingdoms, spanning eight thousand li on every side, wherever there existed a connection ripe for transformation, all alike entrusted their sincere faith to Nāgārjuna as a buddha without marks; and among those who dared to count themselves among his students, there was not one who failed to savor this treatise as the very collar and throat of his own learning. Were this treatise merely a one-sided emptiness, how could it possibly have been held in such regard by every one of these kingdoms? Moreover, Kumārajīva himself originally held fast to the Hīnayāna, and it was on account of this very treatise that he turned his course toward correct contemplation; and all the many masters who came after him relied on this same text to awaken from their own confusion. Examining the matter in this detail, this is, in fact, the ultimate teaching, without remainder.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

"This treatise" throughout this passage is the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā itself, and Jizang's argument here is deliberately biographical before it becomes philosophical: Kumārajīva's own conversion from Hīnayāna study, and the reverence paid to Nāgārjuna across the whole of India, are offered as evidence that a text with this reach cannot be the narrow, one-sided thing the objection supposes. The philosophical case — that the three treatises' emptiness is not a nihilistic dead end but the very thing that makes correct vision possible — occupies the rest of this part.

2. What the Whole Method Rests On

A sharper objection follows: if the three treatises rebuke both outsiders and Buddhists, both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna alike, what is actually left for their own teaching to stand on? Jizang answers with a chain of causation running from confusion about inside-and-outside, through failure to generate correct contemplation, to the endless turning of the wheel of suffering — and its reverse, running from the stilling of all such distinctions to the collapse of that same wheel.

Chinese Source

問若內外並呵大小俱斥。此論宗旨何所依據耶。答若心存內外情寄大小。則墮在偏邪失於正理。既失正理則正觀不生。若正觀不生則斷常不滅。若斷常不滅則苦輪常運。以內外並冥大小俱寂。始名正理。悟斯正理則發生正觀。正觀若生則戲論斯滅。戲論斯滅則苦輪便壞。三論大宗其意若此。蓋乃總眾教之旨歸。統群聖之靈府。味道之流豈不栖憑斯趣耶。

Ru-Yi Translation

Question: If the three treatises rebuke both inside and outside, and reject both great and small alike, then on what does this treatise's own guiding doctrine actually rely? Answer: If the mind still harbors inside and outside, and the feelings still lodge in great and small, then one has already fallen into one-sided error and lost the correct principle. Having lost the correct principle, correct contemplation does not arise. If correct contemplation does not arise, then annihilationism and eternalism are not extinguished. If annihilationism and eternalism are not extinguished, then the wheel of suffering turns on forever. It is only when inside and outside are both left in stillness, and great and small are both quiesced together, that this is properly named the correct principle. Awakening to this correct principle, one gives rise to correct contemplation; once correct contemplation arises, conceptual proliferation is thereby extinguished; once conceptual proliferation is extinguished, the wheel of suffering is thereby broken. This is the underlying intent of the three treatises' great doctrine — it is, in fact, the very culmination toward which the whole body of teachings converges, and the numinous repository unifying the entire assembly of sages. How could those who savor the way fail to make their home in, and rely upon, this very direction?

Reading note — Ru-Yi

This chain of dependent causation — confusion produces failure of correct contemplation, which produces the persistence of annihilationism and eternalism, which produces the endless turning of the wheel of suffering — mirrors the twelve links of dependent origination in structure while substituting philosophical error for craving as the driving link. It is worth noticing that Jizang here finally answers, explicitly, the tension left open at the end of Part 5: refuting every fixed position, including fixed ideas of "Hīnayāna" and "Mahāyāna" themselves, is not nihilism but precisely what correct contemplation requires.

3. Does Stilling Every Position Collapse Into Nihilism?

An immediate and sharp challenge follows: if "inside" and "outside" are both dissolved, is this not simply the extinction-view (斷見) that the treatise itself elsewhere condemns? What follows is a rapid-fire exchange, each answer immediately met with a fresh version of the same worry, refining the position at every turn.

Chinese Source

問若內外並除大小俱斥。乃為斷見。何名正宗。答既內外並冥。則斷常斯寂。二邊既捨。寧非正宗耶。

Ru-Yi Translation

Question: If inside and outside are both done away with, and great and small are both rejected, this surely amounts to the view of annihilation — how, then, can it be called the correct doctrine? Answer: Precisely because inside and outside are both stilled together, annihilationism and eternalism are thereby quiesced as well. With both extremes now abandoned, how could this fail to be the correct doctrine?

難曰。夫有斷有常故名之為有。無斷無常目之為無。既其是無。何由離斷。答既斷常斯寂。則有無等皆離。不應更復謂染於無。

Objection: To have annihilation and to have eternalism is precisely what is called "existence"; to be without annihilation and without eternalism is thereby designated "non-existence." But since this position is itself simply non-existence, how could it possibly escape annihilationism after all? Answer: Precisely because annihilationism and eternalism are quiesced together, existence and non-existence, and every such pair, are thereby left behind as well. One ought not, on top of this, turn around and claim that the position has simply been dyed over into non-existence instead.

難曰。雖有此通。終不免難。夫有有有無名之為有。無有無無始是大無。既其墮無。何由離斷。答本對有病。是故說無。有病若消。空藥亦廢則知聖道未曾有無。何所滯耶。

Objection: Though this answer offers a way through, it still does not escape the difficulty. To have both "there is existence" and "there is non-existence" is what is called existence; to have neither "there is existence" nor "there is non-existence" — this, from the outset, is simply the greater non-existence. But since the position has thereby fallen into non-existence, how does it escape annihilationism after all? Answer: The teaching of non-existence was, from the start, set up specifically to counter the sickness of existence. Once the sickness of existence has dissolved, the medicine of emptiness is likewise set aside — from which it may be known that the sagely path has never, at any point, actually been either existence or non-existence. What, then, is there left to be caught on?

Reading note — Ru-Yi

This exchange is doing something structurally important: each objection assumes that "non-existence" is itself a further fixed position the treatise has landed on, and each answer insists that non-existence was never a resting place but only a medicine — applied while the sickness of existence-clinging lasts, and withdrawn the moment that sickness is gone. The pattern continues to sharpen through the rest of this part, culminating in the water-and-fire simile below, which makes the same point through image rather than argument.

4. Two Assertions, Two Denials, and the Water That Must Not Catch Fire

The objections continue to escalate — from "existence versus non-existence" to "affirmation versus double negation" to the charge that this is simply a rehash of the ancient Chinese debate between the Confucians and the Mohists. Jizang's answer culminates in one of this treatise's most memorable images: emptiness as water that extinguishes the fire of annihilationism and eternalism, on the strict condition that the water itself never catches flame.

Chinese Source

難曰。是有是無名為兩是。非有非無名為兩非。既墮是非。還同儒墨。答本非二是。故有雙非。二是既亡。雙非亦息。故知非是亦復非非。

Ru-Yi Translation

Objection: "It is existence" and "it is non-existence" are what is called the two assertions; "it is not existence" and "it is not non-existence" are what is called the double negation. But since the position has thereby fallen into a dispute of assertion against negation, it is simply the same, after all, as the ancient quarrel between the Confucians and the Mohists. Answer: It is precisely because of the two assertions that the double negation was set forth in the first place. Once the two assertions have already vanished, the double negation is likewise set to rest. Hence it is known that the position is neither the assertion, nor, for that matter, the negation of the assertion either.

難曰。非是非非還墮二非。何由免非。答二是生乎夢虎。兩非還見空華。則知本無所是。今亦無非。

Objection: "Neither the assertion nor its negation" still falls into a pair of negations — how, then, does the position escape negation after all? Answer: The two assertions are born from a tiger seen in a dream; the double negation, in turn, is nothing but a flower seen in the empty sky. From this it is known that there was, from the very beginning, nothing that was ever truly asserted — and so now, likewise, there is nothing that is truly negated either.

難曰。若無是無非。亦不邪不正。何故建篇章稱破邪顯正。答夫有非有是此則為邪。無是無非乃名為正。所以命篇辨破邪顯正。

Objection: If there is neither assertion nor negation, then there is likewise neither the false nor the true — why, then, does this treatise's whole structure bear the title "refuting the false and revealing the true"? Answer: To have a negation and to have an assertion — this precisely is the false. To be without assertion and without negation — this precisely is what is named the true. This is exactly why the work's chapters are titled to discriminate refuting the false and revealing the true.

難曰。既有邪可破。有正可顯。則心有取捨何謂無依。答為息於邪強名為正。在邪既息則正亦不留。故心無所著。

Objection: Given that there is a false to be refuted and a true to be revealed, the mind must then be taking hold of one and casting aside the other — how, then, can it be said to rest on nothing at all? Answer: It is only in order to bring the false to rest that the name "the true" is provisionally applied at all. Once the false has been brought to rest, the true is likewise not retained as a fixed resting place — and so the mind ends up attached to nothing whatsoever.

難曰。若邪正並冥。豈非空見。答正觀論云。大聖說空法。為離諸見故。若復見有空。諸佛所不化。如水能滅火。今水還出火。當用何滅。斷常為火。空能滅之。若復著空。即無藥可滅也。

Objection: If the false and the true are both stilled together, is this not simply the view of emptiness? Answer: The Treatise on Correct Contemplation says: "The great sage taught the dharma of emptiness precisely in order to leave every view behind. If one then goes on to view emptiness itself as existing, this is a case even the buddhas cannot transform." It is like water, which is able to extinguish fire — but if the water itself now gives rise to fire in turn, what could possibly be used to extinguish it? Annihilationism and eternalism are the fire; emptiness is what is able to extinguish it. But if one then goes on to become attached to emptiness itself, there remains, at that point, no medicine left that could extinguish anything at all.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The water-and-fire image is this treatise's own gloss on a line from the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā's chapter on examining views, quoted here under its alternate title; it appears again, in slightly different form, in the discussion of emptiness as remedy elsewhere in this school's literature. "A tiger seen in a dream" and "a flower seen in the empty sky" are stock images in Chinese Buddhist writing for a thing that has no reality even while it is vividly perceived — used here to argue that both the position being refuted and the negation used to refute it are, in the end, equally without a real object to grasp onto.

5. Why Attachment Is the Real Problem

One more round presses the point from a slightly different angle — if the emptiness-medicine must itself be abandoned, why not simply keep the existence-sickness instead of curing it with something that will also need curing? Jizang's answer shifts the entire discussion onto its real axis: the danger was never existence or emptiness as such, but attachment to either one.

Chinese Source

難曰。既著空病。何故不服有藥而言息化。答若以有化。還復滯有。乃至亡言便復著斷。如此之流何由可化。問心有所著。有何過耶。答若有所著便有所縛。不得解脫生老病死憂悲苦惱。故法華云。我以無數方便引道眾生令離諸著。

Ru-Yi Translation

Objection: Given that attachment to emptiness is itself a sickness, why not simply administer the medicine of existence instead, and call the transformation complete that way? Answer: If one transforms a person by means of existence, he simply becomes stuck fast in existence once again; and pursued to its end, once even speech itself is abandoned, he ends up attached to annihilation instead. People of this kind — by what means could they ever actually be transformed? Question: What fault, exactly, is there in the mind's having something it is attached to? Answer: Wherever there is something attached to, there is thereby something binding — and one cannot then gain liberation from birth, old age, sickness, death, sorrow, grief, and suffering. Hence the Lotus Sūtra says: "By means of countless skillful expedients, I guide and lead sentient beings, so that they may leave every attachment behind."

淨名云。不著世間如蓮華。常善入於空寂行。達諸法相無罣礙。稽首如空無所依。三世諸佛為六道眾生心有所著故出世說經。四依開士為大小學人心有所依故出世造論。故有依有得為生死之本。無住無著為經論大宗。

The Vimalakīrti Sūtra says: "Unattached to the world, like the lotus flower, ever skillfully entering the practice of empty stillness, penetrating the marks of all dharmas without any obstruction — I bow my head to one who, like empty space, rests upon nothing at all." It is precisely because the buddhas of the three times see that the beings of the six destinies have minds with something attached to that they appear in the world and expound sūtras; it is precisely because the enlightened beings of the four kinds of reliance see that students of both great and small vehicles have minds with something relied upon that they appear in the world and compose treatises. Hence having something relied upon and having something attained is the very root of birth-and-death, while abiding nowhere and being attached to nothing is the great central doctrine shared by sūtra and treatise alike.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

This is the clearest single statement in the entire treatise of what its "refuting the false" method is actually diagnosing: not any particular content (existence, non-existence, Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna) but the structural relation of attachment itself, which can fasten onto absolutely any content whatsoever, including emptiness. It retroactively reframes every refutation in the first six parts of this collection — the outsiders were not wrong merely for believing in a creator god, nor the Abhidharma merely for believing in real dharmas; both were refuted for holding their respective positions in the binding way this passage now names directly.

6. Then Why Does Scripture Still Teach Two Vehicles?

A natural question follows: if inside and outside, great and small, are all ultimately stilled together, why do the Buddhist sūtras go on distinguishing Hīnayāna from Mahāyāna teaching at all? Jizang answers by returning to a line already used in Part 6 — names and marks are provisionally applied in the nameless, precisely so that beings can use the name to awaken to what has no name.

Chinese Source

難曰。若內外並冥。佛經何故說大小兩教。答法華云。是法不可示。言辭相寂滅。如來於無名相中強名相說。故有大小教門。欲令眾生因此名相悟無名相。而封教之徒聞說大小更生染著。是故造論破斯執情。還令了悟本來寂滅。故四依出世為如佛也。

Ru-Yi Translation

Objection: If inside and outside are both stilled together, why do the Buddhist sūtras still teach the two vehicles of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna at all? Answer: The Lotus Sūtra says: "This Dharma cannot be shown; the marks of speech are themselves quiescent." The Tathāgata, within what has no name and no mark, forcibly speaks of names and marks — and this is why there come to be the two teaching-gates of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, so that sentient beings might, by means of these very names and marks, awaken to what has no name or mark at all. But those sealed within their own fixed teaching, on hearing the distinction of great and small taught, only give rise to further defiled attachment on that very account — and this is precisely why treatises are composed, to refute this attached state of mind, and to bring beings back to a full awakening to what was, from the very beginning, already quiescent. This is why the enlightened beings of the four kinds of reliance appear in the world, acting exactly as a buddha would.

7. Two Kinds of Correctness: Essential and Functional

The part closes by asking directly: given that the treatise is named for "correct contemplation," how many kinds of "correct" actually exist? Jizang's answer distinguishes essential correctness — what all things really are, prior to any naming — from functional correctness, the pairing of conventional and ultimate truth by which that essence is provisionally spoken of at all.

Chinese Source

問此論名為正觀。正有幾種。答天無兩日。土無二王。教有多門理唯一正。是故上來破斥四宗。華嚴云。文殊法常爾。法王唯一法。一切無畏人。一道出生死。但欲出處眾生。於無名相法強名相說。令稟學之徒因而得悟。故開二正。一者體正。二者用正。

Ru-Yi Translation

Question: This treatise is named for correct contemplation — how many kinds of "correct" are there? Answer: Heaven has no two suns; a land has no two kings. The teaching has many gates, but the underlying principle admits of only a single correctness — this is exactly why the four sects have been rebuked above. The Avataṃsaka Sūtra says: "Mañjuśrī, the Dharma is ever thus: the Dharma-king has only the one Dharma. Every fearless one travels the one single path that leads out of birth-and-death." It is only in order to lead sentient beings out that, within a Dharma without name or mark, one forcibly speaks of names and marks at all — so that those who take up the teaching may, by means of this very speech, come to awakening. On this basis, two kinds of correctness are opened up: first, essential correctness; second, functional correctness.

非真非俗名為體正。真之與俗目為用正。所以然者。諸法實相言亡慮絕。未曾真俗。故名之為體。絕諸偏邪目之為正。故言體正。所言用正者。體絕名言物無由悟。雖非有無強說真俗。故名為用。此真之與俗亦不偏邪。目之為正。故名用正也。

Being neither the ultimate nor the conventional is what is named essential correctness; being the ultimate paired together with the conventional is what is designated functional correctness. The reason is this: the real character of all dharmas leaves speech behind and cuts off deliberation, and has never, at any point, actually been either the ultimate or the conventional — this is why it is called the essence. Cutting off every one-sided deviation is what is designated correctness — hence it is called essential correctness. As for what is called functional correctness: since the essence cuts off names and words, beings would have no means at all to awaken to it. So although it is, in truth, neither existence nor non-existence, one forcibly speaks of it as the ultimate and the conventional — hence this is called the function. And since this ultimate paired with this conventional likewise involves no one-sided deviation, it too is designated correctness — hence it is called functional correctness.

問既云真俗則是二邊。何名為正。答如因緣假有目之為俗。然假有不可言其定有。假有不可言其定無。此之假有遠離二邊。故名為正。俗有既爾。真無亦爾。假無不可定無。假無不可定有。遠離二邊故目之為正。

Question: Since you speak of the ultimate and the conventional, this is simply the two extremes all over again — how, then, can this be named correct? Answer: Take, for instance, provisional existence arising through causes and conditions, which is designated the conventional. Yet this provisional existence cannot be said to definitely exist, and it likewise cannot be said to definitely not exist. This provisional existence, being far removed from both extremes, is thereby named correct. And just as conventional existence is like this, so too is ultimate non-existence: provisional non-existence cannot be said to definitely not exist, and it cannot be said to definitely exist either. Being far removed from both extremes, it too is thereby designated correct.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The essential/functional distinction (體正/用正) drawn here becomes the organizing framework for how this treatise assigns a "guiding doctrine" to each of the four treatises it defends, worked out in full in Part 11 of this collection: the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā is there said to take the two truths — functional correctness — as its own guiding doctrine, precisely because essential correctness itself, being beyond both truths, cannot be directly taught at all. Note also that "provisional existence... far removed from both extremes" is this treatise's own compact definition of the middle way, arrived at without ever using the word "middle" — a definition Jizang will return to and expand at great length in the extended exegesis of the title Zhonglun that closes this entire collection.

8. Three Grades of Correctness, and Contemplation Paired with Treatise

The part closes with a final refinement: correctness itself comes in three grades, from remedying a specific bias, through exhausting every bias without remainder, to a correctness beyond even the distinction of biased and correct — and this same threefold grading applies equally to contemplation and to the treatises that expound it.

Chinese Source

問何故辨體用二正耶。答像末鈍根多墮偏邪。四依出世匡正佛法。故明用正。既識正教便悟正理則有體正。但正有三種。一對偏病目之為正。名對偏正。二盡淨於偏名之為正。謂盡偏正也。三偏病既去正亦不留。非偏非正。不知何以美之。強嘆為正。謂絕待正也。

Ru-Yi Translation

Question: Why distinguish essential correctness and functional correctness at all? Answer: In the semblance and final ages, those of dull faculty mostly fall into one-sided error, and so the enlightened beings of the four kinds of reliance appear in the world to set the Buddha's teaching right again — this is why functional correctness is made clear. And once one has recognized the correct teaching, one thereupon awakens to the correct principle, at which point there is essential correctness as well. Correctness itself, however, is of three grades. First, that which is designated correct with reference to a specific biased sickness — this is named correctness-against-bias. Second, that which is designated correct by exhausting bias entirely and leaving it thoroughly purified — this is called correctness-exhausting-bias. Third, once the biased sickness has already departed, correctness itself is likewise not retained as a fixed thing — neither biased nor correct, and not knowing what else to call it, one forcibly praises it under the name correct all the same — this is called correctness-beyond-all-comparison.

在正既然。觀論亦爾。因於體正發生正觀名為體觀。藉二諦用生二諦觀名為用觀。故觀具二也。觀辨於心。為眾生故如實說體。名為體論。若說於用。名之為用論。故論具二也。正既有對偏盡偏絕待。觀論亦然。類前可知。

As it stands with correctness, so too with contemplation and treatise. Contemplation arising from essential correctness is named essential contemplation; contemplation arising by relying on the function of the two truths is named functional contemplation — hence contemplation, too, comprises both. Contemplation is discriminated within the mind; when, for the sake of sentient beings, one speaks of the essence exactly as it truly is, this is named an essential treatise; when one speaks instead of the function, this is named a functional treatise — hence treatise, too, comprises both. And just as correctness itself has its three grades of against-bias, exhausting-bias, and beyond-all-comparison, so too do contemplation and treatise — the pattern may be understood by analogy with what has come before.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

This closing framework — essence and function, each graded into three degrees of correctness, applied uniformly across correctness itself, contemplation, and treatise — is a piece of genuinely systematic philosophical architecture, and it functions as this treatise's answer to a question that has been implicit since Part 1: what, precisely, does the "revealing" in "revealing the true" actually reveal, if every fixed position is subject to refutation? The answer given here is that revealing the true does not mean asserting a new fixed content to replace the old ones, but showing the graded structure by which any provisional teaching — however necessary as medicine — can be seen through to what it was always pointing toward.

· · ·

Part Seven Complete

This closes Part Seven: the case that the three treatises' emptiness is no one-sided teaching but the ultimate one, the dialectical chain answering every escalating charge of nihilism, the water-that-must-not-catch-fire image for emptiness as remedy, and the closing architecture of essential and functional correctness, each graded into three degrees and applied alike to correctness, contemplation, and treatise.

Part Eight turns to a new question: how do sūtra and treatise actually depend on each other? The answer will trace scripture and commentary through a fourfold web of mutual dependency, before opening the long historical account of how the eighteen — or twenty — schools of Indian Buddhism first came to divide against one another.