Why Three Treatises, Not Four

Next, making clear the different ways the four treatises refute and expound. As for what is meant by "refuting" and "expounding," there are, in all, three senses. First, breaking the outsiders' sickness of confusion about the teaching is called refuting; expounding the Buddha's own teaching-gate of the two truths is called expounding. Second, expounding the Buddha's own correct teaching in such a way that heresy and confusion collapse of themselves — this too is called "expounding-as-refuting." Third, the treatise-author expounding and setting forth the Buddha's own act of refutation — this too is called "expounding-refutation": the various Mahāyāna sūtras refute the empty falsehood of sentient beings in order to reveal the one way, but those of dull faculty in the final age fail to grasp the Tathāgata's own intent in refuting sickness to reveal the way — and so the bodhisattvas of the four kinds of reliance, in turn, expound and set forth this very refutation of the Buddha's own, which is why it is called "expounding-refutation." It is not that the treatise establishes some new doctrine of its own beyond what is in the sūtra; the treatise simply makes clear, in its own words, a refutation that was already the Buddha's.

Question: How is it known that Nāgārjuna is expounding the Buddha's own refutation, rather than a refutation of his own devising? Answer: The final chapter, on wrong views, says: "Gautama, great and sagely lord, out of compassion taught this Dharma, cutting off every view entirely — I now bow my head in reverence before him." From this it is known that the treatise-author is expounding and setting forth the Buddha's own refutation, and does not possess any refutation of his own apart from this.

Question: The sūtras contain both establishing and refuting — why does the treatise-author refute exclusively, in every case? Answer: Those of dull faculty in the final age are confused about both the Buddha's own acts of establishing and of refuting alike, and both become, for them, a sickness in equal measure. This is why the treatise-author must refute both together — and only then is he able to fully set forth the Tathāgata's own acts of establishing and refuting as they truly are. Question: Since the treatise-author's expounding the Buddha's own refutation may be called the treatise-author's own refutation, should the treatise-author's expounding the Buddha's own establishing likewise be named the treatise-author's own establishing? Answer: Yes, this too may properly be said.

Question: In what way do the four treatises' patterns of refuting and expounding agree and differ? Answer: The three treatises refute the whole range of confusion broadly, and expound the whole range of teaching broadly. The Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom refutes specifically the confusion regarding prajñā, and expounds specifically the teaching of prajñā. Within the three treatises themselves, two categories may further be opened up: the Hundred Treatise primarily refutes the outsiders and, as a secondary matter, refutes fellow Buddhists as well; the remaining two treatises primarily refute fellow Buddhists and, as a secondary matter, refute the outsiders as well. The reason all three treatises refute both insiders and outsiders is this: every one of the many sicknesses reduces, without exception, to just two kinds — first, the outsiders' own erroneous fabrications, which give rise to confusion; second, insiders who, in receiving the teaching, lose sight of its true purport. If both of these two are refuted, every one of the many sicknesses is thereby entirely removed.

Question: It is clear enough that the Hundred Treatise refutes the outsiders — but where, exactly, does it also contain a refutation of fellow Buddhists? Answer: In the chapter refuting the sense-object, an outsider cites an insider's own doctrine as supporting proof, and the treatise-author thereupon refutes this very citation as well — the matter is set out there in full detail.

Question: On what grounds is it legitimate to refute fellow Buddhists at all? Answer: There are three such grounds. First, as already explained above: when an outsider's own position fails to hold and he cites an insider's doctrine as proof, the insider's doctrine must then be refuted along with it. Second, some Buddhist masters hold positions genuinely identical to the outsiders' — as when they posit that space is eternal and pervades everywhere, or even posit that in nirvāṇa both body and knowledge are entirely absent; such positions are identical to the outsiders' own, and so must be refuted as well. Third, an outsider's own position may happen to be identical to an insider's — as in the chapter refuting the absence of the effect within the cause, where outsiders who posit that the three marks of conditioned existence arise one after another in sequence hold the same view as the Dārṣṭāntika school, while outsiders who posit that the three marks all arise simultaneously and interdependently hold the same view as the Sarvāstivāda — and in both cases the corresponding Buddhist school must be refuted as well. This is why Master Sengzhao said: "Heretical eloquence presses so close upon the truth that it very nearly throws the correct way into utter confusion."

Question: Why does the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā refute outsiders as a secondary matter? Answer: There are, in all, four reasons. First, it is in order to show that correct contemplation of the middle leaves no dharma unexamined and no assertion unspoken — for if a single dharma were left unexamined, or a single assertion left unspoken, then conceptual proliferation would not be extinguished, and correct contemplation of the middle would not arise; this is why both insiders and outsiders alike are refuted together. Second, some insiders hold positions identical to the outsiders', and so the outsiders too must be refuted along with them. Third, some outsiders hold positions identical to the insiders', and so the outsiders too must be refuted on that account. Fourth, it is in order to show that the reality of the middle is neither internal nor external, neither correct nor heretical — and this too is why the outsiders must be refuted.

Question: Does the Hundred Treatise's refutation of the outsiders also involve any sense of gathering them in? Answer: There are, here too, four propositions. First, refuted and not gathered in: this describes the outsiders' own heretical assertions, which obstruct correct contemplation of the middle and give rise to confusion — with respect to the condition they address, these bring no benefit at all, only harm. Second, gathered in and not refuted: some outsiders have stolen fragments of good teaching left over from the Tathāgata's own tradition, and these are now all gathered back in — like catching a thief who has stolen an ox, which is exactly the case in point. Also, some outsiders, each pressing their own erroneous mind to its very limit through investigation, arrive at a hidden wisdom that happens to coincide with the insiders' own — like an insect gnawing at wood that happens, by chance, to trace out a real written character; this too is gathered in and not refuted. Third, both refuted and gathered in at once: some outsiders have stolen fragments of the Buddha's teaching without recognizing its true purport — their confused clinging to that teaching is now refuted, while the very teaching they were confused about is gathered back in. Fourth, neither refuted nor gathered in: this describes the gate of the correct way itself, which has never, at any point, actually been either internal or external to begin with.

Next, explaining in particular why they are called "the three treatises." Question: Given that there are four treatises, why are they consistently referred to as "the three treatises"? Answer: There are, in brief, eight reasons. First, each and every one of the three treatises individually possesses three aspects in full: refuting the false, revealing the true, and verbal teaching. Since all three treatises alike possess these same three aspects, they are jointly named "the three treatises." Second, it is only by combining the three treatises together that these same three aspects are fully supplied between them: the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā makes clear the principle that is revealed; the Hundred Treatise refutes heretical clinging; the Twelve Gate Treatise is named for its verbal teaching. Since these three aspects mutually complete one another across the three works, they are named "the three treatises."

Third, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā is the extensive treatise; the Hundred Treatise is the intermediate treatise; the Twelve Gate Treatise is the concise treatise. Since these three works together supply the upper, middle, and lower grades, they are named "the three treatises." Fourth, all sūtras and treatises without exception fall into three kinds: first, those consisting of verse alone — this is the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā; second, those consisting of prose alone — this is the Hundred Treatise; third, those consisting of both prose and verse together — this is the Twelve Gate Treatise. Since these three works open up their own distinct approaches, avoiding overlap, while mutually completing one another, they are named "the three treatises."

Fifth, these three works are alike Mahāyāna general treatises — this too is why they are named "the three treatises." Sixth, these three works alike reveal the non-dual real character of things — this too is why they are named "the three treatises." Seventh, they are alike composed by bodhisattvas of the four kinds of reliance. Eighth, they are alike works composed in the semblance and final ages, undertaken solely in order to hold together the great Dharma as its own guiding framework.

Next, discussing the general and particular distinction among the three treatises themselves. Set against the Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom, the Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom is a particular treatise, and the three treatises together are general treatises. Yet within the three treatises themselves, a further threefold distinction may be drawn, giving three separate grades. The Hundred Treatise is the broadest of the general treatises; the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā is the middling one; the Twelve Gate Treatise is the most concise. The reason is this: the Hundred Treatise refutes, as a whole, every heresy obstructing both the mundane and the world-transcending alike, and sets forth, as a whole, every correct teaching for the mundane and the world-transcending alike — and so it is named the broadest of the general treatises. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā refutes only the two confusions of great and small, and sets forth, as a whole, the two teachings of great and small, without refuting worldly confusion or setting forth worldly teaching as such — and so it is the middling one among the general treatises. The Twelve Gate Treatise refutes only the confusion of clinging to the great, and sets forth the teaching of the Mahāyāna alone — and so it is the most concise of the general treatises.

Question: Why should this be so? Answer: The outsiders' heresies arose everywhere, obstructing every teaching, mundane and world-transcending, great and small alike — and so Āryadeva refuted every heresy comprehensively and set forth every teaching in full. This is why the treatise makes clear its scope from the three refuges at the very beginning all the way through to the two truths at the very end: there is no teaching it fails to set forth, and no heresy it fails to refute. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, addressing students of both great and small vehicles who have each sealed themselves within their own respective teaching, therefore refutes only these two confusions and sets forth only these two teachings — and this is why its own text speaks of a great section and a small section. The Twelve Gate Treatise discriminates the essential refinement of contemplative practice and makes clear the root doctrine of the broad Mahāyāna canon, and so it directly refutes the great confusion and sets forth the great teaching alone — this is why its own text, in naming its guiding doctrine, says only that it "briefly explains the meaning of the Mahāyāna."

Question: The Twelve Gate Treatise also refutes the Hīnayāna and the outsiders in full — how, then, can it be said that it refutes only the great confusion and sets forth only the great teaching? Answer: Although it does refute the whole range of sicknesses in full, its actual, governing intent is solely to set forth the Mahāyāna. This is why its own text first states, at the outset, that it will briefly explain the Mahāyāna, and only afterward says that sentient beings in the final age, of thin merit and dull faculty, though they search through the sūtra text, are unable to penetrate it fully — from which it may be known that this searching for the Mahāyāna, and losing its true purport in the process, is precisely on account of the Hīnayāna and the outsiders obstructing that very Mahāyāna, and this is exactly why they must be refuted. Moreover, it is also in order to lead the Hīnayāna and the outsiders alike into the Mahāyāna together that they must be refuted.

Question: The Hundred Treatise sets forth both the great and small teachings — how does this differ from the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā? Answer: The Hundred Treatise sets forth great and small together, as one undivided whole, whereas the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā sets forth the two teachings separately, each in its own distinct section. Moreover, the Hundred Treatise proceeds from shallow to deep, while the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā proceeds from deep to shallow. Question: Why should this be so? Answer: The Hundred Treatise exists to turn people away from heresy and into the correct way, addressing beginners at the very start of their practice — hence it begins from the three refuges and ends by entering the broad Mahāyāna canon, proceeding from shallow to deep. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā displays the meaning of what is root and what is branch among all the buddhas' teaching, where the Mahāyāna is the root and the Hīnayāna is the branch — hence it proceeds from deep to shallow instead.

Next, making clear the different ways the four treatises make use of the provisional. Although all dharmas without exception are provisional, taking hold of their essential function reveals, in all, four distinct gates. First, the provisional through causal conditioning. Second, the provisional adapted to circumstance. Third, the provisional as counter-measure to circumstance. Fourth, the provisional right where circumstance stands. As for the provisional through causal conditioning: this is as with the two truths of emptiness and existence — existence is not self-existent, but exists precisely because of emptiness; emptiness is not self-empty, but is empty precisely because of existence. This is what is meant by emptiness and existence being provisional through causal conditioning. As for the provisional adapted to circumstance: this is as when the three vehicles' own teaching-gates are taught according to the differing faculties of the three vehicles. As for the provisional as counter-measure to circumstance: this is as when impermanence is taught specifically to counteract a clinging to permanence, and permanence is taught specifically to counteract a clinging to impermanence. As for the provisional right where circumstance stands: this is as when outsiders cling to dharmas as really existing, and the buddhas and bodhisattvas, investigating and examining the matter right where the outsiders themselves stand, find in the end nothing at all to be gotten — this is what is called the provisional right where circumstance stands. These four kinds of the provisional together comprehend the twelve divisions of scripture and the eighty-four thousand teachings of the Dharma in their entirety. All four treatises make use of all four kinds of the provisional, yet the Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom makes the most use of the provisional through causal conditioning, since its purpose is to explain the sūtra and establish its doctrine directly; the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and Twelve Gate Treatise make the most use of the provisional right where circumstance stands; and the Hundred Treatise makes the most use of the provisional as counter-measure to circumstance.

Next, making clear the different ways the four treatises respond to circumstance. Focusing on the four treatises, two kinds may be briefly distinguished. The bodhisattva Āryadeva thundered the drum of debate in the royal courts themselves; ninety-six teachers gathered together at once like massing clouds, each establishing his own celebrated theories and setting forth arguments without any fixed limit. Āryadeva broke apart these heretical teachers face to face, and only afterward withdrew to a quiet forest, where he compiled the words spoken at the time into what became the Hundred Treatise. The bodhisattva Nāgārjuna, by contrast, worked hidden behind a curtain, wielding his own brush, seeking out the outsiders' actual positions in order to refute their sickness and set forth the sūtras' meaning — and it was in this way that he composed the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Question: Why this difference? Answer: Nāgārjuna's own reputation was heard throughout the world, and neither the outsiders nor the Hīnayāna schools dared engage him directly in speech — and so he worked hidden behind a curtain, composing the treatise with his brush alone. Āryadeva, being a disciple rather than the master himself, was not someone others' hearts held in dread, and so they were willing to engage him directly in speech — and this is why his words came to be compiled into a treatise only afterward.

Next, making clear how the faculties addressed by the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and Hundred Treatise differ in sharpness and dullness. Taking the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and Hundred Treatise together here, briefly, four distinct kinds of awakening among sentient beings may be identified. First, there exists a certain kind of root-capacity that, on hearing the Hundred Treatise — beginning with the discarding of sin and merit and ending with the refutation of emptiness and existence alike — awakens to the unborn at the very moment these words are spoken. Second, there are outsiders who, though they heard what Āryadeva refuted at the time and were bested in both speech and reasoning, still did not thereby awaken; only afterward, going forth from household life and receiving the Buddhist scriptures directly, did they finally awaken. These are persons of middling faculty. Third, there are outsiders who, on hearing Āryadeva's own words, failed to fully understand them, and on searching the sūtras themselves only gave rise to further confusion instead; it was only through the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā's own refutation that they finally awakened. These are persons of duller faculty. Fourth, there are outsiders who, having first received Āryadeva's words, and even after searching the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā as well, still failed to gain understanding; it was only afterward, through the profound yet concise contemplation of the Twelve Gate Treatise, that they finally awakened.