The Many Meanings of "the Middle"
The treatise closes as it opened — with a careful, exhaustive taxonomy. Four separate approaches to the meaning of "the middle" are laid out, followed by a count of how many "middles" there really are: one, when speaking of the single undivided way; two, three, or four, depending on how finely the two truths and the notion of bias are distinguished. The treatise's very last words survey how outsiders, the Abhidharma, Satyasiddhi, and the Mahāyāna each understand "the middle" differently — closing the entire work on the same comparative method it opened with in Part 1.
1. Completing the Answer: Contemplation Gives Rise to Conditions
Part 13 closed mid-sentence, in the middle of the source text's own account of whether contemplation can be said to give rise to conditions in return, just as conditions were shown to give rise to contemplation. The answer completes cleanly here: correct contemplation, once it exists, is precisely what allows heretical conditions to be recognized as heretical in the first place.
[承前]由邪緣故得顯正觀。即是緣發於觀。由正觀故顯緣是邪。謂觀發於緣耳。
[Continuing from Part 13] ...It is by means of heretical conditions that correct contemplation comes to be displayed at all — this is precisely what is meant by conditions giving rise to contemplation. And it is by means of correct contemplation that conditions come to be shown as heretical in the first place — this is precisely what is meant by contemplation giving rise to conditions.
2. Four Approaches to the Meaning of "the Middle": Definition and Principle
Jizang now catalogs four distinct ways the single character "middle" can be explained, moving from the simplest — glossing it as "the real" or "the correct" by direct definition — to a subtler approach in which "the middle" is said to mean, precisely, "not-middle," a provisional name meant to lead the hearer beyond names altogether.
次明別釋三字門。總論釋義凡有四種。一依名釋義。二就理教釋義。三就互相釋義。四無方釋義也。依名釋義者。中以實為義。中以正為義。中以實為義者。如涅槃釋本有今無偈云。我昔本無中道實義。是故現在有無量煩惱。叡師中論序云。以中為名者。照其實也。照謂顯也。立於中名。為欲顯諸法實故。云照其實也。
Next, making clear the gate of the separate exegesis of the three characters. Speaking generally, this exegesis takes, in all, four forms. First, explaining the meaning by direct definition. Second, explaining the meaning by way of principle and teaching. Third, explaining the meaning by way of mutual definition. Fourth, explaining the meaning without any fixed reference. As for explaining the meaning by direct definition: "the middle" takes "the real" as its meaning, and "the middle" takes "the correct" as its meaning. As for "the middle" taking "the real" as its meaning: the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, in explaining the verse on originally existing yet now absent, says: "In the past I originally lacked the real meaning of the middle way — this is why, in the present, there are measureless afflictions." Master Sengrui's preface to the Zhonglun says: "In taking 'the middle' as the name, one illuminates its reality." "Illuminates" here means "makes manifest." The name "the middle" is established precisely in order to make manifest the reality of all dharmas — this is what is meant by "illuminates its reality."
所言正者。華嚴云。正法性遠離一切言語道一切趣非趣。悉皆寂滅相。此之正法即是中道。離偏曰中。對邪名正。肇公物不遷論云。正觀論曰。觀方知彼去。去者不至方。故知中以正為義也。
As for what is called "the correct": the Avataṃsaka Sūtra says: "The nature of the correct Dharma is far removed from every path of speech, and every destination as well as every non-destination — all alike bear the mark of quiescence." This correct Dharma is precisely the middle way. Being apart from bias is called "the middle"; being set against heresy is named "the correct." Master Sengzhao's Things Do Not Shift says: "The Treatise on Correct Contemplation states: one observes direction and thereby knows that a thing has departed — yet the thing that has departed never actually arrives at any direction at all." From this it is known that "the middle" takes "the correct" as its meaning.
理教釋義者。中以不中為義。所以然者。諸法實相非中非不中。無名相法為眾生故強名相說。欲令因此名以悟無名。是故說中為顯不中。問中以不中為義。出何文耶。答華嚴云。一切有無法了達非有無。若爾。一切中偏法了達非中偏。即其事也。
As for explaining the meaning by way of principle and teaching: "the middle" takes "not-middle" as its meaning. The reason is this: the real character of all dharmas is neither the middle nor not-the-middle. What has no name and no mark is, for the sake of sentient beings, provisionally given a name and a mark and spoken of — precisely so that beings might, by means of this very name, awaken to what has no name at all. This is why "the middle" is spoken of in order to reveal "not-the-middle." Question: From what text does "the middle" taking "not-the-middle" as its meaning derive? Answer: The Avataṃsaka Sūtra says: "All dharmas of existence and non-existence are thoroughly understood as neither existence nor non-existence." If this is so, then all dharmas of the middle and of bias are likewise thoroughly understood as neither the middle nor bias — this is exactly the matter in question.
Sengzhao's Things Do Not Shift (物不遷論) is one of the four essays making up his celebrated Zhao Lun, and the citation here of "the Treatise on Correct Contemplation" — this treatise's own recurring alternate name for the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, already used in Part 3 and Part 5 — links this treatise's own title-exegesis back to the same Chang'an circle of Kumārajīva's disciples whose prefaces and essays have supplied so much of this collection's proof-texts throughout. The "not-the-middle" approach is the sharpest formulation in this whole section: even the treatise's own central technical term must, in the end, be seen through rather than clung to, exactly as "emptiness" itself was shown to require abandoning once its remedial work was done, back in Part 7.
3. Two More Approaches: Mutual Definition, and No Fixed Reference
The third approach defines "the middle" and "the biased" strictly in terms of each other, exactly as the two truths define each other by contrast; the fourth abandons fixed definition altogether, illustrating "the middle" instead through the mutual interpenetration of the one and the many.
所言互相釋義者。中以偏為義。偏以中為義。所以然者。中偏是因緣之義。故說偏令悟中。說中令識偏。如經云。說世諦令識第一義諦。說第一義諦令識世諦也。
As for explaining the meaning by way of mutual definition: "the middle" takes "the biased" as its meaning, and "the biased" takes "the middle" as its meaning. The reason is this: "the middle" and "the biased" stand in a relationship of mutual causal conditioning — hence "the biased" is spoken of in order to lead one to awaken to "the middle," and "the middle" is spoken of in order to lead one to recognize "the biased." It is exactly as the sūtra says: "The conventional truth is spoken of in order to lead one to recognize the ultimate truth; the ultimate truth is spoken of in order to lead one to recognize the conventional truth."
四無方釋義者。中以色為義。中以心為義。是故華嚴經云。一中解無量。無量中解一。故一法得以一切法為義一切法得以一法為義。
As for explaining the meaning without any fixed reference: "the middle" takes "form" as its meaning, and "the middle" takes "mind" as its meaning. Hence the Avataṃsaka Sūtra says: "Within the one, the immeasurable is understood; within the immeasurable, the one is understood." So a single dharma may take every dharma whatsoever as its own meaning, and every dharma whatsoever may take a single dharma as its own meaning.
4. How Many Kinds of "Middle" Are There? One, Two, and Three
Jizang now asks, directly, how many kinds of "middle" exist — and answers that since "the middle" is by nature neither many nor one, the count itself shifts depending on what distinction is being tracked: a single undivided way when speaking of the path itself, two when the two truths are distinguished, and three once the further "neither ultimate nor conventional" middle is added.
問中有幾種。答既稱為中。則非多非一。隨義對緣得說多一。所言一中者。一道清淨更無二道。一道者即一中道也。所言二中者。則約二諦辨中。謂世諦中真諦中。以世諦不偏故名為中。真諦不偏名為真諦中。所言三中者。二諦中及非真非俗中。
Question: How many kinds of "the middle" are there? Answer: Since it is called "the middle" at all, it is, by nature, neither many nor one — depending on the sense intended and the circumstance addressed, one may properly speak of it as many or as one. As for what is called "the one middle": it is the one pure way, with no second way alongside it — this one way is precisely the one middle way. As for what is called "the two middles": these are distinguished with reference to the two truths, namely the middle of the conventional truth and the middle of the ultimate truth. Because the conventional truth is not biased, it is named "the middle"; because the ultimate truth is not biased, it is named "the middle of the ultimate truth." As for what is called "the three middles": these are the middle of the two truths, together with the middle that is neither the ultimate nor the conventional.
5. The Four Middles: Against Bias, Exhausting Bias, Absolute, and Constituting the Provisional
The treatise's final and most detailed enumeration divides "the middle" into four kinds — from a remedial middle defined strictly against a specific bias, through a middle that emerges once every bias is exhausted, to an absolute middle beyond the very distinction of biased and correct, and finally a middle that itself constitutes the provisional truths spoken for the sake of teaching.
所言四中者。謂對偏中。盡偏中。絕待中。成假中也。對偏中者。對大小學人斷常偏病。是故說對偏中也。盡偏中者。大小學人有於斷常偏病則不成中。偏病若盡則名為中。是故經云。眾生起見凡有二種。一斷二常。如是二見不名中道。無常無斷乃名中道。故名盡偏中也。
As for what is called "the four middles": these are the against-bias middle, the exhausting-bias middle, the absolute middle, and the provisional-constituting middle. As for the against-bias middle: it is spoken of specifically to counter the biased sickness of annihilationism and eternalism found among students of both great and small vehicles — this is why it is called the against-bias middle. As for the exhausting-bias middle: so long as students of both great and small vehicles retain any biased sickness of annihilationism or eternalism, the middle is not yet constituted; only once this biased sickness is exhausted entirely is it named "the middle." Hence the sūtra says: "The views that arise among sentient beings are, in all, of two kinds: first, annihilationism; second, eternalism. Views of this kind are not named the middle way. Being without impermanence and without annihilation — only this is named the middle way." This is why it is called the exhausting-bias middle.
絕待中者。本對偏病是故有中。偏病既除中亦不立。非中非偏。為出處眾生強名為中。謂絕待中。故此論云。若無有始終。中當云何有。經亦云。遠離二邊不著中道。即其事也。
As for the absolute middle: it is originally on account of countering a biased sickness that "the middle" comes to exist at all; but once the biased sickness has already been removed, "the middle" itself is likewise not established as a fixed thing either — being neither the middle nor the biased, and simply for the sake of leading sentient beings out, one forcibly names it "the middle" all the same. This is what is called the absolute middle. Hence this very treatise says: "If there were no beginning and no end, how, then, could 'the middle' possibly exist at all?" A sūtra likewise says: "Being far removed from both extremes, and not attached even to the middle way itself" — this is exactly the matter in question.
成假中者。有無為假。非有非無為中。由非有非無故說有無。如此之中為成於假。謂成假中也。所以然者。良由正道未曾有無。為化眾生假說有無故。以非有無為中。有無為假也。
As for the provisional-constituting middle: existence and non-existence constitute the provisional; being neither existence nor non-existence constitutes the middle. It is precisely because of being neither existence nor non-existence that existence and non-existence can be spoken of at all. A middle understood in this way exists in order to constitute the provisional — this is what is called the provisional-constituting middle. The reason is this: the correct way has, in truth, never at any point actually been either existence or non-existence; it is solely for the sake of transforming sentient beings that existence and non-existence are provisionally spoken of at all. This is why what is neither existence nor non-existence is the middle, while existence and non-existence together constitute the provisional.
The line quoted here from "this very treatise" — "if there were no beginning and no end, how could 'the middle' possibly exist at all?" — comes from the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā's own chapter examining the beginning and end of things, and its logic is the same logic used throughout this section: "the middle" only ever exists relative to something it corrects, and once nothing remains that needs correcting, the term itself has no fixed referent left to point to. This fourfold scheme — against-bias, exhausting-bias, absolute, and provisional-constituting — gives a name to nearly every argumentative move this entire treatise has made since Part 1: every refutation of a specific sect was an against-bias middle in action; the final state after every sect is refuted is the exhausting-bias middle; the "neither this nor that, and not even a fixed 'neither' either" moves repeated throughout Part 7 are the absolute middle; and the treatise's habitual practice of speaking provisionally of "existence" and "emptiness" for pedagogical purposes, while insisting neither is ultimately fixed, is the provisional-constituting middle throughout.
6. Refinements Within the Provisional: Single, Compound, Sparse, and Dense
The treatise adds one further layer of technical refinement to the provisional-constituting middle just described, distinguishing single from compound, and sparse from dense, formulations of the existence/non-existence pairing — a set of distinctions the treatise notes are treated at greater length in a separate discussion of "the doctrine of the middle and the provisional."
就成假中有單複疎密橫竪等義。具如中假義說。如說有為單假。非有為單中。無義亦爾。有無為複假。非有非無為複中。有無為疎假。非有非無為疎中。不有有為密假。有不有為密中。疎即是橫。密即是竪也。
Within the provisional-constituting middle, there are further senses of single and compound, sparse and dense, horizontal and vertical, set out in full in the separate discussion of the doctrine of the middle and the provisional. For instance: speaking of "existence" alone constitutes a single provisional; "non-existence" alone constitutes a single middle — and the same holds for the sense of "non-existence" in turn. "Existence and non-existence" together constitute a compound provisional; "neither existence nor non-existence" constitutes a compound middle. "Existence, non-existence" spoken in sequence constitutes a sparse provisional; "neither existence nor non-existence" spoken correspondingly constitutes a sparse middle. "Not-existent existence" spoken as a single dense formulation constitutes a dense provisional; "existent not-existence" constitutes a dense middle. The sparse formulation corresponds to the horizontal; the dense formulation corresponds to the vertical.
This closing technical refinement is offered by Jizang as a pointer to a fuller, separate treatment elsewhere in his own body of work rather than a self-contained explanation — the terse compression here (single/compound, sparse/dense, horizontal/vertical, distinguished in barely more than a single sentence each) is characteristic of how this treatise handles material it considers secondary to its main argument, trusting the reader either to consult the fuller source or to accept the terminology as a marker of a real distinction without needing every implication drawn out.
7. Four Schools' Final Word on "the Middle"
The treatise closes with one last comparative survey, structurally mirroring the four-sect refutation that opened the entire work: how the outsiders, the Abhidharma, Satyasiddhi, and the Mahāyāna each explain "the middle" in their own distinct terms — a fitting close, since it returns, one final time, to exactly the comparative method this treatise has used from its very first page.
次釋中不同得有四種。一外道明中。二毘曇明中。三成實明中。四大乘人明中也。外道說中者。僧佉人言。泥團非瓶非非瓶。即是中義也。衛世師云。聲不名大不名小。勒沙婆云。光非闇非明。此之三師並以兩非為中。而未知所以為中耳。
Next, explaining how "the middle" is understood differently across four kinds of teaching. First, how the outsiders explain the middle; second, how the Abhidharma explains the middle; third, how Satyasiddhi explains the middle; fourth, how Mahāyāna teachers explain the middle. As for how the outsiders speak of the middle: the followers of Kapila say that "a lump of clay is neither a pot nor not a pot" — this is precisely their sense of the middle. The followers of Ulūka say that "sound is called neither great nor small." Ṛṣabha says that "light is neither darkness nor brightness." These three teachers all take a double negation as constituting the middle, yet none of them actually knows why this should count as the middle at all.
毘曇人釋中者。有事有理。事中者。無漏大王不在邊地。謂不在欲界及非想也。理中者。謂苦集之理不斷不常也。成實人明中道者。論文直言離有離無名聖中道。而論師云。中道有三。一世諦中道。二真諦中道。三非真非俗中道。
As for how the Abhidharma masters explain the middle: there is both a phenomenal middle and a principled middle. As for the phenomenal middle: "the undefiled great king does not dwell at the borderlands" — meaning that it dwells neither within the desire realm nor at the peak of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. As for the principled middle: it means that the principle of suffering and its origin is neither annihilated nor permanent. As for how the Satyasiddhi masters make clear the middle way: the treatise's own text says directly that "apart from existence and apart from non-existence" is named the noble middle way, while the treatise's own commentators say that the middle way is threefold: first, the middle way of the conventional truth; second, the middle way of the ultimate truth; third, the middle way that is neither the ultimate nor the conventional.
四大乘人明中者。如攝大乘論師明。非安立諦不著生死不住涅槃。名之為中也。義本者。以無住為體中。此是合門。於體中。開為兩用。謂真俗。此是用中。即是開門也。又中假師云。非有非無為中。而有而無為假也。
Fourth, as for how Mahāyāna teachers explain the middle: as the masters of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha make clear, "not the fixed, established truth, not attached to birth-and-death, and not abiding in nirvāṇa" is what is named the middle. Its basic point is this: taking non-abiding as the essential middle constitutes the gate of unifying. From within this essential middle, two functions are opened up, namely the conventional and the ultimate — this constitutes the functional middle, which is precisely the gate of opening up. The masters of the doctrine of the middle and the provisional say, further: being neither existence nor non-existence constitutes the middle, while having existence and having non-existence constitutes the provisional.
The treatise ends without any concluding summary, colophon, or formal closing statement of its own — it simply completes this final comparative survey and stops, on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha masters' own account of the middle as neither a fixed truth nor an attachment to either saṃsāra or nirvāṇa, and on the "middle and provisional" doctrine's own restatement of existence and non-existence as the provisional face of a middle that is itself neither. This is consistent with how the treatise has proceeded throughout: even its final word is another instance of the same method announced in Part 1 — state each position in its own terms, place it beside its neighbors, and let the comparison itself do the remaining work. The outsiders' "double negation" that its own proponents cannot explain, set beside the Abhidharma's phenomenal-and-principled middle, Satyasiddhi's threefold middle way, and the Mahāyāna's non-abiding middle, quietly recapitulates, one final time, the entire ranking from shallow to deep that has organized this treatise from its very opening pages.
The Sanlun Xuanyi Complete
This closes Part Fourteen, and with it the entire Sanlun Xuanyi: the completion of the title-exegesis begun in Part 13, four approaches to the meaning of "the middle," the count of one, two, three, and four middles, and a final comparative survey of how outsiders, the Abhidharma, Satyasiddhi, and the Mahāyāna each understand the very term this school is named for. The treatise as a whole has moved from refuting four sects in turn — outsiders, Abhidharma, Satyasiddhi, and a mistaken grasp of the Mahāyāna — through establishing Nāgārjuna's own authority and the ultimacy of the three treatises' teaching, into an extended history of the schismatic schools, a taxonomy of general and particular treatises, the guiding doctrine proper to each of the four treatises this school defends, and, at last, a dedicated exegesis of its own founding text's own three-character name.
Jizang leaves the reader exactly where the treatise's own method has been pointing all along: not with one final doctrine to accept, but with a demonstration, repeated across fourteen parts and every school this treatise has touched, that the middle way is reached by tracing each position to its root, stating it fully and fairly, and seeing through it — rather than by arriving at some further fixed position of one's own.