The Sixteen Rival Doctrines
The treatise changes register completely. For the first time it argues against named opponents, and it does so on a fixed pattern: state the position, give the two grounds on which it rests — scripture and reasoning — reconstruct the opponent's own argument as strongly as possible, and only then begin. The refutations are conducted almost entirely by dilemma, and their refrain is a single phrase repeated more than eighty times in this fascicle alone: this does not stand to reason. Five of the sixteen doctrines are taken up here, including one held by fellow Buddhists, and the treatment of the self runs longer than any other passage in the treatise so far — ending, unexpectedly, with an account of the sense in which a self may properly be spoken of after all.
Where This Fascicle Picks Up
Fascicle 8 completed the first four topics of its opening verse — noble practice, the unsurpassed vehicle, great enlightenment, and the bodhisattva's qualities. The fifth topic of that verse was 異論, rival doctrines, and this fascicle takes it up.
Classical text is set in the left-hand column below, our English in the right. See also this site's note on translation method, and the note on this treatise's method in fascicle 1.
1. The Sixteen
異論多種者，謂十六種異論。何等十六？嗢柁南曰：
執因中有果、 顯了、有去來、
我、常、宿作因、 自在等、害法、
邊無邊、矯亂、 見無因、斷、空、
計勝、淨、吉祥， 名十六異論。
Rival doctrines are of many kinds — sixteen kinds. What sixteen? Summary verse:
Holding the effect to be in the cause; manifestation;
that past and future exist;
self; eternity; former action as cause;
a lord and the like; harming as Dharma;
finite and infinite; evasion;
the view of no cause; annihilation; emptiness;
supposing something supreme, purifying, auspicious —
these are called the sixteen rival doctrines.
論曰：十六異論者，一因中有果論、二從緣顯了論、三去來實有論、四計我論、五計常論、六宿作因論、七自在等作者論、八害為正法論、九有邊無邊論、十不死矯亂論、十一無因見論、十二斷見論、十三空見論、十四妄計最勝論、十五妄計清淨論、十六妄計吉祥論。
The exposition: the sixteen rival doctrines are — the doctrine that the effect exists in the cause; the doctrine of manifestation from conditions; the doctrine that past and future really exist; the doctrine of a self; the doctrine of eternity; the doctrine that former action is the cause; the doctrine of a Lord and other such makers; the doctrine that harming is the true Dharma; the doctrine of the finite and the infinite; the doctrine of undying evasion; the view of no cause; the view of annihilation; the view of emptiness; falsely supposing something supreme; falsely supposing something purifying; and falsely supposing something auspicious.
This list of sixteen is inherited from the Treatise on the Stages of Yogic Practice, and it is not a survey of Indian philosophy so much as a catalogue of positions a Buddhist teacher would actually meet. Several are recognizable schools: the first is Sāṃkhya's satkāryavāda, the second includes the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of eternal sound, the seventh is theism, and the tenth is the eel-wrigglers of the early discourses. The eleventh and twelfth are the materialist and annihilationist positions.
Two entries deserve advance notice. The third — that past and future really exist — is the signature doctrine of the Sarvāstivāda, a Buddhist school; it is refuted here at greater length than most of the non-Buddhist positions. And the thirteenth, the view of emptiness, is a misreading of the Buddha's own teaching, listed among the rival doctrines because a wrong account of emptiness is treated as more dangerous than an honest theism.
2. The Effect Already Exists in the Cause: The Case For It
Asaṅga's method is fixed and worth watching: state the position, name its two grounds, and then build the opponent's reasoning out to four independent arguments before answering any of them.
因中有果論者，謂如有一，若沙門若婆羅門，起如是見立如是論：因中常恒具有果性。謂雨眾外道作如是計。
問：何因緣故，彼諸外道於諸因中起如是見立如是論顯示有果？答：由教及理故。教者，謂彼先師所造教藏，隨聞傳授展轉至今，宣說因中先已有果。理者，謂即如彼沙門及婆羅門，為性尋思、為性觀察，住尋思地、住自辦地、住異生地、住隨思惟觀察行地，彼如是思：若從彼體此體得生，一切世間共知共立，彼是此因非餘。又諸世間欲求此果，唯取此因不取餘因。又即於彼彼事中，如是如是加功營造，非於餘事。又若彼果即從彼生不從餘生，是故因中定已有果。若不爾者，應立一切是一切因。又應求一一果取一切因。又應於一切事加功營造為求一果。又應從一切一切果生。如是由建立故、取故、作事故、生故，彼見因中常有果性。
The doctrine that the effect exists in the cause: some ascetic or brahmin gives rise to this view and sets up this doctrine — that the cause constantly and permanently possesses the nature of the effect. The followers of Vārṣagaṇya hold this.
Question: for what reason do those outsiders give rise to this view and set up this doctrine, displaying the effect within the cause? Answer: by scripture and by reasoning. By scripture: the collection of teachings composed by their former masters, handed down by hearing from then until now, which proclaims that the effect already exists in the cause. By reasoning: those ascetics and brahmins, being by nature given to investigation and observation, abiding on the level of investigation, on the level of what they have worked out for themselves, on the level of ordinary beings, on the level of proceeding by reflection and observation, think as follows.
If this thing arises from that thing, the whole world knows in common and holds in common that that is the cause of this and nothing else is. Again, when people in the world want this effect, they take only this cause and not some other. Again, in this or that matter they put out effort and labor in just this or that way, and not in other matters. Again, if that effect arises from that and not from something else — therefore the effect is definitely already in the cause. Were it otherwise, one would have to hold that everything is the cause of everything; and in seeking each single effect one would have to take up every cause; and one would have to put out effort and labor in every matter in order to seek a single effect; and every effect would have to arise from everything whatever. Thus by establishment, by taking up, by doing the work, and by arising, they see the cause as constantly possessing the nature of the effect.
The opponent's argument is genuinely good, and Asaṅga presents it that way. It is an argument from the regularity of causation: curd comes from milk and not from water; if you want curd you get milk; you churn rather than doing something else; and curd arises from milk alone. If the effect were not already present in the cause, they argue, nothing would explain why any particular cause yields any particular effect — and the alternative is that anything could produce anything.
Note the description of the opponents. They are 為性尋思、為性觀察, by nature given to investigation and observation — thinkers, not fools. The one limiting phrase is 住異生地, abiding on the level of ordinary beings: they reason well and they reason without having seen the truths. This is the consistent posture of the whole fascicle. The rival doctrines are errors of philosophy, not of stupidity.
3. The Refutation: Neither the Same nor Different, Neither Arisen nor Unarisen
我今問汝，隨汝意答。因果兩相為異不異？若不異者，即無決定因果二體，由此二相無差別故。而言因中有果，不應道理。若異相者，汝意云何？因中果體為未生相、為已生相？若未生相者，於彼因中果猶未生而說是有，不應道理。若已生相者，則果體已生，復從因生，不應道理。是故因中非先有果，然要有因故待緣而生。
彼有相法於有相法中，由五種相可得了知。一於處所可得了知，謂如瓮中水。二於所依止可得了知，如眼中眼識。三即於自相可得了知，如因自體不由比決。四於自作業可得了知。五由因變故果變可得，或由緣變故果變可得。是故常時恒時說因中有果，不應道理。
由此義故，彼所立論非如理說。謂不異相故、異相故、不生相故、生相故，不應道理。
I now ask you; answer as you think. Are the marks of cause and effect different or not different? If not different, then there are no two determinate entities, cause and effect, since the two marks would have no difference — and to say that the effect is in the cause does not stand to reason. If they are of different marks, then what do you say: is the effect within the cause of the mark of not yet having arisen, or of having already arisen? If not yet arisen, then to say it exists in that cause while it has not yet arisen does not stand to reason. If already arisen, then the effect has already arisen and yet arises again from the cause, which does not stand to reason. Therefore the effect is not already in the cause; rather, there must be a cause, and it arises in dependence on conditions.
Where a thing possessing marks is present within another thing possessing marks, it can be known by five marks. First, it can be known by its place — as water in a jar. Second, by what it rests on — as eye-consciousness in the eye. Third, by its own mark directly, as with the substance of the cause, without needing inference. Fourth, by its own activity. Fifth, by the fact that when the cause alters the effect alters, or when conditions alter the effect alters. Therefore to say that the effect is constantly and permanently in the cause does not stand to reason.
For this reason the doctrine they set up is not stated in accordance with reason — by not-different marks, by different marks, by the mark of not having arisen, and by the mark of having arisen, it does not stand to reason.
The refutation is a dilemma inside a dilemma, and it is airtight given the opponent's own commitments. Either cause and effect are the same, in which case there is nothing for the phrase "the effect in the cause" to mean — the claim collapses into an identity. Or they are different, and then the effect present in the cause is either already arisen, in which case its subsequent arising is superfluous, or not yet arisen, in which case calling it present is empty. Nothing is left.
The five ways one thing may be known to be present in another is the constructive half of the argument, and it is an appeal to observation. Water in a jar is found by its place; eye-consciousness by what it rests on; some things by direct perception; some by what they do; and some by covariation — when the cause changes, the effect changes. The challenge to the opponent is simple: by which of these five is the curd known to be present in the milk? None of them applies, and the answer that the milk merely can become curd is the Buddhist position, not theirs.
4. Manifestation from Conditions
The second doctrine is the first one's line of retreat: nothing is produced, and causes merely reveal what was there all along. Asaṅga notes explicitly that its adherents include the people just refuted.
從緣顯了論者，謂如有一，若沙門若婆羅門，起如是見立如是論：一切諸法體自本有，從眾緣顯非緣所生。謂即因中有果論者及聲相論者，作如是計。
問：何因緣故，因中有果論者見諸因中先有果性從緣顯了？答：由教及理故。教如前說。理者，謂如有一，為性尋思、為性觀察，廣說如前。彼如是思：果先是有，復從因生，不應道理。然非不用功為成於果，復以何緣而作功用？豈非唯為顯了果故。彼作如是妄思惟已，說顯了論。
我今問汝，隨汝意答。為無障緣故障、為有障緣故障？若無者，無有障緣而有障者，不應道理。若有者，屬果之因何故不障？同是有故。譬如黑闇，障瓫中水亦能障瓫。若言亦障因者，亦應顯了俱是所障，而但顯因中先有果性而不顯因，不應道理。
The doctrine of manifestation from conditions: some ascetic or brahmin gives rise to this view and sets up this doctrine — that the substance of all things exists of itself from the outset, and is merely manifested by the various conditions, not produced by them. Both those who hold the effect to be in the cause and those who hold the doctrine of eternal sound hold this.
Question: for what reason do those who hold the effect to be in the cause see the nature of the effect as already present in causes and merely manifested by conditions? Answer: by scripture and by reasoning. Scripture as stated above. By reasoning: such a person, being by nature given to investigation and observation — expounded at length as above — thinks thus: that the effect already exists and yet arises from the cause does not stand to reason. Yet it is not that no effort is expended to accomplish the effect. For what reason, then, is effort applied? Surely only in order to manifest the effect. Having so falsely reflected, he states the doctrine of manifestation.
I now ask you; answer as you think. Is the obstruction due to there being no obstructing condition, or due to there being one? If there is none, then for there to be obstruction with no obstructing condition does not stand to reason. If there is one, then why does it not obstruct the cause that belongs to the effect, since the cause equally exists? Just as darkness, which obstructs the water in a jar, can also obstruct the jar. And if you say it obstructs the cause as well, then both should equally be objects of manifestation; yet you manifest only the effect's nature as already present in the cause and do not manifest the cause — which does not stand to reason.
The opponent's reasoning here is an honest response to the refutation just delivered. Granted that a pre-existing effect cannot also be produced — but effort clearly accomplishes something, so let effort manifest rather than produce. Asaṅga treats this as a genuine philosophical move and attacks it at its weakest joint: manifestation implies prior concealment, and concealment requires something doing the concealing.
The image of darkness and the jar is the hinge of the argument and worth following. If darkness is what hides the water, then darkness hides the jar too — an obstruction does not discriminate between one existing thing and another. So if the effect was hidden in the cause and is now revealed, the cause should have been equally hidden and should now be equally revealed. But the opponent says only the effect becomes manifest. There is no principled reason for the asymmetry.
5. Why a Real Thing May Go Unperceived
Having pressed the dilemma further, Asaṅga supplies the constructive alternative: six ordinary reasons something real is not perceived, none of which requires a doctrine of manifestation.
汝又應說，為有性是障緣、為果性是障緣？若有性是障緣者，是則有性常不顯了，不應道理。又因亦是有，何故不是障緣？若果性是障緣者，如是一法亦因亦果，如芽是種子果，是莖等因，是即一法，亦顯不顯，不應道理。
又今問汝，隨汝意答。顯與本法，為一為異？若言一者，彼本有法常顯，已顯復顯，不應道理。若言異者，此顯為無因耶？為有因耶？若無因者，無因而顯，不應道理。若有因者，果性可顯，非是因性，不顯之因能顯於果，不應道理。如是無障緣故、有障緣故、有相故、果相故、顯了一故、顯了異故，不應道理。是故汝言，若法性無是則無相、若法性有是則有相，若性是無不可顯了、若性是有則可顯了者，不應道理。
今當略說，雖實是有而不可取相，或有遠故不可取、或由四種障因之所障故不可取、或極微細故不可取、或心散亂故不可取、或根損壞故不可取、或未得彼相應智故不可取。如因中有果從緣顯論，不應道理。當知聲相論亦爾。此中差別者，外聲論師起如是見立如是論：聲相本有，無生無滅，然由數宣吐方得顯了，而聲體是常。是故從緣顯了論，非如理說。
You must further say: is it existence that is the obstructing condition, or is it being an effect? If existence is the obstructing condition, then whatever exists would never be manifest, which does not stand to reason; and the cause too exists, so why is it not an obstructing condition? If being an effect is the obstructing condition, then since one and the same thing is both cause and effect — as a sprout is the effect of the seed and the cause of the stalk — one and the same thing would be both manifest and unmanifest, which does not stand to reason.
And I ask further: is the manifesting the same as the thing itself, or different? If the same, then that pre-existing thing is always manifest, and to be manifested again when already manifest does not stand to reason. If different, then is this manifesting without a cause or with one? If without a cause, manifesting without a cause does not stand to reason. If with a cause, then the effect can be manifested but the cause cannot; and that an unmanifested cause should manifest the effect does not stand to reason. Thus by there being no obstructing condition, by there being one, by the mark of existence, by the mark of being an effect, by the manifesting being the same, and by its being different — it does not stand to reason. Therefore your statement that if a thing's nature is non-existent it has no mark, and if existent it has a mark; and that what is non-existent cannot be manifested while what is existent can — does not stand to reason.
Now to state it briefly: a thing may really exist and yet its mark not be apprehended — because it is far off; because it is obstructed by the four kinds of obstructing cause; because it is extremely subtle; because the mind is distracted; because the faculty is damaged; or because one has not yet obtained the knowledge corresponding to it. Thus the doctrine that the effect is in the cause and is manifested by conditions does not stand to reason. The doctrine of eternal sound should be understood in the same way. Its difference is this: the outsider grammarians give rise to this view and set up this doctrine — that the mark of sound exists from the outset, without arising or ceasing, and is merely manifested by being repeatedly uttered, the substance of sound being permanent. Therefore the doctrine of manifestation from conditions is not stated in accordance with reason.
The sprout is the decisive counterexample and it is beautifully economical. A sprout is the effect of the seed and the cause of the stalk. So if being an effect is what makes something hidden, the sprout is hidden qua sprout-from-seed and unhidden qua cause-of-stalk — the same thing, at the same moment, both manifest and not. The opponent's doctrine cannot survive an item that occupies both roles, and every item in a causal series does.
The six reasons a real thing may go unperceived are the positive teaching hidden inside the polemic, and they are worth extracting from the argument. Something exists and is not seen because it is too far away, because something blocks it, because it is too fine, because one's attention is elsewhere, because one's sense faculty is damaged, or because one lacks the knowledge that would let one recognize it. The last is the interesting one for a Buddhist treatise: some things are unperceived not because of any defect in the object or the eye but because the perceiver has not yet developed the corresponding knowledge. No metaphysics of concealed essences is needed to explain why we do not see everything.
6. Past and Future Really Exist: The Case For It
The third doctrine is held by Buddhists — the Sarvāstivādins — and its grounds accordingly include the Buddha's own words. Asaṅga quotes three passages on their behalf.
去來實有論者，謂如有一，若沙門若婆羅門，或在此法，由不正思惟起如是見立如是論：有過去、有未來自相成就，猶如現在實有非假。
問：何因緣故，彼起如是見立如是論？答由教及理故。教如前說。又於此法有不如理思惟所引經教。如經中說：一切有者謂十二處，是十二處自相故有。又如薄伽梵說：有過去業。又經中說：有過去色、有未來色，乃至識亦如是。
理者，謂如有一，為性尋思、為性觀察，廣說如前。彼如是思：若法自相安住此法，真實是有。此若未來無者，彼時應未受自相。此若過去無者，彼時應退失自相。若如是者，諸法自相應不成就，由是諸法應性不真實。若如是者，不應道理。由如是思故，起如是見立如是論：過去未來性相實有。
The doctrine that past and future really exist: some ascetic or brahmin — or someone within this very teaching — by improper reflection gives rise to this view and sets up this doctrine: that there is a past and there is a future, accomplished in their own marks, really existent and not merely nominal, just as the present is.
Question: for what reason do they give rise to this view? Answer: by scripture and by reasoning. Scripture as stated above; and also, within this teaching, scriptural passages drawn on by improper reflection. As the scripture says: "All that exists is the twelve sense fields" — and these twelve exist by their own marks. And as the Blessed One said: "There is past karma." And as a scripture says: "There is past form, there is future form," and so on down to consciousness.
By reasoning: such a person, being by nature given to investigation and observation, thinks thus: if a thing abides in its own mark, that thing truly exists. If it were non-existent in the future, then at that time it would not yet have received its own mark; and if it were non-existent in the past, then at that time it would have lost its own mark. If that were so, the own-marks of things would not be accomplished, and thereby the nature of things would not be real — which does not stand to reason. Reasoning thus, they give rise to this view and set up this doctrine: that the nature and marks of past and future really exist.
The phrase 或在此法, "or someone within this very teaching," marks this doctrine as an inner-Buddhist dispute, and everything about the presentation changes accordingly. The grounds are not the treatises of former masters but three sayings of the Buddha, and the treatise concedes that they say what the opponent claims. What it disputes is not the texts but the reading — 不如理思惟所引, drawn on by improper reflection.
The opponent's reasoning is the strongest philosophical case for the position. Own-marks are what make a thing the thing it is. If a thing lacks its own mark in the future and loses it in the past, then own-marks are not stable properties at all — they come and go — and if that is so, nothing has a real nature. The Sarvāstivāda position is not a naïve view about time; it is a defense of the reality of dharmas, which is exactly what its name says.
7. The Refutation: Seven Ways the Future Might Become Present
我今問汝，隨汝意答。去來兩相與現在相，為不異相、為是異相？若不異相者，立三世相，不應道理。若異相者，性相實有，不應道理。
又汝應說自意所欲，墮三世法，為是常相、為無常相？若常相者，墮於三世，不應道理。若無常相者，於三世中恒是實有，不應道理。
又汝應說自意所欲，為計未來法來至現在世、為計未來死滅生現在世、為計法住未來以此為緣生現在世、為計本無業用今有業用、為計本相不圓滿今相圓滿、為計本相異今相異、為計未來有現在分相？
若言即未來法來至現在者，此應有方所；又未來、現在應無差別；又應是常，不應道理。若言未來死滅生現在者，是則未來法不生於今，現在法本無今生；又未來未生而言死滅，不應道理。若言法住未來，以此為緣生現在世者，此應是常；又應本無今生，非未來法生，不應道理。若本無業用今有業用者，是則本有，今有便有如前所說過故，不應道理。又此業用，汝意云何？與彼本法為有異相、為不異相？若異相者，此業用相未來無故，不應道理。若不異相者，本無業用，今有業用，不應道理。
如無業用有此過失，如是不圓滿相、異相、未來分相亦爾。此中差別者，復有自體雜亂過失，不應道理。如未來向現在，如是現在往過去，如其所應有過失應知，謂如前所計諸因緣及所說破道理。如是自相故、共相故、來故、死滅故、生故、業故、圓滿相故、異相故、未來分故，說過去未來實有論，不應道理。
I now ask you; answer as you think. Are the marks of past and future not different from the mark of the present, or different? If not different, then to set up three temporal marks does not stand to reason. If different, then their nature and marks really existing does not stand to reason.
You must further state your own position: are things that fall into the three times of a permanent mark or an impermanent one? If permanent, then falling into the three times does not stand to reason. If impermanent, then being really existent throughout the three times does not stand to reason.
You must further state your own position. Do you hold that a future thing comes to the present; or that a future thing dies and ceases and a present one is born; or that the thing stays in the future and, with that as condition, a present one is born; or that it formerly had no activity and now has activity; or that its original mark was incomplete and now is complete; or that its original mark was one and now is another; or that the future contains a portion that is the present?
If you say the future thing comes to the present, then it must have a location; and future and present would have no difference; and it would be permanent — which does not stand to reason. If you say the future dies and ceases and the present is born, then the future thing does not arise now and the present thing, formerly non-existent, now arises; and to speak of dying and ceasing for what has not yet arisen does not stand to reason. If you say the thing stays in the future and, with that as condition, the present is born, then it would be permanent; and the present would be formerly non-existent and now arisen, so it is not the future thing that arises — which does not stand to reason. If you say it formerly had no activity and now has activity, then it formerly existed and now exists, and the fault stated above applies. And what do you say of this activity: is its mark different from the original thing or not different? If different, then that mark of activity is absent in the future, which does not stand to reason. If not different, then formerly having no activity and now having it does not stand to reason.
As with activity, so with the incomplete mark, the altered mark, and the future's portion. Their further difference is that they incur in addition the fault of confusion of substance. And as the future goes toward the present, so the present goes to the past, and the same faults apply as is fitting. Thus by own-mark, by general mark, by coming, by dying and ceasing, by arising, by activity, by the complete mark, by the altered mark, and by the future's portion — the doctrine that past and future really exist does not stand to reason.
The seven options are not invented by Asaṅga; they are the actual positions Sarvāstivāda masters took on how a dharma passes from future to present while remaining the same dharma. The fourth — that what changes is only its activity — is the best-known solution, associated with Vasumitra, and it gets the longest treatment. The fifth and sixth correspond to the theories of altered mode and altered state. Asaṅga is working through a live debate within his own tradition rather than knocking down a straw man.
The opening dilemma is the one that does the real work, and it is disarmingly simple. If past, present, and future have the same mark, there are no three times. If they have different marks, then a dharma does not carry the same real nature through all three — which is the very thing the doctrine was invented to secure. The rest of the section is a survey of attempted escapes.
8. The Objection: How Can We Think of What Does Not Exist?
The opponent's best counter-attack, and the answer to it — which turns into an account of how the three scriptural passages should be read.
如是破已，復有難言：若過去、未來是無，云何緣無而有覺轉？若言緣無而覺轉者，云何不有違教過失？如說一切有者謂十二處。
我今問汝，隨汝意答。世間取無之覺，為起、不起？若不起者能取無我，兔角石女兒等覺皆應是無，此不應道理。又薄伽梵說：我諸無諂聲聞如我所說正修行時，若有知有，若無知無。如是不應道理。若言起者，汝何所欲此取無覺？為作有行、為作無行？若作有行者，取無之覺而作有行，不應道理。若作無行者，此無行覺汝何所欲？為緣有事轉、為緣無事轉？若緣有事轉者，無行之覺緣有事轉，不應道理。若緣無事轉者，無有緣無之覺，不應道理。
Having been refuted thus, they object: if past and future are non-existent, how can an awareness operate taking the non-existent as its object? And if you say awareness does operate taking the non-existent as object, how do you not incur the fault of contradicting scripture — as when it says, "All that exists is the twelve sense fields"?
I now ask you; answer as you think. Does the world's awareness that apprehends the non-existent arise, or not? If it does not arise, then the awareness that apprehends no-self, and the awarenesses of a hare's horns or a barren woman's son, should all be non-existent — which does not stand to reason. And the Blessed One said: "When my undeceitful disciples practice rightly as I have taught, if a thing is, they know that it is; if it is not, they know that it is not" — and your position does not stand to reason. If you say it does arise, then what do you hold about this awareness that apprehends the non-existent: does it operate in the mode of existence or in the mode of non-existence? If in the mode of existence, then an awareness apprehending the non-existent operating in the mode of existence does not stand to reason. If in the mode of non-existence, then what do you hold: does it operate taking an existent matter as object, or a non-existent one? If an existent matter, then an awareness in the mode of non-existence operating on an existent matter does not stand to reason. If a non-existent one, then there is no awareness taking the non-existent as object — which is what you denied.
The objection is a serious one and Asaṅga does not dodge it: if past things do not exist, what is the mind doing when it remembers? The answer turns the question back by pointing at cases the opponent must already accept. We have awareness of a hare's horns and of a barren woman's son — the standard Indian examples of the plainly non-existent — and, more pointedly, awareness of no-self. If awareness could never take a non-existent object, the central insight of Buddhism would be impossible. And the Buddha's own words are quoted: a disciple who practices rightly knows what is not, as not.
The dilemma that follows is the mirror image of the ones Asaṅga has been posing all fascicle, and it is turned against the questioner's own framework. Once the opponent admits that awareness of the non-existent occurs, he has to say how it operates, and every branch of the analysis he would use to describe it fails. The lesson is that the opponent's own categories cannot describe memory either. The problem was never Asaṅga's alone.
9. How the Three Scriptural Passages Are to Be Read
雖說一切有者謂十二處，然於有法密意說有有相，於無法密意說有無相。所以者何？若有相法能持有相，若無相法能持無相，是故俱名為法、俱名為有。若異者，諸修行人但知於有、不知於無，應非無間觀所知法，此不應道理。
又雖說言有過去業，由此業故眾生受有損害受、無損害受。此亦依彼習氣密意假說彼法為有，謂於諸行中曾有淨不淨業生滅，由此因緣故，彼行勝異相續而轉，是名習氣。由此相續所攝習氣故，愛不愛果生。是故於我無過，而汝不應道理。
又雖說言有過去色、有未來色、有現在色，如是乃至識亦爾者，此亦依三種行相密意故說，謂因相、自相、果相，依彼因相密意說有未來，依彼自相密意說有現在，依彼果相密意說有過去。是故無過。
Although it is said that "all that exists is the twelve sense fields," yet with respect to existent things it is said with a hidden intent that there is the mark of existence, and with respect to non-existent things that there is the mark of non-existence. Why? Because a thing with the mark of existence bears the mark of existence, and a thing with the mark of non-existence bears the mark of non-existence; therefore both are called things and both are called existent. Were it otherwise, practitioners would know only the existent and not the non-existent, and would not be able to observe the knowable without interruption — which does not stand to reason.
Again, although it is said that "there is past karma," and that by that karma beings undergo feelings that injure and feelings that do not, this too is said nominally, with a hidden intent directed at the habitual traces. That is: within the formations there have been the arising and ceasing of pure and impure karma, and by that cause those formations continue on in a distinctively altered continuity — and that is what is called a habitual trace. It is because of the habitual traces comprised in that continuity that welcome and unwelcome fruits arise. Therefore there is no fault on my side, and your position does not stand to reason.
Again, although it is said that "there is past form, there is future form, there is present form," and so on down to consciousness, this too is said with a hidden intent directed at three modes of the formations — the causal mark, the own mark, and the resultant mark. With hidden intent directed at the causal mark it is said that the future exists; at the own mark, that the present exists; and at the resultant mark, that the past exists. Therefore there is no fault.
Three passages, three different readings, and the second is the doctrinally weighty one. "There is past karma" is true, and what makes it true is not that a past act persists somewhere but that 習氣, the habitual trace, persists — the continuity of formations altered by the act. This is the same seed-and-perfuming mechanism that fascicle 1 built the ālayavijñāna out of. The Yogācāra answer to how past karma can bear fruit without a persisting past is that nothing persists except a modified present.
The third reading is elegant. Any given formation can be regarded under three aspects: as cause of what follows, as itself, as result of what preceded. Speak of it as cause and you are speaking of the future; as itself, the present; as result, the past. The three times are three ways of regarding one thing, not three places where it is stored. This is the constructive core of the whole refutation.
Notice the technical term 密意, hidden intent, doing the work in all three cases. Fascicle 6 established that all non-explicit scripture is to be read by way of the three natures and named "the approach of intent" as one of the six approaches. Here that hermeneutic is applied to three passages a fellow Buddhist school reads literally.
10. Twelve Marks of Each of the Three Times
又復不應說過去、未來是實有相。何以故？應知未來有十二種相故，一因所顯相、二體未生相、三待緣相、四已生種類相、五應生法相、六不生法相、七未生雜染相、八未生清淨相、九應可求相、十不應求相、十一應觀察相、十二不應觀察相。
應知現在亦有十二種相，一果所顯相、二體已生相、三緣會相、四已生種類相、五剎那相、六不復生法相、七現雜染相、八現清淨相、九可喜樂相、十不可喜樂相、十一應觀察相、十二不應觀察相。
應知過去亦有十二種相，一已度因相、二已度緣相、三已度果相、四體已壞相、五已滅種類相、六不生法相、七靜息雜染相、八靜息清淨相、九應顧戀處相、十不應顧戀處相、十一應觀察相、十二不應觀察相。
Further, one should not say that past and future have the mark of real existence. Why? Because the future should be known to have twelve marks: the mark of being displayed by a cause; the mark of a substance not yet arisen; the mark of awaiting conditions; the mark of a kind already arisen; the mark of a thing that will arise; the mark of a thing that will not arise; the mark of defilement not yet arisen; the mark of purity not yet arisen; the mark of what should be sought; the mark of what should not be sought; the mark of what should be observed; and the mark of what should not be observed.
The present too should be known to have twelve marks: the mark of being displayed by an effect; the mark of a substance already arisen; the mark of conditions having met; the mark of a kind already arisen; the mark of a moment; the mark of a thing that will not arise again; the mark of present defilement; the mark of present purity; the mark of what is delightful; the mark of what is not delightful; the mark of what should be observed; and the mark of what should not be observed.
The past too should be known to have twelve marks: the mark of a cause already passed; of a condition already passed; of an effect already passed; the mark of a substance already broken up; the mark of a kind already ceased; the mark of a thing that will not arise; the mark of defilement stilled; the mark of purity stilled; the mark of a place that should be looked back upon with longing; the mark of a place that should not; the mark of what should be observed; and the mark of what should not be observed.
Three sets of twelve, and the sets are built to be read against each other. The first three marks in each set are the causal ones — the future is displayed by a cause, the present by an effect, the past by cause, condition, and effect all having passed. The middle marks concern substance: not yet arisen, arisen, broken up. And each set ends with the same pair: what should be observed and what should not.
The point of the exercise is that all thirty-six marks are relational. Not one of them attributes real existence to a past or future thing; every one describes a relation to arising — awaiting it, undergoing it, having undergone it. This is the alternative offered in place of the opponent's real past and future: the times are fully describable, in detail, without any of them being a place where things are.
Two marks in the past's list are not metaphysical at all. 應顧戀處相 and its negation — a past that should be looked back on with longing, and one that should not — put an ethical distinction into a list of temporal properties. Some of the past is worth returning to in memory and some is not; and the same pair, what should and should not be observed, closes all three sets.
11. The Doctrine of a Self: Two Reasons for It
The fourth doctrine receives the longest treatment in the fascicle. Its case rests on two observations about ordinary experience, and both are stated carefully before anything is said against them.
計我論者，謂如有一，若沙門若婆羅門，起如是見立如是論：有我、有薩埵、有命者、有生者、有養者、有數取趣者，如是等是實是常。諸外道等作如是計。
問：何故彼諸外道起如是見立如是論？答：由教及理故。教如前說。理者，謂如有一，為性尋思、為性觀察、廣說如前。由二種因故，一先不思覺率爾而得有薩埵覺故、二先已思覺得有作故。
彼如是思：若無我者見於五事，不應起於五種有我之覺。一見色形已，唯應起於色覺，不應起於薩埵之覺。二見順苦樂行已，唯應起於受覺，不應起於勝劣薩埵之覺。三見已立名者，名相應行已，唯應起於想覺，不應起於剎帝利、婆羅門、吠舍、戍達羅、佛授、德友等薩埵之覺。四見作淨不淨相應行已，唯應起於行覺，不應起於愚者、智者薩埵之覺。五見於境界識隨轉已，唯應起於心覺，不應起於我能見等薩埵之覺。由如是先不思覺，於此五事唯起五種薩埵之覺非諸行覺，是故先不思覺見已率爾而起有薩埵覺。如是決定知有實我。
The doctrine of a self: some ascetic or brahmin gives rise to this view and sets up this doctrine — that there is a self, a being, a living one, one who is born, one who is nourished, one who takes up the destinies; and that these are real and permanent. The outsiders hold this.
Question: why do those outsiders give rise to this view? Answer: by scripture and by reasoning. Scripture as stated above. By reasoning: such a person, given by nature to investigation and observation, reasons from two causes — first, that without any prior deliberation an awareness of a being arises immediately; and second, that deliberation comes first and then there is action.
He thinks thus: if there were no self, then on seeing five things one ought not to give rise to five awarenesses of a self. First, having seen a shape and color, one ought to give rise only to an awareness of form and not to an awareness of a being. Second, having seen activity that conduces to pain or pleasure, one ought to give rise only to an awareness of feeling and not to an awareness of a superior or inferior being. Third, having seen one to whom a name has been given, and activity associated with a name, one ought to give rise only to an awareness of perception and not to an awareness of a being who is a kṣatriya, a brahmin, a vaiśya, a śūdra, Buddhadatta, or Guṇamitra. Fourth, having seen activity associated with pure or impure conduct, one ought to give rise only to an awareness of formations and not to an awareness of a being who is foolish or wise. Fifth, having seen consciousness following along after an object, one ought to give rise only to an awareness of mind and not to an awareness of a being who thinks "I can see," and so on. Since without prior deliberation one gives rise, with respect to these five things, only to five awarenesses of a being and not to awarenesses of formations — therefore, seeing without prior deliberation, an awareness of a being arises immediately. Thus one knows with certainty that there is a real self.
The opponent's first argument is a phenomenological one and quite strong. Seeing a person, one does not first perceive shape and then infer a being; the awareness of a someone is immediate and undeliberated. And the argument is neatly organized around the five aggregates: what one ought to perceive, on the Buddhist analysis, is form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness. What one in fact perceives is a person who is tall, who is fortunate or unfortunate, who is a brahmin named Buddhadatta, who is clever, and who says "I see." Five aggregates, five failures of the analysis to match experience.
The argument is worth taking seriously precisely because it is not a scriptural appeal. It says: your own five-fold analysis predicts one thing about perception, and perception delivers another. The immediacy is the evidence.
12. The Second Argument, and the First Replies
又彼如是思：若無我者，不應於諸行中先起思覺得有所作。謂我以眼當見諸色、正見諸色、已見諸色，或復起心：我不當見如是等用，皆由我覺行為先導。如於眼見，如是於耳鼻舌身意應知亦爾。又於善業造作善業止息、不善業造作不善業止息如是等事，皆由思覺為先方得作用。如是等用唯於諸行，不應道理。由如是思故說有我。
我今問汝，隨汝意答。為即於所見事起薩埵覺、為異於所見事起薩埵覺耶？若即於所見事起薩埵覺者，汝不應言即於色等計有薩埵，計有我者是顛倒覺。若異於所見事起薩埵覺者，我有形量，不應道理。我有勝劣、或剎帝利等、或愚或智、或能取彼色等境界，不應道理。
又汝何所欲？為唯於此法自體起此覺耶、為亦於餘體起此覺耶？若唯於此法自體起此覺者，即於所見起彼我覺，不應說名為顛倒覺。若亦於餘體起此覺者，即一切境界各是一切境界覺因，不應道理。
又汝何所欲？於無情數有情覺、於有情數無情覺、於餘有情數餘有情覺，為起、為不起耶？若起者，是則無情應是有情，有情應是無情，餘有情應是餘有情，此不應道理。若不起者，則非撥現量，不應道理。
He thinks further: if there were no self, there ought not to be, within the formations, a deliberation arising first and then an action — as when one thinks "I shall see forms with my eye," "I am seeing forms," "I have seen forms," or gives rise to the thought "I shall not see." All such functioning is led by the awareness of a self. As with seeing by the eye, so with ear, nose, tongue, body, and mentation. And in undertaking wholesome karma and desisting from it, undertaking unwholesome karma and desisting from it, all such things function only when deliberation comes first. That such functioning should belong to formations alone does not stand to reason. Reasoning thus, he asserts a self.
I now ask you; answer as you think. Does the awareness of a being arise with respect to the very thing seen, or with respect to something other than the thing seen? If with respect to the very thing seen, then you should not say that supposing a being with respect to form and the rest, and supposing a self, is a distorted awareness. If with respect to something other than the thing seen, then the self having shape and size does not stand to reason; nor does the self being superior or inferior, or a kṣatriya and the rest, or foolish or wise, or able to apprehend the objects of form and the rest.
Further, what do you hold: does this awareness arise only with respect to the substance of this thing, or also with respect to other substances? If only with respect to this thing's substance, then the awareness of a self arises with respect to what is seen, and should not be called a distorted awareness. If also with respect to other substances, then every object whatever would be the cause of an awareness of every object, which does not stand to reason.
Further, what do you hold: do the awareness of a sentient being with respect to what is insentient, of the insentient with respect to a sentient being, and of one being with respect to another, arise or not? If they do, then the insentient would be sentient, the sentient insentient, and one being another, which does not stand to reason. If they do not, then you are denying direct perception, which does not stand to reason.
The opening dilemma catches the opponent in a trap of his own construction. His evidence was that the awareness of a being arises immediately, on seeing. So: is that awareness of the thing seen, or of something else? If of the thing seen, then it is an awareness of shape and color — and he has conceded that supposing a self there is distorted. If of something else, then that something else must be what the awareness attributes: shape, size, caste, cleverness, the power to see. But those belong to what was seen, not to an invisible self. Either the self is the aggregates, or the properties ascribed to it are not its own.
The third argument is the sharpest because it appeals to a fact the opponent cannot deny. We do sometimes mistake a post for a man, and a man for a post, and one person for another. If awareness of a being were simply reading off a real self, such errors would be impossible; if the opponent denies that they occur, he is denying what everyone perceives. Misperception is evidence that the awareness of a being is constructed.
13. Can a Permanent Self Act?
又汝何所欲？此計我覺為取現量義、為取比量義耶？若取現量義者，唯色等蘊是現量義，我非現量義故，不應道理。若取比量義者，如愚稚等未能思度，不應率爾起於我覺。
又我今問汝，隨汝意答。如世間所作，為以覺為因、為以我為因？若以覺為因者，執我所作，不應道理。若以我為因者，先已思覺得有所作，不應道理。
又汝何所欲？所作事因，為是無常、為是常耶？若無常者，此所作因體是變異，而執我有所作，不應道理。若是常者，則無變異，無變異法執有所作，不應道理。
又汝何所欲？為有動作之我能有所作、為無動作之我能有所作耶？若有動作之我能有所作者，是則常作，不應復作。若無動作之我能有所作者，無動作性而有所作，不應道理。
又汝何所欲？為有因故我有所作？為無因耶？若有因者，此我應由餘因策發方有所作，不應道理。若無因者，應一切時作一切事，不應道理。
又汝何所欲？此我為依自故能有所作、為依他故能有所作？若依自者，此我自作老病死苦雜染等事，不應道理。若依他者，計我所作，不應道理。
Further, what do you hold: does this awareness that supposes a self apprehend an object of direct perception or an object of inference? If of direct perception, then only the aggregates of form and the rest are objects of direct perception, and the self is not — which does not stand to reason. If of inference, then fools and small children, who cannot yet reason, ought not to give rise immediately to an awareness of self.
I now ask you further. As to what is done in the world: is awareness its cause, or the self? If awareness is the cause, then holding that the self does it does not stand to reason. If the self is the cause, then holding that deliberation comes first and action follows does not stand to reason.
Further: is the cause of what is done impermanent or permanent? If impermanent, then the substance of this cause alters, and holding that the self acts does not stand to reason. If permanent, then it does not alter, and holding that an unaltering thing acts does not stand to reason.
Further: is it a self that has motion that can act, or a self without motion? If a self with motion, then it acts constantly and should not act again. If a self without motion, then acting while having no motion does not stand to reason.
Further: does the self act because there is a cause, or without a cause? If with a cause, then this self must be spurred on by some other cause before it acts, which does not stand to reason. If without a cause, then it should do everything at all times, which does not stand to reason.
Further: can this self act in dependence on itself, or in dependence on another? If on itself, then this self makes for itself old age, sickness, death, suffering, and defilement, which does not stand to reason. If on another, then holding that the self acts does not stand to reason.
Six dilemmas in succession, all pressing the same fracture: agency requires change, and a permanent self cannot change. If the self acts because something prompts it, it is not the ultimate agent; if nothing prompts it, it should be acting always and everywhere. If it moves, it never stops; if it does not move, it never acts. The self was posited to explain deliberation and action, and it turns out that a permanent thing is the one kind of thing that cannot deliberate or act.
The observation about children is a small gem. The opponent claimed the awareness of self is immediate and undeliberated. Fine — then it is not an inference. But if it is direct perception, its object should be perceptible, and no one perceives a self. And the immediacy that was the opponent's best evidence now works against him: infants have the sense of self before they can reason at all, which shows it is not the conclusion of any argument, and therefore not evidence of anything.
The last dilemma is quietly devastating in a way that goes beyond logic. If the self acts in dependence on itself, then the self is what makes its own aging, sickness, death, and defilement. Nobody would say that. But the alternative — that it acts in dependence on something else — abandons the whole reason for positing it.
14. The Self and the Aggregates
又我今問汝，隨汝意答。為即於蘊施設有我、為於諸蘊中、為蘊外餘處、為非蘊性耶？
若即於蘊施設我者，是我與蘊無有差別，而計有我是實是常，不應道理。若於諸蘊中者，此我為常、為無常耶？若是常者，常住之我為諸苦樂之所損益，不應道理。若無損益起法非法，不應道理。若不生起法及非法，應諸蘊身畢竟不起，又應不由功用我常解脫。若無常者，離蘊體外有生有滅相續流轉法不可得故，不應道理。又於此滅壞後，於餘處不作而得，有大過失故，不應道理。若蘊外餘處者，汝所計我應是無為。若非蘊性者，我一切時應無染污。又我與身不應相屬，此不應道理。
I now ask you further. Is the self set up as identical with the aggregates; or as within the aggregates; or in some place outside the aggregates; or as not of the nature of the aggregates at all?
If the self is set up as identical with the aggregates, then the self has no difference from the aggregates, and holding that there is a self which is real and permanent does not stand to reason. If within the aggregates, then is this self permanent or impermanent? If permanent, then a permanently abiding self being harmed and benefited by the various pains and pleasures does not stand to reason; and if it is neither harmed nor benefited, its giving rise to what is right and what is wrong does not stand to reason; and if it gives rise to neither, then the body of the aggregates should never arise at all, and the self should be permanently liberated without any exertion. If impermanent, then since apart from the substance of the aggregates no arising, ceasing, and continuously flowing thing can be found, it does not stand to reason; and further, that after ceasing here it should be obtained elsewhere without being made incurs a great fault, and does not stand to reason. If in some place outside the aggregates, then the self you suppose would be unconditioned. If not of the nature of the aggregates, then the self should at no time be defiled, and the self and the body should not belong to one another — which does not stand to reason.
The fourfold question exhausts the logical space, and the chain under "permanent" is the most interesting because it runs to a conclusion the opponent would welcome and cannot accept. If the self is permanent, pleasure and pain cannot affect it. If they cannot affect it, it cannot be moved to right or wrong action. If it never acts rightly or wrongly, no aggregates are ever produced for it — and it is already liberated, without any practice at all. The permanent self turns out to make the entire religious life unnecessary, including the religious life of the school that posits it.
The option "outside the aggregates" is dismissed in a single clause, and the clause is precise: such a self would be 無為, unconditioned. Unconditioned things do not act, do not change, and do not get reborn. Whatever the opponent wanted a self for, an unconditioned one cannot supply.
15. Is the Self the Seer? Six Analogies Tested
If the self is what sees, hears, and knows, then seeing is either something the self does or an instrument it uses. Asaṅga takes both branches and tests every analogy the tradition offers.
又汝何所欲？所計之我，為即見者等相、為離見者等相？若即見者等相者，為即於見等上假立有能見者等相、為離於見等上別立有能見者等相？若即於見等上假立有能見者等相者，即應見等是能見者等，而汝立我為能見者等，不應道理，以見者等與見等相無差別故。
若離於見等上別立有能見者等相者，彼見等法，為是我所成業、為是我所執具？若是我所成業者，此我若如種子，應是無常。若言如陶師等假立士夫，此我應是無常、應是假立。而汝言是常是實，不應道理。若言如具神通假立士夫，此我亦應是無常假立，於諸所作隨意自在。此亦如前，不應道理。若言如地，應是無常。又所計我，無如地大顯了作業故，不應道理。何以故？世間地大所作業用顯了可得故，謂能持萬物令不墜下。我無是業顯了可得。若如虛空，應是無法，此不應道理。何以故？唯於色無，假立空故。虛空雖是假有，而有業用分明可得，非所計我故，不應道理。世間虛空所作業用分明可得者，謂由虛空故得起往來屈伸等業。是故見等是我所成業，不應道理。
若是我所執具者，若言如鎌、如離鎌外餘物亦有能斷作用。如是離見等外，於餘物上見等業用不可得故，不應道理。若言如火，則徒計於我，不應道理。何以故？如世間火離能燒者，亦自能燒故。若言離見者等相別有我者，即所計我相乖一切量，不應道理。
Further, what do you hold: is the self you suppose identical with the mark of a seer and the rest, or apart from it? If identical, then is the mark of a seer nominally established upon seeing itself, or separately established apart from seeing? If nominally established upon seeing itself, then seeing and the rest just are the seer and the rest; and your setting up a self as the seer does not stand to reason, since the seer and seeing would have no difference of mark.
If a seer is separately established apart from seeing, then are seeing and the rest something the self produces, or an instrument the self takes up? If something the self produces: if this self is like a seed, it must be impermanent. If you say it is like a nominally designated person such as a potter, then this self must be impermanent and nominally established — yet you say it is permanent and real, which does not stand to reason. If you say it is like a nominally designated person possessed of supernormal powers, then it too must be impermanent and nominally established, doing whatever it wishes at will; and this fails as before. If you say it is like the earth, it must be impermanent; and moreover the self you suppose has no manifest activity as the earth element does, which does not stand to reason. Why? Because the earth element's activity in the world is manifestly found — namely that it holds all things up and keeps them from falling. No such activity of the self is manifestly found. If you say it is like space, then it must be a non-thing, which does not stand to reason. Why? Because space is nominally established merely upon the absence of form; and though space is nominally existent, its activity is plainly found, whereas the self you suppose has none. The activity of space plainly found in the world is that by space one can go and come, bend and stretch. Therefore that seeing and the rest are produced by the self does not stand to reason.
If they are an instrument the self takes up: if you say it is like a sickle — well, apart from a sickle, other things also have the function of cutting; whereas apart from seeing and the rest, the activity of seeing is not found in anything else, and so it does not stand to reason. If you say it is like fire, then supposing a self is idle, which does not stand to reason. Why? Because fire in the world burns of itself, apart from any burner. And if you say there is a self apart from the mark of a seer and the rest, then the mark of the self you suppose runs counter to every means of knowledge, and does not stand to reason.
Six analogies are offered and each is turned. Seed and potter and magician all make the self impermanent or merely nominal, which is what the opponent denies. Earth and space are more interesting: both are proposed as things that are pervasive and yet do something, and Asaṅga's reply in both cases is the same — earth manifestly holds things up, space manifestly permits movement, and the self manifestly does nothing that anyone can point to. The analogies fail not because they are badly chosen but because their terms have observable functions the self lacks.
The instrument branch is dispatched even more quickly. A sickle is an instrument for cutting, but other things cut too; the function is not tied to the tool. Seeing, by contrast, occurs nowhere except in seeing — so seeing is not an instrument something else uses. And the fire analogy is self-defeating: if the self is to seeing what fire is to burning, then the self is superfluous, since fire burns without needing a burner behind it.
The closing line names the underlying problem: a self apart from seer, hearer, and knower 乖一切量, runs counter to every means of knowledge. It is not perceived, not inferred, and not attested. The whole section is an application of the three means of knowledge that fascicle 6 set out under "the real as reasoning has it."
16. Defilement, Flowing On, and the Experiencer
又我今問汝，隨汝意答。汝所計我，為與染淨相相應而有染淨、為不與染淨相相應而有染淨耶？若與染淨相相應而有染淨者，即於諸行中有疾疫災橫及彼止息順益可得。即彼諸行雖無有我，而說有染淨相相應。如於外物，內身亦爾，雖無有我，染淨義成。故汝計我，不應道理。若不與染淨相相應而有染淨者，離染淨相我有染淨，不應道理。
又我今問汝，隨汝意答。汝所計我，為與流轉相相應而有流轉及止息耶？為不與流轉相相應而有流轉及止息耶？若與流轉相相應而有流轉及止息者，於諸行中有五種轉相可得：一有因、二可生、三可滅、四展轉相續生起、五有變異。若諸行中此流轉相可得，如於身牙河燈乘等流轉作用中雖無有我，即彼諸行得有流轉及與止息，何須計我？若不與彼相相應而有流轉及止息者，即所計我無流轉相而有流轉止息，不應道理。
又我今問汝，隨汝意答。汝所計我，為由境界所生若苦若樂，及由思業并由煩惱隨煩惱等之所變異，說為受者、作者及解脫者；為不由彼變異說為受者等耶？若由彼變異者，是即諸行是受者、作者及解脫者，何須計我？設是我者，我應無常，不應道理。若不由彼變異者，我無變異而是受者、作者及解脫者，不應道理。
I ask you further. Is the self you suppose defiled and purified by being associated with the marks of defilement and purity, or without being so associated? If by being associated, then within the formations themselves plague, calamity, and their stilling and benefit are found; and those very formations, though there is no self in them, are said to be associated with the marks of defilement and purity. As with outer things, so with the inner body: though there is no self, the sense of defilement and purity is established. So your supposing a self does not stand to reason. If without being so associated, then a self apart from the marks of defilement and purity being defiled and purified does not stand to reason.
I ask you further. Is the self you suppose subject to flowing on and its stilling by being associated with the mark of flowing on, or without being so associated? If by being associated, then within the formations five marks of flowing are found: having a cause; being able to arise; being able to cease; arising in continuous succession; and having alteration. If these marks of flowing on are found within the formations — as in the flowing activity of a body, a shoot, a river, a lamp, or a carriage, in which there is no self and yet those very formations have flowing on and its stilling — what need is there to suppose a self? If without being so associated, then the self you suppose has no mark of flowing on and yet flows on and is stilled, which does not stand to reason.
I ask you further. Is the self you suppose called the experiencer, the agent, and the one liberated because it is altered by the pain and pleasure produced from objects, by volitional karma, and by the afflictions and secondary afflictions — or without being so altered? If by being so altered, then it is the formations that are the experiencer, the agent, and the one liberated; what need is there to suppose a self? And if it were the self, the self would be impermanent, which does not stand to reason. If without being so altered, then a self that does not alter being the experiencer, the agent, and the one liberated does not stand to reason.
These three dilemmas share one structure, and it is the most useful thing in the section: every function the self was supposed to perform is shown to be already performed by the formations. Bodies fall sick and recover without needing a self to be sick. A river flows and a lamp burns down without needing a self to flow. Pain and pleasure alter a person without needing a self to be altered. The refrain is not a logical objection but an economic one — 何須計我, what need is there to suppose a self?
The five marks of flowing on, with their five images, are worth keeping. A body, a shoot, a river, a lamp, and a carriage: five ordinary continuities, each having a cause, arising, ceasing, succeeding itself, and altering. Nobody posits a self inside a river to explain that it flows. The argument invites the opponent to say what is different about a person, and the difference he would name — that a person feels it — is exactly what the third dilemma has already taken away.
17. Is the View of Self Wholesome?
又汝今應說自意所欲，為唯於我說為作者、為亦於餘法說為作者？若唯於我者，世間不應說火為燒者、光為照者。若亦於餘法者，即於見等諸根說為作者，徒分別我，不應道理。
又汝應說自意所欲，為唯於我建立為我、為亦於餘法建立為我耶？若唯於我者，世間不應於假說士夫身呼為德友、佛授等。若亦於餘法者，是則唯於諸行假說名我，何須更執別有我耶？何以故？諸世間人唯於假設士夫之身起有情想、立有情名，及說自他有差別故。
又汝何所欲？計我之見，為善、為不善耶？若是善者，何為極愚癡人深起我見，又不由方便率爾而起，又能令眾生怖畏解脫，又能增長諸惡過失，不應道理。若言不善，不應說正及非顛倒。若是顛倒，所計之我體是實有，不應道理。
又汝何所欲？無我之見，為善、為不善耶？若言是善，於彼常住實有我上見無有我，而是善性非顛倒見，不應道理。若言不善，而一切智者之所宣說，精勤方便之所生起，令諸眾生不怖解脫，能速證得白淨之果，諸惡過失如實對治，不應道理。
又汝意云何？為即我性自計有我、為由我見耶？若即我性自計有我者，應一切時無無我覺。若由我見者，雖無實我，由我見力故，於諸行中妄謂有我。是故汝計定實有我，不應道理。
You must further state your position: is "agent" said only of the self, or also of other things? If only of the self, then the world ought not to call fire the burner and light the illuminator. If also of other things, then the faculties of seeing and the rest are called agents, and discriminating a self is idle — which does not stand to reason.
You must further state your position: is "self" established only of the self, or also of other things? If only of the self, then the world ought not to call the nominally designated body of a person Guṇamitra or Buddhadatta. If also of other things, then "self" is merely nominally said of the formations — so what need is there to grasp at a separate self besides? Why? Because people in the world give rise to the notion of a being, and set up the name of a being, merely with respect to the nominally designated body of a person, and thereby speak of the difference between self and other.
Further, what do you hold: is the view of a self wholesome or unwholesome? If wholesome, then why do the most foolish people hold the view of self most deeply; and why does it arise immediately without any method; and why does it make beings dread liberation; and why does it increase every evil fault? This does not stand to reason. If you say unwholesome, then you should not call it right and undistorted. And if it is distorted, then the self you suppose being really existent does not stand to reason.
Further: is the view of no-self wholesome or unwholesome? If you say wholesome, then seeing that there is no self upon a permanently abiding, really existent self, and this being wholesome and not a distorted view, does not stand to reason. If you say unwholesome, then that it is proclaimed by all the wise, arises from diligent application, causes beings not to dread liberation, enables the swift realization of the pure white fruit, and truly counteracts every evil fault — this does not stand to reason.
Further, what do you think: does one suppose a self by the very nature of a self, or by the view of a self? If by the very nature of a self, then there should never at any time be an awareness of no-self. If by the view of a self, then although there is no real self, by the force of the view of self one falsely supposes a self within the formations. Therefore your holding that a self definitely really exists does not stand to reason.
The argument from the moral character of the two views is the most humanly interesting in the fascicle, because it appeals to consequences rather than logic. The view of self is held most tenaciously by the least wise; it arises without any training; it makes people afraid of liberation; and it increases every fault. Those are not the marks of a true perception. The view of no-self is taught by every wise person, requires effort, removes the fear of liberation, and counteracts faults. If the self were real, this distribution would be inexplicable — a true view held by fools with no effort, and a false one requiring the diligence of sages.
The clause about dread deserves particular attention: 能令眾生怖畏解脫, it makes beings dread liberation. The view of self is not merely mistaken; it is what makes the goal frightening, because to a self, liberation looks like extinction. Removing the view removes the fear, which is why the treatise lists that among the reasons a self is nominally spoken of at all in the passage that follows.
The final dilemma is the whole refutation in miniature. If a self is supposed because there is a self, no one could ever have the awareness of no-self — yet people do. So the supposition comes from the view, not the object. Once that is granted, the view explains everything the opponent wanted the self to explain, and explains as well why the self is never found.
18. In What Sense a Self May Be Spoken Of
After the longest refutation in the treatise, the constructive account — and it does not abolish the word.
如是不覺為先而起彼覺故、思覺為先見有所作故、於諸蘊中建立是有故、由於彼相安立為有故、建立雜染及清淨故、建立流轉及止息故、建立受者作者及解脫者故、施設有作者故、施設言說故、施設見故，計實有我，皆不應道理。
又我今當說第一義我相。所言我者，唯於諸法假立為有，非實有我。然此假我，不可說言與彼諸法異不異性，勿謂此我是實有體，或彼諸法即我性相。又此假我是無常相、是非恒相、非安保相、是變壞相、生起法相、老病死法相、唯諸法相、唯苦惱相。故薄伽梵說：苾芻當知，於諸法中假立有我，此我無常無恒、不可安保、是變壞法，如是廣說。
當知由四因故，於諸行中假設有我，一為令世間言說易故、二為欲隨順諸世間故、三為欲斷除謂定無我諸怖畏故、四為宣說自他成就功德成就過失令起決定信解心故。是故執有我論，非如理說。
Thus by the awareness arising without prior deliberation; by deliberation coming first and action being seen; by its being established within the aggregates; by its being set up as existing on the strength of that mark; by the establishing of defilement and purity; by the establishing of flowing on and its stilling; by the establishing of an experiencer, an agent, and one liberated; by the designating of an agent; by the designating of speech; and by the designating of views — supposing that a self really exists does not, in any of these ways, stand to reason.
Now I shall state the mark of the self in the ultimate sense. What is called a self is merely nominally set up as existing upon things, and there is no real self. Yet of this nominal self it cannot be said that it is different from those things or not different — lest one suppose that this self has a real substance, or that those things just are the nature of a self. And this nominal self has the mark of impermanence, of not being constant, of not being securable, of decaying, of being a thing that arises, of being a thing subject to old age, sickness, and death; it is merely the mark of things, merely the mark of anguish. Therefore the Blessed One said: "Monks, know that a self is nominally set up among things; this self is impermanent and inconstant, cannot be secured, and is a thing that decays" — and so on at length.
It should be known that for four reasons a self is nominally posited among the formations: so that worldly speech may be easy; in order to accord with the world; in order to remove the dread that arises from thinking there is definitely no self; and in order to proclaim that oneself and others accomplish good qualities and accomplish faults, so as to give rise to a mind of settled conviction. Therefore the doctrine that a self exists is not stated in accordance with reason.
The most striking thing about this closing passage is that it does not end in denial. Having spent pages showing that no real self can be found anywhere, Asaṅga turns and gives 第一義我相, the mark of the self in the ultimate sense — and it is a nominal self, of which the same non-declarability holds that fascicle 6 asserted of suchness: it cannot be said to be either different from things or not different. And the reason given for that reticence is symmetrical: lest one think it has a real substance, and lest one think the things themselves are a self.
The scriptural citation is the pivot. The Buddha did say "a self is nominally set up among things" — and immediately qualified it with impermanent, inconstant, unsecurable, decaying. The word is licensed; the substance is not.
The four reasons are the same four given in fascicle 4 for why "persons" is retained as one of the nine topics, and the third of them is the one that could not be guessed from doctrine alone: a self is spoken of in order to remove 謂定無我諸怖畏, the dread that arises from thinking there is definitely no self. The teaching of no-self, badly received, terrifies people. Speaking of a self is part of the remedy for that — which is why the thirteenth of these sixteen rival doctrines will turn out to be a wrong view of emptiness.
19. The Doctrine of Eternity
The fifth doctrine, and the fascicle ends in the middle of refuting it. Asaṅga first explains where eternalism comes from — and the answer is meditative attainment misread.
計常論者，謂如有一，若沙門若婆羅門，起如是見，立如是論：我及世間皆是常住，非作非作所作、非化非化所作、不可損害，積聚而住，如伊師迦。謂計前際說一切常者、說一分常者，及計後際說有想者、說無想者、說非想非非想者。復有計諸極微是常住者，作如是計。
問：何故彼諸外道起如是見，立如是論：我及世間是常住耶。答：彼計因緣，如經廣說，隨其所應盡當知。此中計前際者，謂或依下中上靜慮，起宿住隨念。不善緣起故，於過去諸行但唯憶念，不如實知計過去世，以為前際，發起常見。或依天眼，計現在世以為前際，於諸行剎那生滅流轉不如實知。又見諸識流轉相續，從此世間至彼世間無斷絕故，發起常見。或見梵王隨意成立、或見四大種變異、或見諸識變異。
計後際者，於想及受雖見差別，然不見我自相差別，是故發起常見，謂我及世間皆悉常住。又計極微是常住者，以依世間靜慮起如是見，由不如實知緣起故，計有為先有果集起，離散為先有果壞滅。由此因緣，彼謂從眾微性麁物果生，漸析麁物乃至微住，是故麁物無常、極微常住。
The doctrine of eternity: some ascetic or brahmin gives rise to this view and sets up this doctrine — that the self and the world are both permanently abiding, not made and not the product of anything made, not conjured and not the product of anything conjured, incapable of being injured, standing gathered together like a post. This includes those who, with respect to the prior limit, assert that all is eternal or that a part is eternal; and those who, with respect to the later limit, assert that there is perception, or no perception, or neither perception nor non-perception. Also those who hold that the finest particles are permanently abiding.
Question: why do those outsiders give rise to this view? Answer: the causes and conditions of their supposition are expounded at length in the scriptures, and should be known as is fitting in each case. Among those who reckon from the prior limit: relying on lesser, middling, or greater absorption, one gives rise to the recollection of former abodes; and because one is unskilled in dependent arising, one merely remembers past formations without knowing them as they really are, and reckons a past world to be the prior limit, giving rise to the view of eternity. Or, relying on the divine eye, one reckons the present world to be the prior limit, not knowing as it really is the momentary arising, ceasing, and flowing on of the formations. Or, seeing consciousnesses flowing on in succession without interruption from this world to that, one gives rise to the view of eternity. Or one sees Brahmā establishing things at will; or sees the alteration of the four great elements; or sees the alteration of the consciousnesses.
Those who reckon from the later limit: although they see differences in perception and feeling, they do not see any difference in the self's own mark, and so give rise to the view of eternity — that the self and the world are both permanently abiding. And those who hold that the finest particles are permanently abiding give rise to this view relying on worldly absorption; because they do not know dependent arising as it really is, they suppose that the effect gathers and arises through prior existence, and perishes through prior dispersal. By this reasoning they hold that the coarse thing as effect arises from the nature of many particles, and that in gradually analyzing the coarse thing one arrives at particles that abide — so that coarse things are impermanent and the finest particles permanent.
The explanation of where eternalism comes from is the most valuable thing in this section, and it is not a story about carelessness. These are meditators. One attains absorption, recollects former lives, and — 不善緣起故, being unskilled in dependent arising — takes the remembered continuity for a permanent self. Another attains the divine eye and sees consciousness passing from world to world unbroken, and concludes the same. The error is not in the attainment, which is genuine, but in the interpretation, and the missing piece is named exactly: knowledge of dependent arising.
This connects directly to what fascicle 2 said about the worldly absorptions, which really do free one from craving for the level below and yet touch no latent tendency. Meditative attainment without right view produces confident error. The eternalist has seen more than most people and drawn the wrong conclusion from it.
The atomists are given the same diagnosis. Analyzing coarse things down to particles that resist further division, they conclude the particles are permanent — the position fascicle 5 was careful to block when it insisted that the finest particle is reached by analysis and that coarse form is not assembled out of such particles.
20. The Refutation of Eternity Begins
此中計前際後際常住論者，是執我論，差別相所攝故。我論已破，當知我差別相論亦已破訖。
又我今問汝，隨汝意答。宿住之念，為取諸蘊、為取我耶？若取蘊者，執我及世間是常，不應道理。若取我者，憶念過去如是名等諸有情類，我曾於彼如是名、如是姓，乃至廣說，不應道理。
又汝意云何？緣彼現在和合色境眼識起時，於餘不現不和合境，所餘諸識為滅、為轉？若言滅者，滅壞之識而計為常，不應道理。若言轉者，由一境界於一切時一切識起，不應道理。
又汝何所欲？所執之我，由想所作及受所作，為有變異、為無變異？若言有者，計彼世間及我常住，不應道理。若言無者，有一想已復有種種想生，復有小想及無量想，不應道理。又先純有樂已，後純有苦，復有苦、有樂、有不苦不樂，不應道理。
Among these, the doctrines of eternity reckoned from the prior and later limits are doctrines of a self, being comprised under a differentiated mark of it. The doctrine of a self having already been refuted, the doctrines of its differentiated marks should be understood as already refuted.
I now ask you further. In the recollection of former abodes, does one apprehend the aggregates or apprehend a self? If one apprehends the aggregates, then holding that the self and the world are eternal does not stand to reason. If one apprehends a self, then remembering the past — "such and such classes of beings by such a name; I was there with such a name, such a clan," and so on at length — does not stand to reason.
Further, what do you think: when eye-consciousness arises taking as object a present, assembled form, then with respect to the other objects that are not present and not assembled, do the remaining consciousnesses cease or continue? If you say they cease, then reckoning a consciousness that has ceased and perished to be permanent does not stand to reason. If you say they continue, then every consciousness arising at all times from a single object does not stand to reason.
Further, what do you hold: is the self you grasp altered by what perception does and what feeling does, or not altered? If you say it is, then reckoning that world and self are permanently abiding does not stand to reason. If you say it is not, then having one perception and then various perceptions arising, and small perceptions and measureless ones, does not stand to reason; and having first pure pleasure and afterward pure pain, and then pain, pleasure, and neither, does not stand to reason.
The first dilemma turns the eternalist's own evidence against him with great economy. His grounds were the recollection of former lives. So: what did he remember? If aggregates, then he remembered impermanent things and has no basis for eternity. If a self — then his memory has the form "I was so-and-so, of such a clan," which is a memory of a name and a lineage, and names and clans are exactly the conventional designations that fascicle 5 classified as conventional truth. The content of the memory refutes the conclusion drawn from it.
The last dilemma is the argument from the variety of experience, and it is the one an eternalist can least answer. Perception changes: one perception, then many, small ones and measureless ones. Feeling changes: pleasure, then pain, then neither. If the self is altered by these, it is not permanent. If it is not altered by them, then nothing accounts for the fact that they change at all — and it was the continuity of the experiencer that the eternalist wanted to explain.
21. Where the Four Positions Come From
又若計命即是身者，彼見我是色。若計命異於身者，彼見我非色。若計我俱遍無二無缺者，彼見我亦色非色。若為對治此故，即於此義中由異句異文而起執者，彼見我非色非非色。
又若見少色少非色者，彼見有邊。若見彼無量者，彼見有無邊。若復遍見而色分少非色無量、或色無量非色分少者，彼見亦有邊亦有無邊。若為對治此故，但由文異不由義異而起執者，彼見非有邊非有無邊，或見解脫之我遠離二種。
Again, if one reckons that the life-principle is the body, one sees the self as material. If one reckons the life-principle to be other than the body, one sees the self as immaterial. If one reckons the self to pervade both, without duality and without deficiency, one sees the self as both material and immaterial. And if, in order to counteract that, one grasps at a different phrasing and different wording within the same meaning, one sees the self as neither material nor immaterial.
Again, if one sees a little form and a little of the immaterial, one sees it as finite. If one sees them as measureless, one sees it as infinite. If one sees pervasively, but with the portion of form small and the immaterial measureless, or the form measureless and the immaterial small, one sees it as both finite and infinite. And if, in order to counteract that, one grasps at a difference of wording without a difference of meaning, one sees it as neither finite nor infinite — or sees a liberated self as apart from both.
This short passage is a piece of doxographical archaeology: it explains how the classical tetralemmas about the self actually got generated. The four positions on whether the self is material arise from three substantive views plus one that is merely verbal — the fourth is produced 由異句異文, by different phrasing and different wording within the same meaning. Someone dissatisfied with "both" reaches for "neither," and has said nothing new.
The same analysis is then applied to finite and infinite, and the diagnosis is repeated even more bluntly: 但由文異不由義異, only by a difference of wording and not by a difference of meaning. Asaṅga is claiming that a substantial portion of the philosophical positions in circulation are artifacts of the grammar of negation rather than genuine alternatives — which is the same insight that stands behind the Buddha's refusal to answer the undeclared questions, set out in fascicle 6.
Fascicle 9 Complete
Five of the sixteen rival doctrines have been taken up: that the effect pre-exists in its cause, that things are merely manifested by conditions, that past and future really exist, that there is a self, and that self and world are eternal. The refutation of eternity is unfinished, and fascicle 10 continues it before proceeding through the remaining eleven doctrines.
Continue to Fascicle 10 →