The Rival Doctrines Completed

Now to those who hold that the finest particles are permanently abiding. I ask you; answer as you think. Do you hold the particles to be permanent after examining, or without examining? If without examining, then to settle on permanence apart from examination by wisdom does not stand to reason. If after examining, then since it contradicts every means of knowledge, it does not stand to reason.

Further: do you hold the particles permanent because of their fineness, or because their mark differs from that of coarse effects? If because of fineness, then since dispersal and diminution make their nature feeble, calling them permanent does not stand to reason. If because their mark differs, then the particles surpass the marks of earth, water, fire, and wind, and being of an unlike kind, saying they produce those effects does not stand to reason. Moreover no different mark of those particles is in fact found, so it is not sound.

Further: is the coarse thing produced from the particles of a mark not different or different? If not different, then since it has no difference from its cause it too should be permanent, and there would be no determinate cause and effect. If different, then does the coarse thing arise from dispersed particles or from assembled ones? If from dispersed ones, every effect should arise at all times, and again there would be no determinate cause and effect. If from assembled ones, then when the coarse effect arises from the particles, does it exceed their bulk or not? If it does not exceed it, then a thing having parts of bulk arising from things that are parts of bulk does not stand to reason. If it does exceed it, then since the substance of a particle has no fine parts and cannot be analyzed, the coarse thing produced should likewise be permanent — which is not sound. And if you say instead that some particles formerly did not exist and now arise, then holding particles to be permanent does not stand to reason.

Further: in producing coarse things, are those particles like seeds and the rest, or like a potter and the rest? If like seeds, then like a seed their substance must be impermanent. If like a potter, then those particles must have deliberation, as a potter does. If you say they are like neither seeds nor a potter, then since no comparable example can be found, it does not stand to reason.

Further: do outer things arise on account of sentient beings, or not? If on account of beings, then for the outer coarse thing to be produced on account of beings while the fine thing it rests on is not so produced does not stand to reason — who could restrict its capacity in that way? If not on account of beings, then outer things arise to no purpose, which does not stand to reason.

Thus by recollecting the aggregates and beings, by the unbroken flow of all consciousnesses from a single object, and by perception and feeling being altered or unaltered, the doctrines of eternity reckoned from the prior and later limits do not stand to reason. And by examining or not examining, by the general mark, by the own mark, by production, and by what the root is used for, the doctrine of permanent particles does not stand to reason. Therefore the doctrine of eternity is not stated in accordance with reason.

Now I shall state the mark of what is permanently abiding: what has the mark of not altering at all times; of not altering in any manner; of not altering of itself; of not altering by another; and what has no mark of arising — this should be known as the mark of permanent abiding.

The doctrine that everything is caused by past action: some ascetic or brahmin gives rise to this view and sets up this doctrine, expounded at length in the scriptures. "Whatever a person in the world undergoes" means the suffering presently undergone. "Is all caused by past action" means caused by past evil deeds. "Because by diligent exertion one vomits out the old karma" means by extreme self-mortification in the present life. "Because present new karma is destroyed by not making its cause" refers to unwholesome deeds. "Thus hereafter there is no more outflow" means that it is entirely wholesome in nature, and so is called free of outflow hereafter. "Because free of outflow, karma is exhausted" refers to evil karma. "Because karma is exhausted, suffering is exhausted" means the anguish brought about by past causes and by present exertion. "Because suffering is exhausted, one realizes the end of suffering" means realizing the exhaustion of the suffering that continues into further lives. The unfettered outsiders hold this.

Question: for what reason do those outsiders give rise to this view? Answer: by scripture and by reasoning. Scripture as stated above. By reasoning: such a person, given by nature to investigation and observation, reasons from seeing that the exertion made in the present life is not determinative. Why? Because he sees that in the world people who employ right means meet with suffering, and people who employ wrong means arrive at happiness. He thinks: if the exertion made in the present life were the cause, then it would be inverted. And since what he sees is not inverted, therefore everything has past action as its cause. By this reasoning they give rise to this view and set up this doctrine.

Now ask them: what do you hold? Is the suffering brought about by present exertion caused by past action, or caused by present exertion? If caused by past action, then your earlier statement — that by diligent exertion one vomits out the old karma, that present new karma is destroyed by not making its cause, and that thus hereafter there is no more outflow, and so on at length — does not stand to reason. If caused by present exertion, then your earlier statement that whatever a person in the world undergoes is all caused by past action does not stand to reason.

Thus, whether the suffering of present exertion is caused by past action or by present exertion, it does not stand to reason; therefore this doctrine is not stated in accordance with reason.

Now I shall state the true account of causes. Some sufferings have past action alone as their cause: as when someone, through the dominant force of his own karma, is born in the evil destinies, or born into a poor and low family; or is born with suffering from mixed causes. Or as when someone, through wrongly serving a king, gains no pleasant result but instead meets with suffering. As with serving a king, so with the occupations of speech, of trade, of farming, of robbery, or of doing harm to other beings: one who has merit obtains wealth and pleasure, while one who lacks it applies effort and achieves no result. And some things are obtained purely from present exertion as their cause — as when what is newly done draws on other karma of existence; or when one hears the true Dharma and awakens to it; or gives rise to the courses of deportment; or trains in a craft. Such things are caused only by present application and exertion.

The doctrine of a Lord and other such makers: some ascetic or brahmin gives rise to this view and sets up this doctrine — that whatever a person in the world undergoes is all caused by the transformative power of a Lord, or by the transformative power of some other great being, and the like. Those who assert a Lord and other unequal causes hold this.

Question: for what reason do those outsiders give rise to this view? Answer: by scripture and by reasoning. Scripture as stated above. By reasoning: such a person, given by nature to investigation and observation, makes this supposition because he plainly sees that in the matter of causes and effects, beings in the world do not turn as they wish. Why? Because he plainly sees that when it comes to causes, beings wish to cultivate pure karma and, failing to follow their own hearts, do evil instead; and when it comes to effects, they vow to be born in a good destiny and, failing to follow their own hearts, fall into an evil one instead; and intending to receive pleasure, they do not obtain what they wish but undergo sufferings instead. Seeing this, he thinks: there must be some separate maker, producer, and transformer of the things of the world, a father to them — namely Maheśvara, or some other.

Now ask them. Summary verse:

The capacity has no substance;
included or not included, both are contradictory;
whether it has a use or has none;
and taken as cause, faults follow.

The exposition: what do you hold? Is Maheśvara's transformative capacity caused by karma and means, or without a cause? If caused by karma and means, then that this capacity alone should be so caused while the rest of the world is not does not stand to reason. If without a cause, then that this capacity alone should be uncaused while the things of the world are not does not stand to reason.

Further: is this Maheśvara included within the world or not included? If included, then he is the same as worldly things, and his producing the whole world does not stand to reason. If not included, then he is liberated, and saying that he produces the world does not stand to reason.

Further: does he transform and produce the world because he needs to, or without needing to? If because he needs to, then he has no mastery over that need, and saying that he has mastery over the world does not stand to reason. If without needing to, then producing the world with no need to do so does not stand to reason.

Further: is what is produced caused by Maheśvara alone, or does it also take other causes? If by Maheśvara alone, then whenever Maheśvara exists production exists, and whenever production exists Maheśvara exists — and saying that production takes Maheśvara as its cause does not stand to reason. If it also takes other causes, then does it take only his wish as cause, or some further cause besides? If only his wish, then does that wish take Maheśvara alone as its cause or some other? If Maheśvara alone, then whenever Maheśvara exists the wish exists and whenever the wish exists Maheśvara exists, and production would be beginningless and constant — which does not stand to reason. If it takes some other cause, then since that cause cannot be found, it does not stand to reason. And having no mastery over his own wish, saying that he has mastery over the things of the world does not stand to reason.

Thus by his capacity, by inclusion and non-inclusion, by need and no need, and by being a cause — none of it stands to reason; therefore this doctrine is not stated in accordance with reason.

The doctrine that harming is the true Dharma: some ascetic or brahmin gives rise to this view and sets up this doctrine — that if in a sacrifice living creatures are killed with spells recited beforehand, then the sacrificer, the creatures killed, and all the assistants are alike reborn in heaven.

Question: for what reason do those outsiders give rise to this view? Answer: this is a doctrine contrary to reason, arisen from flattery and deceit, and not established by examining any principle. Rather, when the evil aeon of strife arose, brahmins transgressed the brahmin law of former times and, wanting to eat meat, falsely set up this supposition.

Ask them further: is this spell-technique of the nature of Dharma or of the nature of non-Dharma? If of the nature of Dharma, then since apart from that killing it cannot bring about the result they want, turning that non-Dharma into true Dharma does not stand to reason. If of the nature of non-Dharma, then being itself a thing of unwelcome result, its turning some other thing of unwelcome result does not stand to reason.

Having been refuted thus, they reply: as poison in the world, when taken up by a spell, cannot do harm, so it should be understood of this spell-technique. Now ask them: as the spell-technique can quell outer poison, can it also quell the inner poisons of craving, hatred, and delusion, or not? If it can, then there is nowhere and no time and no single person in whom craving, hatred, and delusion are found quelled — so it is not sound. If it cannot, then your earlier statement that as a spell quells outer poison it also removes unlawful deeds does not stand to reason.

Further: does this spell-technique extend to everything, or not? If it extends to everything, then not using one's own beloved kin as the first sacrifice does not stand to reason. If it does not, then the spell's capacity is not determinate, which does not stand to reason.

Further: does the spell's capacity turn only the cause, or the effect as well? If only the cause, then it has no power over the effect, which does not stand to reason. If the effect as well, then as with any transformation it should make the goat and the rest into a lovely and excellent form on the spot; but that they take a heavenly body only after abandoning the body of a goat does not stand to reason.

Further: does the maker of the spell have both the power and compassion, or not? If he has them, then his being unable to bring them to heaven without killing them does not stand to reason. If he has not, then that the spell he made can accomplish anything does not stand to reason.

Thus by cause, by the analogy, by indeterminacy, by having no power over the effect, and by the maker of the spell — it does not stand to reason; therefore this doctrine is not stated in accordance with reason.

Now I shall state the marks of what is not Dharma. A deed that injures another and does not remedy a present fault is not Dharma. A deed that those who cultivate the path commonly know to bring an unwelcome result. A deed that all the wise definitely declare unwholesome. A deed one does not want done to oneself. A deed arisen from a defiled mind. A deed that requires a false spell before it will work. A deed whose own nature is morally neutral. All such things are marks of what is not Dharma.

The doctrine of the finite and the infinite: some ascetic or brahmin, relying on the worldly absorptions, dwells with respect to that world in the perception of a limit, of no limit, of both, or of neither, expounded at length in the scriptures. Hence he gives rise to this view: that the world is finite, that it is infinite, that it is both, that it is neither. The causes and the holders of these views have been stated there.

Here, when one seeks the world's limit by way of a terminal boundary: recollecting the aeon of destruction, one gives rise to the perception that the world is finite; recollecting the aeon of formation, to the perception that it is infinite. When one seeks the world's limit by way of spatial extent: below, passing the Avīci hell, nothing further is found; above, passing the fourth absorption, nothing further is found; and to the sides, no limit is found anywhere. Then with respect to above and below one gives rise to the perception of a limit, and with respect to the sides, of no limit. And if, in order to counteract that, one relies on a difference of wording with no difference of meaning, one gives rise to the perception that the world is neither finite nor infinite.

Now ask them: since the former aeon of destruction, has any further world arisen, or not? If you say it has, then your reckoning the world finite does not stand to reason. If you say it has not, then your presently dwelling in this world and recollecting the world's limit does not stand to reason. Thus whether a world has come from there or has not, it does not stand to reason; therefore this doctrine is not stated in accordance with reason.

The doctrine of undying evasion: the four kinds of outsider who evade by appeal to the undying, expounded at length in the scriptures. When someone comes and asks them, by way of the worldly path, about the wholesome and the unwholesome, or by way of the transcendent path, about suffering, origin, cessation, and the path, they then declare: "I am one who does not become confused about the undying" — and wherever they are, relying on the pure gods of the undying, they claim not to be confused by cross-examination, while in fact evading the question with words, either putting it off by some other matter or merely echoing the questioner's own phrasing.

Of these, the first evader has not yet awakened in understanding; the second has overestimated what he has realized; the third has awakened but is not yet settled; the fourth is feeble and dull. Further, the first fears speaking falsely and fears others, knowing he has no knowledge, and so does not plainly answer "I know nothing." The second has not attained fearlessness about what he has realized, and dreading cross-examination, fearing to speak falsely and fearing wrong view, does not plainly say "I have realized something." The third fears wrong view and fears speaking falsely, and dreading cross-examination, does not plainly say "I am not settled." These three put the matter off by some other subject and evade with words. The fourth fears only cross-examination; he understands neither the worldly nor the transcendent path, and is not even well versed in ordinary letters, and yet does not plainly say "I am dull and understand nothing" — he merely puts the question back and echoes the other's words in evasion. The causes of these four doctrines, those who hold them, and the refutation of their positions are all as stated in the scriptures.

Because those outsiders are full of fears, they abide in this view: if anyone comes and cross-examines them, they evade by flattery and crookedness. This view should be known as comprised among the evil views; therefore this doctrine is not stated in accordance with reason.

The view of no cause: established in two ways, by reliance on absorption and by improper reflection, expounded at length in the scriptures.

Question: for what reason do those outsiders, by improper reflection, give rise to the view that the self and the world arise without a cause? Answer: in brief, because they see discontinuity first, and then inner and outer things arising in measurelessly various ways. Or because at times they see causes and conditions empty of any fruit, and so see the world as having no causes and conditions. Or because at times a great wind suddenly springs up and then in a moment falls silent and still. Or a violent river suddenly floods and then in a moment is plainly dry. Or fruit trees suddenly flourish and then in a moment wither away. On such grounds they give rise to the view of no cause and set up the doctrine of no cause.

Now ask them: in your recollection of former abodes, do you recollect something without substance, or do you recollect your own self? If you recollect something without substance, then a thing without substance, never having been habituated to and never having been cognized, being able to be recollected does not stand to reason. If you recollect your own self, then reckoning that the self formerly did not exist and afterward suddenly arose does not stand to reason.

Further: do the various inner and outer things of the world, arising in various ways or arising suddenly, arise without a cause or with one? If without a cause, then arising in various ways and arising suddenly, and then suddenly not arising, does not stand to reason. If with a cause, then your reckoning that the self and the world arise without a cause does not stand to reason. Thus by recollecting what has no substance, by recollecting one's own self, by inner and outer things being various without depending on causes and conditions, and by their being various through those causes and conditions — it does not stand to reason; therefore this doctrine is not stated in accordance with reason.

The view of annihilation: some ascetic or brahmin gives rise to this view — that so long as I have this body of coarse form derived from the four great elements, sustained and not yet broken up, there is sickness, there is an abscess, there is an arrow; and when after death I am cut off and do not exist, then I am well and truly annihilated. And so likewise of the gods of the realm of desire, the gods of the realm of form, and what is comprised in the formless sphere of space up to the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, expounded at length in the scriptures. Those who state the seven kinds of annihilationism hold this.

Question: for what reason do those outsiders give rise to this view? Answer: by scripture and by reasoning. Scripture as stated above. By reasoning: such a person, given by nature to investigation and observation, thinks thus: if after death I have a body again, then I should obtain a ripened result without having done the deed; and if my substance is entirely and permanently non-existent, then the fruits of karma undergone should also not exist. Seeing that neither of these two is possible, he gives rise to this view: that once my body has died it is cut off and does not exist, like a potsherd — as one that has been broken cannot be joined again, so it is with this.

Now ask them: are the aggregates annihilated, or is a self annihilated? If the aggregates, then since the substance of the aggregates is impermanent and cause and effect arise in unbroken succession, calling that annihilation does not stand to reason. If a self, then your earlier statement about the body of coarse form derived from the four great elements, with sickness, abscess, and arrow, and about the gods of the realms of desire and form and what is comprised in the formless spheres, does not stand to reason.

The view of emptiness: some ascetic or brahmin gives rise to this view — that there is no giving, no cherishing, no sacrifice, and so on at length down to: there is no true arhat in the world. And some give rise to this view: that no thing whatever has any substance or mark.

Question: for what reason do those outsiders give rise to this view? Answer: by scripture and by reasoning. Scripture as stated above. By reasoning: such a person, given by nature to investigation and observation — and further, relying on the worldly absorptions — sees a donor of the world who for a whole lifetime gave without interruption, and who at death was born into a low and poor family, destitute. He thinks: there is definitely no giving, no cherishing, no sacrifice. Again, he sees someone who for a whole lifetime practiced excellent conduct, or evil conduct, and sees him at death fall into an evil destiny and be born in the hells, or go to a good destiny and be born in a happy world among the gods. He thinks: there is definitely no excellent conduct and no evil conduct, and no ripened fruit of either.

Again, he sees one of kṣatriya caste who after death is born among brahmins, vaiśyas, or śūdras; or a brahmin who after death is born among kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, or śūdras — and so with vaiśyas and śūdras. He thinks: the kṣatriyas of this world definitely do not come from the kṣatriyas of that world, nor do the kṣatriyas of that world go from the kṣatriyas of this. Again, he observes those free of craving being born in a lower level. Again, he sees a mother who dies and is born as a daughter, and a daughter who dies and becomes her mother; a father who dies and becomes a son, and a son who becomes a father. Seeing that fathers and mothers are not fixed, he thinks: there is definitely no father and no mother in the world. Or he sees someone whose body breaks up at death and who, being born without perception, or in the formless, or having entered nirvāṇa, cannot be found however he searches for the place of rebirth. He thinks: there are definitely no spontaneously born beings, since their place cannot be known. Or, having overestimated himself as an arhat, at the point of death he sees the marks of rebirth in himself, and thinks: there is definitely no true arhat in the world. And so on at length.

Question: and for what reason do some give rise to the view that no thing whatever has any substance or mark? Answer: because with respect to the seemingly profound teaching, apart from speech, in the profound scriptures spoken by the Tathāgata, they cannot rightly awaken to it as it really is; and because they reflect without accordance with reason upon the established marks of things — and so give rise to the view of emptiness. They think: there is definitely no substance or mark to anything.

Now ask them: do you hold that there is karma to be experienced in this life and karma to be experienced later, or that all of it is to be experienced in this life? If both exist, then your earlier statement — that there is no giving, no cherishing, no sacrifice, no excellent conduct, no evil conduct, no ripened fruit of either, no this world and no other world — does not stand to reason. If you say there is none to be experienced later, then that those who perform pure and impure deeds of every kind should, at the moment of birth after death, experience all at once the ripened fruits of every pure and impure deed does not stand to reason.

Further: are those from whose womb and from whose seed one is born father and mother to one, or not? If they are, then your saying there is no father and mother does not stand to reason. If they are not, then being born from that womb and that seed while they are neither father nor mother does not stand to reason. When they are father and mother, they are not son and daughter; when they are son and daughter, they are not father and mother — there is no fault of indeterminacy here.

Further: are there beings born in places the divine eye does not see, or are there not? If there are, then your saying there are no spontaneously born beings does not stand to reason. If there are not, then you are denying those free of craving for perception, those free of craving for form, and those free of craving for the three realms — which does not stand to reason.

Further: is there such a thing as arhatship, with respect to which one may overestimate oneself, or is there not? If there is, then your saying there is definitely no true arhat in the world does not stand to reason. If there is not, then anyone who through improper and inverted reflection calls himself an arhat should thereby be a true arhat — which does not stand to reason.

Ask them further: do things marked by the perfectly accomplished nature, things marked by the dependent nature, and things marked by the imagined nature exist, or not? If they exist, then your saying that no thing whatever has any substance or mark does not stand to reason. If they do not, then there would be no inverted grasping, and no defilement and no purity — which does not stand to reason.

Thus by there being karma experienced later, by there being no indeterminacy, by there being a place of rebirth, by there being overestimation, and by there being the three natures — it does not stand to reason; therefore this doctrine is not stated in accordance with reason.

Falsely supposing something supreme: some ascetic or brahmin gives rise to this view — that brahmins are the supreme caste and kṣatriyas and the rest are the inferior castes; that brahmins are of the white class and other castes of the black class; that the brahmin caste can attain purity and other castes cannot; that brahmins are sons of Brahmā, born from his belly and mouth, issued from Brahmā, transformed by Brahmā, offspring of Brahmā's own body. In the aeon of strife the brahmins hold this.

Question: for what reason do the brahmins give rise to this view? Answer: by scripture and by reasoning. Scripture as stated above. By reasoning: such a person, given by nature to investigation and observation, makes this supposition because he sees that true brahmins in the world are possessed of moral discipline by nature — and also because he craves fame, gain, and honor.

Now ask them: is it only the other castes that are born from a mother, or brahmins too? If only the other castes, then since the world plainly sees brahmins born from mothers, you are denying what is manifest, which does not stand to reason. If brahmins too, then your earlier statement that brahmins are the supreme caste and kṣatriyas and the rest inferior does not stand to reason.

And as with being born from a mother, so with doing unwholesome deeds and wholesome deeds; committing evil conduct of body, speech, and mind, and excellent conduct of body, speech, and mind; receiving unwelcome or welcome results in this present life; being born in the evil destinies or the good destinies in the life to come; entering a mother's womb and being born from it when the three conditions are present, this one and that one, by this and by that; the crafts of the world and the occupations; the wholesome and the unwholesome; being king or being minister; being quick-witted; advancing to fullness; being taken into a king's service or not; being subject to old age, sickness, and death or not; cultivating the Brahmā abidings and being born in the Brahmā world or not; cultivating the factors of enlightenment or not; and awakening to the enlightenment of the śrāvaka, of the pratyekabuddha, or the unsurpassed enlightenment — or not.

Further: is one called supreme because born of a supreme caste, or on account of moral discipline, learning, and the like? If because born of a supreme caste, then your own treatises, which say that at a sacrifice one takes superiority in learning or in discipline as the measure, should not be sound. If on account of discipline and learning, then your earlier statement that brahmins are the supreme caste and the rest inferior does not stand to reason.

Thus by being born, by deeds, by rebirth, by crafts and occupations, by advancement, by being taken into service, by the Brahmā abidings, by cultivating the factors of enlightenment, by realizing enlightenment, and by superiority in discipline and learning — it does not stand to reason; therefore this doctrine is not stated in accordance with reason.

Falsely supposing something purifying: some ascetic or brahmin gives rise to this view — that if I am liberated, with mind at its own disposal and contemplation at its own disposal, that is called purity. That is, to be firmly attached to and take up the subtle five desires of the gods, sporting and delighting and enjoying them at will, is what is called attaining nirvāṇa in this present life, the highest purity. And again: to be secluded from desire and from evil and unwholesome states and dwell having fully attained the first absorption, and so on up to the fourth, is likewise called attaining nirvāṇa in this present life, the highest purity.

Other outsiders give rise to this view: that if beings bathe their limbs in the river Sundarikā, all their sinful obstructions are wholly removed. And as with the Sundarikā, so with the Bāhudā, the Gayā, the Sarasvatī, the Ganges, and the rest — bathing the limbs in them removes all sinful obstructions, the highest purity.

Other outsiders reckon that keeping the vow of a dog is purity; or the vow of a cow; or the vow of oil and ink; or the vow of nakedness; or the vow of ashes; or the vow of self-mortification; or the vow of filth — reckoning these to be purity. The outsiders who assert nirvāṇa in this present life, and those who assert purification by water and the rest, hold these.

Question: for what reason do they give rise to these views? Answer: by scripture and by reasoning. Scripture as stated above. By reasoning: such a person, given by nature to investigation and observation, holds that attaining unrestricted mastery — mastery over desire and mastery in yoga — is called surpassing purity; yet he does not know as it really is the marks of such unrestricted mastery. And another reckons that by mortifying his own body he is liberated from his own evil, or that by committing a fault he is liberated from the fault.

Now ask them: those who sport and take pleasure in the subtle five desires — are they free of craving for desire, or not yet free? If already free, then sporting and taking pleasure in the world's five desires does not stand to reason. If not yet free, then reckoning that to be liberation and purity does not stand to reason.

Further: those who attain the first absorption and dwell having fully attained up to the fourth — have they become free of all craving, or not? If free of all craving, then merely dwelling in attainment up to the fourth absorption does not stand to reason. If not free of all craving, then reckoning that to be final liberation and purity does not stand to reason.

Further: is ultimate purity by inner purity or by outer purity? If by inner, then reckoning that bathing in a river brings purity does not stand to reason. If by outer, then while inwardly possessed of every filth of craving, hatred, and delusion, reckoning that removing outer dirt alone is ultimate purity does not stand to reason.

Further: does purity come from taking up what is pure, or from taking up what is impure? If from taking up what is pure, then since the world agrees that dogs and the like are impure, your reckoning that taking up the vow of a dog brings purity does not stand to reason. If from taking up what is impure, then a thing whose own substance is impure making another pure does not stand to reason.

Further: do those who take up the vow of a dog and the like attain purity by practicing evil conduct of body and the rest, or by practicing excellent conduct of body and the rest? If by evil conduct, then practicing evil conduct and reckoning it purity does not stand to reason. If by excellent conduct, then keeping the vow of a dog is wasted effort, and your reckoning that it brings purity does not stand to reason.

Thus by being free or not free of craving, by inner and outer, by taking up the pure or the impure, and by evil conduct or right conduct — it does not stand to reason; therefore this doctrine is not stated in accordance with reason.

Falsely supposing something auspicious: some ascetic or brahmin gives rise to this view — that when in the world the sun and moon are eclipsed and the constellations depart from their courses, whatever one wishes to do will not succeed; and when they are favorable, whatever one wishes will succeed. For this reason they diligently make offerings to sun, moon, and stars, sacrifice to fire, recite spells, set out kuśa grass, and fill jars with bilva fruit, conch shells, and the like. The calendrical calculators hold this.

Question: for what reason do they give rise to this view? Answer: by scripture and by reasoning. Scripture as stated above. By reasoning: such a person, given by nature to investigation and observation, has obtained the worldly absorptions, and the world commonly calls him an arhat; so whoever wishes to obtain wealth, station, and happiness for himself, and to have what he prays for come to pass, goes and consults him. But he does not know as it really is the principle of dependent arising in which karma and its fruit correspond; he merely sees that when the sun and moon are eclipsed and the constellations move in their courses, at that time the fruits of beings' pure and impure karma ripen — and he reckons this to be done by the sun and moon. And then he sets it up and proclaims it for those who have faith in such things.

Now ask them: are the risings and fallings of the world done by eclipses of sun and moon and the courses of the constellations, or by pure and impure karma? If done by the sun and the rest, then what is plainly seen — that throughout life, according as one performs meritorious and non-meritorious deeds, one brings about the results of rising and falling, suffering and pleasure — does not stand to reason. If done by pure and impure karma, then your saying it is done by the sun and the rest does not stand to reason.

Thus by being done by the sun and the rest, and by being done by pure and impure karma, it does not stand to reason; therefore this doctrine is not stated in accordance with reason.

Thus these sixteen rival doctrines, examined by the two approaches and pursued and examined by right reasoning, in every one of their kinds do not stand to reason.