The Methods of Debate
Having spent two fascicles refuting rival doctrines, the treatise turns to the discipline that made those refutations possible. Seven headings cover the whole art: what kinds of discourse there are and which are worth engaging in at all; where a debate properly takes place; the eight components of a proof, with direct perception and inference each analyzed at length and a searching account of what makes a scripture count as authority; the five adornments of a debater and the twenty-seven benefits they bring; the twenty-nine ways a debater is defeated, including a catalogue of evasions that will be recognizable to anyone who has watched an argument go wrong; and — the most unexpected of the seven — the three examinations a person should make before opening their mouth, the first of which asks whether the debate will do any good.
Where This Fascicle Picks Up
Fascicle 10 completed the sixteen rival doctrines, the fifth topic of the verse that opened fascicle 8. The sixth topic of that verse was 論法, the methods of debate, and this fascicle is given entirely to it. Readers who want this material worked out at greater length will find it on this site in the Nyāyapraveśa and the Nyāyamukha, the two logic treatises Xuánzàng also translated.
Classical text is set in the left-hand column below, our English in the right. See also this site's note on translation method, and the note on this treatise's method in fascicle 1.
1. Six Kinds of Discourse
Before any rules of proof, a prior question: what sort of talk is this? Six kinds are distinguished, and the answer at the end sorts them by whether they are worth taking part in.
論法多種者，嗢柁南曰：
論體、論處所、 論據、論莊嚴、
論負、論出離、 論多所作法。
The methods of debate are of many kinds. Summary verse:
The substance of debate, its place,
its basis, its adornment,
defeat, disengagement,
and what is of much use in debate.
論曰：論法有七種，一論體性、二論處所、三論所依、四論莊嚴、五論墮負、六論出離、七論多所作法。
論體性者，復有六種：一言論、二尚論、三諍論、四毀謗論、五順正論、六教導論。
言論者，謂一切言說言音言詞。尚論者，謂世所樂聞語論。
諍論者，謂或依諸欲所起，若自所攝諸欲他所逼奪、若他所攝諸欲自行逼奪，若於自他所愛有情所攝諸欲互相侵奪，謂歌舞戲笑等所攝，若倡女僕從等所攝，或為觀看、或為受用。於如是等諸欲差別事中，未離欲者、為欲界貪現所染者，因堅執故、因縛著故、因耽嗜故、因貪愛故，發憤現威互相鬪諍，異諍乖諍違害諍論。或依惡行所起，若自所作身語惡行他所譏毀、若他所作身語惡行自行譏毀、若自他所愛有情所作身語惡行互相譏毀。於如是事中為作未作諸惡行者、重貪瞋癡所拘執者，因堅執故、因攝受故、因貪愛故，更相發憤，以染污心現威鬪諍，異諍乖諍違害諍論。或依諸見所起，謂身見、斷常、無因、惡因、雨眾外道等所起邪見，及餘種種諸惡見類。於如是諸見中，或於自所執他所遮斷、或於他所執自行遮斷、或為令他離所執見、或為攝受所未執見。於此事中未離欲者，如前乃至違害諍論，是名諍論。
The exposition: the methods of debate are of seven kinds — the substance of debate; its place; its basis; its adornment; defeat in debate; disengagement from debate; and what is of much use in debate.
The substance of debate is of six kinds: mere speech; agreeable talk; wrangling; abuse; discourse that accords with what is right; and discourse that instructs.
Mere speech: all utterance, all vocal sound, all words. Agreeable talk: talk the world enjoys hearing.
Wrangling: it arises in dependence on desires — when what one possesses is seized by another, when one seizes what another possesses, or when people mutually encroach on the possessions of beings dear to themselves and to others; that is, over things comprised in singing, dancing, sport, and laughter, or in courtesans and servants, whether for watching or for use. Over such various matters of desire, those not free of craving and presently defiled by the craving of the realm of desire — by reason of firm grasping, of being bound, of relishing, and of craving — grow angry, make a show of force, and quarrel with one another: disputing, opposing, and injuring one another in argument. Or it arises in dependence on evil conduct — when one's own evil conduct of body and speech is derided by another, when one derides another's, or when people mutually deride the evil conduct of beings dear to themselves and to others. In such matters, those who have done or not done evil deeds and are held fast by heavy craving, hatred, and delusion — by reason of firm grasping, of appropriating, and of craving — grow angry with one another and, with defiled minds, make a show of force and quarrel. Or it arises in dependence on views — the view of a body, annihilation and eternity, no cause, a wrong cause, the wrong views of the followers of Vārṣagaṇya and the like, and the other various kinds of evil view. Among such views: another blocks what one holds oneself, or one blocks what another holds, or one seeks to make another let go of a view he holds, or to make him take up one he does not. In such matters, those not free of craving — as above, down to injuring one another in argument. This is called wrangling.
The three roots of wrangling are worth setting out plainly, because they cover almost everything people actually argue about: property, conduct, and opinions. And the treatise gives them equal footing. A dispute over a doctrinal view is classified alongside a quarrel over a servant or a fight about who behaved badly — all three are 諍論, and all three are described in the same vocabulary of grasping, anger, and showing force.
The condition named in every case is 未離欲者, those not free of craving. Wrangling is not defined by its subject matter but by the state of the people doing it. The same words about the same view could be either wrangling or its opposite, depending on whether the speaker is defiled. This is why the sixfold division is placed before any rules of inference: the logic is worthless if one has not first asked what kind of conversation is happening.
2. Abuse, Right Discourse, Instruction — and Which to Undertake
毀謗論者，謂更相憤怒，以染污心振發威勢互相謗毀，謂麁語所攝、或妄語所攝、或綺語所攝。乃至惡說法律中，若為有情宣說彼法，若銓量刊定、若教授教誡等，皆名毀謗論。何以故？非撥實相故、引惡道故、徒設功勞無義利故，是故此論名毀謗論。
順正論者，謂於善說法律中，若為有情宣說正法，若銓量刊定、若教授教誡等，為斷有情所起疑故、為善通達甚深義故、為令智見畢竟淨故，皆名順正論。何以故？順正行故、順正義故，是故此論名順正論。
教導論者，謂於順正論中，為令修習增上心學增上慧學故，所有教誨，心未定者令心得定、心已定者令心解脫、未得真實智者開悟令得、已得真實智者令其修滿，名教導論。何以故？分明委悉教導有情故，是故此論名教導論。
問：如實觀察此六種論，幾論真實能引義利所應修習？幾不真實能引無義所應遠離？答：最後二論是真實引義利，應修習。中間二論，不真實引無義，應遠離。初二種論應分別。
論處所者，當知亦有六種：一於國王前、二於執理者前、三於大眾中、四於善解法義者前、五於沙門婆羅門前、六於樂法義者前。
Abuse: growing angry with one another and, with defiled minds, mustering force to revile one another — comprised in harsh speech, or in false speech, or in idle speech. And within a badly stated Dharma and discipline, whatever is proclaimed to beings as its teaching, whatever is weighed and settled, whatever is taught and admonished — all this is called abuse. Why? Because it denies what is really the case, because it leads to the evil destinies, and because it expends labor to no benefit. Therefore this discourse is called abuse.
Discourse that accords with what is right: within a well-stated Dharma and discipline, whatever true teaching is proclaimed to beings, whatever is weighed and settled, whatever is taught and admonished — in order to cut off the doubts that arise in beings, in order that the profound meaning may be well penetrated, and in order that knowledge and vision may be made finally pure — all this is called discourse that accords with what is right. Why? Because it accords with right practice and with right meaning.
Discourse that instructs: within right discourse, whatever instruction is given so that the higher training in mind and the higher training in wisdom may be cultivated — settling the mind of one whose mind is not settled, liberating the mind of one whose mind is settled, opening and awakening one who has not obtained the knowledge of the real, and bringing to fullness one who has — this is called discourse that instructs. Why? Because it instructs beings plainly and thoroughly.
Question: examining these six kinds of discourse as they really are, how many are genuine, lead to benefit, and should be practiced? How many are not genuine, lead to no benefit, and should be avoided? Answer: the last two are genuine and lead to benefit, and should be practiced. The middle two are not genuine and lead to no benefit, and should be avoided. The first two are to be distinguished case by case.
The place of debate is likewise of six kinds: before a king; before an arbiter; in a great assembly; before those who understand the Dharma and its meaning well; before ascetics and brahmins; and before those who delight in the Dharma and its meaning.
The definition of abuse is broader than its name suggests, and deliberately so. It covers harsh, false, and idle speech — and then it covers all teaching whatever within a badly stated Dharma, including the careful, scholarly, well-intentioned parts. Someone expounding a false system to his students, weighing its problems, giving admonition, is classified as engaged in abuse. The reason given is the third one: 徒設功勞無義利, expending labor to no benefit. It is not that such a teacher is angry; it is that the work goes nowhere.
The verdict on the six is worth memorizing for its restraint. Two are to be practiced, two avoided, and two — mere speech and agreeable talk — 應分別, are to be judged case by case. Ordinary conversation and enjoyable talk are neither condemned nor recommended. A treatise this systematic could easily have moralized them into one column or the other, and it declines to.
3. The Basis of Debate: What Is Proved and What Proves
論所依者，有十種應知，謂所成義有二種、能成法有八種。
所成義二種者，一自性、二差別所成。自性者，謂有立為有、無立為無。所成差別者，謂有上立有上、無上立無上、常立為常、無常立無常。如是有色無色、有見無見、有對無對、有漏無漏、有為無為，如是等無量差別義門，是名所成差別應知。
能成法八種者，一立宗、二辯因、三引喻、四同類、五異類、六現量、七比量、八至教。
立宗者，謂依二種所成義，各別攝受自宗所許，若論教所攝、若自辯所立、若從他所聞，或為成立自宗、或為顯他宗過、或為折伏憍慢、或為摧屈陵侮、或為悲愍有情。
辯因者，謂為成就所立宗故，依所引喻同類異類、現量比量及與至教辯道理因。
引喻者，亦為成就所立義故，引因所依諸餘世間串習共許易了之法以為比況。
The basis of debate is of ten kinds: two kinds of what is to be proved, and eight kinds of what proves.
What is to be proved is of two kinds: own-nature and distinction. Own-nature: establishing that what exists exists and what does not exist does not. Distinction: establishing that what has something higher has something higher, that what has nothing higher has nothing higher, that what is permanent is permanent, that what is impermanent is impermanent — and so with having form and formless, visible and invisible, resistant and unresistant, contaminated and uncontaminated, conditioned and unconditioned, and measureless other such approaches by distinction.
What proves is of eight kinds: stating the thesis; setting out the reason; adducing an example; the similar class; the dissimilar class; direct perception; inference; and authoritative testimony.
Stating the thesis: with respect to the two kinds of what is to be proved, taking up separately what one's own school accepts — whether comprised in one's school's teaching, established by one's own reasoning, or heard from another — whether in order to establish one's own position, or to display the faults of another's, or to subdue arrogance, or to break down contempt, or out of compassion for beings.
Setting out the reason: in order to accomplish the thesis stated, one sets out a principled reason in dependence on the example adduced, the similar and dissimilar classes, direct perception, inference, and authoritative testimony.
Adducing an example: also in order to accomplish the meaning stated, one adduces, as a comparison, some other matter that the world is habituated to, commonly accepts, and readily understands, on which the reason rests.
The five motives for stating a thesis are notable for what they include and for the order they are in. To establish one's own position; to display another's faults; to subdue arrogance; to break down contempt; and — last — out of compassion for beings. Two of the five are about the opponent's character rather than the truth of the matter, and the tradition is candid that debate serves that purpose. Compassion is placed last, which in these lists usually means it is the culminating rather than the least reason.
The definition of an example is the most practically demanding of the eight. What is adduced must be 世間串習共許易了, something the world is habituated to, commonly accepts, and readily understands. An example drawn from one's own technical system is useless; it has to be something the other side already grants. This is what distinguishes an example from a further premise, and it is where most bad arguments fail.
4. Similar and Dissimilar Classes
同類者，謂或於現在、或先所見相貌相屬遞互相似。此復四種：一自體、二業、三法、四因果。自體相似者，謂彼相貌更互相似。業相似者，謂彼作用更互相似。法相似者，謂自體上法門差別展轉相似，如無常法與苦法、苦法與無我法、無我法與生法、生法與老法、老法與死法。如是有色無色、有見無見、有對無對、有漏無漏、有為無為，如是等無量法門差別更互相似。因果相似者，謂彼因果能成所成更互相似。是名同類。
異類者，所謂諸法隨其異義互不相似，此亦四種，翻上應知。
The similar class: things whose marks and relations, whether presently seen or seen before, resemble one another. This is of four kinds: by own substance, by activity, by property, and by cause and effect. Similar in own substance: their marks resemble one another. Similar in activity: their functions resemble one another. Similar in property: the distinctions of the approaches belonging to their own substance resemble one another — as what is impermanent resembles what is suffering, what is suffering resembles what is selfless, what is selfless resembles what arises, what arises resembles what ages, what ages resembles what dies; and so with having form and formless, visible and invisible, resistant and unresistant, contaminated and uncontaminated, conditioned and unconditioned, and measureless other such distinctions of approach resembling one another. Similar in cause and effect: their causes and effects, what proves and what is proved, resemble one another. This is the similar class.
The dissimilar class: things that, according to their differences of meaning, do not resemble one another. This too is of four kinds, understood as the reverse of the above.
The chain given under similarity by property is not an example chosen at random; it is a compressed statement of the Buddhist reading of experience: impermanent, therefore suffering, therefore selfless, therefore arising, aging, dying. Each term is said to resemble the next, meaning that where one is found the other is found — which is exactly the relation a valid reason must have to what it proves. The logic chapter is quietly using the four marks of existence as its worked example of a well-formed similarity.
5. Direct Perception: What Is Not Unseen
Perception is defined negatively, by three things it must not be — and the first of the three opens into a detailed account of the four ways something can be obstructed from view.
現量者，有三種相：一非不現見相、二非思搆所成相、三非錯亂所見相。
非不現見相者，復有四種應知，謂由諸根不壞作意現前時，同類生、異類生、無障礙、不極遠。同類生者，謂欲纏諸根於欲纏境、上地諸根於上地境，已生已等生，若生若起，是名同類生。異類生者，謂上地諸根於下地境若已生等，是名異類生。
無障礙者，復有四種：一非覆障所礙、二非隱障所礙、三非映障所礙、四非惑障所礙。覆障所礙者，謂黑闇無明闇不澄淨色之所覆隔。隱障所礙者、謂或藥草力、或呪術力、或神通力之所隱蔽。映障所礙者，謂少為多物之所映奪故不可見、或飲食等為諸毒藥之所映奪、或髮毛端為餘麁物之所映奪，如是等類無量無邊。且如小光為大光所映不可得見，所謂日光映星月等。又如能治映奪所治令不可得，謂不淨觀映奪淨相，無常苦無我觀映奪常樂我相，無相觀力映奪眾相。惑障所礙者，謂幻化所作、或相貌差別、或復相似、或內所作目眩惛夢悶亂酒醉放逸癲狂，如是等類名為惑障。若不為此四障所礙，名無障礙。不極遠者，謂非三種極遠：一處極遠、二時極遠、三推折極遠。如是總名非不現見。由非不現見，故名現量。
Direct perception has three marks: the mark of not being unseen; the mark of not being produced by conjecture; and the mark of not being seen erroneously.
Not being unseen is of four kinds. When the faculties are undamaged and attention is present: arising within the same class; arising across classes; being unobstructed; and not being too remote. Arising within the same class: faculties bound to the realm of desire with respect to objects bound to that realm, and faculties of a higher level with respect to objects of that level, having arisen and arisen alike, arising or occurring. Arising across classes: faculties of a higher level with respect to objects of a lower level, having arisen and so on.
Being unobstructed is of four kinds: not obstructed by covering, by concealment, by being outshone, or by confusion. Obstruction by covering: being screened by darkness, by the darkness of ignorance, or by matter that is not transparent. Obstruction by concealment: being hidden by the power of a herb, of a spell, or of supernormal power. Obstruction by being outshone: what is small cannot be seen because it is overwhelmed by what is great; or food and drink are overwhelmed by poisons; or the tip of a hair is overwhelmed by coarser things — such cases are measureless. Thus a small light is overwhelmed by a great one and cannot be seen, as sunlight overwhelms the stars and moon. And thus a counteragent overwhelms what it counteracts so that it cannot be found: the contemplation of impurity overwhelms the mark of purity; the contemplations of impermanence, suffering, and no-self overwhelm the marks of permanence, pleasure, and self; and the power of the signless contemplation overwhelms the manifold signs. Obstruction by confusion: what is produced by conjuring; differences of appearance; resemblance; or what is produced within, such as dizziness, drowsiness, dreaming, faintness, drunkenness, heedlessness, and madness. If one is not obstructed by these four, one is unobstructed. Not too remote: not remote in the three ways — remote in place, remote in time, and remote by analysis. All this together is called not being unseen; and because it is not unseen, it is called direct perception.
The third obstruction, being outshone, is the most interesting of the four because the treatise pushes it somewhere unexpected. It begins with ordinary optics — sunlight washing out the stars — and then applies the same structure to meditation: the contemplation of impurity overwhelms the mark of purity; impermanence overwhelms the appearance of permanence; the signless contemplation overwhelms all signs. A counteragent works by outshining, not by argument. And this places meditative attainment inside a discussion of perception rather than beside it: what a meditator ceases to see is unseen for the same kind of reason that a star is unseen at noon.
The three remotenesses at the end are worth separating. Remote in place and remote in time are obvious. 推折極遠, remote by analysis, is not: it names what recedes from perception as one divides it — the finest particle of fascicle 5, reached by analysis and never by the eye. Something can be too far away in the direction of smallness.
6. Perception: Not Conjectured, Not Erroneous
非思搆所成相者，復有二種：一纔取便成取所依境、二建立境界取所依境。纔取便成取所依境者，謂若境能作纔取便成取之所依，猶如良醫授病者藥，色香味觸悉皆具足，有大勢力成熟威德。當知此藥色香味觸纔取便成取所依境，藥之所有大勢熟德，病若未愈思搆所成，若病愈時便非思搆。如是等類，名為纔取便成取所依境。建立境界取所依境者，謂若境能為建立境界取之所依，如瑜伽師假想思搆地界水界火界風界，若於地界假為水解，即依地想建立水想。若於地界假為火風二解，即依地想建立火風二想。此中地想即是建立境界，取地界即是建立境界取之所依。如於地想，如是於水火風想如其所應盡當知。是名建立境界取所依境。此中建立境界取所依境，非是思搆所成假想所解地等諸界。若解未成，是名思搆所立；解若成就，即非思搆。如是名為非思搆所成。由非思搆之所成故，名為現量。
Not produced by conjecture is of two kinds: an object that supports apprehension as soon as it is apprehended, and an object that supports the apprehension by which a domain is constructed.
Supporting apprehension as soon as it is apprehended: an object that can serve as the support of an apprehension the moment it is apprehended — as when a good physician gives a sick person medicine complete in color, smell, taste, and touch, and possessing great potency and maturing power. Know that the medicine's color, smell, taste, and touch are objects supporting apprehension as soon as they are apprehended; but the medicine's great potency and maturing power, so long as the illness is not yet cured, are produced by conjecture, and when the illness is cured they are no longer conjecture.
Supporting the apprehension by which a domain is constructed: an object that can serve as the support of the apprehension by which a domain is constructed — as when a yogin, by imaginative construction, conceives the earth element, the water element, the fire element, and the wind element. If with respect to the earth element he provisionally forms the understanding of water, then upon the perception of earth he constructs the perception of water; and if with respect to the earth element he provisionally forms the understandings of fire and wind, then upon the perception of earth he constructs the perceptions of fire and wind. Here the perception of earth is the constructed domain, and apprehending the earth element is the support of that constructed apprehension. As with the perception of earth, so with water, fire, and wind, each as is fitting. And here the support of the constructed apprehension is not the earth element and the rest as understood by imaginative conjecture: while the understanding is not yet accomplished, it is what conjecture sets up; once the understanding is accomplished, it is no longer conjecture. This is what is meant by not being produced by conjecture; and because it is not so produced, it is called direct perception.
The medicine is a beautifully chosen example because it separates two things a patient encounters at once. The color, smell, taste, and feel of the medicine are directly perceived; its potency is not — while one is still ill, "this will cure me" is a conjecture. And then the striking clause: 若病愈時便非思搆, when the illness is cured it is no longer conjecture. What was inferred becomes perceived, retroactively, by the outcome. Perception and conjecture are not two permanent classes of object but two relations one can stand in to the same thing.
The second kind extends the same point to meditation, and the reasoning is subtle. A yogin practicing the elemental totalities looks at earth and constructs the perception of water. Is that conjecture? While the practice is unaccomplished, yes. 解若成就，即非思搆 — once the understanding is accomplished, it is no longer conjecture but a genuine object of perception. This is the epistemological warrant for the meditative form that fascicle 1 classified under form included in the dharma sense field, and it is stated with care: a successful meditative construction counts as perceived, and an unsuccessful one does not.
7. Seven Errors, and Four Kinds of Perceiver
非錯亂所見相者，當知或五種、或七種。五種者，謂非五種錯亂所見。五種錯亂者，一想錯亂、二數錯亂、三形錯亂、四顯錯亂、五業錯亂。七種者，謂非七種錯亂所見。七種錯亂者，即此五種錯亂，及餘二種遍行錯亂，合為七種。二種錯亂者，一心錯亂、二見錯亂。
想錯亂者，謂於非彼相起彼相想，如於陽焰鹿渴想起於水想。數錯亂者，謂於少數起多增上慢，如瞖眩者於一月處見多月像。形錯亂者，謂於餘形起餘形增上慢，如於旋火見彼輪形。顯錯亂者，謂於餘顯色起餘顯色增上慢，如為迦末羅病損壞眼根，於非黃色悉見黃相。業錯亂者，謂於無業起有業增上慢，如執捲馳走見樹奔流。心錯亂者，謂即於五種所錯亂義心生喜樂。見錯亂者，謂即於五種所錯亂義忍受顯說、安立寶重妄想堅執。若非如是錯亂所見，名為現量。
問：如是現量，誰所有耶？答：略說四種所有，一色根現量、二意受現量、三世間現量、四清淨現量。色根現量者，謂色相五根所行境界，如前所說現量體相。意受現量者，謂諸意根所行境界，如前所說現量體相。世間現量者，謂即前二種總名世間現量。清淨現量者，謂若世間現量亦是清淨現量。有清淨現量非世間現量，謂出世智於所行境，有知為有、無知為無、有上知有上、無上知無上。不共世間，名清淨現量。
Not seen erroneously should be understood as of five kinds or of seven. The five: not seen by the five errors — the error of perception, of number, of shape, of color, and of activity. The seven: those five together with two further pervasive errors — the error of mind and the error of view.
Error of perception: giving rise to the perception of a mark where that mark is not, as when in a mirage one perceives water. Error of number: overestimating a small number as many, as when one with dimmed sight sees many moons where there is one. Error of shape: overestimating one shape as another, as when in a whirling firebrand one sees the shape of a wheel. Error of color: overestimating one color as another, as when the eye faculty is damaged by jaundice and everything not yellow is seen as yellow. Error of activity: overestimating motion where there is none, as when running while gripping the reins one sees the trees streaming past. Error of mind: taking delight in the very things the five errors have got wrong. Error of view: with respect to those same five errors, accepting them, proclaiming them, setting them up, prizing them, and clinging firmly to the false conception. What is not seen by such errors is called direct perception.
Question: whose is such direct perception? Answer: in brief it belongs to four: the direct perception of the material faculties; the direct perception of mental experience; worldly direct perception; and pure direct perception. Of the material faculties: the domains ranged over by the five faculties of form, with the marks of direct perception as stated. Of mental experience: the domains ranged over by the faculty of mentation, with the same marks. Worldly: the former two together. Pure: whatever is worldly direct perception is also pure direct perception; but there is pure direct perception that is not worldly — namely, transcendent knowledge with respect to the domains it ranges over, knowing what exists as existing and what does not as not existing, what has something higher as having something higher and what has nothing higher as having nothing higher. Not shared with the world, it is called pure direct perception.
The five errors are illustrated by five stock examples, and they are well chosen because in each case the perception is vivid and the perceiver is not being careless: the mirage, the double moon, the whirling brand that looks like a circle, jaundiced yellow vision, and the trees that seem to run past a moving rider. Error is not treated as inattention. It is what a working perceptual system delivers under certain conditions.
The two additional errors are of a different order and are called pervasive for good reason. The error of mind is enjoying the mistake; the error of view is defending it, proclaiming it, and prizing it. These are what turn a misperception into a doctrine. Read against the sixteen rival positions of fascicles 9 and 10 — several of which were traced to accurate observations wrongly generalized — this pair names exactly the step at which a mistaken glimpse becomes a school.
8. Inference: Five Kinds
The account of inference is given almost entirely through examples, and the list amounts to a small portrait of the world Asaṅga's readers moved in.
比量者，謂與思擇俱推度境界，此復五種：一相、二體、三業、四法、五因果。
相比量者，謂隨其所有相貌相屬，或由現在及先所見推度境界，如以見幢故比知有車、以見煙故比知有火。如是以王比國、以夫比妻、以角犎比牛、以形軟髮黑輕舉色美比知是少、以面皺髮白等比知是老、以執自相比道比俗、以樂見聖者樂聞正法遠離憍慢比正信者、以善思所思善說所說善作所作比聰叡者、以慈悲愛語勇猛樂施善能解釋甚深義意比知菩薩、以掉動輕轉嬉戲歌笑等比未離欲、以諸威儀恒寂靜故比知離欲、以具如來微妙相好智慧寂靜勝行辯才比知如來應正等覺具一切智、見彼幼年所有相貌比知老時當有是事。諸如是等，名相比量。
體比量者，由現見彼自體性故，比類彼物不現見體。或現見彼一分自體，比類餘分。如以現在比類去來、或以過去比未來事、或以現近事比現遠事。又如衣服飲食嚴具車乘等事，觀見少分得失之相比知一切。又以一分成熟比餘熟分。如是等類，名體比量。
Inference is the weighing of an object together with reflective discernment. It is of five kinds: by mark, by substance, by activity, by property, and by cause and effect.
Inference by mark: according to whatever marks and relations a thing has, one weighs an object by what is presently or was formerly seen — as by seeing a banner one infers a chariot, and by seeing smoke one infers fire. So too: by a king one infers a kingdom; by a husband, a wife; by horns and a hump, a bull; by a soft form, black hair, light bearing, and fine color one infers youth; by a wrinkled face and white hair, age; by his taking up his own distinguishing marks one infers a renunciant or a layman; by delighting to see the noble ones, delighting to hear the true Dharma, and being far from arrogance one infers a person of right faith; by thinking well what he thinks, saying well what he says, doing well what he does, one infers a person of acumen; by loving-kindness, compassion, kindly speech, courage, delight in giving, and skill in explaining the profound meaning one infers a bodhisattva; by agitation, flightiness, sport, singing, and laughter one infers one not free of craving; by deportment constantly still one infers one free of craving; by possessing the Tathāgata's subtle marks and signs, wisdom, stillness, surpassing conduct, and eloquence one infers a Tathāgata, a Worthy One, a Perfectly Enlightened One possessed of omniscience; and by seeing the features someone has in youth one infers what will be so in age.
Inference by substance: because one presently sees a thing's own nature, one infers by likeness the nature of that thing which is not presently seen; or, presently seeing one portion of its own nature, one infers by likeness the remaining portions. As one infers past and future from the present, or future matters from past, or present distant matters from present near ones. And as with clothing, food, ornaments, and carriages: observing the marks of gain and loss in a small portion, one infers them of the whole. And from one portion being ripe one infers the remaining portions are ripe.
Banner-and-chariot and smoke-and-fire are the two stock examples of Indian logic, and the list then leaves the textbook behind entirely. Notice what it becomes: a set of rules for reading people. Youth and age from hair and skin; a renunciant from his robes; a person of faith from what he enjoys; a person of acumen from the quality of his thinking, speech, and action; someone still bound by craving from restlessness and laughter, someone free of it from stillness of bearing. A bodhisattva is inferred from six marks, the last of which is 善能解釋甚深義意, skill in explaining the profound meaning.
The list is honest about what it is doing. These are inferences, not perceptions — one does not see that someone is free of craving, one infers it from how they carry themselves, and the whole preceding section on error is a warning about how such readings go wrong. The final item makes the fallibility explicit by extending the same procedure into the future: from what someone is like as a child, one infers what will be true of them as an old person.
9. Inference by Activity, Property, and Cause and Effect
業比量者，謂以作用比業所依。如見遠物，無有動搖、鳥集其上，如是等事比知是杌。若有動搖等事，比知是人。若見跡步寬長比知是象，身曳地行比知是蛇。若聞嘶聲比知是馬，哮吼比師子，咆吼比牛王。見比於眼，聞比於耳，嗅比於鼻，甞比於舌，觸比於身，識比於意。以杖尋水礙杖比地，若見是處草木滋潤莖葉青翠比知有水，若見熱灰比知有火，若見草木搖動比知有風。若見瞑目執杖蹎蹷失路等比知是盲，高聲側聽比知是聾。以所作業比知正信聰叡菩薩未離欲離欲，如來如前應知。
法比量者，謂於一切相屬著法，以一比餘。如屬無常比知有苦，以屬苦故比空無我，以屬生故比有老法，以屬老故比有死法，以屬有色有見有礙比有處所及有形質。屬有漏故比知有苦，屬無漏故比知無苦。屬有為故比知生住異滅之法，屬無為故比知反彼。如是等類，名法比量。
因果比量者，謂因果相比，如見物行比有所至，見有所至比先有行。若見有人如法事王，比知當獲廣大祿位；見大祿位，比知先已如法事王。若見有人備善作業，比知必當獲大財富；見大財富，比知先已備善作業。見善惡行，比當興衰；見有興衰，比先善惡。若見豐饒飲食，比知飽滿；見有飽滿，比豐飲食。若見有人食不平等，比知有病；若見有病，比知食不平等。見有靜慮，比知離欲；見離欲者，比有靜慮。若見修道，比知必獲四沙門果；若見有獲四沙門果，比知修道，如是等類當知。是名因果比量。如是總名比量。
Inference by activity: inferring the support of an action from its function. Seeing a distant object that does not move and on which birds settle, one infers a stump; if it moves, one infers a person. Seeing broad and long tracks one infers an elephant; a body dragging along the ground, a snake. Hearing a neigh one infers a horse; a roar, a lion; a bellow, a bull. From seeing one infers the eye; from hearing, the ear; from smelling, the nose; from tasting, the tongue; from touching, the body; from cognizing, mentation. Probing water with a staff, one infers ground where the staff meets resistance; seeing a place where grass and trees are moist and their stems and leaves green, one infers water; seeing hot ashes, fire; seeing grass and trees swaying, wind. Seeing someone with closed eyes, holding a staff, stumbling and losing the way, one infers he is blind; speaking loudly and turning the ear, that he is deaf. And by the deeds a person does one infers a person of right faith, of acumen, a bodhisattva, one not free of craving or free of it — and a Tathāgata, as stated above.
Inference by property: among all mutually attaching properties, inferring the rest from one. Because a thing belongs to the impermanent one infers that it is suffering; because it is suffering, that it is empty and selfless; because it arises, that it ages; because it ages, that it dies; because it has form, is visible, and is resistant, that it has a place and a shape. Because it is contaminated one infers that it is suffering; because uncontaminated, that it is not. Because it is conditioned one infers arising, abiding, alteration, and ceasing; because unconditioned, the reverse.
Inference by cause and effect: inferring cause and effect from each other. Seeing a thing move one infers it will arrive somewhere; seeing it arrived, one infers it moved before. Seeing a person serve a king lawfully, one infers he will obtain a great post; seeing a great post, one infers he served a king lawfully. Seeing a person fully engaged in good works, one infers he will obtain great wealth; seeing great wealth, that he was engaged in good works. Seeing good or evil conduct, one infers rising or falling; seeing rising or falling, one infers prior good or evil. Seeing abundant food and drink, one infers satiety; seeing satiety, abundant food. Seeing a person eat immoderately, one infers illness; seeing illness, immoderate eating. Seeing meditative absorption, one infers freedom from craving; seeing one free of craving, that he has absorption. Seeing someone cultivate the path, one infers he will certainly obtain the four fruits of the renunciant; seeing someone who has obtained them, that he cultivated the path.
The stump-or-person example is the classic Indian illustration of a doubtful perception resolved by inference, and Asaṅga gives it the extra detail that settles it: birds have landed on it. Then the list turns to the countryside — tracks, a dragging body, a neigh, a roar, moist earth, hot ashes, swaying branches — and to the reading of disability from behavior. Every one is a case of inferring from what something does to what it is.
Inference by cause and effect is stated in both directions each time, and this is its distinguishing feature: from movement to arrival and from arrival back to movement; from service to a king to office and from office back to service. The last two pairs make the point that matters. From meditative absorption one infers freedom from craving and the reverse; from cultivating the path one infers the four fruits and from the fruits back to the cultivation. Nothing in the religious life is exempt from ordinary inference, and nothing in it is directly seen by an observer.
10. Authoritative Testimony, and What Contradicts the Marks of Things
The eighth component is scripture — and the treatise's test for it is unusually demanding, since two of its three conditions have nothing to do with who spoke it.
至教者，謂一切智人所設言教，或從彼聞法隨法行。此復三種：一聖言所攝、二對治雜染、三不違法相。
聖言所攝者，所謂如來及諸弟子所說經教，展轉流布傳來至今，不違正法、不違正義。
對治雜染者，謂依此法善修習時，能永調伏貪瞋癡等一切煩惱及隨煩惱。
不違法相者，謂翻違法相當知，是名不違法相。何等名為違法相耶？謂於無相增為有相，如執有我、有情、命者、生者等，或常或斷、有色無色如是等類，或於有相減為無相，或於決定立為不定，如一切行皆是無常、一切有漏皆性是苦、一切諸法皆是無我，而妄建立一分是常一分無常、一分是苦一分非苦、一分有我一分無我。如是於佛所立不可記法，一向記別，又復推求謂應立記。
Authoritative testimony: the verbal teaching set forth by one who is omniscient, or the practice of the Dharma in accordance with the Dharma as heard from him. It is of three kinds: comprised in the noble word; counteracting defilement; and not contradicting the marks of things.
Comprised in the noble word: the scriptural teaching spoken by the Tathāgata and his disciples, transmitted and handed down to the present, which does not contradict the true Dharma or the true meaning.
Counteracting defilement: when one cultivates well in dependence on this teaching, it can permanently tame craving, hatred, delusion, and all the afflictions and secondary afflictions.
Not contradicting the marks of things: to be understood as the reverse of contradicting them. And what is it to contradict the marks of things? To add a mark where there is none — as in grasping at a self, a being, a living one, one who is born, and the like, or at permanence or annihilation, or having form and formless. Or to subtract a mark where there is one. Or to make determinate what is indeterminate — as when all formations are impermanent, all that is contaminated is by nature suffering, and all things are selfless, and yet one falsely sets up that a part is permanent and a part impermanent, a part suffering and a part not, a part with a self and a part without. And likewise, of the matters the Buddha declared undeclarable, to declare them categorically, and further to press for an answer, holding that a declaration ought to be made.
The three conditions are the striking thing here. One is about provenance — the noble word, transmitted. But the other two are tests a text has to pass on its own merits: does cultivating it actually tame the afflictions, and does it contradict the marks of things? Authority is not conferred by transmission alone. A passage handed down impeccably that made people worse, or that contradicted impermanence, would fail two of the three conditions.
The catalogue of contradictions works from a single principle: superimposition and denial, the two extremes named first in fascicle 6's account of the middle way. Adding a mark that is not there; subtracting one that is; making a universal claim partial. And then a fourth item of a different kind — answering the undeclarable questions, and pressing for answers to them. Reticence is here made part of the marks of things, not merely a pedagogical tactic.
11. More Ways to Contradict the Marks of Things
或於不定建立為定，如執一切樂受皆貪所隨眠、一切苦受瞋所隨眠、一切不苦不樂受癡所隨眠、一切苦樂皆是有漏、思已造業唯受苦報，如是等類。或於有相法中，無差別相建立差別、有差別相立為無別。如依有為差別之相，於無為法亦別建立；依無為法無差別相，於有為法亦不別立。如於有為無為，如是於有色無色、有見無見、有對無對、有漏無漏等，隨其所應盡當了知。
又於有相不如正理立因果相，如立妙行感不愛果、立諸惡行能感愛果，計於惡說法律之中習諸邪行能得清淨、於佛善說法律之中修行正行不得清淨。又於雜染立為清淨、於清淨法立為雜染，於不實相以假言說立為真實、於真實相以假言說立不真實，如於永離言說法中以言戲論建立勝義，如是等類名違法相。翻此違相，名不違相，是名至教。
Or to make determinate what is indeterminate — as in holding that all pleasant feeling has craving as its latent tendency, all painful feeling hatred, all neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling delusion; that all pain and pleasure are contaminated; that karma performed after deliberation is undergone only as painful recompense; and the like. Or, among things having marks, to set up a distinction where there is no distinguishing mark, or to set up no distinction where there is one — as when, relying on the distinguishing marks of the conditioned, one likewise makes distinctions in the unconditioned; or relying on the absence of distinguishing marks in the unconditioned, one likewise makes no distinctions in the conditioned. As with the conditioned and unconditioned, so with having form and formless, visible and invisible, resistant and unresistant, contaminated and uncontaminated, each as is fitting.
Again, to set up causal relations among things having marks contrary to right reasoning — as in holding that excellent conduct brings about an unwelcome result and evil conduct a welcome one; or reckoning that practicing wrong conduct within a badly stated Dharma and discipline can bring purity, and that practicing right conduct within the Buddha's well-stated Dharma and discipline does not. Or to set up the defiled as pure and pure things as defiled. Or, by provisional speech, to set up what is not real as real and what is real as not real — as when, with respect to a teaching permanently apart from speech, one sets up the ultimate by verbal proliferation. Such things are called contradicting the marks of things. The reverse of these is called not contradicting them; and that is authoritative testimony.
The last item on the list is the sharpest, and it is aimed at people on Asaṅga's own side of the argument. To take a teaching that is 永離言說, permanently apart from speech, and then set up the ultimate by verbal proliferation — this contradicts the marks of things exactly as much as denying karma does. It is the error of talking the ultimate into existence, and it is placed in the same catalogue as the belief that good conduct brings bad results.
The examples of false determinacy are worth noting because each is a real doctrinal position, plausibly held. Does every pleasant feeling carry latent craving? Is all pleasure contaminated? Is deliberate karma always painful in its result? Each is a generalization from something true — pleasant feeling often carries craving — hardened into a universal. The fault is not the observation but the "all."
12. Why a Proof Is Ordered as It Is
問：若一切法自相成就自義差別法爾建立，復何因緣立有二種所成義耶？答：為欲生成他信解故，非為生成諸法相貌。
問：為欲成就所成立義，何故先說立宗耶？答：為先顯示自所愛樂義故。問：何故次辯因耶？答：為欲開顯依現見法決定道理，即於所立宗義不捨離故。問：何故次引喻耶？答：為欲顯現能成道理之所依止現見法故。問：何故後說同類異類、現量比量、至教等耶？答：為欲開示因喻二種相違不相違智故。又相違者，由二種因：一由不決定故、二由同所成故。不相違者亦由二因：一由決定故、二由異所成故。此中相違者為成所立宗義不能為量，故不名量。不相違者為成所立宗義能為正量，故名為量。是名論所依。
Question: if all things are accomplished in their own marks and their own distinctions are established by the nature of things, then for what reason are two kinds of what is to be proved set up? Answer: in order to produce another person's confident understanding — not in order to produce the marks of things.
Question: in order to accomplish what is to be established, why is the thesis stated first? Answer: in order first to display the meaning one holds dear. Question: why is the reason set out next? Answer: in order to disclose a settled principle resting on what is presently seen, so that one does not depart from the meaning of the thesis stated. Question: why is the example adduced next? Answer: in order to make manifest the presently seen thing on which the proving principle rests. Question: why are the similar and dissimilar classes, direct perception, inference, and authoritative testimony stated last? Answer: in order to disclose the knowledge of whether reason and example are contradictory or not.
And contradiction arises from two causes: from indeterminacy, and from proving the same thing. Non-contradiction likewise from two: from determinacy, and from proving something other. Here, what is contradictory cannot serve as a means of proof for establishing the thesis, and so is not called a means of proof; what is not contradictory can serve as a right means of proof, and so is called a means of proof. This is the basis of debate.
The first question and answer is the most important thing in the section, because it says what logic is for. If things already are what they are, why prove anything? Answer: 為欲生成他信解故，非為生成諸法相貌 — in order to produce another person's confident understanding, not in order to produce the marks of things. A proof does not make anything true. It changes a person. Everything that follows about theses, reasons, and examples is subordinate to that.
The two causes of a reason being contradictory are technical and worth unpacking. 不決定, indeterminacy, is the fault of a reason that could equally support the opposite conclusion. 同所成, proving the same thing, is circularity — the reason simply restates the thesis. These are the two most common failures in the refutations of fascicles 9 and 10, where opponents' reasons were repeatedly shown either to prove too much or to assume what was at issue.
13. The Five Adornments of a Debater
論莊嚴者，有五種應知，一善自他宗、二語具圓滿、三無畏、四敦肅、五應供。
善自他宗者，謂如有一，於此正法及毘柰耶深生愛樂，即於自論宗本讀誦受持、正聞審慮、純熟修行，已善已說已明。復於彼法彼毘柰耶不愛不樂，但於彼論宗本讀誦受持、聞思純熟而不修行，然已善已說已明。是名善自他宗。
語具圓滿者，謂如有一，音聲圓滿不犯音聲。音聲者，謂具五德：一不鄙陋、二輕易、三雄朗、四相應、五義善。云何不鄙陋？謂離諸邊國鄙俚詞故。云何輕易？謂世間共立非餘說故。云何雄朗？所謂於義建立言詞，為成彼義巧妙雄壯故。云何相應？所謂前後功德法義相符順故。云何義善？謂能引發世出世利，無顛倒故。又此相應論者，復由九種差別相故，語具圓滿應知，一不雜亂、二不麁獷、三辯了、四限量、五與義相應、六以時、七決定、八顯了、九相續。以此足前，總名語具圓滿。
無畏者，謂如有一，處在多眾異眾大眾、勝眾諦眾善眾等中，其心無有下劣怯懼，身無戰汗面無怖色，聲不動掉語不怯弱，如是等類名為無畏。
敦肅者，謂如有一，性不忿毒，面無變改、身不掉動，如是等類名為敦肅。
應供者，謂如有一，性善可樂性不惱他，尋常住善可樂地者，隨順他心而發言語知時如實，為益自他能引義利，言詞柔軟如對親友，是名應供。
The adornment of debate is of five kinds: being good at one's own and the other's position; completeness of speech; fearlessness; gravity; and being worthy of honor.
Good at one's own and the other's position: someone who deeply delights in this true Dharma and discipline, and with respect to the root text of his own school recites and upholds it, hears it rightly, considers it carefully, practices it to maturity, and has mastered, stated, and clarified it. And who, with respect to that other Dharma and discipline, has no delight, and with respect to the root text of that school recites and upholds it, hears and reflects on it to maturity without practicing it, and yet has mastered, stated, and clarified it. This is being good at one's own and the other's position.
Completeness of speech: someone whose voice is complete and commits no fault of voice. The voice has five qualities: not coarse; easy; strong and clear; consistent; and good in meaning. What is not coarse? Free of the vulgar words of the border countries. What is easy? Established in common by the world and not some other usage. What is strong and clear? Establishing words for the meaning, skillful and vigorous in accomplishing that meaning. What is consistent? That the qualities, teachings, and meanings before and after agree with one another. What is good in meaning? That it can draw forth worldly and transcendent benefit, without distortion. And a consistent debater's completeness of speech should further be known by nine distinguishing marks: not confused; not rough; clearly articulated; measured; in accord with the meaning; timely; determinate; plain; and continuous. These added to the foregoing are together called completeness of speech.
Fearlessness: someone who, in the midst of many assemblies, differing assemblies, great assemblies, superior assemblies, assemblies of truth, and assemblies of the good, has no inferiority or timidity in his mind; his body does not tremble or sweat, his face shows no fear, his voice does not waver, and his speech is not faint.
Gravity: someone who by nature is not given to rancor; his face does not change and his body does not fidget.
Worthy of honor: someone whose nature is good and pleasing and does not vex others; who always abides on ground that is good and pleasing; who speaks in accordance with the other's mind, knows the time, and speaks in accordance with reality; who benefits himself and others and can draw forth what is of value; and whose words are gentle, as if addressing a close friend.
The first adornment sets a standard that is easy to state and hard to meet: one must know the opposing system as thoroughly as one's own — reciting it, hearing it, reflecting on it to maturity, and having 已善已說已明, mastered, stated, and clarified it. The one thing not required is practicing it. Note also that the description does not pretend to neutrality; it says plainly 不愛不樂, one has no delight in it. Sympathetic mastery and disagreement are treated as entirely compatible, and this is precisely how fascicles 9 and 10 presented the sixteen rival doctrines.
The last adornment is the one that turns the whole chapter. Having established a discipline for defeating opponents, the treatise says that the finished debater's words are 柔軟如對親友, gentle, as if addressing a close friend. Two of the five adornments — gravity and worthiness of honor — have nothing to do with argument at all, and describe a person whose face does not change when contradicted and who does not make others uncomfortable.
14. Twenty-Seven Benefits
若有依五論莊嚴相興言論者，當知復有二十七種稱讚功德。何等名為二十七種？一眾所敬重；二言必信受；三於大眾中轉加無畏；四於他所宗深知過隙；五於自所宗知決定德；六無有僻執；七於所受論情無偏黨；八於自正法及毘柰耶無能引奪；九於他所說速能了悟；十於他所說速能領受；十一於他所說速解理趣；十二能以語德勝伏大眾；十三悅可信解因明論者；十四能善宣釋義句文字；十五身不勞倦；十六心不勞倦；十七言不謇澁；十八辯才無盡；十九身不頓顇；二十念無忘失；二十一心無損害；二十二咽喉無損；二十三凡所宣吐分明易了；二十四善護自心令無忿怒；二十五善順他心令無憤恚；二十六令對論者心生淨信；二十七凡有所行不招怨對，廣大名稱聲流十方，世咸傳唱此大法師、處大師數。
如受欲者以末尼真珠瑠璃等寶廁環釧等寶莊嚴具以自莊嚴，威德熾盛光明普照。如是論者以二十七種稱讚功德廁此五種論莊嚴具以自莊嚴，威德熾盛光明普照，是故名此為論莊嚴。
If someone undertakes discourse in accordance with the five marks of the adornment of debate, twenty-seven praiseworthy qualities should be known. What twenty-seven? He is revered by the assembly; his words are believed and accepted; in a great assembly he grows still more fearless; he knows deeply the gaps and faults in the other's position; he knows the settled merits of his own; he has no perverse attachments; he is without partiality toward the position he has taken up; he cannot be dragged away from his own true Dharma and discipline; he swiftly understands what another says; he swiftly takes in what another says; he swiftly grasps the drift of what another says; he can prevail over the assembly by the excellence of his speech; he pleases those who have confidence in the science of reasoning; he explains meanings, phrases, and words well; his body does not tire; his mind does not tire; his speech does not falter; his eloquence is inexhaustible; his body does not wilt; his mindfulness is unforgetting; his mind takes no injury; his throat takes no injury; whatever he utters is plain and easily understood; he guards his own mind well so that there is no anger; he accords well with the other's mind so that there is no resentment; he causes his opponent's mind to give rise to pure faith; and whatever he does provokes no enmity, so that his great renown flows through the ten directions and the world proclaims him a great teacher of the Dharma, counted among the great masters.
As one who enjoys pleasures adorns himself with ornaments of maṇi, pearl, and lapis set among rings and bracelets, so that his majesty blazes and his radiance shines everywhere — so a debater adorns himself with these twenty-seven praiseworthy qualities set among the five adornments of debate, so that his majesty blazes and his radiance shines everywhere. Therefore this is called the adornment of debate.
The list is not what one would expect a treatise on winning arguments to produce. A large block of it is physical and unglamorous — the body does not tire, the mind does not tire, the speech does not falter, the body does not wilt, the throat takes no injury. Anyone who has spoken publicly for hours will recognize why these are counted as benefits, and it is a mark of the tradition's realism that a debate manual thinks about the speaker's throat.
The last four are the ones that matter most. He guards his own mind so there is no anger; he accords with the other's mind so there is no resentment; he causes his opponent to give rise to pure faith; and what he does provokes no enmity. The measure of a successful debate, on this account, is not that the opponent is defeated but that he is left believing something and bearing no grudge. Set this beside the definition of non-contention in fascicle 4 — the knowledge that guards against becoming the occasion of another's affliction — and the two are plainly the same skill.
15. Defeat: Conceding, and Being Cornered
Three ways to lose. The first is honest, the second is a catalogue of thirteen evasions, and Asaṅga sorts them into three groups by what has actually gone wrong.
論墮負者，謂有三種應知，一捨言、二言屈、三言過。
捨言者，謂立論者以十三種詞謝對論者，捨所言論。何等名為十三種詞？謂立論者謝對論者曰：我論不善、汝論為善、我不善觀、汝為善觀、我論無理、汝論有理、我論無能、汝論有能、我論屈伏、汝論成立、我之辯才唯極於此、過此已上更善思量當為汝說、且置是事我不復言。以如是等十三種詞謝對論者，捨所言論。捨所論故，當知摧破，為他所勝、墮在他後、屈伏於彼，是故捨言名墮負處。
言屈者，如立論人為對論者之所屈伏，或假餘事方便而退，或引外言，或現憤發，或現瞋恚，或現高慢，或顯彼所覆，或現惱害，或現不忍，或現不信，或復默然，或復憂慼，或竦肩伏面，或沈思詞窮。
Defeat in debate is of three kinds: conceding; being cornered; and faults of speech.
Conceding: the proponent excuses himself to his opponent with thirteen expressions and abandons what he was arguing. What thirteen? He says to his opponent: my argument is not good; your argument is good; I have not observed well; you have observed well; my argument has no principle; your argument has principle; my argument has no force; your argument has force; my argument is defeated; your argument is established; my eloquence reaches only this far; beyond this I shall consider more carefully and then speak to you; let this matter rest and I shall say no more. With such thirteen expressions he excuses himself and abandons what he was arguing. Because he abandons the argument, know that he is broken and overcome by the other, falls behind him, and submits to him; therefore conceding is called a place of defeat.
Being cornered: when a proponent is subdued by his opponent, he may retreat by resorting to some other matter; or bring in outside talk; or display outrage; or display anger; or display arrogance; or expose what the other has concealed; or display hostility; or display impatience; or display distrust; or fall silent; or grow dejected; or hunch his shoulders and hang his head; or sink into thought with nothing left to say.
The thirteen expressions of conceding are worth reading as what they are: a list of ways of saying "you are right." Nine of them are straightforward admissions in matched pairs — my argument is bad, yours is good; mine has no principle, yours has. The last four are the face-saving versions: my eloquence reaches only this far; I shall think about it and get back to you; let us drop it. The treatise counts all thirteen equally as defeat, including the polite retreats. Asking for time to think is losing.
The thirteen ways of being cornered are the most immediately recognizable passage in the fascicle, and they run through the whole repertoire: changing the subject, bringing in irrelevancies, getting loud, getting angry, pulling rank, and — the ugliest — 顯彼所覆, exposing something the opponent had kept hidden. Then the register shifts to the physical: silence, dejection, hunched shoulders and a lowered face, and finally sitting there with nothing left to say. The list moves from aggression to collapse, and both ends are the same defeat.
16. The Thirteen Evasions Explained
假託餘事方便而退者，謂捨前所立更託餘宗，捨先因喻同類異類、現量比量及至教量，更託餘因乃至至教。引外言者，謂捨所論事，或論飲食、或論王臣盜賊衢路倡穢等事，假託外緣捨本所立。現憤發者，謂以麁言擯對論者。現瞋恚者，謂以怨報之言責對論者。現高慢者，謂以卑賤種族等言毀對論者。顯彼所覆者，謂以發他所覆惡行之言舉對論者。現惱害者，謂以害酷怨言罵對論者。現不忍者，謂發怨言怖對論者。現不信者，謂以破戒行言謗對論者。或默然者，謂語業頓盡。或憂慼者，謂意業焦惱。竦肩伏面者，謂威勇身業而頓萎顇。沈思詞窮者，謂才辯俱竭。如是十三種事，當知言屈。前二妄行矯亂，中七發起邪行，後四計行窮盡。是名言屈墮在負處。
Retreating by resorting to some other matter: abandoning what he formerly established and resorting to another thesis; abandoning his earlier reason, example, similar and dissimilar classes, direct perception, inference, and authoritative testimony, and resorting to another reason and so on down to another authority. Bringing in outside talk: abandoning the matter under discussion and talking of food and drink, or of kings and ministers, thieves, the streets, courtesans, and filth — resorting to outside circumstances and abandoning what he originally established. Displaying outrage: driving off his opponent with coarse words. Displaying anger: rebuking his opponent with words of retaliation. Displaying arrogance: reviling his opponent with words about his low family and the like. Exposing what the other has concealed: attacking his opponent by bringing up words about evil conduct the other had kept hidden. Displaying hostility: abusing his opponent with cruel and hateful words. Displaying impatience: frightening his opponent with hateful words. Displaying distrust: slandering his opponent with words about breaking the precepts. Falling silent: his verbal action suddenly exhausted. Growing dejected: his mental action scorched with distress. Hunching the shoulders and hanging the head: his bold bodily bearing suddenly withered. Sinking into thought with nothing left to say: his talent and eloquence both spent.
These thirteen are to be known as being cornered. The first two are false conduct and evasion; the middle seven are the setting going of wrong conduct; the last four are the exhaustion of one's reckoning. This is being cornered, falling into the place of defeat.
The three-way sort at the end is the analytic payoff. The first two — switching theses and changing the subject — are 矯亂, evasion; they are dishonest but not vicious. The middle seven are 邪行, wrong conduct, and every one of them is an attack on the person rather than the position: coarse words, retaliation, sneering at the opponent's family, exposing his hidden faults, cruelty, intimidation, and accusing him of breaking precepts. The last four are simply 窮盡, running out. Three quite different things are all called being cornered, and only the middle group is a moral failing.
The examples of outside talk are wonderfully specific — food, politics, crime, street gossip, courtesans. These are the things people change the subject to. And note the definition given for switching theses: it is not merely offering a new argument but abandoning the whole apparatus, reason and example and every means of proof, and starting again elsewhere. Bringing a better argument is not defeat; quietly replacing the question is.
17. Nine Faults of Speech
言過者，謂立論人有九種過，故名言過。何等為九？一雜亂、二麁獷、三不辯了、四無限量、五非義相應、六非時、七不決定、八不顯了、九不相續。
雜亂者，謂捨所論事，雜說異語。麁獷者，謂憤發卒暴，言詞躁急。不辯了者，謂若法若義，眾及對論所不領悟。無限量者，謂於所說義，言詞複重或復減少。非義相應者，當知十種：一無義、二違義、三損理、四與所成等、五招集過難、六不得義利、七義無次序、八義不決定、九成立已成、十順不稱理諸邪惡論。非時者，謂所應說前後不次。不決定者，謂立已復毀、毀而復立，速疾轉換難可了知。不顯了者，謂犯聲明相不領而答，或先為典語後作俗語，或復翻此。不相續者，謂於中間言詞斷絕。凡所言論犯此九失，是名言過。
Faults of speech: a proponent has nine faults, and hence they are called faults of speech. What nine? Confusion; roughness; lack of articulation; want of measure; not according with the meaning; untimeliness; indeterminacy; obscurity; and discontinuity.
Confusion: abandoning the matter under discussion and speaking a jumble of other things. Roughness: flaring up violently, with hasty and agitated words. Lack of articulation: neither the assembly nor the opponent grasps the teaching or the meaning. Want of measure: with respect to the meaning stated, the words are repetitious or too few. Not according with the meaning: ten kinds — without meaning; contrary to the meaning; damaging to principle; identical with what is to be proved; inviting objections; obtaining no benefit; the meaning out of sequence; the meaning indeterminate; establishing what is already established; and going along with wrong and evil doctrines that do not accord with principle. Untimeliness: what should be said comes out of order, before or after. Indeterminacy: having established a point he then demolishes it, and having demolished it establishes it again, switching so rapidly that it is hard to follow. Obscurity: offending against the marks of grammar, answering without having understood; or first using literary language and afterward vulgar language, or the reverse. Discontinuity: his words break off in the middle. Any discourse that commits these nine failings is called a fault of speech.
The nine faults are the exact negations of the nine marks of complete speech given among the five adornments, which is why they need no separate justification: not confused, not rough, clearly articulated, measured, in accord with the meaning, timely, determinate, plain, continuous. A well-formed argument in bad prose is still a defeat.
The ten sub-faults of not according with the meaning include the two classical failures of proof, stated here in plain language: 與所成等, identical with what is to be proved — circularity — and 成立已成, establishing what is already established, which is proving what nobody disputed. These are the same two faults that section 12 named as the causes of a reason being contradictory. Between them they account for a very large share of arguments that go nowhere without anyone noticing.
18. Disengagement: Three Examinations Before Speaking
The sixth of the seven headings, and the most unexpected in a manual of debate. Before arguing at all, one asks three questions — and the first is not about whether one will win.
論出離者，謂立論者三種觀察興廢言論。云何名為三種觀察？一觀察德失、二觀察眾會、三觀察善不善。
云何觀察德失？謂立論者方欲立論，應如是觀：我立是論，將無自損損他及俱損耶？不生現法後法及俱罪耶？勿起身心所有諸憂苦耶？莫由此故執持刀杖鬪罵諍訟諂言妄語而發起耶？將無種種惡不善法而生長耶？非不利益安樂自及他耶？非不利益安樂多眾生耶？非不憐愍於世間耶？不因此故諸天世人無義無利不安樂耶？
彼立論者如是觀時，若自了知我所立論能為自損，乃至天人無義無利及不安樂，便自思擇不應立論。若如實知我所立論不為自損，乃至能引天人義利安樂，便自思擇應當立論。是名第一論出離相。
Disengagement from debate: the proponent makes three examinations by which he takes up or lays aside discourse. What three? Examining merit and fault; examining the assembly; and examining what is good and not good.
Examining merit and fault: when a proponent is about to argue, he should examine thus. In arguing this, will I not injure myself, injure the other, or injure both? Will it not produce guilt in this life, in the next, or in both? Will it not give rise to distress and suffering of body and mind? Will it not lead to taking up knife and staff, to fighting and reviling and litigation, to flattering words and lying? Will it not cause various evil and unwholesome states to grow? Will it not fail to benefit and give ease to myself and others? Will it not fail to benefit and give ease to many beings? Will it not fail in compassion for the world? Will it not, on this account, leave gods and humans without meaning, without benefit, and without ease?
When the proponent examines thus, if he knows for himself that the argument he would make could injure himself, and so on down to leaving gods and humans without meaning, benefit, or ease, he considers and decides that he should not argue. If he knows as it really is that his argument will not injure himself, and so on down to drawing forth meaning, benefit, and ease for gods and humans, he considers and decides that he should argue. This is the first mark of disengagement from debate.
Nine questions, and not one of them asks whether the argument is sound or whether one would win. They ask whether it will injure anyone, produce guilt, cause distress, lead to violence and litigation and lying, feed unwholesome states, benefit anyone, benefit many, show compassion, or leave gods and humans better off. The whole apparatus of theses and reasons and examples built up over this fascicle is placed under a prior test that is entirely ethical.
The clause about knives and staves, fighting, reviling, and litigation is not rhetorical. Public debates in Asaṅga's world were staged before kings and arbiters — the first two places of debate listed at the head of this fascicle — with reputations and patronage at stake, and they did produce enmity and lawsuits. The question is a practical one about consequences the proponent can foresee.
19. Examining the Assembly and Oneself
云何觀察眾會？謂立論者應當觀察現前眾會，為有執著為無執耶？為有賢正為無有耶？為有善解為無解耶？如是觀時，若知眾會有所執著非無執著，唯不賢正無有賢正，唯不善解無善解者，便自思擇於是眾中不應立論。若知眾會無所執著非有執著，唯有賢正無不賢正，唯有善解無不解者，便自思擇於是眾中應當立論。是名第二論出離相。
云何觀察善不善？謂立論者應自觀察善與不善：我於論體、論處、論依、論嚴、論負、論出離等，為善為不善耶？我為有力建立自論摧伏他論，於彼負處解脫不耶？如是觀時，若自了知我為不善非善解了、我無力能非有力能，便自思擇與對論者不應立論。若自了知我善非不善、有力非無力，便自思擇與對論者應共立論。是名第三論出離相。
論多所作法者，謂有三種於所立論多所作法：一善自他宗、二無畏、三辯才。問：如是三法，何故名為於所立論多有所作？答：由善了達自他宗故，於一切法能起談論。由無畏故，於一切眾能起談論。由辯才故，於諸問難能善酬答。是故此三名為於所立論多所作法。
Examining the assembly: the proponent should examine the assembly present. Are they attached or unattached? Are they worthy and upright or not? Do they understand well or not? Examining thus, if he knows the assembly is attached and not unattached, only unworthy and not upright, only without good understanding — he considers and decides that he should not argue in that assembly. If he knows the assembly is unattached and not attached, only worthy and upright, only of good understanding — he considers and decides that he should argue in that assembly. This is the second mark of disengagement from debate.
Examining what is good and not good: the proponent should examine himself as to what is good and not good. As regards the substance of debate, its place, its basis, its adornment, defeat, disengagement, and the rest — am I good at these or not? Have I the power to establish my own position and overthrow the other's, and to be free of the places of defeat, or not? Examining thus, if he knows for himself that he is not good and does not understand well, that he has no power rather than power — he considers and decides that he should not argue with that opponent. If he knows for himself that he is good and not otherwise, that he has power and not otherwise — he considers and decides that he should argue with that opponent. This is the third mark of disengagement from debate.
What is of much use in debate: three things are of much use with respect to the argument one makes — being good at one's own and the other's position; fearlessness; and eloquence. Question: why are these three called of much use with respect to the argument one makes? Answer: because through well penetrating one's own and the other's position one can undertake discourse on any matter; because of fearlessness one can undertake discourse in any assembly; and because of eloquence one can well answer any objection. Therefore these three are called of much use in debate.
The examination of the assembly is a judgment about the audience rather than the opponent, and it produces a conclusion that a modern reader may find uncomfortable: before an audience that is partisan, not upright, and does not understand, one should not argue at all. Not argue more simply, not argue more persuasively — decline. A debate before such an assembly cannot produce the confident understanding that section 12 named as the entire purpose of proof, so there is nothing to be gained by holding it.
The third examination is self-assessment, and its honesty runs in both directions. One asks whether one has actually mastered the seven headings of this very fascicle, and whether one has the power to establish one's position and escape the places of defeat. If not, one declines. This is not modesty; it is the same accuracy that fascicle 7 required under freedom from timidity and freedom from overestimation. And the closing three items make plain what is being asked for — a person who can discuss any matter, in any assembly, and answer any objection.
Fascicle 11 Complete
This completes the sixth topic of the verse that opened fascicle 8. One topic of that verse remains — 釋, interpretation — and fascicle 12 takes it up, continuing the chapter on Gathering the Pure Meaning toward its close in fascicle 13.
Continue to Fascicle 12 →