Determinations on Mind, Form, and Cause
The concluding chapter works through its inventory. Mind is sorted by support and by object, then by the six ways it scatters and the fifteen ways it settles, then by the sixteen and the twenty kinds that have to be counteracted. The five universal mental factors are each given a single function. Form yields a short and consequential set of denials — the subtle particle has no substance of its own, and seven things commonly treated as form turn out not to be real. The formations dissociated from mind are shown to be provisional by a test made of language: six kinds of speech, any one of which marks its object as a construction rather than a thing. Then the longest stretch, on causation — the six causes of the older Abhidharma refuted for three faults apiece, and in their place ten causes, four conditions, five fruits, and the fifteen bases on which all of them rest. The fascicle closes with the eight unconditioned and twelve ways the three realms differ.
Where This Fascicle Picks Up
Fascicle 17 opened the concluding chapter with its ten aspects of determination and applied them to the first topic, mind, in the form of the eightfold proof of the ālayavijñāna. This fascicle continues down the list of things: the distinctions within mind, the mental factors, form, the formations dissociated from mind, cause, the unconditioned, and the realms. The material is the treatise at its most technical, and it is also where it argues most directly with other Buddhist schools.
Collating against T1603 gives twenty-four verse lines here, matching line for line, in twelve verses of four. One single-character variant falls in this fascicle and is noted where it occurs — the same pair that has divided the two texts three times already.
Classical text is set in the left-hand column, our English in the right. See also this site's note on translation method.
1. The Distinctions of Mind, and Seven That Are Hard to Know
復次心差別相建立應知。頌曰：
所依境界力， 建立心差別，
復由七種行， 難了相應知。
論曰：心差別相當知復由所依、所緣力而得建立。由所依力者，謂立眼識乃至意識。所緣力者，謂立色識乃至法識，青識黃識乃至苦識樂識。如是等復由七種行相了知諸心難知差別，一不可知相續久住器差別相、二多種相境差別相、三俱有差別相、四能治所治速疾迴轉差別相、五習氣差別相、六續生差別相、七解脫心差別相。復次頌曰：
所緣無自在， 住惡所依止，
隨緣力所轉， 心繫縛應知。
論曰：由三因故說心被縛，一於所緣境不自在故、二安住穢惡所依止故、三隨眾緣力而轉變故。此中於所緣境不自在者，謂於制伏相、於化、於變等，不如所欲住境自在。
Further, the establishing of the marks of difference within mind should be known.
By the force of support and of object
the distinctions of mind are established;
and by seven aspects further,
the marks hard to understand are to be known.
The exposition: the marks of difference within mind should be known to be established by the force of support and of object. By the force of support: this establishes eye consciousness on down to mind consciousness. By the force of object: this establishes form consciousness on down to consciousness of things — blue consciousness, yellow consciousness, on down to consciousness of pain and consciousness of pleasure. And beyond these, by seven aspects one understands the distinctions among minds that are hard to know: the mark of difference as an unknowable vessel abiding long in continuity; the mark of difference as objects of many kinds of mark; the mark of difference as concurrent; the mark of difference as antidote and what is counteracted turning about swiftly; the mark of difference as habitual tendencies; the mark of difference as continuation into birth; and the mark of difference as a liberated mind.
Without mastery over its object,
abiding on a foul support,
turned about by the force of conditions —
know that mind is bound.
The exposition: for three reasons mind is said to be bound: because it has no mastery over its object; because it abides on a filthy and foul support; and because it alters as the force of the many conditions turns it. Here, having no mastery over its object means that with respect to the mark of subduing, and to transforming, and to altering, it does not abide upon its object with the mastery it would wish.
The first of the seven hard-to-know marks is the ālayavijñāna described without being named — 不可知相續久住器, an unknowable vessel abiding long in continuity. The phrase 不可知 echoes the standard verse formula for the store consciousness, whose appropriation and objects are said to be imperceptible. Having spent the whole of fascicle 17 arguing it into existence, the treatise here files it under "distinctions of mind that are hard to know" and moves on, which is a fair estimate of where the argument left it: established, and still not the sort of thing one can look at.
The three reasons mind is bound are worth reading as a description rather than a doctrine. Mind cannot hold what it wants to hold; it sits on a support that is 穢惡, filthy — the body; and it is turned this way and that by conditions it did not choose. Nothing in the list is metaphysical. It is what it is like to have a mind, stated without consolation, and the word 縛 is used in its ordinary sense of being tied up.
2. Six Ways Mind Scatters
復次頌曰：
散亂及安住， 六種十五種，
緣境界六等， 所治心非一。
論曰：當知心散亂有六種、心安住有十五種、心緣境有六種等眾多差別，所對治心亦非一種應知。
心散亂有六種者，一作意心散亂，謂諸菩薩棄捨大乘相應作意，退習聲聞獨覺相應下劣作意。二外心散亂，謂於外妙五欲中及憒閙相貌尋思隨煩惱外境界中縱心流散。三內心散亂，謂或由惛沈睡眠下劣。或由味著諸定。或由種種定中隨煩惱故惱亂其心。四相心散亂，謂依止外相作意思惟內境相貌。五麁重心散亂，謂內作意為緣生起諸受，由麁重身故計我我所。六自性心散亂，謂五識身。
Furthermore:
Scattering and settling,
six kinds and fifteen;
six and more in taking objects;
and the minds to be counteracted are not one.
The exposition: know that the scattering of mind is of six kinds, the settling of mind of fifteen, and mind's taking of objects of six kinds and many further distinctions; and the minds to be counteracted are likewise not of a single kind.
The scattering of mind is of six kinds. First, scattering of mind in attention: bodhisattvas abandon the attention that belongs to the Great Vehicle and fall back into practicing the inferior attention that belongs to the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. Second, outward scattering of mind: among the excellent five objects of desire outside, and among outer objects of noise and commotion, of discursive thought, and of the secondary afflictions, one lets the mind run loose and disperse. Third, inward scattering of mind: whether through torpor, sleep, and lassitude, or through relishing the concentrations, or through the secondary afflictions arising in the various concentrations, one's mind is disturbed. Fourth, scattering of mind in marks: resting on outer marks, one attends to and reflects on the appearance of inner objects. Fifth, scattering of mind by coarse heaviness: inner attention serves as the condition for feelings to arise, and by reason of a body of coarse heaviness one supposes "I" and "mine." Sixth, scattering of mind by its own nature: the five bodies of consciousness.
The first and the last of the six are the ones that make this a distinctively Mahāyāna list. Scattering in attention is not distraction toward pleasure; it is a bodhisattva quietly relaxing into the śrāvaka's aim, and the treatise counts that as the mind coming apart. And the sixth is startling in its flatness: 自性心散亂，謂五識身 — scattering by its own nature is the five sense consciousnesses. Seeing and hearing are, as such, a form of scatter. Nothing has gone wrong; that is simply what having senses is, and it is why the path of seeing was said in fascicle 16 to rest on the absorptions.
The third kind includes 味著諸定, relishing the concentrations, among the inward scatters — a practitioner enjoying his own meditation is listed alongside torpor and sleep as a way the mind is disturbed. This is the same caution that fascicle 17 attached to the bodhisattva's diligence 無愛味, free of relish. The treatise is consistent about it: taking satisfaction in the practice is a defect of the practice.
3. Fifteen Ways Mind Settles
心安住有十五種者，一初發安住心，謂修三摩地方便。二證得安住心，謂已得未至三摩地。三圓滿安住心，謂已得根本靜慮三摩地。四自在安住心，謂即於此得隨所欲。五有動安住心，謂於下三靜慮。六無動安住心，謂於第四靜慮。七此上寂靜安住心，謂於寂靜無色解脫。八最勝寂靜安住心，謂於想受滅解脫。九信解安住心，謂於聞所生智。十決定安住心，謂於思所生智。十一影像安住心，謂於世間修所生智。十二成實安住心，謂出世間修所生智。十三有增上慢出離安住心，謂於世間靜慮無色。十四無增上慢出離安住心，謂於出離世間靜慮無色。十五三行雜染安住心，謂識隨色而住、緣色而住、依色而住，如是乃至隨行而住、緣行而住、依行而住。此中隨色而住者，謂執受所依故。緣色而住者，謂取境界故。依色而住者，謂由麁重故。如是乃至隨行等三，當知識非識住，緣自心心能盡愛故。
The settling of mind is of fifteen kinds. First, the mind settled at the first arousing: cultivating the means to concentration. Second, the mind settled in realization: having obtained the concentration of access. Third, the mind settled in fulfillment: having obtained the concentration of the fundamental absorptions. Fourth, the mind settled in mastery: having obtained, in that very state, whatever one wishes. Fifth, the mind settled with movement: in the three lower absorptions. Sixth, the mind settled without movement: in the fourth absorption. Seventh, the mind settled in what is still beyond this: in the still formless liberations. Eighth, the mind settled in the most excellent stillness: in the liberation that is the cessation of perception and feeling. Ninth, the mind settled in confident understanding: in the knowledge born of hearing. Tenth, the mind settled in certainty: in the knowledge born of reflection. Eleventh, the mind settled on an image: in the worldly knowledge born of cultivation. Twelfth, the mind settled in accomplished reality: in the transcendent knowledge born of cultivation. Thirteenth, the mind settled in an emergence attended by overweening pride: in the worldly absorptions and formless attainments. Fourteenth, the mind settled in an emergence without overweening pride: in the absorptions and formless attainments that emerge from the world. Fifteenth, the mind settled in the defilement of the three ways of proceeding: consciousness abides following form, abides taking form as object, abides depending on form — and so on to abiding following the formations, taking the formations as object, and depending on the formations. Here, abiding following form means because it is the support that is appropriated; abiding taking form as object means because it grasps the object; abiding depending on form means by reason of coarse heaviness. And so on down to the three regarding the formations. Know that consciousness is not a station of consciousness, since a mind that takes its own mind as object is able to exhaust craving.
The list is a ladder for eleven rungs and then stops being one. Items one through eight climb from a beginner's first attempt to the cessation of perception and feeling; nine through twelve run the three wisdoms — hearing, reflection, cultivation — with the last split into worldly and transcendent; thirteen and fourteen are a matched pair distinguished only by 增上慢, overweening pride, the assumption that one has attained more than one has. That the same attainment appears twice, once with the conceit and once without, and that the difference is not a difference in the attainment, is the most useful thing on the list.
The fifteenth item is not a settling at all but its opposite, and it is placed last so as to end the discussion where it began: consciousness abiding on the aggregates in three ways — following what it appropriates, grasping what it takes as object, weighed by coarse heaviness. The closing remark is the release. 識非識住 — consciousness is not itself a station of consciousness. There are four stations, form, feeling, perception, and the formations; consciousness is not among them, so a mind that takes its own mind as object has nowhere to land, and 能盡愛, can exhaust craving. The whole sequence of fifteen ends by pointing at the one place the mind cannot settle, and calling that the way out.
4. Which Minds Take Which Objects
復次緣境界六等者，謂常緣境、非常緣境、遍滿緣境、淨行緣境、善巧緣境、淨惑緣境。如是為先復有多種餘緣境界，謂欲界繫心緣欲色無色及不繫境，如是色無色界繫心及不繫心各緣四種境。又依欲界繫心起欲色無色界繫心及不繫心，依色界繫心起色無色界繫心及不繫心，依無色界繫心起無色界繫心及不繫心。又過去心緣過去未來現在，如是未來、現在心各緣三種。又善心緣善不善無記，如是不善、無記心各緣三種。又樂俱行心緣樂俱行等三種境界，如是苦俱行心、不苦不樂俱行心各緣三種。又貪瞋癡相應心各緣貪等相應三種境界。
復次所治心非一者，謂欲界繫有五種心，謂見苦所斷心乃至修道所斷心。如是色無色界繫心各有五種，及無漏心，合為十六種心。復有二十種心，謂欲界繫心有八種：一生得善心、二方便善心、三不善心、四有覆無記心，及無覆無記心，分為四種，謂異熟生心、威儀路心、工巧處心、變化心。色界繫有六心，除不善工巧處心。無色界繫有四心，謂除不善威儀路、工巧處、變化心。不繫心有二種，謂學心、無學心。
Further, as to the six and more kinds of taking objects: the permanent object, the impermanent object, the all-pervading object, the object that purifies conduct, the object of skill, and the object that purifies afflictions. Beyond these there are many further ways of taking objects. A mind bound to the desire realm takes as object what belongs to desire, form, and formlessness, and what is unbound; and likewise minds bound to the realms of form and formlessness, and the unbound mind, each take four kinds of object. Again, in dependence on a mind bound to the desire realm there arise minds bound to the realms of desire, form, and formlessness, and the unbound mind; in dependence on a mind bound to the form realm there arise minds bound to the realms of form and formlessness, and the unbound mind; in dependence on a mind bound to the formless realm there arise a mind bound to the formless realm and the unbound mind. Again, a past mind takes past, future, and present as object, and likewise future and present minds each take three kinds. Again, a wholesome mind takes the wholesome, the unwholesome, and the indeterminate as object, and likewise unwholesome and indeterminate minds each take three kinds. Again, a mind occurring together with pleasure takes as object the three kinds beginning with what occurs together with pleasure, and likewise minds occurring together with pain and with neither pain nor pleasure each take three kinds. Again, minds associated with craving, hatred, and delusion each take as object the three kinds associated with craving and the rest.
Further, as to the minds to be counteracted not being of one kind: bound to the desire realm there are five minds, namely the mind abandoned by seeing suffering on down to the mind abandoned by the path of cultivation. Likewise minds bound to the realms of form and formlessness are five apiece; and together with the uncontaminated mind these make sixteen minds. There are also twenty minds. Minds bound to the desire realm are of eight kinds: the mind wholesome by birth; the mind wholesome by application; the unwholesome mind; the obscured-indeterminate mind; and the unobscured-indeterminate mind, which divides into four — the mind born of ripening, the mind of deportment, the mind of craft, and the mind of transformation. Bound to the form realm there are six minds, excluding the unwholesome and the mind of craft. Bound to the formless realm there are four minds, excluding the unwholesome, the mind of deportment, the mind of craft, and the mind of transformation. The unbound mind is of two kinds, the mind of the learner and the mind of the adept.
The rule governing what a mind can take as its object is stated by exhaustion rather than by principle, but the principle is visible in the pattern. A mind bound to a lower realm can take a higher realm as its object; a mind bound to a higher realm cannot reach down. One can think about the absorptions from the desire realm — indeed one must, in order to cultivate them — but a mind in the formless attainments does not take form as an object. Thought can look up but not down, which is why the whole path has to be begun from where it is hardest.
The mind of craft, 工巧處心, is excluded from the upper realms, and the reason is worth stating because it makes the classification concrete. Craft is a form of unobscured-indeterminate mind — carpentry, calculation, music — morally neutral and requiring the manipulation of material things. The form realm has bodies but no occupations; the formless has neither. What survives into the form realm is deportment and transformation; what survives into the formless is only ripening. The higher one goes, the fewer things there are to do.
5. Mental Factors, and the Work of the Five Universals
復次心所有事勝決擇，今當說。頌曰：
依多境了別， 各為自業生，
心法不應思， 相似境轉故。
論曰：心所有法依止能緣多境八種識故，各各造作自業而起，依心而有，故名心所有法。不應更思彼所緣境，由彼與識等緣轉故。如經言：若於此受，即於此思；若於此思，即於此想；若於此想，即於此了別。復次今當略說作意、觸、受、想、思五種遍行心法作業。頌曰：
引心三分別， 領位審了相，
德失等營為， 名作意等業。
論曰：引發於心是作意業，三和分別是觸業，領納違順俱相違位是受業，審了位相是想業，為造功德過失俱非是思業。餘心法業，如前廣說。
Further, the superior determination regarding the matter of the mental factors shall now be stated.
Resting on what cognizes many objects,
each arises for its own work;
the mental factors need not be asked about,
since they turn upon a like object.
The exposition: the mental factors rest on the eight consciousnesses that can take many objects, and each arises performing its own work; they exist in dependence on mind, and are therefore called factors belonging to mind. One need not further ask about the objects they take, since they turn upon the same object as the consciousness. As the scripture says: where there is feeling, there is volition; where there is volition, there is perception; where there is perception, there is cognizing.
Further, the work of the five universal mental factors — attention, contact, feeling, perception, and volition — shall now be briefly stated.
Drawing forth mind; the threefold discrimination;
registering a position; discerning a mark;
and setting about quality and fault —
such is the work of attention and the rest.
The exposition: drawing forth the mind is the work of attention. Discriminating upon the meeting of three is the work of contact. Registering a position that is adverse, favorable, or neither is the work of feeling. Discerning the mark of a position is the work of perception. Setting about qualities, faults, or neither is the work of volition. As for the work of the remaining mental factors, it has been expounded at length above.
The verse here carries the fascicle's one variant, and it is the fourth appearance of the same pair. T1603 reads 得失等營為, gains and losses; T1602 reads 德失等營為, qualities and faults. The prose settles it: 為造功德過失俱非是思業 — volition sets about qualities, faults, or neither, using 功德 and 過失 outright. Four times now the two texts have parted over 得 and 德, and four times T1602's own prose has vindicated 德. At this point the pattern is better described as a stable difference between the transmissions than as a series of copying errors.
The verse gives one function per factor and the compression is instructive. Attention 引, draws the mind — it does not select the object, it starts the engine. Contact is 三和分別, the discrimination that occurs when faculty, object, and consciousness meet. Feeling registers whether a situation is for you, against you, or neither. Perception discerns the mark, which is what makes a thing nameable. And volition 營為, sets about — it is the only one of the five described with a verb of undertaking, and its objects are moral: qualities, faults, or neither. In five short phrases the mind is decomposed into starting, meeting, valuing, identifying, and acting.
6. Form: The Subtle Particle, and Seven Things That Are Not Real
復次色事決擇，今當說。頌曰：
上界無香味， 大造隨可得，
極微無自體， 非實有七事。
論曰：上界無香味者，欲界已上香味無故。大造隨可得者，四大及所造色，隨於聚中現可得者即自相有，不可得者此中即無。極微無自體者，謂諸極微但假想立，自體實無。非實有七事者，謂七種事無有實體，一表色、二形色、三影像、四響音、五觸處造色、六律儀色、七不律儀色。復次頌曰：
微和合不離， 善惡無自然，
三相想外無， 法處色十二。
論曰：微和合不離者，謂於大極微能依造色處不相離，餘異處色若和若合亦不相離。善惡無自然者，色非自體有善惡性，隨能發心假說善惡故。三相想外無者，三相色外無別有色，謂有見有對色、無見有對色、無見無對色。三想所行色外亦無別色，謂色想、有對想、種種別異想。法處色十二者，謂法處所攝色，略說有十二種相：一影像相、二所作成就相、三無見相、四無對相、五非實大種所生相、六屬心相、七世間相、八不可思議相、九世間三摩地果相、十出世間三摩地果相、十一自地下地境界相、十二諸佛菩薩隨心自在轉變不可思議相。
Further, the determination regarding the matter of form shall now be stated.
In the upper realms no smell or taste;
great elements and derived form, as found;
the subtle particle has no substance of its own;
seven things are not really existent.
The exposition: in the upper realms there is no smell or taste, since above the desire realm smell and taste are absent. Great elements and derived form, as found: of the four great elements and the form derived from them, whatever is presently found within an aggregation exists with its own particular mark, and whatever is not found is simply absent there. The subtle particle has no substance of its own: the subtle particles are set up merely by an imagined notion, and have no substance of their own in reality. Seven things are not really existent: seven things have no real substance — expressive form, shape, images, echoing sound, form derived at the field of the tangible, the form of restraint, and the form of non-restraint.
The subtle joined and combined, not apart;
good and bad are not by nature;
apart from three marks and three notions there is none;
form in the dharma field is twelve.
The exposition: the subtle joined and combined, not apart, means that within the great subtle particles the derived form that depends on them is not apart from its place; and other form in other places, whether joined or combined, is likewise not apart. Good and bad are not by nature, means that form does not have a wholesome or unwholesome nature in its own substance, and is provisionally called wholesome or unwholesome according to the mind that produces it. Apart from three marks and three notions there is none, means that apart from form of three marks there is no other form — visible and resistant form, invisible and resistant form, and invisible and unresistant form; and apart from the form ranged over by three notions there is likewise no other form — the notion of form, the notion of resistance, and the notion of manifold difference. Form in the dharma field is twelve, means that the form included in the dharma sense field has in brief twelve marks: the mark of an image; the mark of the accomplishment of what is done; the mark of being invisible; the mark of being unresistant; the mark of not being produced from real great elements; the mark of belonging to mind; the worldly mark; the inconceivable mark; the mark of being the fruit of worldly concentration; the mark of being the fruit of transcendent concentration; the mark of being an object of one's own level or a lower level; and the mark of the inconceivable transformation that buddhas and bodhisattvas effect by mastery according to mind.
極微無自體 is a short sentence with a long history behind it. The subtle particle is the atom of Vaibhāṣika physics, the indivisible unit out of which aggregations are built, and fascicle 14 already refuted it as a first cause. Here it is disposed of in eight characters: the particles are 假想立, set up by an imagined notion, and have no substance of their own. The atom is an artifact of analysis — what you get by dividing in thought until you can divide no further — and the treatise treats the terminus of a mental operation as belonging to the operation rather than to the world.
The list of seven unreal things is the more consequential denial, because two of its members are the moral form of the older systems. 律儀色 and 不律儀色 — the form of restraint and of non-restraint — are the Sarvāstivāda account of how taking a vow changes you: an invisible material something is created in the body and persists, which is what makes a vow binding when you are asleep or distracted. Asaṅga says it has no real substance. The Yogācāra account puts the continuity of a vow in the seeds of the ālayavijñāna instead, which is more economical and requires no invisible matter — and the sentence just before, that form has no wholesome or unwholesome nature of its own but is called so 隨能發心, according to the mind that produces it, is that argument's premise.
7. Formations Dissociated from Mind: Speech of Ownership
復次心不相應行勝決擇，今當說。頌曰：
當知不相應， 皆假施設有，
假有性六種， 彼皆二過故。
論曰：當知心不相應行皆是假有，假有之性略有六種。云何為六？
謂若事能起六種言論。何等名為六種言論？一屬主相應言論、二遠離此彼言論、三眾共施設言論、四眾法聚集言論、五不遍一切言論、六非常言論。屬主相應言論者，謂諸言論配屬於主方解其相，非不屬主。如說生時，此誰之生？觀所屬主起此言論，所謂色之生、受想行識之生。非說色時，此誰之色？觀所屬主起此言論。如生，如是住異無常等心不相應行類，如其所應盡當知。是名屬主相應言論。若事能起如是言論，當知此是假相。
Further, the superior determination regarding the formations dissociated from mind shall now be stated.
Know that the dissociated
are all provisionally designated as existing;
the nature of the provisional is of six kinds,
and all of them incur two faults.
The exposition: know that the formations dissociated from mind are all provisionally existent, and the nature of the provisional is in brief of six kinds. What six?
Namely, whatever gives rise to six kinds of speech. What are the six kinds of speech? Speech that is correlated with an owner; speech that is far from displaying this by this or that by that; speech by designation held in common; speech that assembles many things; speech that does not extend to everything; and speech that is not constant. Speech correlated with an owner means speech whose mark is understood only when it is assigned to an owner, and not otherwise. When one says "arising," one asks: whose arising? and the speech arises by regarding the owner it belongs to — the arising of form, the arising of feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness. But when one says "form," it is not that one asks: whose form? and the speech arises by regarding an owner. As with arising, so with abiding, alteration, impermanence, and the other kinds of formation dissociated from mind: each is to be known as is fitting. This is called speech correlated with an owner. Wherever a thing gives rise to such speech, know that its mark is provisional.
What follows over the next three sections is one of the most original passages in the treatise: a test for whether a thing is real or constructed, conducted entirely on the way we talk about it. The claim is not that language is unreliable. It is that certain grammatical behaviors are diagnostic — that a term which can only be used in a certain way is a term whose referent is a construction.
The first test is the genitive. "Arising" cannot stand alone; the question 此誰之生, whose arising, always has an answer, and the answer is always something else — form, feeling, and the rest. "Form" does not work that way; you cannot sensibly ask whose form it is in the same sense. A term that must borrow an owner has no standing of its own, and the whole list of formations dissociated from mind — arising, abiding, alteration, impermanence, possession, class-commonality, and the rest — fails the test in exactly this way. They are all names for something that happens to something else.
8. Speech That Displays Neither This by This nor That by That
遠離此彼言論者，謂諸言論非以此顯此，亦非以彼顯彼，此說名為遠離此彼言論。若以此顯此言論，此言論亦於實相處起、亦於假相處起。若以彼顯彼言論，此言論亦於實相處起、亦於假相處起。若非以此顯此亦非以彼顯，彼言論此言論一向於假相處起。云何以此顯此言論於實相處起？如言地之堅。云何此復於假相處起？如言石之圓。如地之堅、石之圓，如是水之濕、油之滑、火之煖、燬之焰、風之動、飄之鼓當知亦爾。云何以彼顯彼言論於實相處起？如言眼之識、身之觸，如是等。云何此復於假相處起？如言佛救德友之食飲衣服嚴具，如是等。云何非以此顯此亦非以彼顯彼言論，一向於假相處起？如舍之門、舍之壁、甕之口、甕之腹、軍之車、林之樹、百之十、十之三，如是等，是名遠離此彼言論。
Speech far from displaying this by this or that by that means speech that neither displays this by this nor displays that by that; this is called speech far from this and that. Speech that displays this by this arises both where the mark is real and where the mark is provisional. Speech that displays that by that arises both where the mark is real and where the mark is provisional. But speech that neither displays this by this nor displays that by that arises invariably where the mark is provisional. How does speech that displays this by this arise where the mark is real? As when one says, the solidity of earth. And how does it also arise where the mark is provisional? As when one says, the roundness of a stone. As with the solidity of earth and the roundness of a stone, so know it to be with the wetness of water, the slipperiness of oil, the heat of fire, the flame of a blaze, the motion of wind, and the gusting of a squall. How does speech that displays that by that arise where the mark is real? As when one says, the consciousness of the eye, the contact of the body, and the like. And how does it also arise where the mark is provisional? As when one says, the food and drink, clothing, and ornaments of Buddharakṣita or Devamitra, and the like. And how does speech that neither displays this by this nor displays that by that arise invariably where the mark is provisional? As when one says, the door of a house, the wall of a house, the mouth of a jar, the belly of a jar, the chariot of an army, the tree of a forest, the ten of a hundred, the three of a ten, and the like. This is called speech far from this and that.
This is the subtlest of the six tests and the passage is compressed, so it is worth setting out. Some genitives display a thing by its own nature — the solidity of earth, where solidity just is what earth is. Some display a thing by something else that genuinely has it — the consciousness of the eye, where the eye really is what the consciousness belongs to. Both of these can be used truly or loosely; the roundness of a stone is the first pattern used loosely, and Devamitra's clothes are the second used loosely. But a third pattern displays neither: the door of a house, the mouth of a jar, the ten of a hundred. The door is not what the house is, and the house is not something the door belongs to over and above the door. That construction only ever occurs where the whole is a construction out of the parts, and so it is a perfect indicator.
The last two examples are the ones that put it beyond doubt — 百之十、十之三, the ten of a hundred, the three of a ten. Nobody supposes a hundred is a thing that owns its tens. Asaṅga has found a grammatical form that we already know, in the case of numbers, to be nothing but part-whole talk, and shown that houses, jars, armies, and forests take it too. The Indian names in the middle, 佛救 and 德友, are ordinary personal names of the Buddharakṣita and Devamitra type, standing in as our "Smith and Jones" would.
9. The Remaining Four Kinds of Speech
眾共施設言論者，謂六種相貌言說自體施設言論。六種相貌者，謂事相、應識相、好等相、益等相、言說狀相、邪行等相。事相者，謂若相識所取。應識相者，謂若相由作意故能起於識。好等相者，謂若相觸所取。益等相者，謂若相受所取。言說狀相者，謂若相想所取。邪行等相者，謂若相思所取。
眾法聚集言論者，謂於眾多和合安立自體言論，如於內色受想行識說我等言論，於外色香味觸安立差別說舍甕軍林等言論。
不遍一切言論者，謂諸言論有處隨轉、有處退還，如於舍舍言唯隨舍轉，於村亭等即便退還；於甕甕言，於餘瓶器等即便退還；軍言於別男女等退還；林言於別樹根莖葉花菓等退還。
非常言論者，當知四種因，謂破壞故、不破壞故、加行故、轉變故。破壞故者，如瓶壞已，瓶言捨，瓦等言生。不破壞故者，如種種藥物共和合已或丸或散，種種藥言捨，藥物丸散等言生。加行故者，如於金段起諸加行，造作環釧等異莊嚴具，爾時金段之言捨，異物環釧等言生。轉變故者，如飲食等轉變時，飲食等言捨，糞穢等言生。如是等類應知非常言論，隨於諸物發起如是六種言論，當知此物皆是假有。
Speech by designation held in common means speech that designates a substance by way of six appearances. The six appearances are: the appearance of a matter; the appearance of what is to be cognized; the appearance of the agreeable and the rest; the appearance of the beneficial and the rest; the appearance of what speech is like; and the appearance of wrong conduct and the rest. The appearance of a matter is the appearance taken up by consciousness. The appearance of what is to be cognized is the appearance that can give rise to consciousness by way of attention. The appearance of the agreeable and the rest is the appearance taken up by contact. The appearance of the beneficial and the rest is the appearance taken up by feeling. The appearance of what speech is like is the appearance taken up by perception. The appearance of wrong conduct and the rest is the appearance taken up by volition.
Speech that assembles many things means speech that sets up a substance upon a combination of many — as with the speech that says "I" and the like upon inner form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness; and the speech that says "house," "jar," "army," "forest," and the like, setting up distinctions upon outer form, smell, taste, and the tangible.
Speech that does not extend to everything means speech that carries over in some places and falls back in others. Thus the word "house" carries over only where there is a house, and falls back at a village or a pavilion; the word "jar" falls back at other vessels and pots; the word "army" falls back at particular men and women; the word "forest" falls back at particular roots, trunks, leaves, flowers, and fruits of trees.
Speech that is not constant should be known by four causes: by destruction, by non-destruction, by application, and by transformation. By destruction: when a jar is broken, the word "jar" is abandoned and the word "shard" and the rest arises. By non-destruction: when various medicinal substances are compounded into pills or powders, the words for the various medicines are abandoned and the words "pill," "powder," and the like arise. By application: when one applies work to a lump of gold and fashions bracelets, bangles, and other ornaments, then the word "lump of gold" is abandoned and the words for those other things, bracelets and bangles, arise. By transformation: when food and drink and the rest are transformed, the words "food" and "drink" are abandoned and the words "dung" and "filth" arise. Such are to be known as speech that is not constant. Wherever these six kinds of speech arise with respect to things, know that all those things are provisionally existent.
The fifth test is the one an analytic philosopher would recognize at once: a term that 有處隨轉、有處退還, carries over here and falls back there, with no principle governing where the boundary lies. "Forest" applies to the trees but not to any particular root or leaf; "army" applies to the men but not to any man. A word with that behavior is not tracking a thing; it is tracking a threshold we set. The example of the village and the pavilion is chosen well, since a house is more house-like than either and yet the word simply stops.
The sixth test is about time and it has four cases, which between them cover every way a thing can stop being what it was. Break it, and it becomes shards. Compound it without breaking anything, and it becomes a pill. Work it, and the gold becomes a bracelet. Let it pass through a body, and food becomes filth. In no case does anything come into or go out of existence — 破壞 and 轉變 are physical processes, and the constituents survive them. What changes is which word applies. Something whose identity is that fragile under our own descriptions was never a substance to begin with, and the last example is deliberately undignified in a way the tradition rather enjoys.
10. Two Faults in Any Account of Arising
問：諸心不相應行皆是假有。云何應知？答：由二種過失故，一因過失、二體過失。因過失者，若言生是生因，能生生故說名為生，是即無別果生可得，此生為誰能生因故說之為生？若言生是生體，是即從他生故，不應說為能生。如是餘心不相應行，如理應知。
Question: the formations dissociated from mind are all provisionally existent. How is this to be known? Answer: by two faults, the fault regarding cause and the fault regarding substance. As for the fault regarding cause: if one says that arising is the cause of arising, and is called arising because it can produce arising, then no separate fruit of arising can be found — for whose cause of arising is this arising, that it should be called arising? And if one says that arising is the substance of arising, then since it arises from something else, it should not be called that which produces. So too with the remaining formations dissociated from mind, as should be understood in accordance with reason.
This is the philosophical core of the section, and the dilemma is tight. Take "arising" to be a real item, and ask what it is. If it is what makes things arise, then it needs something to make arise, and that something is just the thing arising — so the alleged extra item has no work left to do and no fruit of its own. If instead it is the arising itself, the state of a thing coming to be, then it is something that has arisen from causes, and a thing that is itself produced cannot be the producer. Either the item is idle or it is a product; on neither branch is it a real constituent of the world alongside the thing that arises.
The dilemma is directed at the Sarvāstivāda position that the conditioned marks — arising, abiding, alteration, ceasing — are real entities that attach to each conditioned thing and do the work of making it arise, abide, and perish. Vasubandhu presses a related argument in the Abhidharmakośa; here his brother makes it in four lines and moves on. The Yogācāra alternative is that these are ways of describing a continuum, not additional furniture in it — which is exactly what the six speech tests were designed to establish before the argument was given.
11. The Six Causes Refuted
復次彼心等乃至心不相應行、諸有為法是因性故。此因決擇今當說。頌曰：
三過因非五， 因相略繫合，
相依處差別， 建立有多種。
論曰：有一異計立六種因，謂同類因，遍行因，俱有因，相應因，異熟因。能作因。如是六種，除異熟因，餘五因性不應道理，由有三種過失故。何等為三？且如同類因有三過失。若言同類之因，名同類因，有已成過。何以故？若善等法善等體性先已成就，彼何用因？若言同類即因，名同類因，是即無果，有不定過。何以故？不示其果，是誰因耶？又非決定因體同類，不相似法亦為因故。若言非同類即因亦非同類之因，是即言名有虛設過，同類因言無有所主浪施設故。如是於餘四因三種過失，亦應如理廣說。
Further, mind and the rest, on down to the formations dissociated from mind — all conditioned things — are of the nature of cause. The determination regarding cause shall now be stated.
Three faults; the causes are not five;
the mark of cause, in brief, is binding and concurrence;
by mark, by basis, and by difference,
the establishing is of many kinds.
The exposition: there are those of a different reckoning who set up six causes — the homogeneous cause, the pervading cause, the co-existent cause, the associated cause, the ripening cause, and the efficient cause. Of these six, excepting the ripening cause, the remaining five do not stand to reason as causes, by reason of three faults. What three? Take the homogeneous cause: it has three faults. If one says that the cause of the homogeneous is called the homogeneous cause, there is the fault of what is already accomplished. Why? If wholesome things and the rest already have the nature of the wholesome and the rest, what use have they for a cause? If one says that the homogeneous is the cause, and this is called the homogeneous cause, then there is no fruit, and there is the fault of indeterminacy. Why? If it does not indicate its fruit, whose cause is it? And moreover the substance of a cause is not determinately homogeneous, since dissimilar things also serve as causes. And if one says that it is neither the homogeneous as cause nor the cause of the homogeneous, then the name has the fault of being idly posited, since the term "homogeneous cause" would have no owner and be set up at random. And so with the remaining four causes, the three faults should likewise be expounded at length in accordance with reason.
The six causes are the Sarvāstivāda scheme of the Mahāvibhāṣā and the Abhidharmakośa, and this is a frontal attack on it. What makes the attack elegant is that the refutation is generated by the same grammatical machinery just used on the formations dissociated from mind. Each compound is read three ways — as a genitive, as an identity, and as neither — and shown to fail on all three. The cause of the homogeneous is idle, because if the thing is already of that kind it needs no cause to make it so. The homogeneous as cause names no fruit, so it identifies nothing. And neither reading leaves the term 無有所主, without an owner, set up at random.
Note which cause survives. 異熟因, the ripening cause, is exempted and not attacked. That is not an oversight: karmic ripening is the one causal relation the Yogācāra system needs to keep, since the whole account of the ālayavijñāna is built on it. The other five are all attempts to say how a moment produces the next moment in the same series, and the treatise's own answer to that question — seeds — is about to be given in a different vocabulary altogether.
12. Two Real Causes, and the Fourfold Question
復次已破不如理因，今當建立如理因相。若略說有二種因：一繫縛相因、二和合相因。繫縛相因者，謂煩惱隨眠，此依能生後有而說。和合相因者，謂因緣和合彼彼法生，此依能生現在時說。
又應知此略所說因相及依處差別建立，復有多種。
相者，謂若由此為先，此為建立，此和合故，彼彼諸法或生或得、或成立或成辦、或起作用，當知說此即是彼因。
問：以誰為先、誰為建立、誰和合故、何法生耶？答：自種子為先，除所依種外所餘若色非色所依及業以為建立，伴及所緣境為和合故，如其所應欲繫、色繫、無色繫及不繫諸法生。問：以誰為先、誰為建立、誰和合故、得何法耶？答：聲聞、獨覺及與如來種性為先，內因力為建立，外因力為和合故，證得煩惱離繫涅槃。此中內因力者，謂如理作意、少欲知足等內分善法。又得人身生在聖處，諸根無缺無諸業障，於如來所具淨信心，如是等法是名內因力。外因力者，謂諸佛出世宣說妙法，住正法者共為伴侶，具悲信者以為施主，如是等法名外因力。
問：以誰為先、誰為建立、誰和合故、何法成立？答：於所知法勝解欲樂為先，宗因譬喻以為建立，不相違眾及對論者為和合故，所欲立義方得成立。
問：以誰為先、誰為建立、誰和合故、何法成辦？答：工巧智為先，隨彼勤勞為建立，工巧業處眾具為和合故，彼彼工巧業處成辦。又愛為先，由食住者依止為建立，四食為和合故，已生有情存養得住。
問：以誰為先、誰為建立、誰和合故、何法作用？答：自種為先，即彼前生為建立，彼生緣為和合故，自作業者自所作用而得成辦。
自所作業者，如眼之見業。如是所餘諸根，當知各別作業。又如地能持、水能爛、火能燒、風能燥，如是等類是名外法各別作業。
Further, having refuted causes that do not accord with reason, the marks of cause that do accord with reason shall now be established. In brief there are two causes: the cause marked by binding, and the cause marked by concurrence. The cause marked by binding is the latent tendencies of the afflictions, and this is stated with reference to what can produce a future existence. The cause marked by concurrence is the coming together of causes and conditions from which this and that thing arises, and this is stated with reference to what can produce in the present.
And it should be known that this briefly stated mark of cause, and its establishing by way of differences among the bases, are again of many kinds.
As to mark: wherever, this having gone before, this being what establishes, and this having come together, these and those things either arise, or are obtained, or are proven, or are brought about, or exercise a function — know that this is called their cause.
Question: with what going before, what establishing, and what coming together, do things arise? Answer: with their own seed going before; with whatever else besides the seed serves as support, material or immaterial, together with karma, as what establishes; and with companions and the object taken as what comes together — thus, as is fitting, things bound to the desire realm, to the form realm, to the formless realm, and things unbound, arise. Question: with what going before, what establishing, and what coming together, is anything obtained? Answer: with the lineage of the śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, or Tathāgatas going before; with the power of inner causes as what establishes; and with the power of outer causes as what comes together — thus one realizes the nirvāṇa that is separation from the bonds of affliction. Here the power of inner causes means attention in accordance with reason, having few wishes and being content, and other inward wholesome things. And obtaining a human body, being born in a noble place, having faculties unimpaired and no karmic obstructions, and possessing a mind of pure faith toward the Tathāgata — such things are called the power of inner causes. The power of outer causes means buddhas appearing in the world and declaring the excellent Dharma, having those who abide in the true Dharma as companions, and having those endowed with compassion and faith as donors — such things are called the power of outer causes.
Question: with what going before, what establishing, and what coming together, is anything proven? Answer: with confident understanding and desire regarding what is to be known going before; with thesis, reason, and example as what establishes; and with an audience that is not hostile and an opponent in debate as what comes together — thus the position one wishes to establish is proven.
Question: with what going before, what establishing, and what coming together, is anything brought about? Answer: with the knowledge of a craft going before; with the diligent labor that follows it as what establishes; and with the tools of the craft as what comes together — thus this and that work of craft is brought about. Again, with craving going before; with the support of one who lives by food as what establishes; and with the four foods as what comes together — thus beings already born are nourished and sustained.
Question: with what going before, what establishing, and what coming together, does anything exercise a function? Answer: with its own seed going before; with its own prior arising as what establishes; and with the conditions of that arising as what comes together — thus one who performs his own work brings about the function that is his own. As to performing one's own work: it is like the seeing that is the work of the eye. So too with the remaining faculties, each of which should be known to have its own work. And as earth can hold, water can rot, fire can burn, and wind can dry — such things are called the several works of outer things.
The replacement account is built on a single template applied five times: what goes before, what establishes, what comes together. It is a good template because it separates three things the six-cause scheme ran together — the antecedent that determines what kind of thing this will be, the standing conditions that make it possible, and the circumstances that have to converge at the moment. Applied to arising, the seed goes before, the body and karma establish, companions and objects converge.
Applied to obtaining nirvāṇa, the same template produces a passage of unusual candor. What goes before is one's lineage. What establishes is inner: right attention, few wishes, contentment — and then, without any change of register, a human body, birth in a place where the teaching exists, unimpaired faculties, no karmic obstructions, and faith. What converges is outer: a buddha having appeared and taught, companions who practice, and donors who feed you. Liberation is here given a list of enabling conditions that includes health, geography, and other people's generosity. The treatise does not treat these as incidental to the spiritual work; they are in the causal account.
The third application, to what is proven, is the treatise doing epistemology in one sentence. A thesis is established by 宗因譬喻 — thesis, reason, and example, the three members of the Indian syllogism as the Yogācāra school standardized them, which fascicle 11 set out at length. But note the third term: what has to come together is 不相違眾及對論者, an audience that is not hostile and an opponent to argue with. Proof is treated as a social event with material preconditions, exactly like farming or cooking. Without someone to disagree and someone willing to listen, nothing gets proven — the syllogism alone is not sufficient.
13. Fifteen Bases, Ten Causes, Four Conditions, Five Fruits
依處者，有十五種因緣所依處：一語、二領受、三習氣、四有潤種子、五無間滅、六境界、七根、八作用、九士夫用、十真實見、十一隨順、十二差別功能、十三和合、十四障礙、十五不障礙。差別者，謂十因、四緣、五果。十因者，謂隨說因、觀待因、牽引因、生起因、攝受因、引發因、定別因、同事因、相違因、不相違因。
四緣者，謂因緣、等無間緣、所緣緣、增上緣。五果者，謂異熟果、等流果、離繫果、士用果、增上果。
此中隨一切法，名為先故想，想為先故說，是謂彼諸法隨說因。若觀待此故、若因此故，於彼諸事若求若取，是謂觀待因。如觀待手故、手為因故，起執取業。觀待足故、足為因故、起往來業。觀待節故、節為因故，起屈伸業。觀待飢渴故、飢渴為因故，追求飲食。隨如是等無量道理，當知皆名觀待因。若種子於最後自果是牽引因。即此種子是自果生起因。除種子外所餘緣是攝受因。即此種子所生起果，是後種所牽引果引發因。能作種種異類各別之因，是名定別因。若觀待因、若牽引因、若生起因、若攝受因、若引發因、若定別因，總攝如是等因名同事因。若於所生能為障礙，是名相違因。若離障礙，是名不相違因。
As to bases: there are fifteen bases on which causes and conditions rest — speech; undergoing; habitual tendencies; the moistened seed; immediate cessation; the object; the faculty; function; human effort; true seeing; conformity; differentiated capacity; concurrence; obstruction; and non-obstruction. As to differences: there are ten causes, four conditions, and five fruits. The ten causes are the cause of what is spoken, the cause of what is regarded, the drawing-in cause, the producing cause, the appropriating cause, the eliciting cause, the determining cause, the cooperating cause, the contrary cause, and the non-contrary cause.
The four conditions are the causal condition, the immediately antecedent condition, the objective condition, and the dominant condition. The five fruits are the ripened fruit, the outflowing fruit, the fruit of separation from bonds, the fruit of human effort, and the dominant fruit.
Among these: because for all things the name goes first there is the notion, and because the notion goes first there is speaking — this is called the cause of what is spoken with respect to those things. If, by regarding this and because of this, one seeks or takes up those matters — this is called the cause of what is regarded. Thus, by regarding the hand and with the hand as cause, the work of grasping arises; by regarding the foot and with the foot as cause, the work of coming and going arises; by regarding the joints and with the joints as cause, the work of bending and stretching arises; by regarding hunger and thirst and with hunger and thirst as cause, one pursues food and drink. In measureless such ways, know that all these are called the cause of what is regarded. A seed with respect to its own final fruit is the drawing-in cause. That same seed is the producing cause of its own fruit. Whatever conditions there are besides the seed are the appropriating cause. The fruit produced by that seed is the eliciting cause of the fruit drawn in by a later seed. What can serve as the cause of various different kinds severally is called the determining cause. The cause of what is regarded, the drawing-in cause, the producing cause, the appropriating cause, the eliciting cause, and the determining cause — all such causes taken together are called the cooperating cause. What can serve as an obstruction to what is being produced is called the contrary cause. What is free of obstruction is called the non-contrary cause.
The ten causes, four conditions, and five fruits are also given in the Treatise on the Stages of Yogic Practice, fascicle 5 and again in its fascicle 38, and English renderings on this site have not been uniform. The set used here follows each term's own gloss in this passage: 隨說因 the cause of what is spoken, since the gloss is about name giving rise to notion and notion to speech; 觀待因 the cause of what is regarded, since the gloss is about acting in view of something; and so on through 定別因 the determining cause and 同事因 the cooperating cause, which is explicitly defined as the previous six taken together.
The gloss on the second cause is the most human paragraph in the fascicle and it deserves to be read as written. One grasps by regarding the hand; one comes and goes by regarding the foot; one bends and stretches by regarding the joints; one seeks food by regarding hunger. The category being illustrated is teleological causation — action undertaken in view of something — and Asaṅga illustrates it entirely with the body. Hunger is a cause of eating in exactly the sense that a hand is a cause of grasping. There is no separate faculty of purpose in the account; there is a body with parts and needs, and things done in view of them.
14. The Four Conditions and the Five Fruits Explained
諸法種子是因緣、等無間緣者，若從此識等無間，諸識等決定生，此是彼等無間緣。若諸心心所有法所緣境，是所緣緣。增上緣者，除種子外餘所依，如眼及諸共有法於眼識等，如是所餘諸根等於餘識等。又善不善法攝受愛不愛果，如是等類是增上緣。諸不善法所招惡趣報，有漏善法所招善趣報，是名異熟果。若由習不善故，樂住不善，不善增多；修習善故，樂住於善，善法增多。又與前業相似後果隨轉，是名等流果。若由聖八支道諸煩惱滅，是離繫果。若諸異生由世間道諸煩惱滅，非究竟轉故，非離繫果。若諸世間於現法中隨依一種工巧業處起士夫用，謂營農商賈、事王、書算計數造印等。由依此故苗稼成滿，獲商利等果法成就，是名士用果。眼識是眼根增上果，如是乃至意識是意根增上果。又諸眾生身不散壞，是命根增上果。又二十二根一切各別增上力故彼果得生，應知彼果皆名增上果。
The seeds of things are the causal condition. As to the immediately antecedent condition: if, immediately after this consciousness, those consciousnesses and the rest definitely arise, this is their immediately antecedent condition. Whatever is the object taken by mind and mental factors is the objective condition. As to the dominant condition: whatever supports there are besides the seed — as the eye and the things held in common with it are for eye consciousness, and so the remaining faculties and the rest for the remaining consciousnesses. And wholesome and unwholesome things take in welcome and unwelcome fruits; such things are the dominant condition. The recompense in bad destinies brought on by unwholesome things, and the recompense in good destinies brought on by contaminated wholesome things, are called the ripened fruit. If, because one habituates the unwholesome, one comes to dwell gladly in the unwholesome and the unwholesome increases; and because one cultivates the wholesome, one comes to dwell gladly in the wholesome and wholesome things increase — and where a later fruit follows on resembling the earlier karma, this is called the outflowing fruit. If the afflictions cease by way of the noble eightfold path, this is the fruit of separation from bonds. If in ordinary beings the afflictions cease by way of a worldly path, then since the turning is not final, it is not the fruit of separation from bonds. If people in the world, in this present life, exercise human effort in dependence on some one craft or occupation — farming, trade, serving a king, writing, reckoning, seal-making, and the like — and by this means the crops are brought to fullness and the profits of trade and other such fruits are accomplished, this is called the fruit of human effort. Eye consciousness is the dominant fruit of the eye faculty, and so on down to mind consciousness being the dominant fruit of the mind faculty. And a body of beings not falling apart is the dominant fruit of the life faculty. And because each of the twenty-two faculties has its own dominant force, their fruits are able to arise; know that all such fruits are called the dominant fruit.
The account of the outflowing fruit is the most practically useful thing in this section and its shape is worth marking. Do the unwholesome and you 樂住不善 — come to dwell gladly in it. The fruit of a habit is not only more of the same behavior but a taste for it. That is a stronger claim than the ordinary one about habituation, and it works both ways: the fruit of practice is that practice becomes what one likes. This is why the treatise can say elsewhere that pleasant and swift progress marks the higher grade of practitioner and not the lazier one.
The fruit of human effort is illustrated by a list of jobs — farming, trade, serving a king, writing, reckoning, seal-making — and it is the only one of the five fruits with no religious content at all. Its presence in the scheme means that the treatise's account of causation is meant to cover getting a harvest in as well as attaining nirvāṇa. Note too the careful exclusion just before it: afflictions suppressed by a worldly path do not yield the fruit of separation, 非究竟轉故, since the turning is not final. The absorptions can quiet an affliction without cutting it, and only the eightfold path produces this fruit.
15. Establishing the First Four Causes on Their Bases
問：建立云何？答？依語因依處建立隨說因。何以故？由於欲界繫法、色無色界繫法及不繫法建立，名為先故想轉，想為先故起語，由語故隨見隨聞隨覺隨知起諸言說，是故依語依處建立隨說因。
依領受因依處建立觀待因。何以故？諸有欲求欲界繫樂者，彼觀此故，於諸欲具或為求得、或求積集、或求受用。諸有欲求色無色繫樂者，彼觀此故，於彼諸緣或為求得、或求受用。諸有欲求不繫樂者，彼觀此故，於彼諸緣或為求得、或求受用。諸有不欲苦者，彼觀此故，於得彼緣於斷彼緣，或求遠離、或求受用。是故依領受依處建立觀待因。
依習氣因依處建立牽引因。何以故？由淨不淨業熏習三界諸行，於愛不愛趣中能感愛不愛自身。又即由此增上力故，諸外資具或成滿或損減。是故依諸行淨不淨業習氣依處建立牽引因。
依有潤種子因依處建立生起因。何以故？欲繫諸法及色無色繫諸法，各從自種而得生起。愛名能潤，種是所潤，由此所潤諸種子故，先所牽引各別自身今得生起。如經言：業為感生因，愛為生起因。是故依有潤種子依處建立生起因。
Question: how are they established? Answer: on the basis of speech is established the cause of what is spoken. Why? Because with respect to things bound to the desire realm, things bound to the realms of form and formlessness, and things unbound, an establishing is made: the name goes first and so the notion turns; the notion goes first and so speech arises; and by speech, according to what is seen, heard, sensed, and known, all utterances arise. Therefore on the basis of speech is established the cause of what is spoken.
On the basis of undergoing is established the cause of what is regarded. Why? Because those who desire the pleasures bound to the desire realm, regarding this, seek to obtain, to accumulate, or to enjoy the instruments of desire. Those who desire the pleasures bound to the realms of form and formlessness, regarding this, seek to obtain or to enjoy the conditions for them. Those who desire the pleasure that is unbound, regarding this, seek to obtain or to enjoy the conditions for it. And those who do not want suffering, regarding this, seek either to keep far from the conditions that bring it or to make use of the conditions that cut it off. Therefore on the basis of undergoing is established the cause of what is regarded.
On the basis of habitual tendencies is established the drawing-in cause. Why? Because pure and impure karma perfumes the formations of the three realms, and can bring about a welcome or unwelcome body of one's own in a welcome or unwelcome destiny. And by that same dominant force the outer requisites are made full or diminished. Therefore on the basis of the habitual tendencies of pure and impure karma in the formations is established the drawing-in cause.
On the basis of the moistened seed is established the producing cause. Why? Because things bound to the desire realm and things bound to the realms of form and formlessness each arise from their own seed. Craving is what moistens and the seed is what is moistened; and because of these moistened seeds, the several bodies drawn in earlier are now able to arise. As the scripture says: karma is the cause that brings about birth, and craving is the cause that produces it. Therefore on the basis of the moistened seed is established the producing cause.
The division of labor between the third and fourth causes is the most doctrinally important thing in this stretch, and the scriptural tag makes it explicit: 業為感生因，愛為生起因 — karma is the cause that brings about birth, craving is the cause that produces it. Karma plants and stores; it draws in a future body but cannot by itself make one arise. Craving moistens what karma planted. A seed lying dry is inert. This is why cutting craving ends rebirth without requiring that past karma be undone: the store is still full, and nothing waters it.
The image of moistening is worth keeping literal. 潤 is what rain does to a field, and the whole agricultural metaphor of the seed doctrine hangs together at this point — planting, storing, watering, sprouting. It also explains the placement of craving in the twelve links, where it comes between feeling and appropriation and immediately precedes existence. Feeling gives craving something to want; craving wets the seed; the seed comes up as a life.
16. Establishing the Remaining Six Causes
依無間滅因依處及境界、根、作用、士用，真實見因依處建立攝受因。何以故？由欲繫諸法無間滅攝受故、境界攝受故、根攝受故、作用攝受故、士用攝受故，彼諸行轉。如欲繫諸行，如是色無色繫諸行亦爾。真實見攝受故，餘不繫諸行轉。是故依無間滅境界根作用士用真實見依處建立攝受因。
依隨順因依處建立引發因。何以故？欲繫善法能引欲繫諸勝善法，如是欲繫善法能引色無色繫諸勝善法，隨順彼故。如欲繫善法，如是色繫善法能引色繫諸勝善法及無色繫若不繫諸勝善法。如色繫善法，如是無色繫善法能引無色繫諸勝善法及不繫善法。如無色繫善法，如是不繫善法能引不繫諸勝善法及能引無為作證之法。又不善法能引勝不善法，謂如欲貪能引瞋癡慢見疑身惡行語惡行意惡行。
如欲貪，如是瞋癡慢見疑，如其所應盡當知。如是無記之法能引善不善無記法，所謂能持善不善無記種子阿賴耶識。又無記法能引同類勝無記法，謂諸段食能引已生有情令住不壞，及能引彼適悅勢力令其增長，隨順彼故。是故依隨順因依處建立引發因。
依差別功能因依處建立定別因。何以故？由欲繫法自體功能有差別故，能生種種體差別法。如欲繫法，如是色繫法、無色繫法及不繫法亦爾。是故依差別功能依處建立定別因。
依和合因依處建立同事因。何以故？要由獲得自生和合故欲繫法生。如欲繫法，如是色繫法、無色繫法及不繫法亦爾。如生和合，如是得和合、成立和合、成辦和合、作用和合亦爾。是故依和合依處建立同事因。
依有障礙因依處建立相違因。何以故？若欲繫法將生時，若有障礙現前便不得起。如欲繫法，如是色無色繫法及不繫法亦爾。如為欲生，如是為欲得、為欲成立、為欲成辦、為欲作用亦爾。是故依障礙依處建立相違因。
依無障礙因依處建立不相違因。何以故？若欲繫法將生時，若無障礙現前便得生起。如欲繫法，如是色無色繫法及不繫法亦爾。如生，如是得、成立、成辦、作用亦爾。是故依無障礙依處建立不相違因。
復次依種子緣依處建立因緣，依無間滅緣依處建立等無間緣，依境界緣依處建立所緣緣，依所餘緣依處建立增上緣。
復次依習氣及隨順因依處緣依處建立異熟果及等流果、依真實見因依處緣依處建立離繫果、依士用因依處緣依處建立士用果、依所餘因依處緣依處建立增上果。
On the bases of immediate cessation, and of the object, the faculty, function, and human effort, and of true seeing, is established the appropriating cause. Why? Because things bound to the desire realm are appropriated by immediate cessation, by the object, by the faculty, by function, and by human effort, those formations evolve. As with the formations bound to the desire realm, so with those bound to the realms of form and formlessness. And because they are appropriated by true seeing, the remaining unbound formations evolve. Therefore on the bases of immediate cessation, object, faculty, function, human effort, and true seeing is established the appropriating cause.
On the basis of conformity is established the eliciting cause. Why? Because wholesome things bound to the desire realm can elicit more excellent wholesome things bound to the desire realm; and likewise wholesome things bound to the desire realm can elicit more excellent wholesome things bound to the realms of form and formlessness, since they conform to them. As with wholesome things bound to the desire realm, so wholesome things bound to the form realm can elicit more excellent wholesome things bound to the form realm, and more excellent wholesome things bound to the formless realm or unbound. As with wholesome things bound to the form realm, so wholesome things bound to the formless realm can elicit more excellent wholesome things bound to the formless realm and unbound wholesome things. As with wholesome things bound to the formless realm, so unbound wholesome things can elicit more excellent unbound wholesome things, and can elicit what realizes the unconditioned. And unwholesome things can elicit more excellent unwholesome things — as craving for the desirable can elicit hatred, delusion, conceit, wrong view, doubt, and bodily, verbal, and mental misconduct.
As with craving for the desirable, so with hatred, delusion, conceit, wrong view, and doubt, each as is fitting. And indeterminate things can elicit wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate things — namely the ālayavijñāna, which can hold wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate seeds. And indeterminate things can elicit more excellent indeterminate things of their own kind — as morsel food can bring beings already born to abide without falling apart, and can elicit the force of well-being in them and make it increase, since it conforms to them. Therefore on the basis of conformity is established the eliciting cause.
On the basis of differentiated capacity is established the determining cause. Why? Because the capacities in the substance of things bound to the desire realm differ, and so they can produce things of various different substances. As with things bound to the desire realm, so with things bound to the form realm, to the formless realm, and things unbound. Therefore on the basis of differentiated capacity is established the determining cause.
On the basis of concurrence is established the cooperating cause. Why? Because things bound to the desire realm arise only upon obtaining the concurrence for their own arising. As with things bound to the desire realm, so with things bound to the form realm, to the formless realm, and things unbound. As with the concurrence for arising, so with the concurrence for obtaining, for proving, for bringing about, and for exercising a function. Therefore on the basis of concurrence is established the cooperating cause.
On the basis of there being obstruction is established the contrary cause. Why? Because when a thing bound to the desire realm is about to arise, if an obstruction is present it cannot arise. As with things bound to the desire realm, so with things bound to the realms of form and formlessness and things unbound. As with what is about to arise, so with what is about to be obtained, proven, brought about, or to exercise a function. Therefore on the basis of obstruction is established the contrary cause.
On the basis of there being no obstruction is established the non-contrary cause. Why? Because when a thing bound to the desire realm is about to arise, if no obstruction is present it is able to arise. As with things bound to the desire realm, so with things bound to the realms of form and formlessness and things unbound. As with arising, so with obtaining, proving, bringing about, and exercising a function. Therefore on the basis of non-obstruction is established the non-contrary cause.
Further, on the basis of the seed as condition is established the causal condition; on the basis of immediate cessation as condition is established the immediately antecedent condition; on the basis of the object as condition is established the objective condition; and on the remaining bases as condition is established the dominant condition.
Further, on the bases of habitual tendencies and of conformity, as causes and as conditions, are established the ripened fruit and the outflowing fruit; on the basis of true seeing, as cause and as condition, is established the fruit of separation from bonds; on the basis of human effort, as cause and as condition, is established the fruit of human effort; and on the remaining bases, as causes and as conditions, is established the dominant fruit.
The eliciting cause is where the system shows its ambition, because 隨順, conformity, is made to run in every direction. Wholesome things elicit better wholesome things, upward through the realms and out of them altogether, and finally elicit what realizes the unconditioned. Then, in the same breath and by the same principle, unwholesome things elicit better unwholesome things — craving elicits hatred, conceit, doubt, and misconduct of body, speech, and mind. Vice has an escalation structure exactly parallel to virtue's. The word 勝, more excellent, is used of both, and the deadpan is not accidental.
The example given for indeterminate things eliciting their own kind is 段食, morsel food — ordinary eating, which keeps the body from falling apart and makes well-being increase. It sits in the same list as the wholesome roots that elicit nirvāṇa. This is characteristic of the fascicle: the causal scheme is not a spiritual scheme with worldly examples attached, it is a general theory of how anything brings anything about, and dinner and the unconditioned are both instances.
17. What Cause, Condition, and Fruit Mean; Seven Marks of Cause
復次順益義是因義、建立義是緣義、成辦義是果義。復次建立因有五種相、謂能生因、方便因、俱有因、無間滅因、久遠滅因。能生因者，謂生起因。方便因者，謂所餘因。俱有因者，謂攝受因一分，如眼於眼識，如是耳等於所餘識。無間滅因者，謂生起因。久遠滅因者，謂牽引因。又建立因有五種相，謂可愛因、不可愛因、增長因、流轉因、還滅因。又建立因有七種相，謂無常法是因相。
無有常法得名為因，謂若生因、若得因、若成立因、若成辦因、若作用因。又無常法為無常法因時，與他性為因非己性，亦與後自性為因，非即此剎那。又與他性為因及後自性為因時，必已生未滅，非未生已滅。又已生未滅為因時，必得餘緣，非不得。又得餘緣時，必成變異，非未成變異。又成變異時，必有功能相應，非功能退失。又功能相應時，必相稱隨順，非不相稱不隨順。如是七種因相，如其所應建立應知。
Further, the sense of conducing and benefiting is the sense of "cause"; the sense of establishing is the sense of "condition"; and the sense of bringing about is the sense of "fruit." Further, the establishing of cause has five marks: the producing cause, the cause as means, the co-existent cause, the cause that ceases immediately, and the cause that ceased long ago. The producing cause is the producing cause among the ten. The cause as means is the remaining causes. The co-existent cause is one portion of the appropriating cause — as the eye is for eye consciousness, and likewise the ear and the rest for the remaining consciousnesses. The cause that ceases immediately is the producing cause. The cause that ceased long ago is the drawing-in cause. Again, the establishing of cause has five marks: the cause of what is welcome, the cause of what is unwelcome, the cause of increase, the cause of flowing on, and the cause of the return to cessation. Again, the establishing of cause has seven marks: an impermanent thing is what has the mark of a cause.
No permanent thing can be called a cause — whether as a cause of arising, of obtaining, of proving, of bringing about, or of exercising a function. Again, when an impermanent thing is the cause of an impermanent thing, it is a cause for another's nature and not for its own, and it is a cause for its own later nature and not for this very moment. Again, when it is a cause for another's nature or for its own later nature, it must have arisen and not yet ceased, and not be unarisen or already ceased. Again, when what has arisen and not yet ceased is a cause, it must have obtained the other conditions, and not lack them. Again, when it has obtained the other conditions, it must have become altered, and not remain unaltered. Again, when it has become altered, it must be endowed with capacity, and not have lost its capacity. Again, when it is endowed with capacity, it must be fitting and conformable, and not unfitting and unconformable. These seven marks of cause should be known as established, each as is fitting.
The seven marks are a chain of necessary conditions, and read forward they answer the question of when a cause actually causes. It must be impermanent. It must be causing something other than itself, or itself at a later moment. It must exist right now — arisen and not yet ceased. It must have its co-conditions. It must have altered. It must still have its capacity. And it must be suited to what it is producing. Each clause is stated in the same form, 必…非…, must be this and not that, so the whole is a sieve. A great many things that look like causes fail at one of the steps.
The first is the one with teeth: 無有常法得名為因, no permanent thing can be called a cause, of arising or obtaining or proving or bringing about or functioning. That single line disposes of the creator god, primordial nature, the permanent self, and the permanent atom in one move, and it is the compressed form of the long refutations in fascicle 14. It is also why the transformation of the basis had to be classed as an establishing cause and not a producing one in fascicle 17 — being permanent, it cannot produce anything, and the treatise is consistent about the price of that.
18. The Eight Unconditioned
復次無為決擇今當說。頌曰：
心所緣等故， 清淨所緣故，
四種離繫故， 建立八無為。
論曰：八種無為，如攝事品已說。虛空無為者，由心所緣境相相似故立為常，非緣彼心緣彼境界有時變異故。由清淨所緣故建立真如，由此真如如清淨時，所緣體相常如是住故。由四種離繫故，建立餘四無為，謂非擇滅等四種。離繫者，謂緣差脫畢竟離繫、簡擇煩惱究竟離繫、苦樂暫時離繫、心心法暫時離繫。
Further, the determination regarding the unconditioned shall now be stated.
Because the mind's object is uniform,
because it is the object of purity,
because of four kinds of separation from bonds —
the eight unconditioned are established.
The exposition: the eight unconditioned have been stated in the chapter on Gathering the Topics. As for unconditioned space: because the mark of the object that mind takes is uniform, it is set up as permanent — not because the mind that takes it, or the object it takes, ever undergoes alteration. Because it is the object of purity, suchness is established: since this suchness, when there is purity, abides always thus as the substance and mark of the object. Because of four kinds of separation from bonds, the remaining four unconditioned are established, namely cessation not through discrimination and the other three. The four separations are: final separation from bonds through the failure of conditions; final separation from bonds through discriminating the afflictions; temporary separation from bonds from pleasure and pain; and temporary separation from bonds from mind and mental factors.
The treatment of space is a small masterpiece of deflation. Why is space unconditioned and permanent? Because the mark of it that the mind takes is always the same. That is the whole reason. Asaṅga then adds the correction that keeps the answer from being more than it is: 非緣彼心緣彼境界有時變異故 — not that the mind taking it or the object taken ever undergoes alteration. Space is permanent in the sense that nothing about how we encounter it ever changes, which is a claim about the uniformity of an appearance, not about an eternal container the world sits in.
The four separations map onto the last four of the eight unconditioned and the pairing of "final" with "temporary" is the useful part. Two are permanent achievements — conditions failing so that something can never arise, and the discriminating knowledge that cuts an affliction for good. Two are temporary: the fourth absorption's freedom from pleasure and pain, and the attainment of cessation's freedom from mind altogether. That the last two are called unconditioned while being explicitly 暫時, temporary, is a wrinkle worth noticing; what is unconditioned is the absence itself, not the practitioner's tenure in it.
19. Twelve Differences among the Three Realms
如是已說一切決擇，界事決擇今當說。頌曰：
三界應當知， 十二相差別，
所治及能治， 唯能損伏種。
論曰：當知欲色無色三界，有十二種相差別。一多種差別，此復六種應知，謂多種所依、多種相貌、多種處所、多種境界、多種煩惱、多種作業。二趣差別。三苦樂不苦不樂俱行差別。四有難無難差別，謂欲界或有難或無難，上二界唯有難少功能故。五不清淨處不清淨身等差別，謂或有處不清淨身清淨，謂欲界無難處生。或有處清淨非身清淨，謂色無色界異生。或有處不清淨身不清淨，謂欲界有難處生。或有處清淨身清淨，謂色無色界已見諦者。六受用差別，謂欲界受用外門境界及受用四食，上二界受用內門境界及受用三食。七善根勝劣差別。八雜惡行不雜惡行善根差別。九麁重厚薄差別。十生差別。十一得自體差別，謂於欲界具四種得自體，上二界唯有一種，由彼界無故、自害亦無他害故。十二言說差別，謂欲界中具四種言說，色界無覺無推度故，無色界中一切無有。又此三界能治所治差別應知，謂欲界是所治，色界是能治；色界是所治，無色界是能治。又下地是所治，上地是能治。如是對治，唯損伏種令其微劣，非是永害，以更生故。
Thus all the foregoing determinations have been stated; the determination regarding the matter of the realms shall now be stated.
The three realms are to be known
by twelve marks of difference;
what is counteracted and what counteracts —
it can only weaken and subdue the seed.
The exposition: know that the three realms of desire, form, and formlessness have twelve marks of difference. First, difference in manifoldness, which should be known as again of six kinds: manifold supports, manifold appearances, manifold places, manifold objects, manifold afflictions, and manifold works. Second, difference of destiny. Third, difference in occurring together with pain, pleasure, or neither. Fourth, difference of hardship and no hardship: the desire realm has both hardship and none, while the upper two realms have only hardship, since their capacity is slight. Fifth, difference of impure place and impure body and the rest: some are in a place that is impure while the body is pure, namely those born in the places without hardship in the desire realm; some are in a place that is pure while the body is not pure, namely ordinary beings in the realms of form and formlessness; some are in a place that is impure and the body impure, namely those born in the places with hardship in the desire realm; and some are in a place that is pure and the body pure, namely those in the realms of form and formlessness who have seen the truths. Sixth, difference of enjoyment: the desire realm enjoys objects by the outer gate and enjoys the four foods, while the upper two realms enjoy objects by the inner gate and enjoy three foods. Seventh, difference in the superiority or inferiority of wholesome roots. Eighth, difference in wholesome roots mixed or unmixed with evil conduct. Ninth, difference in the thickness or thinness of coarse heaviness. Tenth, difference of birth. Eleventh, difference in obtaining a body of one's own: in the desire realm there are four ways of obtaining a body of one's own, while in the upper two realms there is only one, since those realms lack it and there is neither harm to oneself nor harm from others. Twelfth, difference of speech: in the desire realm there are four kinds of speech; in the form realm, since there is no coarse discursive thought and no examining, there are fewer; and in the formless realm there is none at all. Further, the difference of what counteracts and what is counteracted among these three realms should be known: the desire realm is what is counteracted and the form realm what counteracts; the form realm is what is counteracted and the formless realm what counteracts. And a lower level is what is counteracted and a higher level what counteracts. Such counteracting only weakens and subdues the seed and makes it feeble; it does not permanently destroy it, since it arises again.
The fourth and fifth differences together produce the treatise's least flattering assessment of the heavens, and it is worth spelling out because it is easy to read past. The upper realms have only hardship, 少功能故, because their capacity is slight — nothing pushes there, so nothing gets done. And the fifth difference gives four combinations of pure and impure place with pure and impure body, in which an ordinary being in the form realm has a pure place and an impure body, while a human being in a comfortable part of the desire realm has an impure place and a pure body. Being in a better neighborhood does not make one a better person, and the treatise arranges the categories so that this is visible at a glance.
The last sentence of the section is the point of the whole classification and it undoes any temptation to treat the ladder of realms as a path. The higher level counteracts the lower — that much is granted — but 唯損伏種令其微劣，非是永害，以更生故: it only weakens the seed and makes it feeble, it does not destroy it, since it comes up again. Climbing to the formless realm suppresses the desire realm's afflictions without cutting one of them. This is exactly why fascicle 16 restricted direct realization to the desire realm and to the absorptions rather than the formless attainments, and why the section on fruits above denied the fruit of separation to anything achieved by a worldly path.
20. Four Questions: The Dharma King, the Salt Sea, Long Lives, One World
復次頌曰：
法王、海醎味、 欲惡趣長壽、
多世界共一， 各二種因緣。
論曰：何因緣故焰魔鬼王說名法王？謂由攝益彼眾生故。由二種因能為攝益：一令彼憶念前生所作，令自訶厭先世惡業故；二令於地獄卒所不造餘惡業故，從彼地獄速得出離。何因緣故諸大海水皆悉醎味？謂由二因故：一水生眾生福力增上故，令餘眾生不能趣入；二陸生眾生非福增上故，令彼不得入取珍寶。何因緣故，於地獄、畜生趣一分眾生壽量長遠，非於欲界所攝善趣？謂惡趣長壽由二因故，一欲界善法思擇勵力方能起故、二諸不善法不由思擇任運起故。何因緣故，此三千大千世界中有多世界乃至色究竟天，而同說為一世界但至梵世？謂亦由二因故，一同成壞故、二建立眾會故。
Furthermore:
The Dharma king; the salt taste of the sea;
long lives in the bad destinies of the desire realm;
many worlds spoken of as one —
each for two reasons.
The exposition: for what reason is Yama, king of the ghosts, called a Dharma king? Because he gathers in and benefits those beings. He benefits them for two reasons: because he makes them recollect what they did in a former life, so that they reproach and grow weary of their own past evil karma; and because he keeps them from making further evil karma toward the wardens of hell, so that they may swiftly be released from that hell. For what reason are the waters of the great oceans all of a salt taste? For two reasons: because the merit of the beings born in the water is dominant, so that other beings cannot enter there; and because the demerit of beings born on land is dominant, so that they cannot enter and take its treasures. For what reason do some beings in the destinies of hell and of animals have a long life span, and not those in the good destinies comprised within the desire realm? Long life in the bad destinies is for two reasons: because wholesome things in the desire realm can arise only by deliberate and strenuous effort, and because unwholesome things arise spontaneously without deliberation. For what reason is it that within this great trichiliocosm there are many worlds, up to the Highest Form heaven, and yet they are spoken of together as one world reaching only to the Brahmā heaven? For two reasons: because they are formed and destroyed together, and because they are established as a single assembly.
The third question is the only one with real doctrinal weight, and its answer is bleak and convincing. Why do beings in hell and among animals live so long, when human lives are short? Because 欲界善法思擇勵力方能起故、諸不善法不由思擇任運起故 — wholesome things in the desire realm arise only by deliberation and strenuous effort, while unwholesome things arise 任運, spontaneously, of themselves. Good karma is expensive to make and therefore scarce, so the good results run out quickly. Bad karma is cheap and abundant, so its results last. The asymmetry in the duration of destinies is derived from an asymmetry in how easy the two kinds of action are, which is an observation anyone can check against a single day.
The first answer is worth noting for its charity. Yama is called a Dharma king because he 攝益, gathers in and benefits, those in hell — by making them remember what they did, so that weariness with their own past arises, and by preventing them from generating fresh evil karma against their tormentors, which would extend the sentence. On this account the judge of the dead is performing a pastoral function, and the second reason in particular reads as an observation about anger: the danger of being punished is that one will respond to it in a way that earns more punishment.
Fascicle 18 Complete
The determinations run through mind, the mental factors, form, the formations dissociated from mind, cause, the unconditioned, and the realms. The most original stretch is the six kinds of speech, a test for whether a thing is a construction conducted entirely on the grammar of how we talk about it — genitives that must borrow an owner, terms that carry over here and stop there, words that lapse when a jar is broken or a lump of gold is worked. The longest is the account of causation, which dismantles the six causes of the older Abhidharma and replaces them with ten causes, four conditions, five fruits, and fifteen bases, held together by the rule that no permanent thing can be a cause of anything. Fascicle 19 continues the determinations.
Continue to Fascicle 19 — Gathering the Superior Determinations, Part Three →